http://www.KevinPerelmanTarget.com

The Right to Proper Council

California Penal Code § 182 – Conspiracy

Summary:

Why is the PERELMAN family FORCING criminal Jewish Lawyers on my with their Judge Friends, Dr Steve Levinson following me to the Car Groups, with his Judicial Family, and Bail Bond friends. In a mass operation to eradicate at all costs with empty label jusitifcatons and the criminal Psychology Community friends?

And a Judicial Aiding and Abetting Crime Ring. This starts at 5 years old.

This law makes it a crime for two or more people to conspire to commit a crime, or to falsely prosecute or frame someone through unlawful means, even if the crime doesn’t actually occur, as long as there’s an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.

🔧 Key Elements:

To prove a criminal conspiracy under PC §182:

  1. Agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime;
  2. Intent to commit that crime;
  3. An overt act committed by one or more parties to advance the conspiracy.

🧩 How It Applies to Refusal to Impeach Witnesses

If multiple actors (e.g., officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or witnesses) are working together to:

  • Protect false testimony
  • Suppress exculpatory evidence (like stalking video, witness credibility issues, parking ticket timestamp, etc.)
  • Refuse to impeach obviously discredited or provable-false witnesses
  • Obstruct a fair trial

…and there is clear or circumstantial evidence of coordination or pattern, then it could fall under PC §182 as a conspiracy to obstruct justice, suppress evidence, or even falsely imprison you.

Kevin Perelman

26500 Agoura Rd, Ste 102

Calabasas, CA 91302

312-259-3686

10/17/2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FOUR

The People of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Kevin Perelman,

Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. B343120

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL

(REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTION OF APPOINTED ATTORNEY)

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT:

Defendant and Appellant Kevin Perelman respectfully moves this Court for the

appointment of new appellate counsel. This motion is based on the following grounds:

Right to Effective, Conflict-Free Counsel:

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

California law requires that appointed counsel must provide effective and conflict-free assistance at all critical stages of the proceedings. (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118; California Penal Code § G87.2.)

Grounds for Substitution:

A defendant is entitled to new counsel if there is a conflict of interest, a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, ineffective assistance, or loss of trust or confidence in current counsel. (See Marsden, supra; People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696; People v.

Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975.)

Specific Basis for Request:

Appellant has experienced a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, “failure to investigate/appellate issues, conflicts of interest, lack of communication, and loss of trust”.

See Attachment Letter:

Request for Hearing:

Appellant requests that the Court conduct a hearing to consider this request for substitution of counsel, as required by People v. Marsden, supra.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully requests:

    • That the Court grant this motion,
    • That new appellate counsel be appointed, and
    • For any other relief the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted,

Kevin Perelman, Appellant

Legal Authority

    • Sixth Amendment, U.S. Constitution; Cal. Const., Art. I, § 15
    • Cal. Penal Code §§ 987, 987.2
    • People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
    • People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696–697
    • People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975

Letter

To California Appellate Project Refusal Acknowledge My Requests

Kevin Perelman

26500 Agoura Rd, Ste 102

Calabasas, CA 91302

312-259-3686

10/16/2025

California Appellate Project – Los Angeles

Attn: Executive Director Jennifer Peabody (or Supervising Attorney) 520 S. Grand Ave, 4th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071 Phone: (213) 243-0300

Fax: (213) 243-0303

Email: Capdocs@lacap.com

Re: Request for Appointment of New Appellate Counsel and Formal Complaint – Case No. B343120

To Whom It May Concern:

I urgently reiterate my request for the appointment of new appellate counsel and submit this formal complaint regarding the ongoing mishandling and oversight of my appeal, Case No. B343120.

Conflict of Interest, Prejudice, and Attorney Selection Concerns

My trial attorney, Shep Alan Zebberman (#155478), was privately retained and provided

ineffective assistance of counsel. My current appellate counsel, Yisrael Gelb (#344924), is a rabbi and presents a clear religious identity. I am Jewish myself, but I have observed a troubling pattern in which nearly all attorneys assigned to me—either by the courts or CAP—share the same tight-knit community affiliation, sometimes with visible religious leadership roles. This pattern raises concerns that attorney selection, rather than being

impartial and neutral, may be influenced by factors risking divided loyalty and bias. I firmly believe that religion and law should remain strictly separate in professional legal

assignment. I request oversight and transparency to ensure fairness and diversity in attorney assignment.

Inexperience of Appointed Counsel

Yisrael Gelb, according to state bar records, has only been licensed for approximately two years. This minimal experience is deeply concerning, as my appeal involves complex

constitutional issues, alleged judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and a significant

impact on my future. It is simply not appropriate for a case with these stakes to be assigned to an attorney this inexperienced.

Omission from CAP-LA Directory

Upon reviewing the official CAP-LA staff/panel listing (see Attachment 1), I found that Mr. Gelb does not appear as a staff or recognized panel attorney. I respectfully request an explanation of how he was assigned and whether standard CAP-LA procedures have been followed.

Lack of Notice or Communication

For the record, I have never received any official notice, written correspondence, or other communication by mail regarding the appointment or substitution of appellate counsel, relevant deadlines, or any related matters in this case from CAP-LA or the court.

All information I have obtained has come from my own online docket research or direct

inquiry. This highlights a serious breakdown in due process and communication affecting my rights.

CAP-LA Communication (Rick Lennon Email) and Inferred Denial of New Counsel Attachment 2 is an email from Rick Lennon of CAP-LA, dated September 14, 2025. While Mr. Lennon does not expressly deny my request for new counsel, he makes it clear that CAP-LA intends to keep Mr. Gelb on my case despite my repeated, written objections. The substance of the email disregards my concerns about conflict of interest, the importance of habeas expertise, and procedural fairness.

Case Docket Irregularities

Attachment 3 contains screenshots of the state court docket showing a “replace appointed counsel” notice dated 10/15/2025. I was never contacted by a new attorney, no

substitution took place, and there are proofs of service filed with dates set in the future (see Attachment 4). This raises further concerns about transparency, accuracy, and

reliability in my case record.

Systemic Pattern and History in Prior Cases

This is not the first time I have experienced such issues in Los Angeles County. I have had two prior criminal cases—Case No. 3PY03498 and Case No. 7VW04099—where similar problems occurred. Lawyers with community or religious ties, or a disposition toward prejudice or coordinated adverse action, resulted in unfair or ineffective representation. I respectfully submit that these repeated problems indicate a broader, systemic issue with how representation is being assigned and overseen in my matters. (See Attachment 5 for detailed summary.)

Comprehensive Record of Documented Complaints and Habeas Petition

In addition, please see:

  • Attachment 6: My initial written request for new counsel (August 4, 2025), which has not been addressed, and a record that an opening statement was filed on 10/13/2025 instead.
  • Attachment 7: Statement of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, summarizing my legal arguments and supporting evidence.
  • Attachment 8: Ineffective Assistance, Misconduct C Corruption Statement – Trial Judicial Misconduct – Notes, providing additional detail on courtroom and systemic misconduct.

Request for Immediate Action

For all these reasons, I respectfully and urgently request:

  • Immediate appointment of new appellate counsel, independent from prior

attorneys, fully vetted, and with no close community or religious ties to previous defenders.

  • Written clarification of CAP-LA’s process for assigning Mr. Gelb to my case, why his name does not appear on your staff/panel directory, and what supervisor-level

review (if any) has been conducted.

  • Assurance that no actions are taken in my appellate matter until impartial, conflict- free, and sufficiently experienced counsel has been assigned, and a supervisor has confirmed full review and corrective action in my file.

Thank you for your immediate attention. Please ensure this letter and all supporting attachments are made part of my official appellate file. I respectfully request a formal, written response as soon as practicable.

Attachments:

  1. CAP-LA Attorney/Staff Directory, October 2025 printout
  2. Email from Rick Lennon (CAP-LA), September 14, 2025
  3. Appellate court docket screenshots (“replace appointed counsel”)
  4. Proof of Service Date 10/20/2025 instead of 10/15/2025 inconsistencies
  5. Criminal cases (now including 3PY03498 and 7VW04099)
  6. Prior request for reassignment of appellate counsel (August 4, 2025)
  7. Statement of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
  8. Ineffective Assistance, Misconduct C Corruption Statement – Trial Judicial Misconduct – Notes

Sincerely,

Kevin Perelman

Attachment 1

CAP-LA Attorney/Staff Directory, October 2025 printout

Attachment 2

Email from Rick Lennon (CAP-LA), September 14, 2025

Attachment 3

Appellate court docket screenshots (“replace appointed counsel”)

Attachment 4

Proof of Service Date 10/20/2025 instead of 10/15/2025 inconsistencies

Attachment 1

criminal cases (now including 3PY03498 and 7VW04099)

Van Nuys Courthouse Cases with Judicial Misconduct: criminal cases:

3PY03498

7VW04099

Attachment 6

Prior request for reassignment of appellate counsel (August 4, 2025)

To

California Appellate Project

Phone: Phone: (213) 243-0300

Fax: (213) 243-0303

August 4, 2025

Email:Capdocs@lacap.com AppellateBranch@pubdef.lacounty.gov

Adress: 520 South Grand Avenue, 4th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071

To Whom It May Concern:

The People v. Kevin Perelman, Case No. B343120 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four

Dear Supervising Attorney,

I am writing to formally request the reassignment of new appellate counsel in my case, The People v. Kevin Perelman, Case No. B343120, currently before the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four.

I have serious concerns about a potential conflict of interest that could affect my representation. While my current appointed appellate attorney has not acknowledged any conflict, I feel there is a strong likelihood of one due to community affiliations and the circumstances of my case. Both my previous trial attorney and the current appellate attorney are members of the same small, close- knit community (the Jewish community), and my current appellate attorney is also a Rabbi. I am concerned these community connections may create both the appearance and reality of divided loyalty, and possibly an unwillingness to fully pursue claims involving another member of the same community.

Additionally, I am concerned about my appointed appellate attorney’s limited experience (approximately two years since passing the bar), which I believe is insufficient for a case of this seriousness and complexity. As an inexperienced lawyer, he may not possess the necessary knowledge or familiarity with habeas corpus proceedings. He has told me directly that he believes he is limited to what is included in the trial transcripts and docket, even though filing a writ of habeas corpus is often necessary to address ineffective assistance of counsel based on facts outside the transcript and docket.

It is especially important to note that my case may also involve significant judicial and prosecutorial misconduct. My concerns include, but are not limited to, fraudulent police reports, improper investigative practices, potential bias or unfair treatment from both the prosecution and the trial court, and witnesses conspiring with police in illegal operations. I am deeply concerned that these issues have substantially impacted the integrity and fairness of my trial, and that they warrant careful and impartial review on appeal. I believe my current appellate counsel is not adequately positioned, either in terms of experience or independence, to thoroughly investigate and argue these matters, especially where those issues involve or are intertwined with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

For these reasons, I respectfully request that a new appellate attorney —one with no prior professional or personal association with my previous legal counsel, not a member of the same religious or social network, and who is highly experienced with both direct appeals and habeas corpus claims—be assigned to handle my appeal. It is critically important to me that my appellate representation is impartial and fully qualified to pursue all necessary legal remedies, including direct challenges to judicial or prosecutorial misconduct and the involvement of witnesses in illegal conduct.

I trust that you will carefully review my concerns and take timely action to ensure fair representation as required by law. Thank you for your attention to this urgent and sensitive matter.

Sincerely, Kevin Perelman

Kevin Perelman

Appellant

26500 Agoura Rd, STE 102

Calabasas, Ca 91302

312-259-3686

Kevin@KevinPerelman.com

Attachment 7

Statement of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

To

California Appellate Project

Phone: Phone: (213) 243-0300

Fax: (213) 243-0303

Email:Capdocs@lacap.com AppellateBranch@pubdef.lacounty.gov Adress: 520 South Grand Avenue, 4th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071

To Whom It May Concern:

The People v. Kevin Perelman, Case No. B343120 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Ground: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel — Presentation of New and Extrinsic Evidence

  1. Petitioner’s Claim: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner, Kevin Perelman, respectfully seeks habeas corpus relief based on egregious ineffective assistance of counsel by Shep Zebberman, as demonstrated by facts both in and outside the trial record. This claim is supported by the following:

  1. Legal Standard (Strickland v. Washington) Relief is warranted when:
    1. Counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient;
    2. There is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.
  2. Statement of Facts C New Extrinsic Evidence

Discriminatory and Prejudicial Conduct

      • Shep Zebberman made prejudiced statements and failed to advocate for me due to personal and community bias, as described in my declaration and corroborated by third-party witnesses and community records.

Failure to Investigate, Prepare and Present Defense

      • Did not review or present extensive video evidence of mobbing, vandalism, and ongoing harassment in conspiring methods and events with LAPD.
      • Refused to meet with me to discuss my side of events, relying solely on prosecution evidence.

Failure to Investigate or Call Available Witnesses

      • Never investigated, interviewed, or subpoenaed witnesses who could have testified on my behalf, including:
  • Eyewitnesses to harassment, vandalism, and provocation;
  • Neighbors and community members familiar with false allegations by Officer Dinse, Terrance Scroggins, Pedram Espinoza, and others;
  • Victims of Officer Dinse’s similar misconduct (e.g., federal lawsuit by Rex Schillenberger);
  • Experts in police procedure and community mobbing.

Failure to hire or consult with any private investigator who could have

interviewed witnesses, gathered additional exculpatory statements, or tracked social media campaigns against me.

    • Evidence: Declarations from available witnesses, statements from those never

contacted by defense, my own sworn declaration, investigator reports (if available), and a list of potential witnesses with what their testimony would have shown.

    • Failure to introduce events of police harassments, intimidation, as well as witness harassment, intimidation, before and during the trial.

Failure to File Key Motions and Argue Self-Defense

      • Did not file a Pitchess motion against Officer Dinse, despite his documented history of similar misconduct.
      • Refused to argue self-defense even with documentary/video evidence of years-long provocation by community and police.
      • Did not challenge fabricated restitution claims or expose documented blackmail efforts by prosecution witnesses. Working with their friends in the court house to pose as FBI agents for intimidation.

Conflict of Interest s Coercion Toward Insanity Plea

      • Prioritized relationships with trial judges over client defense.
      • Pressured me to accept Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGI) without legal/medical basis.

