kevin perelman target

“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer.”

That was attorney Jonathan Scott Franklin’s reported response when Kevin Perelman attempted to explain that LAPD officers had fabricated or distorted the allegations underlying his 2013 criminal case.

California Bar: 176617

Franklin was not retained to protect police officers from criticism. He was retained to investigate the evidence, test witness credibility, challenge false allegations, expose police misconduct, and protect his client’s constitutional rights.

Instead, the defense abandoned the central issues: whether Officer Jensen, Senior Lead Officer Charles “Sean” Dinse, restaurant personnel, and Alexandra Derse supplied false, exaggerated, or coordinated accounts; whether the incident resulted from continuing provocations and threats; and whether five criminal counts were manufactured from Perelman peacefully sitting on a public sidewalk with a small protest sign.

The case did not arise from violence, an encampment, obstruction of a crowded sidewalk, or a trespass observed by police. It arose after prolonged provocations and cryptic warnings at a restaurant and most public businesses or places her goes to based on mass defamation of character, disinformation, and using the Internet to globally and federally coordinate these methods to try to make him look unstable or like he suffers from mental illness, followed by Perelman’s peaceful public protest and request for Jensen’s badge number.

All five counts were ultimately dismissed. Before that happened, however, Perelman was placed into an inadequately disclosed plea and LAPD CAMP arrangement without informed awareness of CAMP’s identity, scope, information-gathering practices, duration, or possible future consequences. That arrangement may have generated police and mental-health records capable of being carried into later cases and used to reinforce false narratives intended to justify doing whatever was necessary to discredit, institutionalize, incarcerate, or otherwise remove him from society—continuing a pattern he reports experiencing since childhood, based on shifting labels and unsupported rationalizations that changed whenever earlier explanations failed.

Not an Isolated Restaurant Dispute

The 2013 incident was not an isolated disagreement with one restaurant.

Perelman had already observed what he describes as an extremely large network of businesses, community participants, neighborhood groups, security personnel, police-connected circles, and psychology-connected individuals exchanging information and disinformation about him with the Perelman Family and finding out around 2001 with his friend and business partner Michael Patrick Huntley, and Paul Humphrey who worked at LAPD in 1998. Such death threats from Mike Huntley were

“I have given you enough rope to hang yourself with”

“World of paranoia”

“Havea good life now”

“You had better live a careful life”

“You are too out of control for California”

Many other threats

Internet communications allowed accusations, photographs, personal information, psychiatric labels, and suggested methods of confrontation to move from one location to another. This allegedly produced recurring incidents at unrelated restaurants, coffee shops, stores, automobile events, neighborhoods, and other public locations.

Perelman would enter a business, order normally, pay, and attempt to relax. The provocations would then begin: passive-aggressive service, incorrect orders or charges, cryptic remarks, conspicuous gestures, indirect threats, staged disputes, or conduct apparently intended to obtain a reaction. These tactics that have been exponentially growing since a young age with LAPD and Community Stalking operations to remove those they simply don’t like out of HATE from society.

When one group stalking method failed, other locations allegedly introduced newer tactics. That changing pattern is important. It shows that similar conduct recurred across businesses that appeared unrelated in person but could be connected through internet communications, neighborhood-watch networks, police contacts, private social-media groups, or circulated misinformation.

The available 2013 docket does not independently prove the entire network. Establishing its participants would require social-media records, police intelligence files, emails, messages, witness testimony, dispatch records, business communications, and discovery that Franklin never meaningfully pursued.

The My Brother’s Bar-B-Q with connected business of enormous circles incident must therefore be examined as one documented episode within a much broader alleged system of surveillance, provocation, labeling, reporting, and removal—not as a self-contained restaurant disagreement.

A Pattern Observed Since Childhood

The operations described here did not begin in 2013.

Perelman reports observing changing forms of monitoring, information-sharing, psychological labeling, community participation, manufactured confrontations, and efforts to provoke him since childhood. When one justification failed, another appeared with larger and larger groups befriending or taking part if they saw Kevin. When one accusation could not be sustained, a different accusation or mental-health label replaced it.

That persistence is central to the asserted motive. If the activity continues regardless of how peacefully, responsible, or stably a person behaves, it cannot reasonably be explained as an ordinary response to particular misconduct.

In Perelman’s account, compliance did not end the activity. Good behavior did not end it. Demonstrating stability did not end it. Instead, the pressure allegedly continued through changing methods intended to discredit him, isolate him, manufacture criminal incidents, obtain psychiatric labels, force institutionalization, secure incarceration with false arrests, forged and fraudulent Police reports to remove from society at all costs out of someone’s HATE for their child with LAPD indoctrinating mass conspiring terror and stalking networks, or fulfill recurring threats that he would ultimately be “dead or gone.” While people laugh and pretend it’s a game or joke.

The 2013 prosecution must therefore be examined as an escalation within that longer alleged pattern—not as the event that created it.

Racially Charged Provocations and the Artwork Narrative

The larger history also includes reported racial slurs, threats, and deliberate efforts to use race-related accusations to provoke Perelman and distort his reactions.

Perelman reports repeatedly hearing the threatening statement, “No relaxing for you, nigger from black individuals with parts of the surrounding harassment network. In context, The statement as both a racial insult to the Jewish Community and a warning that he would not be permitted to sit peacefully in restaurants, coffee shops, or other public places. This is to manufacture the appearance of Mental Illness with the Judicial System, Psychology Community, and Police out of hate or to cover up the crimes against him when they started at a young age.

The legal importance is not the race of an individual participant by itself. A person’s racial identity does not establish conspiracy, bias, or criminal motive. The relevant evidence would be the threatening language, conduct, communications, repetition across locations, relationships among participants, and whether those participants circulated a common narrative.

Perelman identifies Alexandra Derse as Black and considers that fact relevant because of the broader pattern of racially charged provocations and reversed racial accusations surrounding him. Her racial identity alone does not prove that she acted with racial animus. It does, however, make it necessary to investigate whether her disputed absurd and infinitesimal business-card allegation was independent or connected to the recurring racialized narrative, internet communications, or other participants who had used threats and slurs.

The same network allegedly focused repeatedly on Perelman’s artwork. One work involved a photo shoot with a Black model identified as Ariana, photographed on a chessboard as part of Perelman’s visual-effects and photographic work. Perelman states that Ariana initially contacted him about participating in the photo shoot and that she was also interacting with or assisting the larger groups monitoring him.

The importance of the episode is that images from the photo shoot allegedly became part of a continuously changing justification for public hostility: private artwork was extracted from its creative context, circulated among groups, and used to encourage additional scrutiny, provocation, or defamatory claims.

Perelman’s sidewalk message—“Smeared for Creating Art,” shown in the surviving photograph with the closely related wording “Smeared for Making Art”—was a response to that claimed misuse of his artwork. Also applying to Art Therapist, Anita Perelman, since he was very young with her neurotic over analyzing of intricate aspects of his life that normal people who aren’t hypersensitive don’t look at.

He was not protesting one isolated meal. He was protesting the alleged circulation of his artwork and personal information among large groups of unheard of proportions that repeatedly supplied new changing and evolving rationalizations for harassment and removal from society out of HATE. The sign communicated that he was being publicly smeared through distorted interpretations of his creative work. This changes from Artwork to almost every other aspect of his life.

The reported racial threats, the Derse allegation, the Ariana photo-shoot history, and the continuing focus on Perelman’s artwork should not be collapsed into an accusation against an entire racial community and mass mobs from city to city, state to state. They should be investigated as particular statements, acts, communications, and relationships among identifiable people. That evidence—not race alone—could establish whether racial hostility or the manipulation of racial narratives supplied motive.

What Happened at My Brother’s Bar-B-Q

Perelman entered My Brother’s Bar-B-Q as a paying customer. He ate, paid his bill, and left.

He was not told that he was prohibited from entering. He was not served with a written trespass notice. He was not ordered to leave and then found refusing to do so. Restaurant personnel accepted his order, served him, accepted his payment, and allowed the customer transaction to be completed.

During one encounter, an employee initiated an aggressive and cryptic conversation about how people should not post negative reviews of businesses on Yelp. Perelman had not mentioned Yelp or threatened to post a review.

The importance was not simply the word “Yelp.” The employee sparked an unnecessary dialogue about customers publicly criticizing businesses while Perelman was already experiencing nonstop instigations, harassment, provocations, and indirect threats.

The statement could be examined as an attempt to obtain a reaction, an indirect warning against reporting the restaurant’s treatment of him, or evidence that personnel were discussing reputational complaints and had a motive to silence criticism.

Despite being served and allowed to pay, Perelman was later accused of trespassing.

The Public-Sidewalk Protest

After the restaurant encounters, Perelman sat on a public sidewalk with a small sign stating:

“Smeared for Creating Art.”

The surviving photograph shows the closely related wording:

“Smeared for Making Art.”

The message was a quiet protest against the continuing harassment and claimed use of Perelman’s artwork to defame, provoke, or psychologically label him.

This was not a homeless encampment. There were no tents, bedding, carts, accumulated property, or blocked pedestrian route. It was one person with a small sign. The photograph does not show a crowd being obstructed or a dangerous condition.

The sidewalk and restaurant were different locations. A person peacefully sitting on a public sidewalk is not simultaneously remaining inside a restaurant after being ordered to leave.

That contradiction is central to the trespass counts. If Jensen and Dinse encountered Perelman outside on a public sidewalk, what evidence established that he was then trespassing on restaurant property? If the restaurant previously served him, accepted payment, and never told him not to return, what notice established a knowing refusal to leave?

Franklin should have investigated those questions before discussing any plea.

Officer Jensen and the Badge-Number Request

Jensen approached Perelman on the sidewalk with Charles Sean Dinse present.

Jensen focused on removing him rather than investigating the provocations, reported threats, or reason for the protest. Jensen stated that a person could sit on the sidewalk for only approximately five minutes and directed Perelman to leave.

Perelman was prepared to leave. Before doing so, he asked Jensen for his badge number.

Jensen reportedly responded in substance, “Sure, I’ll give you my badge number,” and then issued the misdemeanor citation that became the foundation for the criminal case.

The timing matters. The citation followed Perelman’s request to identify the officer and seek accountability. The encounter did not escalate because Perelman attacked an officer, established an encampment, obstructed a crowd, or refused repeated lawful commands. It escalated after he questioned Jensen’s indifference to the continuing instigations and requested his badge number.

That sequence shows the reoccurring retaliation Jensen issued and expanded the citation because Perelman questioned police conduct and requested identifying information?

Charles Sean Dinse and Internet-Based Neighborhood Operations

Dinse’s presence is particularly important because his later public history supplies context that Franklin should have investigated.

This incident is significant because the 2013 case marks the point at which Dinse first exposed the structure of the police-connected neighborhood operations that had followed Perelman in changing forms since childhood—using coordinated provocations, circulated disinformation, unsupported mental-health labels, and even a disputed, facially absurd, and infinitesimal business-card allegation inflated into a criminal battery charge to manufacture false narratives and justify removing him from society.