Failure to Seek Change of Venue or Protect Against Community Harassment

      • Ignored repeated, documented attempts by Officer Dinse and neighborhood watch to incite community bias, including via Facebook and public statements.
      • Did not move to change venue despite mass prejudice, nor did he advise or assist with seeking restraining orders against harassers.

Failure to Impeach Prosecution Witnesses

      • Did not challenge (impeach) perjured or contradictory testimony from key

witnesses, and did not present readily available impeachment material (videos, letters, reports).

Failure to Protect Defendant from Direct Courtroom Intimidation

      • Did not object or seek mistrial when individuals impersonating FBI agents appeared in the courtroom with Prosecutor Orbelli to intimidate me in the

presence of the judge and jury—egregious misconduct designed to prejudice my defense, create an unfair environment, and reinforce false government narratives.

      • Failed to raise the issue of prosecutorial collusion with these individuals and did not seek judicial intervention or police report to expose this unlawful intimidation tactic.
      • Evidence: My declaration, affidavits from anyone who witnessed or heard about the “FBI” presence, court security reports, and any correspondence with court staff about these incidents.

G. Additional Examples of Evidence Outside the Trial Record

  • Newly available police records or Bar complaints showing patterns of misconduct not included in trial evidence.
  • Social media posts by Officer Dinse or others, including deleted/archived content recovered through subpoenas.
  • Expert opinions now available but not sought by defense (e.g., on police procedure, mobbing, prejudice).
  1. Prejudice: Strickland Standard Satisfied Because of the above errors:
  • The jury never heard or saw critical exculpatory evidence or witness testimony that would have undermined the prosecution’s case.
  • Lack of a private investigator, lack of witness interviews, and failure to object to intimidation fundamentally denied me a fair trial.
  • The outcome would likely have been different had defense counsel met even minimal professional standards.
  1. Prayer for Relief and Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner respectfully requests:

    1. An order to show cause and/or evidentiary hearing to receive this new, extrinsic evidence.
    2. Vacation of conviction and/or outright dismissal due to cumulative constitutional error.
  1. Evidence to be Attached (Example)
  • Declaration of Kevin Perelman (listing all witnesses I requested or identified, complaints re: FBI impersonators, failure to investigate)
  • Declarations/affidavits from uninvestigated witnesses, neighbors, and potential experts
  • Affidavit from (or record of attempted contact with) a private investigator, if available
  • Videos and audio not introduced at trial
  • Screenshots/archived copies of relevant Facebook/social posts
  • Security/court incident reports regarding presence of FBI agents or intimidation efforts
  • Insurance, restitution, and any financial records relating to blackmail/extortion claims
  • Copies of relevant Bar complaints, police records, or civil complaints

Attachment 8

Trial Judicial Misconduct – Notes

To

California Appellate Project

Phone: Phone: (213) 243-0300

Fax: (213) 243-0303

Email:Capdocs@lacap.com AppellateBranch@pubdef.lacounty.gov Adress: 520 South Grand Avenue, 4th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071

To Whom It May Concern:

The People v. Kevin Perelman, Case No. B343120 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and courtroom misconduct – Shep Zebberman Specific Accusations:

  • Discriminatory and Prejudicial Comments
  • Sheps Statement to me, right before the verdict “You might get away with this” Showing from day one, he was acting as a judge, not a Lawyer. And was never going to represent me fairly and was involved in a conspiracy to lock me away no matter how innocent. No matter how much proof. He wasn’t even going to try to prove my innocence.
  • Everything asked he give an opposite answer, and disinformation, showing anger. I asked about change of venue. like change of venue, he lied stating their was not

grounds for. While was friends with a lot of the Judges. Being provoked and harassed by witness Terrance Scroggins during trial. Would not help with filing restraining

orders or use the information to show in the court at any time that Terrance was always the aggressor or impeach the witnesses properly jumping from lawyer to lawyer.

– Penal Code § 147: Willful deprivation of a client’s rights

Failure to Investigate/Prepare/Defend

  • Did not review Kevin’s exculpatory video evidence or ask for Kevin’s version of events. – Relied on fabricated reports and prosecution narrative. – Penal Code § 1054.G: Failure to seek or present exculpatory evidence

Failure to File Key Motions

  • Judge Dohi, refused to file Pitchess motion for LAPD Officer Charles Sean Dinse, despite Dinse’s federal lawsuits for similar behavior. – Would not request change of venue or move for mistrial, nor file dismissal. Even with the events happening in the court room – Penal

Code § 1054.5: Withholding of motions/evidence

Conflict of Interest

  • Admitted being friends with Judge Gregory A. Dohi and Judge Stephen Marcus, failed to zealously advocate for client. – Potentially took $50,000 under false pretenses (with

influence from Arnold Silber, Kevin’s stepfather). – Penal Code § 182(a)(5): Conspiracy to obstruct justice

Coercion Toward Insanity Plea (NGI)

  • Tried to pressure client to plead NGI to “get you out of this,” abusing attorney’s

power/trust. Stating “I can get you out of this” I know some Psychology People – Business s Professions Code § 6068: Duty to act with honesty and loyalty

Refusal to Provide Self-Defense Argument

  • Refused to present documented mobbing/stalking history; said self-defense not possible for vandalism despite clear evidence of gangstalking and conspiracy amongst mass

stalking groups with LAPD with an Agenda to setup or frame the defendant. – Penal Code § 6G2-6G4: Legitimacy of self-defense argument

Judicial Corruption s Misconduct Specific Accusations:

    • Bias and Prejudice
  • Judge Stephen Marcus: “I’ll squeeze you out of your place.”
  • Judge Gregory A. Dohi: Fabricated mental health diagnoses, belittled and intimidated

defendant (“Come on down!”) treating court rooms and trials like fun game shows, denied defense motions for Pitchess; colluded in systemic prejudice.

  • Penal Code § G6 s G6.5: Judicial officers acting corruptly, maliciously, or with conflict of interest

Van Nuys Court Reporter who owns property adjoining my wall Misconduct – Debbie Wollman

  • Spread false rumors about Kevin’s mental health to court staff and judges; owned

property adjoining defendant (conflict of interest). – Omitted critical exculpatory phrases from transcripts (e.g., “Every Miata is modified”). – Penal Code § 134: Preparing false

evidence (tampered transcript) – Penal Code § 182: Conspiracy

Police Corruption – Officer Charles Sean Dinse Specific Accusations:

    • History of Lawsuits and Misconduct
  • Used Facebook to incite neighborhood harassment against Kevin; earlier federally sued by Rex Schillenberger.
  • Publicly posted “How do we FORCE people into mental facilities,” inciting community intimidation/hate/Stalking groups.
  • Penal Code § 182: Conspiracy to violate civil rights
  • Penal Code § 135: Destroying/concealing evidence

Fabrication of Claims and Evidence

  • Lied about Kevin following him with Prosecutor Orbell to use as amo for increased

sentencing, staged incidents to provoke legal trouble. – Seized art computer (falsely called a “hard drive”), made misleading claims about data. – Penal Code § 118: Perjury – Penal Code § 141: Planting/tampering with evidence

Intimidation and Collusion

  • Orchestrated use of “fake FBI agents” to intimidate Kevin in courtroom right before trial day. – Colluded with Prosecutors Lisa Orbelli and Detective Ruiz, and Charles Sean Dinse.
  • Penal Code § 136.1: Witness/victim intimidation – Penal Code § 182: Conspiracy

Witness and Community Misconduct

Specific Accusations:

    • Terrance Scroggins (Neighbor/Witness):
  • Engaged in continuous harassment/provocation before and during the trial(240+ videos), staged vandalisms with neighbors, Provokings, submitted false restitution claims (colluded with USAA Insurance to repaint entire car, then sought extra $5,000 after USAA paid for

repairs).

  • Left blackmail threats in writing demanding DIRECT restitution money.
  • Penal Code § 518: Extortion
  • Penal Code § 118: Perjury

Pedram Espinoza (Neighbor/Witness):

  • Provided knowingly false testimony about his time at the property and his encounters with Kevin. – Penal Code § 118: Perjury. No impeaching the witness with Pedram on video stating I’m not allowed at my townhouse complex. Or that I take pictures of kids. Showing he’s defaming my name and has motive to get rid of me. Shep kept the argument in the

context to make it look like I was loitering around his house, in the common areas of our complex. A Juror had to ask the Judge how long I lived their he picked up one the one sided stories.

Community Members (“Yosi,” Jason Ryan Fishman, etc.):

  • Participated in organized surveillance/harassment; repeated slander (“not a real Jew,” “mentally ill”), acted at direction of Officer Dinse and neighborhood watch. – Penal Code §

653.2: Electronic/cyber harassment – Penal Code § 182: Conspiracy to harass. Showing linked events within the Jewish Community.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Specific Accusations:

  • Lisa Orbelli s Detective Ruiz (Prosecutors):
  • Collaborated with police and witnesses to create “incidents” for prosecution; made false claims and permitted intimidation tactics in and around the courthouse.
  • Permitted/introduced false evidence, allowed staged intimidation (fake FBI agents and courthouse staff).
  • Penal Code § 118: Subornation of perjury
  • Penal Code § 182: Conspiracy
  • Penal Code § G6.5: Misconduct by officers of the court

Transcript, Records, and Restitution Tampering Specific Accusations:

    • Omitted or altered evidence/testimony in trial transcripts (Debbie Wollman).
    • Docket/minute orders contained unexplained errors or clerical manipulation (split sentence, “no probation” issues), possibly at the direction of corrupt clerks and neighbor/court reporter Debbie Wollman.
    • Restitution awarded based on fraudulent insurance claims and blackmail tactics (Terrance Scroggins).
    • Penal Code § 134: Preparing false documentary evidence
    • Penal Code § 115: Filing false instruments

Overarching Constitutional and Civil Rights Violations Specific Accusations:

    • Constitutional:
  • Denial of due process (U.S. Const. Amend. XIV)
  • Denial of effective assistance/counsel (U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington)
  • Denial of fair trial and equal protection (California Const. Art. I, §§ 7, 15)

Pattern of Systemic Government Abuse:

  • Collusion among judges, defense, prosecutors, police, and community.
  • Tampering, intimidation, and long-term targeting that makes fair retrial impossible.
  • Penal Code § 182: Criminal conspiracy
  • Civil Remedies: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (federal civil rights suit for deprivation of rights under color of law)

Judicial Corruption—Grounds for Dismissal Overlooked

    • Repeated Judicial Bias:
  • Judge Stephen Marcus made overtly hostile comments toward Defendant (“I’ll squeeze you out of your place”), demonstrating clear personal animosity and prejudice contrary to impartial adjudication required by law.
  • Judge Gregory Dohi fabricated “mental illness” labels for Defendant with no clinical basis, belittled Defendant during proceedings, and denied valid defense motions (e.g., Pitchess motion for Officer Dinse), demonstrating pattern of prejudiced rulings.

Legal Basis: Judicial bias and partial are grounds for mistrial or dismissal:

  • *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (extreme judicial bias may violate due process).
  • Cal. Penal Code § 96, § 96.5 (corrupt conduct by judicial officers).

Court Reporter Misconduct s Transcript Tampering:

  • Debbie Wollman, with a direct conflict of interest, fabricated negative mental health rumors about Defendant to judges and staff, and altered the official record (omitting

exculpatory testimony such as “Every Miata is modified”). Legal Basis: Cal. Penal Code § 134 (preparing false evidence), § 182 (conspiracy to pervert justice).

Police Officer Corruption—Grounds for Dismissal Overlooked

    • Officer Charles Sean Dinse’s Documented Corruption:
  • Used his Facebook account to incite community mobbing (“How do we FORCE people into mental facilities”), was previously federally sued for similar actions.
  • Lied under oath about Defendant following him with Prosecutor Orbelli for increased

sentencing, fabricated incidents, and seized Defendant’s computer misrepresenting both its contents and evidentiary value.

  • Regularly engaged in provocation and intimidation designed to escalate Defendant’s legal peril.

Legal Basis:

  • Cal. Penal Code § 118 (perjury), § 141 (evidence tampering), § 182 (conspiracy), § 147 (officials depriving rights).
  • Cal. Evidence Code § 1043 et seq. (Pitchess motion—officer history of dishonesty/abuse is grounds for discovery, impeachment, and, where egregious, dismissal).

Prosecutorial Misconduct—Compelling Grounds for Dismissal Ignored

    • Fabrication, Coll, and Use of False Evidence:
  • Prosecutors Lisa Orbelli and Detective Ruiz collaborated with Dinse, Scroggins and others, knowingly presenting false or uninvestigated claims to the court.
  • Prosecutors enabled and facilitated courtroom intimidation—including the appearance of people posing as FBI agents during trial—creating an atmosphere of threat and

unlawfulness.

  • Prosecutors injected irrelevant hearsay and prejudicial evidence into the record, repeatedly straying from the charges to paint Defendant as dangerous or unstable, manipulating judicial perception and deliberation.

Legal Basis:

  • *People v. Batts* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 693 (dismissal appropriate in egregious government misconduct).
  • Cal. Penal Code § 118 (subornation of perjury), § 182 (conspiracy), § 96.5 (prosecutorial misconduct).

Admission of Hearsay/Irrelevant Allegations:

  • Prosecutors repeatedly introduced and relied on one sided prejudicial statements and hearsay incidents—statements, rumors, alleged threats, and unrelated community disputes—irrelevant to the charged offenses, used solely to inflame and manipulate the judge and jury. – Defense counsel failed to object or move to strike these prejudicial and

improper references, compounding the miscarriage of justice. Legal Basis: – Cal. Evidence Code § 1200 (hearsay inadmissibility), – *People v. Fuiava* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622

(admission of repeated, irrelevant misconduct evidence is reversible error).

Cumulative Misconduct Clearly Justified Dismissal

    • Pattern of Collusion:
  • Combined judicial, police, and prosecutorial bias, evidenced by intimidation, tampering, and fabrication, destroyed any pretense of fair trial.
  • Egregious conduct rises to the constitutional standard where “the only appropriate remedy is dismissal,” as retrial would merely replicate injustice.

Missed Opportunities for Relief:

  • At each stage—pretrial (based on evidence fabrication/transcript tampering), during trial (judicial bias, police perjury, prosecutorial hearsay, intimidation), and post-trial (restoration of rights, clerical errors)—counsel declined to move for dismissal.

Grounds for Dismissal (Relief Requested):

    • Cumulative due process violations.
    • Systemic government misconduct and collusion.
    • Prejudice so severe retrial would be unjust and constitutionally insufficient.
    • Legal authorities: US and California Constitution, People v. Batts (2003), Strickland. Washington (4), Caperton v. Massey (2009), Penal Code §§ 96, 96.5, 147, 182.

This is about all the lies, setups, frame jobs smears, defamation, teacher setup attemp ivnolvement operations when I went to Calabasas High, and graduated in 1991

Operations to try to make me look like a violent paranoid schitzo who was supposdly reckless and out of control in those years. But yet, just like now, non of it really exists except LIES, Defamation, slandor to the WORLD with my own families HATE and RAGE behind it working with the Police and Government to try to get LPS Conservatorships to lock me into mental institutions based on someones HATE and RAGE for me.

People like Mike Huntley paid off to have me EXTERMINATED starting before this.

Remember, this lies are BLASTED to the world in SECRET so that I can’t DEFEND MYSELF. and done in such ways by the Government to try to make me look crazy.and force me or other people who’s KNOWLEDGE is a threat to them into cages or mental institutions for speaking out.

AKA Gang Stalking

My World Wide Targeting info
http://www.KevinPerelmanTarget.com
http://www.kevinperelmantargetsimplified.com

http://WordBlog.kevinperelmantarget.com
http://www.facebook.com/KevinPerelmanTarget
http://www.starbucksdiscrimination.com
http://www.coffeebeandiscrimination.com
http://www.modelmayhemstalkskevinperelman.com

For access to all the raw data on the last 17 years of daily stalking’s to me:
http://www.kevinperelmantarget.com/RawDataView

http://www.rudytherubbershow.com – Victoria Walker and Michael Bialys sent after me by the government, Brian Longbotham, in all sorts of operations from my father putting the bullet hole in his 300e with the policFore, to endless other ones
http://erotic-ranch.kevinperelman.com
http://askcandi.kevinperelman.com
http://aubrysphotography.kevinperelman.com Aubrey Fisher Stripper/Hostess sent after me working on all sorts of angels how I supposedly ruined her life by tapping my foot around her, with worldwide retaliation and government resources why she kept calling me up asking me for help as she was hunting me down working with Tom Farley
http://emilyjewel.kevinperelman.com
http://fetishrage.kevinperelman.com – Connected to a girl named Melissa Detwiller sent after me
http://ladygreeneyes.kevinperelman.com
http://lisaskirts.kevinperelman.com
http://lisa-anns-playhouse.kevinperelman.com – Victoria Walker working some kind of Fraud Angle with a porn star named Lisa Ann Against me when asking me to build her the site
http://traciannakoval.kevinperelman.com – Hustler girl sent after me by Tim Thompson trying to reel me into some Gene Simmons hotel spy camera scam which they were trying to frame me for

Most these people were approached beforehand and were working on me with every angle and tactic known to man to remove me from society. It got a lot worse once Rodie Morales was sent after me because my family didn’t approve of these sites, and he was working endless strip club and gym frame job operations as punishment for living my life

Forty-Nine Years of Unexplained Accusations, Psychological Warfare, and the Use of “Public Shaming” to Justify Punishment

By Kevin Perelman

Brian Weaver called it “a public shaming.” But I am challenging something far more serious than public humiliation: the use of public shaming as a mask for psychological terror, intimidation, fabricated criminal accusations, nonstop setup, frame job, disinformation, and terror operations with unlimited resources across the largest circles possible and what is a prolonged effort to remove me from society, under California Penal Code § 182(a)(1), conspiracy to commit murder, and § 182(a)(2), conspiracy to procure false criminal charges or arrests and refusal of those in the Judicial System to honestly defend me. My account concerns the involvement I attribute to members of the Perelman family, police officers, judicial employees, and community groups in an escalating pattern of coercion, psychological harassment, and attempts to portray me as dangerous or mentally ill.

What could I possibly have done at five years old to justify forty-nine years of conflict and an increasingly destructive pattern of accusations, death threats, coordinated worldwide provocations, and daily operations directed toward removing me from society? I trace the origins of this history to approximately 1977, when I was just five years old and my brother, Jason Perelman, was approximately seven. My account begins with Jason’s involvement in efforts to control my life and ultimately remove me from society, regardless of the consequences. The situation escalated throughout my childhood and adolescence, becoming progressively more aggressive before reaching an extraordinary level after 2001, with near-daily confrontations involving workplaces, restaurants, coffee shops, public streets, educational institutions, friendships, almost every human interaction, and ordinary social activities. Throughout this history, I have challenged police monitoring, disputed arrests, psychiatric characterizations, death threats, and attempts to turn my reactions to repeated provocations, confrontations, and attempts on my life into evidence against me.

By “control,” I do not mean a simple family disagreement or someone trying to set ordinary rules. I am describing the far more serious objective I have questioned throughout this article: attempts to exclude or remove me from society, with the language of control, concern, or supposed behavioral correction used as its justification. A seven-year-old child would not ordinarily invent such an elaborate purpose independently. The question is what he was being told, by whom, and why psychiatric labels such as “crazy” were being attached to a five-year-old in the first place.

The chronology is essential to my account: I trace the beginning of the conduct I question to approximately 1977, at age five, and the period of intensifying encounters and disputed police-related events to approximately 2001, when I began directly asking what was happening. These are two distinct periods—not a claim that I understood everything at age five. I am examining a forty-nine-year history as I describe it, including approximately twenty-five years of more intensive confrontations since 2001, while asking which specific actions and relationships can be independently established.

But the most disturbing question is who was influencing a seven-year-old child in the first place. Jason was not an adult operating independently. Where would a seven-year-old learn methods of psychological manipulation, terror, false accusations, attempts to make people disappear, and tactics designed to portray another child as mentally unstable or dangerous? That question leads directly to the adults surrounding us, particularly our parents, their backgrounds in psychology, and their relationships within police, government, and psychological communities.

Even more disturbing is the moral and ethical question of a parent encouraging one child to psychologically harm, intimidate, or destroy the life of another child within the same family. Most parents consider it their fundamental responsibility to protect their children from cruelty, not encourage one child to inflict it upon another. The idea of a parent deliberately teaching a child to hurt their own sibling represents a profound betrayal of parental responsibility, compassion, and basic human decency. My central question is not simply what Jason was doing, but who taught him those behaviors which exponentially went viral and grew worldwide, who encouraged them, And what kind of parents could knowingly turn one child against another instead of protecting them both, simply because they favor one child over the other? The message becomes, “We like this child better than that child,” as though parental favoritism somehow justifies cruelty, psychological punishment, or sacrificing the rights and well-being of the less-favored child. Favoritism is not a moral justification for abuse, and no child deserves to be harmed simply because their parents prefer their sibling.

The question is whether “public shaming” has become a convenient justification for conduct intended not to correct wrongdoing, but to destroy another person’s independence and ultimately remove them from society. Threats, deliberate psychological cruelty, false criminal accusations, and efforts to cause serious harm do not become legitimate simply because the people responsible avoid physical contact or operate through the apparent gray areas of the law. And if an agreement and intent to kill were established, the conduct would raise questions of criminal conspiracy far beyond ordinary harassment.

That is the contradiction at the center of this article: the people claiming the authority to judge and punish my supposed behavior refuse to identify the original offense, while the increasingly severe consequences of their accusations become the real punishment.

One particularly disturbing contradiction involves Tom Farley, my very first childhood friend, whom I had known since I was very young. Around 2001, Farley told me, “Kevin, you can’t control people.” Yet I had spent my life attempting to make my own decisions, develop friendships, pursue my education, focus on positive experiences, and establish an independent career. I was not trying to control Farley or anyone else as we all know. The critical distinction is that Tom Farley and others originally sought me out, befriended me, and established relationships with me—not the other way around. The central issue is the ulterior motives behind those relationships and the contradiction between presenting themselves as friends while attempting to dictate my behavior and personal choices.

At the same time, I was attempting to welcome people into my life, make friends, and treat others with warmth and openness. That matters because the statement “Kevin, you can’t control people” was being directed at someone who was actively trying to build friendships and an independent future. I also question the way the accusations themselves shifted: one negative description could be replaced with another, then repeated to people who had never taken the time to know me. In my account, that circulation of shifting labels—not a single disagreement with Farley—is the issue.

These were not genuine friendships in my account, but relationships established under false pretenses for the purpose of gaining influence and control over my life. Tom Farley, Michael Patrick Huntley, Paul Humphrey, and others approached me and cultivated friendships while I was attempting to build an independent future. The mentality I am describing is not “I want to be your friend,” but “I want to befriend you so I can control you, dictate your decisions, and treat you as though you belong to me.” That is ownership disguised as friendship, reducing another human being to the status of a slave rather than respecting their independence. The extraordinary hypocrisy is that Farley told me, “Kevin, you can’t control people,” while the very issue I was confronting was the attempt to control my life through relationships that had been presented to me as genuine friendships.

That is the extraordinary reversal of responsibility: people seek me out, establish friendships, subject me to hostility or punishment with unlimited resources, and then suggest that I am responsible for their treatment of me because of my supposed behavior. The underlying message becomes, “It’s your fault I’m stalking or punishing you because you’re a bad person.” But calling someone a bad person, crazy, mentally ill, a criminal, does not justify stalking, intimidation, or punishment. Farley’s statement, “You can’t control people,” captures the hypocrisy I am challenging: I was trying to live independently, while people who had deliberately entered my life were attempting to impose their judgments upon my choices, relationships, and personal freedom.

The extraordinary hypocrisy is that Farley was accusing me of trying to control people while I was challenging what I regarded as attempts to control virtually every aspect of my own life. I have connected his involvement to the recurring pattern of childhood acquaintances and family relationships through which I encountered accusations, distorted accounts of ordinary events, and situations in which other people’s actions were attributed to me. I have also questioned whether private information and false narratives from these relationships were subsequently circulated through broader social networks.

The central issue is the reversal of responsibility. “You can’t control people” becomes another accusation directed at me, while the question of who was attempting to control my relationships, career, independence, and personal decisions remains unanswered. I reject the idea that friendship or family relationships give anyone ownership over another person’s life. No childhood friend, relative, police officer, or judicial employee has the authority to treat me as personal property, dictate my lawful choices, or punish me for refusing to surrender my independence. The fact that Farley had known me since childhood makes his statement particularly important to the history of control and coercion I am describing, and does establish his participation in a coordinated effort to harm me or remove me from society no matter what it takes with others in a mass conspiracy.

This is not an embarrassing incident, a disagreement between friends, or a few people expressing disapproval. I am describing experiences I call psychological terror and torture operations by the police, government, psychology community, my own family, judicial employee’s, and lawyers: relentless provocations, efforts to produce negative reactions, reputational attacks, and repeated attempts to portray ordinary human behavior as evidence of criminality or mental illness. At times the encounters have seemed to occur minute by minute, day and night, online and offline. I have encountered hostility from people I know as well as strangers, in places where I was simply trying to relax, work, socialize, or exercise. Some of these group coordinated death threats. “No relaxing for you nigger”, “World of Paranoia”, “You better accept what’s going on or it will get a lot worse for you”

The scale is the essential point. Over decades I have described similar encounters in different communities, cities, and states. I have questioned whether private information about me was collected, distorted, and passed through broad social networks, perhaps extending across the United States and internationally. I do ot have evidence that establishes a single worldwide organization behind these events, but my account is about the cumulative reality of repeated conflict, its effects on my life, and my attempts to understand the apparent similarities and say something about the mass worldwide crime spree against me since an early age. The absence of proof of one centralized network does not excuse anyone’s actual threats, intimidation, or false accusations in what is easily achievable with todays technology.

The most serious concern is not embarrassment. It is what sustained psychological intimidation, isolation, and coercion can do to a person’s health, independence, relationships, and livelihood. The absence of a visible injury, eradication or killing of others, does not make deliberate cruelty harmless. I have repeatedly tried to an ordinary life while also attempting to understand why interactions that should have ended with a simple conversation instead escalated into accusations, hostility, or confrontations while their disinformation is relayed across the largest circles each and every time.

Around 2001, Brian Weaver called it “a public shaming.” Michael Patrick Huntley said “World of paranoia,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” and “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with.” My father, Ron Perelman, said, “You know what you did.” My mother, Anita Perelman, said, “Your past caught up with you.” Garrett a Starbucks employee around 2005 threatened, “It’s your transgressions.” None of those statements, taken at face value, identifies a specific offense. Yet the implications are severe. The people doing the condemning were acting like judge, jury, and executioner—pronouncing guilt while withholding the details that would allow a meaningful response.

Brian Weaver, Around 2001: What Exactly Is Being Publicly Shamed?

When Brian Weaver described the situation as “a public shaming,” he supplied a phrase that sounded like an explanation without identifying an actual wrong. Public criticism ordinarily concerns something recognizable: a statement, a decision, or an event that can be described and challenged. In my encounters the supposed offense was shifting or undefined. A career choice, a friendship, a photograph, a trip to a gym, a walk at night, or an ordinary conversation could become a fresh source of condemnation.

Weaver pursued aviation and commercial flying, as I understand his background. I pursued art, computer graphics, visual effects, animation, and internet technology. Neither career is inherently wrong. Neither of us has the moral authority to punish the other for choosing a different path. One person’s preferred life is not a law that everyone else must obey. The same principle applies to relationships, hobbies, clothing, automobiles, and personal expression.

What troubles me is the double standard. Someone who wants to criticize how I live should ask whether they would accept the same scrutiny of every conversation, date, meal, friendship, or professional interest in their own life. The phrase “public shaming” cannot turn personal disapproval into legal authority, and a crowd does not become a court simply because its members share an opinion.

The Psychological Noose: The Provocation Is the Rope

In 2001 I confronted Michael Patrick Huntley, a person I had known since approximately age fourteen and who later became my business partner. I asked, “Mike, what the hell is going on?” I remember him making several remarks: “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” “You’d better live a careful life,” “It’s your behavior,” and “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with.”

The rope, in the way I understood the exchange, was not simply my asking questions. It was repeated provocation. Imagine a series of confrontations in which a person tries to ignore the pressure, asks for it to stop, leaves the location, and later faces another disagreement and another one. All day and not until this mass mob gets what they want no matter how many people, and no matter how broad the circles. Eventually there is a frustrated reaction. The preceding incidents are then left out, and the reaction becomes the entire story: “He’s angry,” “He’s obsessive,” “He’s unstable,” or “He’s dangerous.” That is the mechanism I mean by a psychological noose.