Dinse was later sued personally in federal court, together with the City of Los Angeles, in Rex Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles et al., U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, case No. 2:20-cv-01313. Schellenberg’s complaint asserted federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from alleged police harassment, dissemination of personal and purportedly false information through internet-based neighborhood groups, and resulting actions against him. The filing establishes that Dinse and the City were defendants in a federal civil-rights lawsuit; the complaint’s allegations should not be characterized as adjudicated findings unless supported by a specific subsequent court ruling.

The Schellenberg complaint alleged that Dinse participated in internet-based neighborhood groups through which residents and police exchanged photographs, locations, personal information, accusations, and statements concerning unhoused or otherwise targeted individuals.

The same groups that have been working on Kevin Perelman the majority of his life with LAPD.

Contemporary reporting stated that Dinse allegedly posted Schellenberg’s location and circulated sensitive or erroneous claims about his housing history, physical condition, mental health, and possible drug use. Schellenberg alleged that those disclosures encouraged residents to contact police, created pretexts for additional police action, contributed to continuing harassment, and culminated in the improper towing of his vehicle.

The lawsuit reportedly described Dinse’s participation in Facebook groups where information about selected individuals was distributed among police and community members. LAPD officials later acknowledged concerns about such groups, including violent comments advocating that unhoused people be poisoned or shot, and officers were reportedly instructed to stop participating in the pages.

Those allegations resemble the structure described throughout Perelman’s account:

• separate residents and businesses connect through internet communications;
• police officers participating in or monitoring neighborhood networks;
• photographs and personal information circulated without meaningful verification;
• unsupported mental-health, drug-use, dangerousness, or instability labels distributed as fact;
• community members encouraged to watch, photograph, report, confront, or help remove selected individuals;
• repeated police calls creating a manufactured appearance of continuing instability; and
• police contacts later cited as confirmation of the narrative that generated those contacts.

Perelman characterizes these operations as neighborhood terror groups because their alleged effect extended beyond legitimate observation or reporting. The claimed methods involved coordinated intimidation, public labeling, privacy invasions, repeated police contacts, and community pressure intended to remove selected people.

The Schellenberg complaint does not establish that every allegation against Dinse was adjudicated as true. It does establish that Perelman was not the only person to accuse Dinse of using police-connected internet groups to circulate personal information and unsupported mental-health or drug allegations while directing community attention and continuing police action toward a particular individual.

Around 1999, gym manager Rodie Morales befriended Kevin Perelman and took him to strip clubs throughout Los Angeles. Michael Patrick Huntley had encouraged Perelman to join the gym and allegedly manipulated him into enrolling through Morales. Perelman maintains that Morales, Paul Humphry, Huntley, and others were working together to gain his trust and engineer situations that could later be used to justify his arrest. This included an incident in which Morales allegedly offered Perelman a trash bag containing what was represented to be police-supplied marijuana and attempted to persuade him to bring it into his home while taking Kevin Perelman to strip clubs all across Los Angeles working defamation of character and disinformation operations all across the United States. Perelman identifies this as part of a planned operation intended to manufacture grounds for an unlawful arrest and character assassinations.

Perelman reports that similar strip-club outings and other various setup attempts, or frame jobs with a disinformation campaign and encounters occurred during his years at Southern Oregon State College in 1991 and the University of Colorado around 1993 – 1997. Individuals connected to these events allegedly included an Alaskan exchange student, Eric Christianson, members or associates of law enforcement in Oregon and San Diego, and Russian exchange student Val Morozov. Perelman identifies the repetition of these encounters across different schools, states, Businesses, Colleges, and social groups as evidence of a broader and continuing connected pattern to remove from society rather than unrelated social events with these illegal Police operations.

That documented comparison should have caused Franklin to investigate:

• Dinse’s participation in Facebook and neighborhood groups;
• communications with restaurant personnel and nearby residents;
• online posts concerning Perelman;
• private subgroup communications;
• photographs and personal information being distributed across enormous circles;
• racial, mental-health, or dangerousness labels;
• whether complaints were independently created or coordinated;
• whether police directed residents to generate repeated calls;
• whether businesses were encouraged to confront or exclude Perelman; and
• whether the five counts were connected to a broader police-and-community operation.

Franklin apparently investigated none of it.

The Five Counts

Los Angeles Superior Court case No. 3PY03498 contained five counts.

Count 1 — Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.18(d)

This was a sidewalk-related charge.

Perelman was sitting with a small protest sign on a quiet public sidewalk. The photograph does not show an encampment or blocked pedestrian route. The available record does not identify anyone prevented from passing.

The sign communicated a protest message. Using a sidewalk ordinance selectively to suppress that message or retaliate against Perelman for criticizing a business or police officer, especially within self-defense to try to dissolve huge, coordinated stalking groups would raise First Amendment concerns.

Count 1 was connected to the later no-contest plea and conditional resolution. It was dismissed on September 26, 2014, in furtherance of justice under Penal Code § 1385.

Count 2 — Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.18(a)

This was a second sidewalk-related count arising from the same basic encounter.

Rather than documenting distinct dangerous conduct, the two municipal counts multiplied one peaceful incident into separate criminal accusations.

Count 2 was dismissed on September 26, 2013, under Penal Code § 1385.

Count 3 — Penal Code § 602(k): Trespass

This count alleged refusal to leave property after being requested to leave.

That event did not occur as charged. Perelman was outside on the public sidewalk when Jensen and Dinse contacted him. During his earlier restaurant visit, he entered as a customer, ate, paid, and left. He was never told he was forbidden from entering.

A trespass conviction would have required evidence of proper notice, Perelman’s actual location, a request to leave, his knowledge of that request, and a willful refusal. Those facts were not established at trial because no trial occurred.

Count 3 was dismissed on September 26, 2013, under Penal Code § 1385.

More troubling is the recurring pattern Perelman reports across businesses throughout the United States: employees initially welcome him inside and allow him to make a purchase, but then allegedly begin a sustained sequence of instigations, provocations, and confrontational interactions intended to produce a reaction before contacting the police. Perelman identifies the repetition of this sequence across numerous unrelated locations from the majority of places he goes to, as evidence of a coordinated pattern and motive, rather than isolated customer disputes. He connects these practices to police-connected operations involving LAPD Officer Charles Sean Dinse and earlier individuals associated with law enforcement, including Paul Humphry beginning around 1998 and Michael Patrick Huntley, whom Perelman had known since approximately age fourteen. Perelman maintains that these recurring tactics have been used in changing forms since childhood to generate adverse reports, manufacture the appearance of instability or criminal conduct, and ultimately remove him from public life and society.

Count 4 — Penal Code § 242: Battery

This count reportedly arose from Black employee Alexandra Derse’s accusation that Perelman threw a business card or piece of paper at someone.

Perelman states that the event did not occur. Even apart from that factual dispute, the account transformed an alleged business card into an absurd assault narrative without meaningful evidence of injury, danger, force, or harmful contact.

A paper object can theoretically support a battery allegation if intentionally used to make harmful or offensive contact. The prosecution must still prove that the event happened, that contact was intentional, and that the complaining witness’s account was reliable.

No jury tested Derse’s allegation. Franklin should have obtained surveillance footage, interviewed witnesses, examined inconsistencies, and investigated Derse’s communications with restaurant employees, Jensen, Dinse, internet groups, and other participants.

Ariana, a black girl, initially contacted Perelman through MySpace.com and asked him to photograph her. Perelman agreed, and the resulting creative work included a staged photograph of Ariana in the photoshoot she wanted to do, who is Black, posed on a chessboard. Perelman reports that harassment, threats, and coordinated group activity directed at him intensified after the photo shoot, as well as her showing hostility towards Kevin afterwards on Myspace.com and that images from the session were subsequently circulated, reinterpreted, and used to construct hostile narratives about him. While adding them to the changing accusations and narratives to these mass groups since early childhood. Because Derse’s allegations arose within this broader context, including Kevin’s reported racial threats with conspiring businesses, reversed accusations of racism, and the manipulation of the context of Perelman’s artwork, the defense should have investigated whether communications concerning Ariana or the circulated photographs supplied a motive for false or exaggerated accusations. Derse’s race alone would not establish racial hostility or motive; that would need to be demonstrated through specific statements, communications, conduct, timing, and connections among the participants. Especially with nonstop 49 year rotating coordinated conspiring groups that has never stopped.

Count 4 was dismissed on September 26, 2013, under Penal Code § 1385.

Count 5 — Penal Code § 602(k): Second Trespass

The filing contained a second charge under the same trespass statute.

Two trespass counts required two legally and factually distinct violations. Each count required its own date, notice, request to leave, willful refusal, and supporting evidence. An officer could not convert an unsupported statement that someone appeared at a restaurant more than once into multiple criminal trespasses. Especially if they welcome the victim in, and fabricate lies with LAPD, which is a common nonstop pattern of behavior with LAPD, and these Public Businesses before Kevin Perelman even walks in the door for the first time. Showing that the anonymous employees know who Kevin Perelman before he enters almost any location, in which Charles Sean Dinse, and others at LAPD deny is happening and state is supposedly mental illness. Stating HATE INFORMATION across the Internet is not possible, while Charles Sean Dinse posts disinformation about Kevin Perelman on his facebook account and other Internet Blogs Forums.  The very crime Charles Sean Dinse was sued for.

Perelman ate, paid, and left. He was never told not to return. When contacted by police, he was outside on a public sidewalk.

Count 5 was dismissed on September 26, 2014, under Penal Code § 1385.

All Five Counts Were Dismissed

The court record shows:

• Count 1 — dismissed September 26, 2014;
• Count 2 — dismissed September 26, 2013;
• Count 3 — dismissed September 26, 2013;
• Count 4 — dismissed September 26, 2013; and
• Count 5 — dismissed September 26, 2014.

As of 2026, none of the five counts remains an active conviction.

That does not automatically erase every historical police report, plea entry, CAMP record, or database notation created during the case. Which seems to be the their real MOTIVE. It does mean that the final disposition of every count is dismissal.

Any later officer, prosecutor, probation official, attorney, judge, or evaluator relying on this matter must disclose that all five charges were dismissed.

Franklin’s Refusal to Challenge Police

Franklin’s reported statement—“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer”—was incompatible with the defense the case required.

The disputed issues concerned police and witness conduct:

• whether Jensen retaliated after the badge-number request;
• whether Jensen and Dinse accurately described the sidewalk;
• whether anyone was obstructed;
• whether Perelman was ever ordered to leave restaurant property;
• whether two distinct trespasses occurred;
• whether Derse’s business-card accusation was true;
• whether charges were expanded after Perelman protested;
• whether Dinse communicated with neighborhood or business groups;
• whether police circulated mental-health or dangerousness labels;
• whether racial narratives or artwork were being distributed;
• whether the citation suppressed protected expression; and
• whether five counts were used to manufacture an appearance of instability.

Franklin allegedly failed to:

• obtain complete police and investigative reports;
• demand dispatch and call records;
• obtain restaurant surveillance;
• interview material witnesses;
• investigate Derse’s motive and communications;
• inspect the locations of the sidewalk and restaurant;
• document the absence of an obstruction;
• investigate Jensen’s and Dinse’s histories;
• investigate Dinse’s community-group activity;
• identify the origin of the racial and mental-health narratives which actually link to 1980 and Kevin Perelman kissing a black girl at sunny skies day camp, and the Perelman families hostility over the harmless event using their psychology degrees with their police and judicial friends with Paul Humphrey as weapons to lash out in anger and rage over a normal situation of warmth.;
• challenge the multiplication of one event into five counts;
• explain CAMP adequately;
• preserve the complete plea terms; and
• ensure that the court accurately understood Perelman’s civil-rights concerns.