It is a calculated, malicious, and profoundly deceptive method of one-sided judgment, designed to condemn someone while deliberately disregarding the truth, the facts, and the circumstances surrounding their actions. By beginning the account at the moment of reaction, the provocations, intimidation, and psychological pressure that preceded it are conveniently erased. The resulting response is then selectively collected, distorted, and presented as evidence of wrongdoing, while the conduct responsible for provoking it is concealed. When these manipulated accounts become the basis for police reports, workplace complaints, criminal accusations, or psychiatric characterizations, the consequences extend far beyond an ordinary disagreement. The victim’s reaction becomes the supposed offense, while the conduct that provoked it escapes scrutiny and accountability by design.

The psychological pressure was especially disturbing because I knew Michael Patrick Huntley so well. I had known him since I was approximately fourteen years old, along with Paul Humphrey, both of whom had longstanding connections to my family and brother, Jason Perelman. I remember the angry, snickering amusement in Huntley’s expression when I confronted him and asked for an explanation of what was going on. I would describe the look as psychotic in its coldness, cruelty, and complete absence of empathy, resembling someone who found another human being’s confusion, suffering, and psychological torment entertaining. This was not an ordinary disagreement or an innocent joke. I was confronting someone I had known for approximately fifteen years, someone who had become deeply involved in my personal and professional life, yet instead of identifying any wrongdoing or providing a straightforward explanation, he responded with threatening remarks, anger, and disturbing amusement.

What made the encounter even more extraordinary was Huntley’s role in bringing me back from the University of Colorado around 1996–1997. He had personally flown to Colorado, presenting what appeared to be a legitimate business opportunity: establishing an internet-hosting company called Signet-e Services, supposedly to generate income, build a successful business, and improve our lives and financial futures. My family also encouraged my return. Yet by 2001, the same longtime acquaintance and business partner was responding to my questions with statements such as “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” and “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with.” The contradiction was staggering. Someone who had spent years cultivating my friendship and encouraging me to build a business with him was now responding to my attempts to understand the relentless provocations and hostility surrounding my life with what I experienced as cold-blooded psychological intimidation. Rather than explain the problem, he appeared to take pleasure in keeping it unresolved, leaving me to confront the disturbing question of what his involvement and motivations had been from the beginning.

The “You’re Important” Mind Game: Brainwashing, Grandiosity, and the Impossible Standard of Perfection

Another recurring psychological contradiction throughout my life involves the cryptic statements that I am somehow extraordinarily important. “It’s because you’re important,” “It’s because you’re smart,” or “It’s because you’re interesting.” But important for what? Smart in what way? Interesting to whom? And why would any of those characteristics justify extraordinary scrutiny, psychological punishment, or interference with my personal freedom?

The contradiction is staggering. I am supposedly so important that virtually every aspect of my life requires extraordinary scrutiny, from my career choices, friendships, relationships, artistic expression, photography, and personality to how often I exercise, what I eat, where I go, and whom I speak to. I am apparently expected to behave according to standards a million times more demanding than those imposed upon the President of the United States. Yet I am not important enough to receive a direct explanation of what makes me important, what responsibilities I supposedly have, or what I allegedly did wrong.

If the suggestion of extraordinary importance were a genuine safety concern, why was there no straightforward explanation, clearly identified responsibility, or ordinary protective assistance? Why would encounters with people I experienced as following, scrutinizing, or provoking me be presented as further evidence of something wrong with me instead of explaining what those people wanted? The contradiction is between vague claims of importance and the absence of any direct, verifiable explanation.

Think about the absurdity. If I were genuinely important because of some extraordinary ability, responsibility, or contribution, there would be direct communication explaining it. Someone could offer employment, commission artwork, provide research funding, support a creative project, or simply explain what they wanted. If I possessed some important responsibility, that responsibility could be identified. Instead, I encounter vague insinuations, hostility, and accusations that never identify an actual offense.

Important enough to be scrutinized, punished, and held to impossible standards of behavior, but not important enough to receive an honest explanation of what those standards are or why they supposedly apply to me. That is the psychological double bind.

The contradiction becomes even more disturbing when these suggestions of importance involve comparisons to the President of the United States or other extraordinary identities. I am not the president. I am an artist and technology professional who attended the University of Colorado, earned a Bachelor of Fine Arts, and pursued interests in computer graphics, visual effects, animation, programming, web development, and Internet technology. Yet I have encountered remarks that seemed intended to suggest I possessed an extraordinary identity or occupied some exceptional position in society.

This raises the issue of grandiose delusions, sometimes described as delusions of grandeur, and the psychiatric concept of ideas of reference. A person can be encouraged to question why others keep suggesting that they are unusually important, only for those questions to become another subject of psychiatric criticism. Asking why someone is making suggestions about extraordinary importance is not the same thing as claiming to possess that importance. Nor does asking about an ambiguous remark establish schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychiatric condition.

This brings me back to Michael Patrick Huntley and the confrontation around 2001. After knowing Huntley since approximately age fourteen, becoming business partners, and returning from the University of Colorado following his proposal to establish Signet-e Services, I confronted him directly: “Mike, what the hell is going on?” Instead of an explanation, I recall his threatening statements: “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” “You’d better live a careful life,” and “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with.”

The significance of those statements is the combination of implied knowledge, threatening language, and refusal to identify the supposed wrongdoing. Huntley could have answered the question. He could have explained any legitimate personal or professional grievance. Instead, I was left confronting an accusation that never identified an offense while simultaneously being warned about paranoia and the judicial system.

The same contradiction appears in statements attributed to other people throughout my life. My father, Ron Perelman, told me, “You know what you did,” yet refused to identify the supposed offense. My mother, Anita Perelman, said, “Your past caught up with you,” then denied making the statement when I attempted to address it. Brian Weaver described the situation as “a public shaming,” while Garrett at Starbucks referred to “your transgressions.” Each statement implies that something serious has occurred, but none provides the information required to understand, address, or dispute the accusation.

This is where vague accusations can create an endless psychological loop. Someone implies that you have committed an offense, refuses to explain it, and then treats your repeated questions as evidence that something is wrong with you. The original accusation remains undefined, but your effort to understand it becomes another supposed behavioral problem. The person seeking an explanation is portrayed as obsessive or paranoid, while the people refusing to explain the accusation are treated as though their conduct requires no justification.

The suggestion of extraordinary importance adds another layer to that contradiction. If I am important, I am supposedly required to accept exceptional scrutiny and punishment. If I ask why I am important, the question itself can be characterized as grandiosity. If I reject the suggestion, I can be accused of refusing to understand. If I continue living an ordinary life, my personal choices become another subject of condemnation. There is no identifiable standard of compliance and no clear way to resolve the situation.

The same problem applies to the idea that I must become some perfect version of a human being before I am permitted to live independently. Whose version of perfection? My father’s? My mother’s? Brian Weaver’s? Michael Patrick Huntley’s? A police officer’s? A stranger’s? One person considers aviation respectable, another prefers the arts, someone dislikes my photography, and another disapproves of whom I date. Personal preferences are not laws, and differing opinions about how I should live do not create the authority to punish me.

The most damaging aspect is the relationship between these accusations and ordinary opportunities to improve my life. If I exercise at a gym, the activity can be criticized as obsession. If I pursue artistic expression, the artwork can be assigned a negative psychological meaning. If I develop friendships or relationships, those choices become another source of condemnation. If I question the accusations, my questions become the problem. This creates an impossible standard under which nearly every attempt to live a healthy, productive, independent life can be interpreted negatively.

And if the supposed purpose is to help someone become healthy, responsible, or successful, why would the response be to interfere with the very activities that support those goals? Why punish someone for exercising, socializing, working, creating art, or attempting to build a future, and then condemn them for supposedly failing to live a successful or productive life? That is not a reasonable method of encouraging independence.

I have described approximately twenty-five years of near-daily hostile encounters, provocations, and accusations since 2001, with concerns about earlier family conflicts extending back to approximately age five. The breadth of these experiences has raised serious questions about how private information and negative characterizations circulate among different people and communities. What remains most important is the contradiction between the extraordinary expectations imposed upon me and the refusal to identify any legitimate basis for those expectations.

“You’re important” is not an explanation. “You’re smart” is not an accusation. “You think differently” is not a crime. “You know what you did” is not evidence. And “World of paranoia” is not an answer to a direct question.

Nobody has the authority to dictate every aspect of my life merely because they consider me important, unusual, intelligent, different, or psychologically unacceptable. Whether someone is exceptionally talented or entirely ordinary, the same fundamental rights apply. A person’s freedom to pursue lawful work, relationships, creative expression, education, and ordinary social activities does not depend on satisfying another person’s subjective expectations.

The ultimate contradiction is that I am supposedly important enough to justify extraordinary punishment, yet not important enough to receive ordinary human communication. If the importance is genuine, explain it. If there is an actual offense, identify it. But neither importance nor an undefined accusation gives anyone the right to control another human being’s life.

The Timeline: Childhood, College, California, and the Years After 2001

I was born in 1972 at Castle Air Force Base in California. I trace some of the family tensions and negative interpretations of my behavior and empty labeling to around 1977 with their negative interpretations in almost every aspect of my life no matter how positive or appropriate, starting around when I was approximately five years old. I have spent years revisiting the early descriptions by others of my personality that shaped later conflicts. One childhood event I remember involved kissing a Black girl around my own age at Sunny Skies Day Camp. A child’s innocent conduct should not become a lifelong accusation.

I also remember an event involving the band Devo at a childhood school or camp setting, which I have connected in my own recollection to later claims that I supposedly conformed to music or media. I remember the innocent childhood kiss and the later interpretations as separate matters. A song, a visiting band, or a child’s exposure to popular culture does not itself show hatred, violence, or a psychiatric condition. The specific circumstances and the source of any later characterization should be examined rather than assumed.

In the mid-1980s, when I was about fourteen, Michael Patrick Huntley entered my life through friendships connected to my brother Jason Perelman, including Mitch Viner and the Lost Hills area. Around 1988, I recall Jason saying, “Me and my friends put a teacher in a mental institution, and we’re listening to everything you do on the radio.” I did not understand that statement at the time. Its significance for me grew as I later encountered arguments involving psychiatric labels and privacy.

In the early 1990s, I attended Southern Oregon State College and later the University of Colorado Boulder, pursuing fine arts, computer programming, computer graphics, web development, animation, and emerging Internet technologies. Around 1994, as the Internet was expanding beyond academic and research institutions into broader public use, I began exploring website technology, html, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), and online social environments, sometimes following suggestions from my brother, Jason Perelman, about websites, chat rooms, and other emerging technologies to explore. At the time, I had no understanding of what Jason was doing behind the scenes or the extent of his involvement in the activities I later came to associate with mass groups of strangers across the United States and around the world. I now regard the emergence of the Internet as a critical turning point in the history of the harassment I describe, providing a means for information about my private life to circulate far beyond the communities and personal relationships in which it originated. What had previously involved people in my immediate social environment could now potentially reach an international audience, introducing an entirely new dimension to the stalking, privacy violations, psychological provocations, and reputational attacks that became central to my experiences.

Around 1995–1996, while attending the University of Colorado, I enrolled in a film photography class and borrowed a Canon AE-1 camera from my friend Chad Bower to complete the assignments. I was not pursuing photography obsessively, nor was it even a serious hobby at that point. It was just a simple film photography class which related to most situations in my life. I was simply a college student taking a class with a borrowed camera. Around the same period, Mike Wexler, originally a friend of my brother Jason, proposed a road trip and made the peculiar statement, “You’re not allowed to take pictures of people.” The significance of that remark was its implication that an ordinary, lawful educational activity was somehow inappropriate, forbidden, or even criminal. It became another example of the broader issue running throughout my account: the transformation of harmless personal activities into supposed behavioral offenses, followed by accusations, distortions, and judgments that bore little resemblance to what actually occurred.

These manufactured or exaggerated accusations became the justifications for what I describe as stalking, intimidation, psychological terror, and attempts to remove me from society through criminal accusations and psychiatric labeling. My account extends beyond individual confrontations to the involvement of judicial employees, police officers, members of the psychology community, and what I describe as an enormous, increasingly worldwide network of angry individuals engaging in a modern-day witch hunt and lynch-mob mentality. The most disturbing aspect is the role I attribute to people associated with institutions supposedly responsible for protecting individual rights, administering justice, and preventing abuse. The resulting double standard is staggering: conduct that would provoke immediate outrage and disgust if inflicted upon almost anyone else is instead presented as acceptable punishment when directed at me. And when psychiatric or criminal labels are used to justify escalating hostility, the supposed wrongdoing of the person being targeted becomes the focus while the far more serious conduct of those administering the punishment escapes scrutiny. The ultimate hypocrisy is that the people claiming the authority to judge, condemn, and punish another human being are themselves engaging in the very cruelty and criminal activities, intimidation, and disregard for human rights that society is supposed to condemn.

Around 1996–1997, Michael Patrick Huntley flew to Colorado to propose that I return to California to establish an internet-hosting business. My family also encouraged my return, and Huntley and I subsequently became involved in Signet-e Services. By approximately 2001, when I was twenty-nine years old, I confronted Huntley about the increasingly disturbing circumstances surrounding my life he was involved in, and the relentless provocations and hostility I was encountering. Rather than provide an explanation, Huntley responded with what I remember as enraged, threatening statements, including “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” “You had better live a careful life,” and “It’s your behavior.” These were accompanied by other cryptic, intrusive, and threatening remarks that offered no explanation of what I supposedly had done wrong. Around the same period, Brian Weaver used the phrase “a public shaming,” presenting yet another vague justification for the treatment without identifying any actual offense.

I did not become seriously interested in digital photography until approximately 2004 or later, when I purchased an inexpensive early digital camera to experiment with the emerging technology. During this period, my longtime friend Brian Longbotham, who had originally been my visual-effects supervisor at Modern Video Film and Universal Studios, became increasingly significant in the setups, provocations, and attempts to frame me through interactions involving public businesses, community members, the Perelman family, police officers, and judicial employees. These encounters also reinforced my concerns about connections between my family, law enforcement, and the judicial system, extending back to the illegal police monitoring from early childhood.

Around 2005, Garrett, a Starbucks employee, made the threatening statement, “It’s your transgressions,” amid the relentless provocations, harassment, and instigation I was encountering in coffee shops and other public settings. By that point, I had come to understand these encounters not as isolated disagreements with individual employees or customers, but as part of what I describe as an increasingly widespread pattern of psychological harassment and attempts to remove me from society. I traced the origins of this pattern back to approximately age five, making it a forty-nine-year history in which ordinary activities were repeatedly turned into accusations, while the underlying objective, as I came to understand it, was to justify my removal from society regardless of what it took or how many people became involved, potentially extending to the broadest networks across the United States and worldwide.