Instead, Franklin moved the case toward a plea while insulating the police narrative from meaningful scrutiny.

CAMP Was Not Properly Explained

The transcript indicates that the resolution involved CAMP—the LAPD Case Assessment and Management Program.

CAMP operates within LAPD’s Mental Evaluation Unit. LAPD materials describe it as a program pairing detectives with mental-health professionals to identify, monitor, engage, and manage people believed to have recurring contacts involving possible mental-health concerns.

CAMP may collect or use:

• police reports;
• Mental Evaluation Incident Reports;
• calls for service;
• officer observations;
• statements from family members;
• information from neighbors and community members;
• available hospital or treatment information;
• prior police contacts;
• investigative reports;
• referrals from officers or clinicians; and
• information from later encounters.

A later LAPD outline stated that CAMP “cases never close.” That description raises an important question: did the 2013 agreement create an open-ended police and mental-health intelligence file that continued after all five charges were dismissed?

The ordinary Tahl waiver did not clearly explain:

• what CAMP meant;
• what information could be collected;
• who could provide information;
• whether neighbors or businesses could be contacted;
• whether family members could be interviewed;
• whether records could be retained indefinitely;
• whether participation was voluntary;
• whether consent could be withdrawn;
• whether CAMP continued after dismissal;
• whether information could be disclosed to other agencies; or
• whether future police contacts would be added.

The transcript refers to a “second sheet,” but that sheet is missing from the available records.

If that sheet contained the CAMP terms, its absence is material. A person cannot knowingly accept an arrangement whose central conditions were not explained or provided to him.

Judge Shellie Samuels and the “Rest of Your Life” Exchange

The March 26, 2014 transcript contains this exchange:

THE COURT: Can you do it for 12 months?

THE DEFENDANT: [Nods.]

THE COURT: Can you then do it for the rest of your life?

THE DEFENDANT: Do I have civil rights to make that decision?

THE COURT: No, you don’t have civil rights to break the law.

THE DEFENDANT: For the year.

Perelman’s reference to civil rights was not an admission that he intended to commit crimes. It reflected concern that compliance could not require surrendering constitutional rights or silently accepting unlawful police activity.

Samuels immediately reframed that concern as though Perelman claimed a “civil right to break the law.” That was not what he said.

The phrase “for the rest of your life” is unexplained. It could have concerned obeying laws generally, continuing treatment, cooperating with CAMP, avoiding locations, or maintaining an undefined behavioral condition. Without the preceding discussion and missing second sheet, its meaning cannot safely be assumed.

If Samuels was referring to CAMP or continuing mental-health monitoring, a lifetime arrangement could not properly be imposed through an ambiguous exchange without explaining the monitoring, information collection, disclosure, and duration.

The fragment does not prove that Samuels ordered lifetime CAMP participation. It demonstrates why the complete transcript and missing paperwork are indispensable.

Promised LAPD Assistance That Disappeared

The arrangement was presented as though LAPD would work with Perelman regarding the conduct he had been reporting.

That assistance lasted approximately one telephone call—or, at most, a very small number of dismissive contacts. LAPD did not meaningfully investigate the businesses, neighborhood groups, racial threats, online communications, provocations, artwork-related defamation, or police-connected activity.

No safety plan emerged. No investigation was disclosed. No officer appears to have determined whether community participants were provoking encounters or supplying false reports.

The promised assistance operated as an inducement: accept the arrangement and LAPD will finally examine what is happening.

Once the plea was obtained, the cooperation disappeared.

If police assistance was material to Perelman’s decision, Franklin had a duty to make the promise written, specific, enforceable, and part of the official record.

The Risk of a Self-Reinforcing CAMP File

CAMP creates a particular danger when its original police narrative is disputed.

An officer or neighbor labels someone unstable. CAMP records the allegation. Later officers see a mental-health history and interpret ordinary frustration through that lens. Their observations are added to the file. Community members learn police consider the person a concern and submit additional reports. The growing number of contacts is then cited as proof that the original label was correct.

The allegation becomes the premise, the premise becomes the psychiatric label, and the label becomes the asserted justification for additional monitoring, disbelief, exclusion, treatment, medication, institutionalization, or punishment.

Every entry therefore requires examination:

• Who supplied the information?
• Was it firsthand?
• Was it corroborated?
• Did it originate with Dinse, Jensen, Derse, restaurant personnel, family members, or neighborhood groups?
• Were racial threats and provocations omitted while reactions were recorded?
• Was disputed information marked as disputed?
• Were dismissed charges still described as criminal conduct?
• Did CAMP retain information after dismissal?
• Was information distributed to later officers, prosecutors, probation officials, or evaluators?

Without the CAMP file, those questions remain unanswered.

Potential Professional Misconduct

Franklin’s actions require examination under duties of competence, loyalty, communication, investigation, and informed consent.

Potential issues include:

• failure to communicate material plea terms;
• failure to explain CAMP;
• failure to obtain informed consent;
• failure to preserve the complete agreement;
• failure to investigate exculpatory evidence;
• failure to challenge materially false police accounts;
• failure to impeach adverse witnesses;
• failure to investigate coordinated internet communications;
• failure to investigate racial threats and manipulated artwork;
• failure to identify conflicts of interest;
• failure to correct the court’s mischaracterization of Perelman’s statement;
• inducing a plea without enforceable police assistance; and
• placing institutional loyalty to police above the client’s defense.

Depending on the evidence, these matters could implicate California Business and Professions Code §§ 6068 and 6106, Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 1.7, ineffective-assistance principles, and the requirement that a plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under Boykin-Tahl.

Records Required for Reconstruction

A complete investigation requires:

1. Every 2013 and 2014 transcript.
2. The complete context of the “rest of your life” exchange.
3. The missing second sheet.
4. Every CAMP referral, assessment, case-management record, and status entry.
5. Mental Evaluation Incident Reports.
6. MEU investigative reports.
7. The prosecution’s complete file.
8. LAPD dispatch audio and calls for service.
9. Jensen’s and Dinse’s notes and reports.
10. Body-camera, dash-camera, or station recordings.
11. Restaurant surveillance.
12. Derse’s original statements.
13. Communications among Derse, restaurant personnel, Jensen, and Dinse.
14. Dinse’s neighborhood-group and Facebook communications.
15. Posts or messages concerning Perelman’s artwork.
16. Communications involving the Ariana photo shoot.
17. Records documenting the reported racial threats.
18. Police intelligence or officer-safety bulletins.
19. Documents showing whether CAMP continued after September 2014.
20. Franklin’s complete client file and investigative records.

Why the Dismissed Case Still Matters

The charges were dismissed, but the institutional narrative not only survived but is being used as a weapon to illegal defame all across the United States, and World to rile the masses against Kevin Perelman. As they have been doing since he was a young child. While telling Kevin Perelman, no one knows of him and he’s imagining it.

This reinforces Michael Patrick Huntley’s death threats in 2001 “World of Paranoia”.

Disseminating nonstop worldwide disinformation and defamation of character while refusal to acknowledge the situation by design to use information to Insite worldwide riots to make people look unstable to remove from society. As they create newer and newer narratives until the target, and victim is no more.

Police reports, CAMP entries, witness allegations, court comments, racialized narratives, and undisclosed mental-health labels can influence later officers, prosecutors, probation departments, judges, and experts even when the charges that created them no longer exist.

The danger is circular:

1. Community members provoke or report the selected person.
2. Police omit the provocations and document the reaction.
3. Police and Judicial Employees lie stating nothing is going on with refusal to investigate what they already know is going on.
4. CAMP retains the resulting allegation.
5. Later officers encounter the historical label.
6. New contacts are interpreted through that label.
7. Later prosecutors and judges cite the accumulated contacts.
8. The record becomes “proof” of the accusation that generated it.

The number of reports does not prove their truth when they may share a common source, online network, police contact, or coordinated narrative.

Conclusion

The 2013 case was not five proven criminal acts. It was one sidewalk encounter expanded into five counts:

• two overlapping sidewalk charges;
• two unsupported trespass charges; and
• one disputed business-card battery allegation.

Perelman entered the restaurant as a customer, ate, paid, and left. He was not told that he was prohibited from entering. When Jensen and Dinse contacted him, he was outside on a public sidewalk with a small sign stating “Smeared for Creating Art” or “Smeared for Making Art.” He was not operating an encampment or blocking pedestrians.

He was as nice as can be and accepting to the employee’s met with hostility anger, and rage just like he always is.

The protest arose from a much broader alleged history of provocations, internet-based disinformation, racial threats, manipulated artwork, and recurring conduct across numerous businesses and public locations. That history included the reported “No relaxing for you, nigger” death threat and the circulation or distortion of artwork such as the Ariana chessboard photo shoot.

No individual’s race proves motive. Motive must be established through statements, actions, communications, repetition, and relationships. Franklin’s duty was to investigate that evidence rather than refuse to challenge police.

The encounter escalated after Perelman asked Jensen for his badge number and questioned the officer’s indifference to the reported instigations. This also shows Dinse, and Jenson had motive since day one. And since 2009 when Topanga division community policing police station was built.

Franklin’s statement—“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer”—protected Jensen’s and Dinse’s accounts from scrutiny, left Derse’s allegation untested, ignored the larger network, and moved Perelman into an inadequately disclosed CAMP arrangement.

The later federal civil-rights lawsuit by Rex Schellenberg supplied a documented parallel: another person accused Dinse of using internet-connected neighborhood groups to distribute personal information and unsupported mental-health or drug allegations, direct community attention toward a selected individual, and generate continuing police action.

All five counts were ultimately dismissed. What remains unresolved is what reports, labels, CAMP entries, and police intelligence survived; who continued using them; and whether the 2013 case became a foundation for later attempts to portray Perelman as mentally unstable rather than investigate the conduct he reported.

The case matters not because of its comparatively minor charges—all of which were ultimately dismissed—but because it provides an early documented view of the alleged method: repeated provocation, stacked accusations, police intervention, undisclosed mental-health case management, and the conversion of reported civil-rights concerns into suggestions of criminality or instability. Perelman maintains that the 2013 proceeding reinforces a broader pattern dating to approximately 1977—a pattern that has continued for forty-nine years, expanded exponentially through police-connected and community networks, and grown progressively more intrusive, aggressive, and dangerous.

Provoke the person. Conceal the provocation. Manufacture or exaggerate the reaction. Multiply the accusations. Refuse to investigate the underlying misconduct. Attach a psychiatric narrative as cover ups. Preserve the resulting institutional record for future use.

That is the pattern requiring disclosure, independent investigation, and judicial review.

LEGAL ADDENDUM

Potentially Implicated Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Professional Duties

This appendix is an issue-spotting reference, not a finding that any person committed a crime or is civilly liable. Each provision has distinct elements, defenses, immunities, limitation periods, and proof requirements. Criminal statutes generally do not create a private right to prosecute; charging decisions belong to authorized prosecutors. The provisions below become relevant only if admissible evidence establishes the required conduct, intent, causation, state action, injury, or agreement.