In 2013, I encountered Officer Jensen and LAPD Senior Lead Officer Charles Sean Dinse in connection with more aggressive police events that began while I was sitting on a sidewalk. I recall Jensen stating, “It’s illegal to sit on the sidewalk for longer than five minutes.” I challenged that assertion and requested his badge number. The incident led to criminal charges that were false or unjustified. These events also intensified my longstanding concerns about LAPD involvement, including the role of my former friend Paul Humphrey, whom latched on at the same time as Michael Patrick Huntley, when I was around 14 years old associated with earlier police-related contacts and alleged surveillance activities. The escalating confrontations and legal proceedings are attempts to turn my objections and defensive reactions into evidence against me, while the underlying conduct I was reporting remained unaddressed.

These dates and relationships and timeline matter because the chronology changes how the events must be understood. Huntley’s relationship with me began in adolescence, long before his 2001 statements. His business proposal and my family’s encouragement preceded my return from Colorado. The statements attributed to Huntley and Weaver preceded Garrett’s reference to unspecified “transgressions,” and the later police encounters introduced increasingly serious legal consequences. Examining these events without their sequence, the original conversations, and the surrounding circumstances risks turning my attempts to understand and address the situation into the very behavioral accusations I have spent years challenging. As I have been forced into a no win situation that is based on continual ratcheting until the target and victim are no more.

Huntley, My Family, and My Return From the University of Colorado

Huntley did not enter my life as an unfamiliar business contact. I knew him from adolescence and through my brother’s social circle. He was somewhat older than Jason and several of Jason’s friends. His family connections and our years of familiarity gave him a place of trust. When he flew to Colorado around 1996 or 1997, the proposal to establish an internet-hosting business sounded compatible with my technical interests. I studied fine arts and technology, and the commercial internet was developing rapidly. A hosting provider looked like a legitimate opportunity.

My family was also encouraging me to return to California. That overlap is important to the story: I was developing an independent life in Colorado, and I returned after receiving both family encouragement and a business proposal from someone I had known for years. The business was called Signet-e Services. After our relationship broke down, I reconsidered that entire period, including the family’s influence, Huntley’s timing, and the remarks he later made about the judicial system.

A legitimate business disagreement can be described directly. Partners can talk about revenue, responsibilities, financial records, broken promises, or an unresolved personal conflict. Huntley’s words in 2001 did not clarify any such issue. “World of paranoia” and “enough rope to hang yourself” gave me no answer to what had supposedly gone wrong. Instead, they caused me to revisit earlier events and wonder whether I had misunderstood the purpose of the relationship.

Daryl Oon, The Rhodesian Ridgeback dog,  Rhoada ‘s Shock Collar, and the Difference Between Communication and Punishment

In Colorado I knew Daryl Oon, an exchange student from Singapore and a friend with whom I played pool. And Pool tournaments. We talked about families and childhood experiences. I described my father Ron Perelman’s use of an electronic shock collar on his Rhodesian Ridgeback, Rhoada , to keep the dog from entering the kitchen. I recall an initial handheld push-button collar and a later perimeter arrangement that delivered a correction when Rhoada  approached the restricted area.

That was an ordinary private conversation between friends. I later remembered that Huntley’s Colorado visit happened relatively soon afterward. The chronology prompted questions for me about whether personal conversations traveled beyond the people involved. I cannot establish from timing alone that Huntley knew about the exchange, but the association became important as I tried to understand my later conflicts.

More broadly, the shock collar provided a disturbing analogy for behavioral conditioning through punishment, pain, and negative reinforcement rather than honest, direct communication. Imagine being subjected to punishment for dating someone another person disapproves of, choosing an artistic career, visiting a coffee shop, purchasing a car, pursuing a hobby, exercising at a gym, taking college classes, going for walks too frequently, deciding whom or how many people to date, choosing what food to eat, speaking to certain individuals, or openly discussing your own family. Imagine ordinary private conversations being collected, scrutinized, analyzed, stripped of context, and subsequently used against you as supposed evidence of wrongdoing. Every aspect of your personal life becomes another opportunity for judgment, criticism, and punishment, yet nobody will identify precisely what rule you supposedly violated or who granted them the authority to impose that rule in the first place.

The shock-collar comparison is not limited to being told whom to date or where to go. My point is the increasing punishment I describe when I continue ordinary activities despite someone else’s disapproval. Because a physical shock collar cannot lawfully be placed on a child or an adult as a method of enforcing another person’s personal preferences, I use it as an analogy for indirect forms of pressure: repeated confrontations, accusations, threats, and attempts to obtain a reaction. In this analogy, “control” is the surface explanation; the deeper question is why the punishment keeps escalating and what ultimate result is being pursued.

Each punishment reinforces only one message: someone else has appointed themselves the authority over your life and can inflict further suffering whenever your choices fail to satisfy their personal expectations. But whose expectations? Whose version of morality, acceptable behavior, or perfection must be obeyed? Human beings have the right to make their own lawful decisions, understand specific criticisms, challenge false accusations, and defend themselves against mistreatment. When the rules continually change, the accusations remain deliberately vague, and every attempt to question or resolve the punishment becomes another justification for retaliation, the process ceases to resemble legitimate correction or accountability. It becomes an endless psychological double bind in which independent thought, personal freedom, and ordinary human behavior are treated as offenses, while the people administering the punishment exempt themselves from the very moral and ethical standards they demand from everyone else.

Mike Wexler, Chad Bower’s Canon AE-1, and Photography as an Imaginary Offense

In approximately 1995 or 1996, I took a film photography class at the University of Colorado. I was not an enthusiastic photographer with a collection of cameras, nor was photography a serious hobby at that point. I simply borrowed my friend Chad Bower’s Canon AE-1 to complete assignments for a college class. I did not begin taking photography seriously as a hobby until years later, around 2004 or afterward, when I purchased an inexpensive early digital camera to experiment with the technology.

Around that same college period, Mike Wexler, originally a friend of my brother Jason Perelman, suggested a road trip with the peculiar restriction, “You’re not allowed to take pictures of people.” The statement was particularly strange because taking lawful photographs is not inherently a crime. There are specific laws and boundaries concerning photography, privacy, and harassment, but borrowing a camera for college assignments does not establish obsession, criminal conduct, or harassment. If someone wants to accuse me of wrongdoing involving a camera, they need to identify what I actually did rather than manufacture an offense out of the mere fact that I possessed or used one.

What makes this example particularly significant is what happened later. I discovered blogs containing accusations that I was supposedly harassing people with my camera, despite my photography involving ordinary artistic, recreational, and everyday subjects that often had nothing whatsoever to do with photographing people. This is part of the far broader pattern of worldwide defamation, disinformation, and reputational attacks I have described throughout my life, extending into virtually every aspect of my personal freedom, including my artistic interests, career choices, relationships, flirting with women, friendships, and personal belief system. Ordinary activities are repeatedly transformed into accusations of inappropriate, obsessive, threatening, or supposedly abnormal behavior.

This pattern is reinforced by my father, Ron Perelman’s, recurring statement that I somehow “think differently,” as though having a different personality, perspective, or way of living were itself evidence of wrongdoing or mental illness. But differently from whom? According to whose standards? And what exactly am I supposedly doing differently? Once again, the accusations are deliberately vague, with no specific wrongdoing identified and no direct explanation provided. The result is a psychological double bind in which the person subjected to the accusations is expected to search endlessly for something they supposedly did wrong. I regard these accusations as part of the psychological pressure surrounding the repeated encounters I have described across the United States and internationally. The central contradiction is that I am expected to accept responsibility for supposed offenses that nobody will identify, while the conduct of those confronting and accusing me escapes the same scrutiny.

The irony is that some of the individuals confronting, yelling at, or provoking me in public ended up appearing in my video recordings precisely because I was documenting those encounters. Yet the resulting accusations reversed the circumstances, portraying me as the person harassing others with a camera rather than examining the confrontations that led me to record. The person attempting to document the harassment becomes the accused, while the people initiating the confrontations are presented as victims. Instead of addressing what actually occurred, the existence of the recording itself becomes another supposed offense, reinforcing the same endless cycle of accusation, provocation, and reversed responsibility that runs throughout this account.

The same pattern extends far beyond photography. It begins with something as simple as purchasing a camera, buying a car, taking a college class, working on an automobile, exercising at a gym, visiting a coffee shop, pursuing artistic interests, or developing a relationship. These are ordinary, constructive activities that millions of people engage in every day. Yet in my account, each becomes another occasion for accusations, confrontations, and what I describe as retaliation extending into increasingly broad social circles, including encounters I have experienced across the United States and internationally.

The most disturbing part is the reversal of responsibility. Someone engages in an ordinary activity, another person objects or initiates a confrontation, and the person attempting to continue their life or document the incident becomes the accused. “Look what he’s doing to us” becomes the convenient justification, while the original confrontation, the actual context, and the conduct of those making the accusations are pushed aside.

Consider the difference between the statements “He carried a camera” and “He harassed people with a camera.” The first describes an ordinary fact. The second alleges misconduct. They are not interchangeable, and no amount of repetition makes them interchangeable. The same applies to owning a car, exercising frequently, attending college, dating, or pursuing a creative profession. Someone else’s suspicion or disapproval does not transform these activities into crimes.

The larger problem is what happens when these accusations are circulated and repeated without anyone examining their accuracy. An ordinary photograph becomes an accusation of harassment. A routine visit to a public business becomes an allegation of inappropriate behavior. A disagreement becomes a supposed threat. A defensive reaction becomes evidence of aggression. Each account can then be stripped of the circumstances that preceded it, leaving only a negative characterization of the person being accused.

I have encountered this problem repeatedly since around 5 years old, hence Brian Weaver death threats “It’s a public shaming” showing his motive in their rotating false narratives for 49 years described throughout this article. I am not talking about a single disagreement between two people. I am describing approximately twenty-five years of near-daily encounters, including repeated provocations, hostile confrontations, threats, and disputes over ordinary activities. The experience has extended across workplaces, restaurants, coffee shops, public streets, personal relationships, and other environments where I should have been able to conduct my life without continually defending myself against unexplained accusations.

I have also described the circulation of accusations through broad social environments, including people and institutions extending beyond my immediate community. The possibility that private information has been improperly collected or distributed is especially serious when the resulting accusations concern criminality, dangerousness, or mental illness. What should be examined is the source of the information, whether the accusation is true, and whether important context has been deliberately excluded.

An accusation becomes particularly destructive when the person making it refuses to identify the supposed offense while insisting that the accused deserves punishment. The result is an impossible standard: everything I do can become another accusation, yet nothing I say can resolve an accusation that nobody will clearly explain. In the end it is clearly designed to create the appearance of mental illness, when none exists out of hate.

This is precisely the hypocrisy behind Brian Weaver’s public-shaming narrative with the Perelman family and their Judicial and Police friends. The supposed wrongdoing begins with something harmless, but the resulting condemnation becomes vastly more serious than the original event. In the process, my ordinary activities are treated as offenses while the conduct of those confronting or accusing me escapes equivalent scrutiny.

The Ultimate Contradiction: When Evidence of Victimization Becomes Another Reason for Retaliation

Perhaps the most disturbing contradiction in this entire situation is the hostility I have encountered from police officers, judicial employees, and individuals associated with the psychology community when I attempt to document and expose the misconduct directed against me. Instead of addressing the recorded provocations, confrontations, threats, and interference with my ordinary activities, attention repeatedly shifts toward my reactions, my efforts to collect evidence, and my refusal to remain silent.

I have spent years documenting encounters that interrupt my ability to work, socialize, pursue hobbies, visit public establishments, and otherwise live an independent life. Yet the act of documenting these incidents becomes another subject of condemnation. The person trying to establish what happened is treated as the problem, while the conduct being documented is pushed aside.

This is particularly disturbing when police officers or judicial employees respond with hostility rather than examining the evidence. A person who records a threatening encounter, challenges a false accusation, or demonstrates that an incident has been presented without its original context should not face greater scrutiny simply for defending themselves. Yet that is the recurring contradiction in my experiences. Instead of addressing the accuracy of the accusations, the attention shifts toward why I am recording, why I am speaking publicly, why I am challenging official accounts, or why I refuse to accept negative characterizations of my behavior.

The reversal is especially troubling when photographs, recordings, or other documentation contradict the account being used against me. A recording can preserve the words spoken, the order of events, and the actions that preceded a confrontation. If that record is ignored while the final reaction becomes the entire story, the resulting judgment is fundamentally distorted.

Evidence that should help establish whether I was subjected to wrongdoing becomes another source of conflict with institutions responsible for protecting people from wrongdoing.

My account involves much more than isolated disputes. I have described approximately twenty-five years of near-daily provocations, confrontations, threats, and psychological pressure, extending from public businesses and community encounters into disputes involving police and the judicial system. These experiences have led me to examine the circulation of damaging personal information and accusations across increasingly broad social networks, including connections I associate with people throughout the United States and internationally.

What makes the situation so disturbing is the double standard. When I attempt to continue an ordinary activity, the activity becomes another subject of criticism. When I document a confrontation, the documentation becomes the offense. When I challenge an accusation, the challenge itself becomes another example of supposedly inappropriate behavior. Yet the conduct that initiated the confrontation receives little or no comparable attention.

This is the psychological double bind running throughout my account. I am expected to accept accusations that remain undefined, endure the resulting consequences, and refrain from questioning the people responsible. But when I speak, record, investigate, or defend myself, those efforts become additional reasons for condemnation.

The family dimension introduces an additional concern. My brother Jason Perelman and the longstanding family conflicts dating back to childhood are central to this history. The involvement I attribute to family members, including my sister-in-law Jennifer Pilchick Perelman, raises questions about the circulation of psychiatric characterizations and personal accusations beyond the immediate circumstances in which they originated. The important question is whether those characterizations were used to discredit my reports of mistreatment instead of examining the incidents, recordings, and evidence themselves.

The fundamental issue is accountability. If evidence contradicts an accusation, the accusation should be reconsidered. If a recording documents a provocation, that provocation should not disappear while the resulting reaction is treated as the entire event. If an official report contains inaccurate information, the discrepancy should be addressed rather than defended through another damaging characterization. And if someone circulates false statements about my mental health or conduct, those statements should be examined for accuracy rather than accepted because of the speaker’s professional standing or family connections.

The ultimate hypocrisy is that the people claiming the authority to judge my behavior have, in the encounters I describe, directed extraordinary hostility toward my attempts to defend myself while the wrongdoing I am reporting remains unaddressed. The same individuals who demand accountability from me must be prepared to answer for their own statements and actions. Public shaming cannot become a justification for suppressing evidence, punishing legitimate complaints, or treating the person reporting mistreatment as the offender.

Jennifer Pilchick Perelman: Political Connections, Legal Circles, and the Perelman Family’s Judicial Relationships

My sister-in-law, Jennifer Pilchick Perelman, is the wife of my brother Jason Perelman. Jennifer is not simply a family member expressing private opinions. She is an attorney who entered the political arena, running for the United States Congress in Florida twice, in 2020 and 2024. Her professional and political activities place her within legal and political circles, making the circulation of accusations concerning my character and mental health particularly important.

Her family background adds another connection to the legal profession. Her father, Jay Pilchick, has been associated with court-reporting services in Florida. This is particularly noteworthy in the broader context of my account because I have also had disputes involving people connected to the legal and judicial professions, including court reporter Debbie Wollman, whose property adjoins my townhouse and who has connections to the Van Nuys courthouse.

I have described statements attributed to Jennifer, including communications among politically and legally connected acquaintances concerning the idea that I should be portrayed as mentally unstable. These statements are particularly important to my account because of the repeated use of psychiatric terminology to dismiss my reports of mistreatment rather than address the actual incidents, recordings, and evidence. My concerns also involve Jason and the longstanding family conflicts that preceded my adult encounters with police and the judicial system.

Jennifer’s congressional campaigns and legal career are relevant parts of her public professional history. Her father’s reported court-reporting background and the relationships I have described provide additional family context. Those professional connections do not independently establish improper access to judicial resources or participation in misconduct. The central question is whether particular communications or actions contributed to false accusations, interference, or attempts to discredit evidence.

What makes these relationships significant is the contrast between the professional responsibilities associated with law and the conduct at issue in my account. Attorneys, police officers, judicial employees, and others involved in the administration of justice are expected to recognize the importance of evidence, due process, and the distinction between an accusation and an established fact.

The geographical distance also raises a fundamental question about personal autonomy. Why should relatives or acquaintances living in Florida or elsewhere possess any authority over my career, relationships, personal decisions, or daily activities in California? What legitimate interest would justify influencing how strangers, employers, community members, or officials perceive my character? And why should another person’s disapproval of my choices outweigh the actual facts?

Psychiatric labels should not become weapons in personal or family disputes. Professional relationships should not become substitutes for proof. And political influence should not determine whether someone’s account of wrongdoing receives a fair examination.

If someone has evidence of criminal behavior, they should identify the conduct and provide the evidence. If someone has a legitimate personal complaint, they should explain it. But vague psychiatric labels, moral judgments, and reputational accusations cannot replace facts.

The issue is not whether Jennifer pursued a political career or whether her family has professional connections to the legal system. Those activities are lawful. The issue is whether personal accusations concerning me have been repeated or used in ways that interfere with my ability to defend myself and live independently.

The hypocrisy remains the same: why should people with legal knowledge, professional influence, or political connections be able to condemn my ordinary life choices while refusing to apply the same standards of truth, fairness, and accountability to their own conduct?

Political influence does not make an accusation true. A legal career does not establish moral superiority. Family relationships do not give anyone authority over another adult’s lawful decisions.

No one becomes judge, jury, and executioner because they possess a law degree, know people in government, run for Congress, or have relatives working within the legal profession. The same standards of evidence, accountability, and individual rights must apply to everyone.

Kelly Hatch: Intentional Coincidences, Southern Oregon State College, and Permission Changes the Story

To understand the out of context motive, intent, disinformation, defamation of character and behaviors involving Kelly Hatch and everyone else working with the Police, and Government to remove children from society out of hate, it is important to explain who she was, where she came from, and how she entered my life. Kelly attended Calabasas High School, the same high school I attended in California. We were not friends, did not belong to the same social circles, and had virtually no relationship or meaningful interaction during high school. Yet after I graduated and went away to college, Kelly appeared at the same relatively small institution I had chosen: Southern Oregon State College in Ashland, Oregon.

The circumstances surrounding my selection of Southern Oregon State College are particularly important. My mother, Anita Perelman, told me that she had college counselors who could recommend schools for me to attend. Rather than independently researching and selecting colleges entirely on my own, I was presented with a limited collection of recommendations, including approximately three schools in California and one in Oregon. I was young, following the guidance presented to me, and did not give much thought to the implications of those recommendations. I selected the school in Oregon, effectively choosing the out-of-state option from the list I had been given.

When I arrived at Southern Oregon State College, I encountered a young woman whom I vaguely recognized. We began talking, and she mentioned that she had attended Calabasas High School. It turned out to be Kelly Hatch, someone from my own high school whom I had barely known and had no reason to expect to encounter in Ashland, Oregon.

At first glance, the situation could be dismissed as a coincidence. Two students from the same Southern California high school happened to attend the same college in Oregon. But as I later examined the recurring encounters, accusations, and unusual relationships throughout my life, the circumstances surrounding Kelly became particularly significant. My college selection had been influenced by recommendations arranged through my mother, and someone from my former high school, with whom I had no established friendship, had independently appeared at the same institution.

I call these situations “intentional coincidences”—encounters that initially appear accidental but later become significant because of the circumstances surrounding them and the interactions that follow. The distinction is important: an apparent coincidence does not, by itself, prove that an encounter was arranged. What makes Kelly’s presence relevant to my account is the subsequent conduct, the disputed interpretations of ordinary interactions, and the recurring pattern of familiar individuals appearing in different stages of my life over and over nonstop with the same disinformation methods to try to get reactions, discredit, isolate, and try to create the appearance of mental illness or instability connected to illegal police operations to remove from society out of insecurity, hate, and fear.

One incident out of countless incidences involving Kelly and others illustrates precisely how harmless conduct can be transformed into a completely different accusation which applies to almost every aspect of my life since a young age. I was installing a car stereo in the parking lot in my Saturn and needed an X-Acto knife from her art supplies. I asked Kelly whether I could borrow hers. Her response, as I remember it, was direct: “Go in my room, you know where it is. The door is open.” She explicitly gave me permission to retrieve the knife.

There was nothing extraordinary about the interaction like every other countless events for 49 years. I was installing a car stereo with a plastic 1 din stereo plate which needed a hole cut in it, needed a tool, asked to borrow it, and received permission to retrieve it. That should have been the entire story. But remove the permission and disseminate false stories worldwide, and a completely different narrative can be constructed to create worldwide lynch mobs out of someone’s hate for a young child with the Police, and their Judicial friends. “I entered Kelly’s room” is not the same as “I entered Kelly’s room without permission.” The first describes an ordinary action whose circumstances still need to be understood. The second accuses someone of crossing a boundary without authorization. Omitting a single sentence—“Go in my room, you know where it is. The door is open”—can transform an innocent interaction into the appearance of trespassing, stalking, or other misconduct.

This is why the Kelly Hatch incident has remained significant in my account of the false narratives and accusations surrounding my life. It illustrates a recurring pattern in which ordinary, harmless interactions become the basis for serious negative characterizations, while the facts that explain those interactions are conveniently omitted. Someone gives me permission to enter a room, but the resulting accusation suggests that I entered without permission. Someone invites me somewhere, but the invitation disappears, and my arrival is portrayed as suspicious. Someone initiates a confrontation, but the resulting account focuses exclusively on my defensive reaction while ignoring the provocation that preceded it. In each case, removing the original context transforms an ordinary interaction into the appearance of wrongdoing.

What makes this pattern especially disturbing is the response I have encountered whenever I attempt to address these contradictions, explain what actually occurred, or obtain a direct answer. Instead of discussing the facts, I am met with statements such as “Nothing is going on,” “You’re imagining it,” “You’re too sensitive,” “You suffer from paranoia,” “You’re schizophrenic,” “You think differently,” or “You know what you did.” Yet the supposed wrongdoing is never clearly identified. There is no specific accusation that can be examined, no direct explanation, and no meaningful opportunity to resolve the dispute through ordinary, mature communication. The conversation is repeatedly redirected away from the events themselves and toward accusations about my mental health, personality, or supposed inability to understand reality.

Yet the police continue arresting me on charges that were falsified by the Los Angeles Police Department, while repeated provocations, harassment, and instigation are used to portray me as crazy, dangerous, or mentally ill. This escalated after around 2001 after noticing the mass stalking networks and asking Michael Patrick Huntley what was going on with his death threats with the Police and Judicial System: “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” and “We’re using the judicial system against you.” With more than twenty criminal charges that were falsified by the Los Angeles Police Department, alongside years of documented confrontations and provocations. The central issue is the use of my reactions to these encounters as grounds for further arrests, psychiatric labeling, and attempts to remove me from society, while the conduct that provoked those reactions remains unaddressed.

The hostility has extended far beyond vague accusations to include direct death threats, alongside what I describe as an extraordinarily large network of stalking and harassment groups involving members of the Perelman family, police officers, and individuals across the United States and worldwide. Including the explicitly racist “No relaxing for you, nigger” for kissing a black girl at 8 years old and “You had better accept what’s going on, or it will get a lot worse.” These statements are not explanations of wrongdoing. They are intimidation, and the racial language makes the first statement particularly degrading. When a person attempts to resolve a dispute and instead receives threats, ridicule, or demands for unquestioning acceptance, the situation has moved far beyond any legitimate disagreement about behavior.

Another disturbing aspect is the use of suggestions about extraordinary importance, secret organizations, or supposed hidden meanings. I have been in nonstop encounters that are designed to encourage speculation about being part of something larger, only for questions about those encounters to become another reason to portray me as paranoid, delusional, or suffering from schizophrenia. Asking someone to explain an ambiguous statement is not the same as claiming membership in a secret organization. Likewise, refusing to accept an unexplained accusation does not establish mental illness. Ambiguous remarks cannot, by themselves, prove that anyone deliberately engineered such an impression, but neither should psychiatric labels be used to evade direct questions about identifiable conduct.

The contradiction is extraordinary. I am asking ordinary questions, attempting to reconstruct events, identifying missing context, documenting confrontations, and seeking direct explanations. Meanwhile, the responses include anger, threats, shifting accusations, personal condemnation, and refusals to discuss the original facts. The person seeking an explanation is portrayed as irrational no matter how obvious the situation, while the refusal to explain the accusation is treated as perfectly acceptable. That is the psychological double bind running throughout this account.

The larger concern is the cumulative effect of this pattern, extending from childhood into approximately twenty-five years of near-daily experiences that I have described as psychological harassment and intimidation. But the central issue does not require every encounter to have the same explanation: ordinary conduct must be judged according to what actually happened, not according to accusations manufactured by removing permission, invitations, context, or the conduct that preceded a reaction.

The wider issue involves the collection and circulation of personal information. Individuals possessed information about my earlier relationships, conversations, interests, and activities that they should not have had because they were not directly involved. In the case of Kelly, the chronology dates to approximately 1991, before the World Wide Web became widely accessible. Information circulated through personal relationships, telephone calls, institutional records, letters, and local social networks. The absence of modern social media did not prevent gossip, false accusations, and coordinated harassment from occurring.

Negative accounts of my interactions with Kelly were circulated to other students, community members, and authorities. These circumstances reflect what I call the “cry-wolf victim game”—a situation in which an ordinary or permitted interaction is subsequently portrayed as threatening or improper, placing me in the position of defending conduct that was never wrongful to begin with. Kelly’s presence and actions fit into the broader pattern involving individuals connected to earlier family and community conflicts, including police and government contacts.

The pattern continued at the University of Colorado through situations involving invitations, open doors, vehicles, and people whose circumstances shared similarities with earlier encounters. These incidents connected back to what happened at Southern Oregon State College. An innocent request to borrow an X-Acto knife became associated with accusations of inappropriate behavior, just as taking a photography class became associated with accusations of harassment or pursuing an ordinary relationship became grounds for accusations of wrongdoing.

The central issue is not whether Kelly Hatch and I happened to attend the same college. It is how an ordinary acquaintance from Calabasas High School became connected to a series of interactions whose original facts were straightforward, yet were subsequently distorted through false accusations, missing context, and the circulation of damaging information that is unexplained and worldwide.

The same question applies throughout the history of public shaming in this article: why should an ordinary, lawful interaction become the foundation for a vastly more serious accusation? Why should permission be ignored? Why should I be denied the opportunity to explain what happened? Especially on insignificant situations in which no one could care less about.  And why should an accusation receive more attention than the facts that directly contradict it?

Intentional coincidences, selective omissions, and distorted narratives are central to this pattern. But the decisive fact in this particular incident remains simple: I asked Kelly Hatch to borrow a tool, and she told me to go into her room and retrieve it because the door was open. That permission changes the entire story.

University Of Colorado Internet Chat, a Jeep guilt and idea of reference, and Similar Encounters

During my time in University of Colorado around 1994, a woman I met through Internet Relay Chat (IRC) in the #Colorado Channel, who wanted me to know she drove a Jeep, like Kelly hatch, invited me to a residence and told me the door was open and that I did not need to knock. I knocked anyway, and a Black man answered the door. When I asked for the woman, he told me that nobody by that name lived there. This was not an ordinary invitation gone as expected. The circumstances raised serious concerns about whether I had been deliberately directed to the wrong residence, potentially placing me in a situation where entering without knocking could have resulted in accusations of trespassing or breaking and entering.

The invitation, references to a Jeep, and later encounters shared striking similarities with the earlier Kelly Hatch episode. A Gothic-looking young woman in my astronomy class, with a darker, olive-brown complexion and long, straight black hair, subsequently moved into the room directly above mine. Her appearance, including her dark hair, complexion, and overall style, reminded me of Kelly Hatch. Ironically, when I lived in Emerald Hall at Southern Oregon State College in 1991, Kelly Hatch had also lived directly above me on the second floor. The similarities in their appearances, the fact that both women lived directly above me, and the recurring circumstances involving vehicles became particularly noticeable. On one occasion, I noticed that the woman in Colorado had left her keys in her car door.