A. Statutes and Ordinances Appearing in the 2013 Case Record

• Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18(d) — the count to which a temporary no-contest plea was entered on September 26, 2013. The plea and resulting finding were withdrawn and vacated on September 26, 2014, and the count was dismissed under Penal Code §1385.
• Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18(a) — count 2; dismissed under Penal Code §1385 on September 26, 2013.
• California Penal Code §602(k) — trespass by entering land to interfere with or injure a lawful business or occupation; charged as counts 3 and 5. Count 3 was dismissed September 26, 2013, and count 5 was dismissed September 26, 2014.
• California Penal Code §242 — simple battery; charged as count 4 and dismissed September 26, 2013.
• California Penal Code §977 — permitted counsel to appear for Perelman in his absence at the August 19, 2013 misdemeanor proceeding, when counts 3 through 5 were added.
• California Penal Code §1385 — dismissal in furtherance of justice. Every count was ultimately dismissed under this section.

B. Federal Constitutional Rights Potentially Implicated

• First Amendment — speech, peaceful protest, petitioning government, requesting police assistance, criticizing public officials, and protection against governmental retaliation for protected expression.
• Fourth Amendment — protection against unreasonable searches, seizures, arrests, prolonged detention, and certain forms of government-directed surveillance.
• Fifth Amendment — privilege against compelled self-incrimination and federal due process. In state proceedings, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates applicable protections.
• Sixth Amendment — effective assistance of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, compulsory process, notice of accusations, and a fair criminal proceeding.
• Fourteenth Amendment — procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and incorporation of fundamental protections against state and local officials.
• California Constitution, article I, §§1, 2, 7, 13 and 15 — state protections for privacy; speech; due process and equal protection; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and rights of criminal defendants.

C. Federal Civil-Rights Statutes

• 42 U.S.C. §1983 — civil remedy against a person acting under color of state law who causes the deprivation of a federal right. Municipal liability requires proof of an official policy, custom, practice, deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise, or action by a final policymaker; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.
• 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) — conspiracy to deprive equal protection or equal privileges, generally requiring a qualifying class-based discriminatory animus and an overt act causing injury.
• 42 U.S.C. §1986 — potential liability for a person who knew of a qualifying §1985 conspiracy, had power to prevent or aid in preventing it, and neglected or refused to do so. It depends on a valid §1985 claim and has its own short limitation period.
• 42 U.S.C. §1988 — governs aspects of civil-rights remedies, including potential attorney-fee awards in qualifying federal civil-rights litigation.

D. Federal Criminal Statutes That May Require Government Investigation

• 18 U.S.C. §241 — conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate a person in the free exercise or enjoyment of federal rights.
• 18 U.S.C. §242 — willful deprivation of federal rights under color of law.
• 18 U.S.C. §1512(b) and (c) — witness tampering and corrupt obstruction involving testimony, evidence, or an official proceeding, if the federal jurisdictional and intent requirements are met.
• 18 U.S.C. §1519 — knowingly altering, destroying, concealing, or falsifying a record with intent to impede or influence a matter within federal jurisdiction or in relation to such a matter.
• 18 U.S.C. §2261A — certain interstate or electronic stalking conduct undertaken with the statutorily required intent and causing the specified fear or substantial emotional distress.
• 18 U.S.C. §§2511 and 2520 — unlawful interception, use, or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications, together with a potential civil remedy, subject to consent, law-enforcement, provider, and other statutory exceptions.
• 18 U.S.C. §§2701 and 2707 — unauthorized access to stored electronic communications and a potential civil remedy, subject to statutory authorization and provider exceptions.

The federal criminal provisions above ordinarily do not authorize a private criminal prosecution. Their inclusion identifies possible referral issues, not established offenses.

E. California Criminal Statutes Potentially Implicated by Proven Fabrication, Concealment, Retaliation, or Coordinated Misconduct

• Penal Code §118 — perjury in a legally qualifying sworn statement, requiring willful material falsity and the other statutory elements.
• Penal Code §132 — offering as genuine a fraudulently altered or forged document or other evidence in a proceeding or authorized inquiry.
• Penal Code §134 — preparing false or antedated evidence with fraudulent intent to produce it as genuine in a proceeding or authorized inquiry.
• Penal Code §135 — willful destruction or concealment of evidence when a person knows it is about to be produced in an authorized proceeding or inquiry.
• Penal Code §141 — knowingly planting, tampering with, or fraudulently altering physical evidence to cause another person to be charged or to affect a legal proceeding; enhanced consequences can apply to peace officers.
• Penal Code §148.5 — knowingly making a false report that a felony or misdemeanor was committed to a peace officer or other listed recipient.
• Penal Code §182 — criminal conspiracy, requiring an agreement to commit a qualifying offense and, for most subdivisions, an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.
• Penal Code §236 — false imprisonment, potentially relevant to an unlawful detention or restraint proved to lack lawful authority.
• Penal Code §422 — criminal threats, requiring proof of the statute’s specific language, intent, unequivocality, immediacy, gravity, and sustained-fear elements.
• Penal Code §422.6 — willful interference with another person’s civil rights by force or threat of force because of an actual or perceived protected characteristic.
• Penal Code §646.9 — stalking, requiring repeated following or harassment plus a credible threat and the required intent.
• Penal Code §136.1 — preventing or dissuading a victim or witness from reporting, assisting, testifying, or attending proceedings, including specified attempts to do so.
• Government Code §6200 — theft, removal, destruction, mutilation, alteration, or falsification of public records by an officer having custody of them, subject to the statute’s precise requirements.
• Penal Code §§630–638.55, including §§631, 632 and 637.2 — California’s Invasion of Privacy Act, governing interception and recording of communications and providing a civil remedy in qualifying cases, subject to consent and statutory exceptions.