What made this especially significant was a story Kelly Hatch had previously told me. According to Kelly, someone had stolen her Jeep Cherokee, driven it to downtown Ashland near the Oregon Shakespeare Festival, and left the keys in the vehicle. The similarities involving the Jeep, the keys, the open-door invitations, and the women living directly above me became part of what I describe as recurring attempts to create associations between unrelated encounters and earlier people in my life.

These incidents raised the disturbing question of whether individuals were deliberately imitating circumstances from my past to provoke reactions or encourage interpretations that could later be characterized as paranoia, schizophrenia, or ideas of reference. The possibility of such manipulation is particularly serious when police officers or mental-health professionals become involved, because an ordinary response to a confusing encounter can be presented without the circumstances that prompted it.

But why would anyone deliberately attempt to manufacture the appearance of mental illness in another human being? The concern at the center of my account is the use of psychiatric accusations as a justification for exclusion, coercive intervention, and removal from society—not the treatment of an actual medical condition.

This is not about a single incident or an isolated coincidence. The history I am describing extends back to approximately 1977, when I was five years old, escalating over decades into what I have experienced as near-daily provocations, hostility, intimidation, and psychological harassment across increasingly broad social environments throughout the United States and internationally. The frequency and magnitude are central to the situation. At some point, the issue is no longer simply questioning one unusual encounter but documenting the repetition of hostile interactions, unexplained accusations, and people responding with anger and rage when I attempt to address what is happening.

One recurring explanation has been that people are merely “teasing” me, or that my reactions demonstrate mental illness. But teasing ordinarily occurs within an identifiable social interaction. These are not necessarily my friends, acquaintances, or people with whom I have any established relationship. I encounter strangers in public places, including locations far removed from my home, all across the United States, and Worldwide communications across the Internet, and the question becomes why their behavior sometimes resembles earlier hostile encounters. If someone in Mississippi makes a hostile remark, what connects that person to a disagreement I had in California and forty years ago? What information did they actually possess, and where did it originate? Those are questions about the circumstances, not proof that every stranger belongs to the same operation.

My mother, Anita Perelman, once responded with the expression, “We don’t know what came first, the chicken or the egg.” My response is that I reject the suggestion that my attempts to defend myself created the original accusations. The central issue is the lies, hostility, and disinformation I have been challenging, not my refusal to accept them. Noticing unheard of violating behaviors in 2001, was met with from Michael Patrick Huntley “World of Paranoia”, then the answer is obvious. That Mike Huntley since 14 years old was involved in something highly illegal and unheard of. If a damaging narrative is deliberately circulated among large groups, it does not spontaneously create itself. Someone must originate the information, others must distribute it, and its accuracy must be examined. The responsibility belongs to those who create and knowingly spread false accusations—not to the person attempting to correct them.

That is why the scale of the public-shaming narrative matters. When accusations appear to follow someone across different communities and over many years, the essential questions are who originated them, which individuals actually circulated them, and whether the same false information was repeated. A campaign of deliberate disinformation would require identifiable acts of creation and distribution; it cannot be justified as harmless teasing merely because those participating call it a joke.

The concrete facts remain essential. I was invited to a residence and explicitly told not to knock, but I knocked anyway. A man answered and said the woman did not live there. Earlier, Kelly Hatch had given me permission to retrieve an X-Acto knife from her room. These were actual conversations and actions, not admissions of wrongdoing. An invitation is not trespassing, and permission is not breaking and entering. These incidents form part of a recurring pattern of provocations, distorted accusations, and attempts to portray ordinary behavior as criminal or evidence of mental illness. The pattern has escalated over decades, accompanied by increasing hostility, anger, and retaliation, including more than twenty police charges that were false or fraudulent, repeated arrests, disputed trials, and additional accusations built upon earlier ones. I trace the origins of this treatment to approximately age five, nearly forty-nine years ago, and my objections did not create the original conflict. The more these accusations accumulate, the greater the consequences of acknowledging the damage done to my life. Rather than addressing that damage, the hostility intensifies when I defend myself or challenge the official accounts. The central issue is not my reaction to the accusations, but the escalating punishment, the failure to correct false records, and the refusal to hold those responsible accountable.

A University Of Colorado Roommate’s Gay Guest: Declining an Advance Is Not Wrongdoing

During my years at the University of Colorado, my roommates brought a gay man home who appeared interested in me. I had not sought him out, met him at a bar, flirted with him, or expressed any romantic or sexual interest in him. He simply showed up, entered my room while I was preparing to sleep, lay down on the floor, and asked me what I was thinking about. I was not interested in pursuing anything with him. There was no Dialogue, foreplay, no sexual encounter, and no relationship. Nothing happened beyond that brief interaction. Other then him laying on my floor, and asking me what I was thinking about.

Yet this ordinary exercise of personal choice became another source of accusations portraying me as supposedly homophobic, hateful, angry, or prejudiced against gay people. I subsequently encountered hostility, confrontations, and remarks that I associated with these accusations, particularly involving gay employees at Starbucks whom I experienced as stalking, harassing, and provoking me; employees and customers at other coffee shops; gay neighbors lashing out at me with anger and rage; and individuals in social environments across different locations.

What makes these encounters particularly disturbing is the extraordinary passage of time and geographical distance separating them from the original incident. Some occurred ten to twenty years later, in entirely different states, involving people who had no apparent connection to the insignificant encounter during my college years. Yet I continued encountering accusations and hostility that I associated with the same supposed wrongdoing, raising serious questions about how information concerning an ordinary private interaction could have circulated so widely and persisted for so many years.

The magnitude of these experiences raises a much larger question: How does an insignificant encounter from someone’s college years become associated with sweeping judgments about their character, appearing years or decades later in different communities, states, and social environments? The issue is not merely the original accusation, but the apparent persistence and renewal of negative characterizations long after the circumstances that supposedly justified them have passed.

This is central to the pattern I am describing throughout this article. I trace the origins of these accusations and negative labels to an extremely early age, with later incidents becoming additional entries in an expanding collection of supposed behavioral offenses. The labels do not simply disappear with time. They can be repeated, revived, and presented to new groups of people as though they represent established facts, even when the original circumstances have been distorted, stripped of context, or never properly explained.

The result is a potentially endless cycle in which each new encounter becomes another opportunity to revive an old accusation, introduce additional allegations, and condemn someone for events that occurred years or decades earlier. Rather than examining the original facts, the accusation itself becomes the enduring narrative, while the person being accused is repeatedly forced to defend the same ordinary decisions against new people in new places.

An accusation does not become true because it survives for twenty years, crosses state lines, or is repeated by successive groups of people. Repetition is not corroboration, and the passage of time does not transform a distorted account of an innocent interaction into evidence of wrongdoing.

Obviously Not being sexually or romantically interested in one gay man does not mean I hate gay people. Nobody is required to have sex, date someone, or enter a relationship to satisfy another person’s expectations. The same freedom I claim for myself belongs to everyone else, regardless of sexual orientation. Turning an unreciprocated advance into an accusation of homophobia or hatred is an extraordinary distortion of what actually happened.

And once again, this is supposedly justified as “public shaming” because of “my behavior.” But what behavior? Absolutely nothing inappropriate, criminal, or even remotely significant occurred. A man I had never pursued romantically or sexually entered my room, expressed interest, and I did not reciprocate. That was the entire encounter. Yet I subsequently faced accusations portraying me as homophobic, hateful, angry, or prejudiced. This illustrates the broader problem of defamation and disinformation: taking an insignificant event, stripping away its context, inventing wrongdoing, and turning the resulting fiction into an attack on someone’s character.

The same negative portrayals have repeatedly surfaced in the hostile encounters I have experienced across different social environments, raising serious questions about the circulation of accusations through Internet-based propaganda, whisper networks, and other channels extending far beyond the original participants. The problem is not simply that someone might have misunderstood an encounter. It is the repeated transformation of ordinary personal decisions into supposedly serious moral or psychological offenses, followed by hostility toward my attempts to explain what actually happened.

Each new accusation adds another supposed offense to an expanding narrative portraying me as dangerous, hateful, or psychologically unstable, while the underlying events reveal nothing remotely resembling those characterizations. The supposed wrongdoing begins with something as insignificant as declining an unwanted romantic or sexual advance, yet the resulting condemnation becomes vastly more serious than the original interaction.

The hypocrisy is extraordinary. Other people are free to decide whom they date, whom they sleep with, and whom they reject. Nobody ordinarily expects a person to justify their lack of romantic interest to an entire community, much less strangers in coffee shops or people in other states and countries. Yet the public-shaming narrative attempts to turn that same personal freedom into a supposed behavioral offense when I exercise it.

The central question remains: how does declining a romantic advance become evidence of hatred, dangerousness, or mental illness, and why should anyone have the authority to punish me for it? Just like kissing a black girl around 1980 when I was approximately eight years old at Sunny Skies Day Camp. The original encounter involved no wrongdoing, no victim, and no legitimate reason for unheard of methods of punishment. But the accusation becomes another justification for hostility under the endlessly repeated excuse: “It’s your behavior.”

Garrett at Starbucks, 2005: “It’s Your Transgressions”—The Hypocrisy of Self-Appointed Judges and Executioners

But what transgressions? Was someone objecting to a photograph, a friendship, a date, or the fact that I returned to a coffee shop regularly? Why not say what the offense was? Even if someone had genuinely behaved badly, unrelated people would not gain the right to threaten or harass, stalk in mass groups, and do whatever it takes to remove them from society with daily attacks with the Judicial System. Garrett’s phrase implied guilt but supplied no specifics, just as the other statements did. It left me to guess at an accusation I had never been allowed to answer.

Consider a date where someone yawns. The other person thinks they are bored. The person explains they are tired. Even if the explanation is rejected, the parties can simply stop dating. Nobody acquires authority to conduct a prolonged campaign of punishment over a misunderstanding. The same is true when a coffee-shop employee dislikes someone’s feet resting on a chair. A reasonable request—“Please take your feet off the chair”—addresses the issue. Transforming it into a judgment about the person’s entire life is disproportionate.

Around 2005, Garrett, a Starbucks employee, made the threatening statement, “It’s your transgressions.” During that period, I was encountering frequent, sometimes near-constant provocations, hostility, and psychological harassment in coffee shops, including Starbucks and other establishments. Some encounters involved employees, while others involved customers whose behavior became confrontational. These experiences continued across numerous locations for years, forming part of what I describe as an increasingly widespread pattern of psychological terror, intimidation, and attempts to interfere with my ordinary life.

But here is the much bigger question: Has Garrett, or anyone else involved in the hostility I have encountered over the past forty-nine years, ever stopped to question whether organizing groups to stalk, terrorize, threaten, or attempt to remove another human being from society is morally or ethically acceptable? What could possibly justify that kind of conduct? Even if someone had committed a genuine offense, that would not give strangers the right to become vigilantes, administer punishment, or threaten someone’s life.

Garrett was not my friend. He was a Starbucks employee inserting himself into my personal life and passing judgment on supposed “transgressions” without identifying a single specific offense. What transgressions? What did I supposedly do? What information was he relying upon, and who gave him the authority to judge or punish me? His statement was not an explanation. It was an accusation presented as though my guilt had already been established and no further discussion was necessary.

The hypocrisy is that Garrett’s statement places the supposed wrongdoing entirely upon me while leaving the morality of the punishment unquestioned. If the harassment and threats I have described were being carried out deliberately by groups of people, their conduct would not become acceptable because someone claimed I had committed an unspecified transgression. The individuals making accusations would remain responsible for their own actions. The seriousness of harassment, intimidation, or threats cannot be erased by pointing toward someone else’s supposed imperfections.

This contradiction extends far beyond Garrett. Throughout my life, I have encountered accusations and negative characterizations involving family members, teachers, acquaintances, police officers, judicial employees, and people in public establishments. Yet the recurring response has been another version of the same vague condemnation. Brian Weaver called it “a public shaming.” Michael Patrick Huntley said “World of paranoia” and “We’re using the judicial system against you.” My father, Ron Perelman, said “You know what you did.” My mother, Anita Perelman, said “Your past caught up with you.” Garrett called it “your transgressions.” Each statement implies that I deserve consequences while refusing to identify the supposed wrongdoing or explain why the treatment itself should be considered acceptable.

And what are some of the ordinary activities that have become subjects of these accusations? Taking photography, Graphics, Art, Internet technologies, IT, Server Architectures, choosing a career, talking to women, dating, pursuing relationships, visiting coffee shops, exercising, taking walks, or engaging in innocent childhood interactions or any type of interaction to this day with their increased hostility. The supposed offense can change from one encounter to another, but the underlying expectation remains that I should accept condemnation without receiving an explanation.

Even if any or every accusation were true, it would not authorize anyone to stalk, terrorize, torture, threaten, Incarcerate, or kill another human being. That is the moral distinction missing from the public-shaming justification. People do not acquire the authority to become judge, jury, and executioner merely because they disapprove of someone. A group does not acquire that authority because its members share the same anger. And a person’s supposed past does not give strangers permission to commit crimes against them.

The most disturbing implication of Garrett’s statement is the apparent willingness to excuse mistreatment through an undefined accusation. I cannot establish from those three words alone what Garrett knew, intended, or supported. But his statement offered no condemnation of the hostile conduct I was encountering, no explanation of the supposed transgressions, and no meaningful attempt to address the circumstances. Instead, the responsibility was placed upon me.

That is the central hypocrisy: the person being condemned is expected to answer for every imagined imperfection, while the people condemning him are not subjected to the same moral scrutiny. Their supposed justification is always that I did something wrong. But the question they refuse to confront is whether their own conduct is wrong.

A person’s past does not grant anyone a license to destroy their future. An accusation does not establish guilt. Personal disapproval does not create legal authority. And public shaming does not transform threats, intimidation, or deliberate cruelty into justice.

The question Garrett’s statement never answers is not merely “What were my transgressions?” It is “Why would anyone think another person’s supposed transgressions gave them the right to inflict punishment in the first place?”

Brian Longbotham: “Stop Doing What You’re Doing,” Hollywood Productions, and the Manufacturing of False Narratives

Brian Longbotham was originally my visual-effects supervisor at Modern Video Film, where I worked on television and Hollywood productions, including projects associated with Universal Studios. Among the productions I remember were two pilots. Hollyweird and another pilot called Spy Game. Our relationship began professionally, but Longbotham subsequently presented himself as a friend after I left the company. His involvement became significant in the broader history of encounters, provocations, and situations that I associate with attempts to portray my ordinary activities as criminal, obsessive, inappropriate, or evidence of mental illness.