F. California Civil Statutes and Causes of Action Potentially Implicated

• Civil Code §51.7 (Ralph Civil Rights Act) — freedom from violence or intimidation by threat of violence because of specified protected characteristics, including race, religion, ancestry, disability, and other listed classifications.
• Civil Code §52.1 (Bane Civil Rights Act) — civil relief for interference, or attempted interference, by threat, intimidation, or coercion with rights secured by federal or California law. The required coercion and specific intent depend on the claim and governing case law.
• Civil Code §1708.7 — civil stalking cause of action when its detailed course-of-conduct, threat, fear, and intent requirements are satisfied.
• Civil Code §§44–46 — statutory framework for defamation, including libel and slander, subject to falsity, publication, fault, privilege, damages, and limitation defenses.
• Civil Code §52.3 — equitable and declaratory relief concerning a governmental authority’s pattern or practice of conduct by law-enforcement officers that deprives rights, within the statute’s authorized enforcement structure.
• Common-law false arrest and false imprisonment — potentially applicable to an unlawful arrest or detention, subject to probable cause, privilege, immunity, claim-presentation rules, and limitation periods.
• Common-law malicious prosecution — generally requires favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and resulting damage; prosecutorial, judicial, and other immunities may limit defendants or theories.
• Negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress — possible state-law theories only when all elements, duties, causation, damages, immunities, and Government Claims Act requirements are met.

G. Police Records, Complaints, and Disclosure Duties

• Penal Code §832.5 — requires agencies employing peace officers to establish procedures for investigating public complaints and to make written complaint procedures available.
• Penal Code §§832.7 and 832.8 — govern confidentiality and disclosure of peace-officer personnel records, including statutorily public categories of specified misconduct records.
• Evidence Code §§1043–1047 — procedures and protections governing Pitchess discovery of peace-officer personnel records.
• California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000 et seq. — establishes public access to state and local records, subject to exemptions, privileges, confidentiality rules, retention realities, and judicial remedies.
• Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, and California Penal Code §1054.1 — require disclosure of qualifying exculpatory and impeachment information in criminal proceedings. The precise duty depends on possession, materiality, timing, and the prosecution team’s access or constructive knowledge.

H. Duties Potentially Applicable to Defense Counsel and Prosecutors

For conduct occurring in 2013–2014, the professional rules then in effect must be used. Current rules may describe continuing or later duties but should not be applied retroactively without legal analysis.

• Business and Professions Code §6068(a), (c), (d), (m) and (o) — duties to support the law; counsel or maintain only legal or just proceedings; employ truthful means; keep clients reasonably informed; and report specified disciplinary events.
• Business and Professions Code §6106 — discipline for acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, whether committed in the course of the attorney-client relationship or otherwise.
• Former California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110 — duty not to intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
• Former Rule 3-500 — duty to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
• Former Rule 5-200 — duties of an attorney presenting a matter to a tribunal, including truthful presentation and not misleading the court by artifice or false statement; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
• Former Rule 5-220 — prohibition against suppressing evidence that the lawyer or client had a legal obligation to reveal or produce; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
• Current Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 — competence, diligence, and communication.
• Current Rule 1.7 — conflicts of interest involving significant risk that representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s interests or duties to others, subject to informed written consent where permitted.
• Current Rules 3.3 and 3.4 — candor toward the tribunal and fairness to opposing parties and counsel.
• Current Rule 3.8 — prosecutors’ special responsibilities, including disclosure obligations and duties concerning evidence that may negate guilt or mitigate an offense or sentence.
• Current Rule 8.4 — professional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, reckless or intentional misrepresentation, prejudice to the administration of justice, or knowingly assisting improper judicial conduct.

A professional-rule violation is primarily a disciplinary issue and does not automatically create a civil cause of action or prove ineffective assistance. A Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claim is governed by Strickland v. Washington and requires both constitutionally deficient performance and resulting prejudice, subject to doctrine specific to pleas and later proceedings.

I. Judicial Conduct and Due Process

• California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 1, 2 and 3 — judicial integrity and independence; avoidance of impropriety and its appearance; impartial, competent, diligent, patient, dignified, and fair performance of judicial duties; and the obligation to give parties the right to be heard according to law.
• Federal and state due-process principles concerning judicial bias — require a neutral decision-maker. Adverse rulings or sharp remarks alone ordinarily do not establish unconstitutional bias; the full context, source of alleged bias, and objective risk of actual bias matter.
• California Code of Civil Procedure §170.1 — identifies circumstances requiring disqualification of a California judge, including specified interests, relationships, knowledge, and situations in which a reasonable person aware of the facts might doubt impartiality.

J. Proof and Preservation Questions for Counsel

Before alleging any particular violation, counsel should identify:

• The exact actor, date, statement, act, and legal duty.
• Whether the actor was a government official, private person, attorney, witness, contractor, or alleged joint participant.
• The original recording, report, metadata, dispatch record, court filing, transcript, or authenticated communication proving the act.
• The required mental state: knowledge, willfulness, malice, fraudulent intent, discriminatory animus, specific intent, or deliberate indifference.
• The injury and causal connection to the actor’s conduct.
• Any warrant, consent, privilege, immunity, statutory authorization, or good-faith defense.
• Applicable administrative exhaustion, Government Claims Act presentation, preservation, and statute-of-limitations requirements.
• Whether a criminal statute supplies only a referral basis or also permits a private civil remedy.

This appendix should therefore be used as a structured checklist for investigation, record requests, attorney review, and amendment after evidence is authenticated—not as a substitute for matching proven facts to every statutory element.

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