One of Longbotham’s particularly strange statements was “Stop doing what you’re doing.” Stop doing what, exactly? We had known each other for years, worked together professionally, and maintained what appeared to be a friendship. I was not engaged in any identifiable wrongdoing when he made the remark, and he provided no specific explanation. Was he referring to my career, my personal relationships, my photography, or something else entirely? The statement was another vague accusation that placed me in the position of having to guess what I supposedly needed to stop doing.

This was not an isolated example of the cryptic language I encountered. Statements such as “What do you do?”, “Keep doing what you’re doing,”, “You know what you did,” and “Your past caught up with you” repeatedly appeared in encounters that I experienced as hostile or confrontational. The words themselves can be ordinary, but when an accusation is implied without identifying an offense, the person receiving it is left with nothing concrete to address. The speaker can subsequently deny that anything unusual was said, while the recipient is criticized for attempting to understand the exchange.

Longbotham’s involvement became especially significant because of his connections to Hollywood productions, visual effects, media, and photography. I have described a recurring pattern in which encounters involving films, television, celebrities, or artistic activities became associated with negative interpretations of my behavior. The result was a series of situations that raised questions about whether ordinary professional and creative interests were being used to portray me as someone who supposedly conformed to media, confused fiction with reality, was abusive, rude, an asshole, or exhibited symptoms of psychiatric instability.

My concerns also involve the way Longbotham maintained a personal connection after our professional relationship ended. What appeared to be friendship became entangled with encounters involving businesses, work opportunities, photography, and accusations about my behavior. The recurring problem was the transformation of ordinary activities into supposed evidence that I was reckless, rude, dangerous, obsessive, a public nuisance, or psychologically unstable. Rather than identifying an actual offense, the negative characterization seemed to change according to the circumstances.

One particularly significant example involved photography and an encounter concerning actors Martin Sheen and Téa Leoni around 2005. Brian Longbotham suggested, “Let’s go to Starbucks and play paparazzi,” after which the actors appeared and I was encouraged to photograph them. Given that Longbotham was my former visual-effects supervisor and had been hiring me for jobs at Universal Studios, the timing and circumstances raised serious questions about whether he had arranged the encounter. More importantly, Martin Sheen and Téa Leoni are public figures, and my right to engage in lawful photography in public places is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2(a) of the California Constitution. California Civil Code § 3344(d) also protects qualifying news and public-affairs uses of photographs without requiring the subject’s consent. I was not a paparazzo, but even if I had been, taking lawful photographs of celebrities, including photographs sold for editorial purposes, would not constitute a crime merely because the subjects were famous. I regard Longbotham’s suggestion and the subsequent accusations as an attempt to stage another situation that could be used against me on these nonstop rotating 49 year insignificant situations that normally no one could care less about.

But the much bigger question is why was Brian Longbotham involving himself in these situations with a young artist and technology professional who had come out of college and was simply trying to establish a career and figure out what he wanted to do with his life? Why would my ordinary interests in visual effects, Hollywood productions, and photography become opportunities for accusations rather than professional development? And why would someone who originally supervised my work and later presented himself as a friend continually become associated with encounters that placed my behavior under scrutiny with worldwide groups of strangers?

This is the same fundamental contradiction illustrated by the gay visitor my roommates brought home at the University of Colorado. I was not interested in pursuing a relationship with him, and nothing happened. Yet I subsequently encountered accusations about homophobia, hatred, and inappropriate behavior that bore no resemblance to that brief interaction. The same principle applies to taking a photograph, choosing a career, or kissing a Black girl when I was approximately eight years old. These are ordinary personal experiences, not extraordinary offenses warranting punishment or social exclusion.

The recurring issue is the inflation of insignificant events into sweeping accusations about my character. Brian Longbotham used the expression “laundry list” in connection with behaviors and activities, a phrase that captures the accumulation of supposedly objectionable conduct. A photograph becomes harassment. A rejected romantic advance becomes hatred. An innocent childhood kiss becomes a supposed character defect. Ordinary activities are repeatedly reinterpreted as evidence that I am obsessive, dangerous, psychologically unstable, or somehow criminal.

I have described the broader pattern as accusations and negative characterizations extending through social networks across the United States and internationally, with each new controversy adding another item to the supposed laundry list. The central question is how harmless, isolated experiences could become grounds for accusations so wildly disproportionate to what actually occurred—and why the people making those accusations are not held to the same standards of truth and accountability. Nothing about a lawful photograph, an unwanted romantic advance, or an innocent childhood interaction justifies threats, harassment, psychiatric labeling, or attempts to remove someone from society. The supposed offense keeps changing, but the public-shaming excuse remains the same: “It’s your behavior.”

What makes this example important is its relationship to the earlier photography incidents. Around 1995–1996, I was simply completing a University of Colorado photography class with Chad Bower’s borrowed Canon AE-1. Mike Wexler, originally a friend of my brother Jason, made the strange statement, “You’re not allowed to take pictures of people.” Years later, around 2004, I purchased an inexpensive digital camera to experiment with photography as a hobby. I subsequently discovered online accusations portraying me as someone who harassed people with a camera. The actual activities were ordinary photography, professional creative work, and the documentation of confrontations occurring around me. The real unspoken problem is, that these mass groups already know of me, and are looking for methods to remove me from society, just like Kelly Hatch. Told to cry wolf, and rile up the masses worldwide with newer and newer fabrications.

The recurring reversal is that I engage in a lawful activity, encounter a confrontation or an unusual request, and then face accusations portraying the activity itself as misconduct. Photography becomes harassment. Professional interest in media becomes supposed confusion about media. Maintaining friendships becomes inappropriate association. Accepting work opportunities becomes suspicious behavior. And when I question the accusations, the questioning becomes another supposed symptom.

I have connected these incidents to the broader pattern of public shaming, psychological harassment, and reputational attacks that I trace back to childhood. These encounters involve professional colleagues, friends, public businesses, community members, and police, with similar accusations arising across different locations and periods of my life. The recurring pattern involves conglomerating, rotating “cry-wolf” accusations that continually build upon one another, creating an expanding archive of disinformation and distorted personal information that I have linked to public shaming across increasingly broad social networks, including internationally. The result is a supposed laundry list of wrongdoing available for others to repeat or use against me whenever they encounter me, while the original facts and context are ignored. The important distinction is between what actually occurred and the increasingly distorted accusations being attached to those events.

The relationship with Longbotham is particularly relevant because he knew me personally and professionally. He was not a stranger drawing conclusions from an isolated encounter. He had worked with me in visual effects, knew my technical and artistic interests, and later maintained a personal relationship. That history makes the unexplained statement “Stop doing what you’re doing” especially important. If he had a legitimate complaint, he could have identified it directly. If he objected to a particular action, he could have explained which action. Instead, the statement added another unresolved accusation to the recurring pattern. However this relationship  was no different then any of the other people who latched onto me with ill intent since a young age with ulterior motives.

And once again, we return to Brian Weaver’s explanation: “It’s a public shaming.” Publicly shamed for what? Working in Hollywood? Participating in television productions? Developing an interest in photography, Internet technologies, Web Development, Visual FX, Computer Networking and IT. Dating women he didn’t approve of? Photographing someone after being asked, or studio photography with people? Purchasing an inexpensive digital camera? None of those activities inherently constitutes criminal or psychiatric misconduct.

The central hypocrisy remains unchanged. Someone else’s personal interpretation of my career, photography, friendships, or creative interests does not establish wrongdoing, and it certainly does not authorize intimidation, fabricated accusations, death threats, or attempts to exclude me from society. The facts of each incident matter more than a negative narrative attached afterward. If someone claims that I committed an offense, they should identify the actual conduct rather than use vague insinuations and psychiatric characterizations to turn ordinary human behavior into something it never was.

The far more disturbing explanation is personal hatred and retaliation disguised as public shaming, moral judgment, or law enforcement. In 2013, Officer Toro confronted me in Encino and, as I recall, threatened, “If you ever take a picture of a person, I’ll exercise the law in my own way.” That statement is particularly significant in the context of the earlier photography accusations and my longtime relationships with Paul Humphrey, Michael Patrick Huntley, and Brian Weaver. Humphrey had been my friend since approximately age fourteen and later became associated with LAPD and private security work around 1998, following the period when Huntley and my family encouraged my return from the University of Colorado. These relationships and events form an important chronology of the hostility and police encounters I have described.

What makes more sense: that ordinary photography, friendships, career choices, and harmless personal activities somehow justified extraordinary punishment, or that personal hostility was being used to rationalize conduct that would otherwise be recognized as abuse? The latter is the explanation I find far more consistent with the threats, confrontations, and shifting 49 years of worldwide exponentially growing accusations and stalking groups I have documented with the Police and Judicial. The statements and chronology raise serious questions about the motives of the individuals involved, although they do not independently establish an agreement to kill me. Personal hatred is not legal authority, and no amount of resentment gives anyone the right to become a vigilante, threaten another person’s life, Manufacture criminal accusations, or use police powers to settle a personal grievance. But what makes this even more disturbing is that it all began when I was around five years old with illegal Police monitoring.

Twenty-Five Years of Near-Daily Encounters Across Ordinary Life Since Notifying the Police, Community, and Global Stalking Operations To Remove Me From Society

The frequency and duration are not background details. I am describing approximately twenty-five years during which I have encountered repeated hostility while trying to carry out ordinary tasks: having coffee, working, meeting people, exercising, walking, shopping, or sitting somewhere to relax. Some days the incidents have seemed to occur one after another, and the apparent similarities have made it difficult simply to distance myself from one particular person.

I have interpreted some encounters as possible signs that negative stories about me were circulating across wide social circles, including online communities. I have used the word “worldwide” because of how broad the experiences have seemed to me. That description is about the scope I have been trying to explain; it does not independently establish that strangers in every location belong to a single organization. What matters for public accountability is determining which concrete allegations were circulated, who circulated them, and what each participant actually did.

Whether the conflict involves one individual or many, nobody should be expected to satisfy limitless behavioral demands. I cannot avoid every public place, abandon exercise, stop talking to women, cease making art, or surrender independent thought merely because someone might dislike a lawful choice.

The Internet, Personal Information, and the Expansion of Worldwide Public Shaming

I was involved with the Internet during its early expansion into public use around 1994, experimenting with basic Telnet sessions, command-line interfaces, and online communication systems before graphical browsers and WYSIWYG web-development tools became widely available. Around 1995, I began writing HTML by hand, learning how websites operated and exploring emerging Internet technologies. This was the era of AOL, Prodigy, EarthLink, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), and later ICQ, when people were beginning to communicate and establish relationships across cities, states, and countries in ways that had previously been much more difficult.

During this period, my brother Jason Perelman repeatedly encouraged me to explore the developing Internet. He would suggest websites, online communities, and chat systems, telling me to check out particular places or technologies. At the time, I was interested in computers, programming, graphics, web development, and meeting people through these new communication systems.

What makes Jason’s involvement particularly significant is the much longer history of family conflicts, surveillance-related statements, and psychiatric accusations that I trace back to approximately 1977, when I was five years old and Jason was seven. I remember him making disturbing statements during our youth, including “Me and my friends put a teacher in a mental institution” and references to listening to everything I did over the radio or having a bug in my room. These remarks became important alongside my later encounters with people connected to my brother’s friendships and social circles, including Michael Patrick Huntley and Paul Humphrey.

The arrival of widely accessible Internet communication introduced an entirely new dimension to this history. What had previously involved family members, childhood acquaintances, school environments, and local communities could now potentially extend through online networks reaching people across the United States and internationally. Instead of information traveling primarily through personal relationships and word of mouth, conversations, accusations, photographs, and personal details could circulate through chat rooms, websites, emails, and online groups.

During the 1990s, I began encountering increasingly strange behavior through Internet chat rooms, friendships, parties, dates, and other social interactions. I recognized that certain individuals were behaving unusually and exercised ordinary common sense when dealing with people who appeared dishonest, manipulative, or potentially dangerous. But I had no understanding of the magnitude of what was happening. The possibility that these encounters could extend beyond individual disagreements into something involving coordinated groups, private information, and attempts to set me up or frame me was so far outside normal human experience that I had no reason to interpret them that way at the time.

It was not until approximately 2001 that I began recognizing how consistently these abnormal situations appeared in my interpersonal relationships. Encounters that should have been ordinary repeatedly developed into strange confrontations, misleading invitations, unexplained hostility, or situations in which my conduct could be portrayed negatively. I recognized the unusual behavior, but I did not yet understand how the separate incidents might be connected or why similar situations kept recurring.

For example, a woman I met through Internet chat told me she drove a Jeep, invited me to a residence in the Denver area, and instructed me to enter because the door was unlocked. When I arrived, I knocked instead, and a man answered who said the woman did not live there. At the time, I regarded it as another bizarre encounter with someone behaving dishonestly. I did not immediately connect it to Kelly Hatch in Oregon, the earlier Jeep-related incidents, or the similarities involving invitations and open doors. Those connections became part of my later examination of the events, rather than something I understood when they occurred.

The critical distinction is that I recognized individual warning signs long before I understood the broader pattern I was trying to explain. Ordinarily, when someone behaves strangely, you distance yourself and move on. You assume that person is dishonest, eccentric, or simply someone you do not want in your life. But avoiding individual encounters did not resolve the recurring conflicts I experienced. Instead, the hostility continued across different relationships and locations, eventually becoming entangled with police encounters, disputed accusations, and what I describe as attempts to provoke reactions that could be used against me. By 2001, the repetition had become impossible for me to dismiss as merely a series of unpleasant personal disagreements, even though the precise connections and motivations behind those encounters were not yet clear.

This became especially significant because I was using the Internet for ordinary social and professional purposes. I wanted to meet people, develop friendships, pursue relationships, learn technology, and establish a career. Yet I repeatedly encountered situations in which those ordinary activities became associated with accusations about my behavior, personality, supposed dangerousness, or mental health. The same negative narratives that concerned me in childhood and adolescence seemed to reappear in increasingly varied social environments.

The broader pattern raised serious questions about whether my brother’s Internet recommendations and overlapping social connections had contributed to the circulation of information about me. I have examined the possibility that earlier family narratives were being repeated through online communities, gradually expanding the audience for accusations and making it increasingly difficult to separate my personal relationships from the reputational disputes surrounding them.

The distinction is between using the Internet to build a life and having ordinary Internet activity transformed into another reason for public condemnation. Visiting a website is not wrongdoing. Participating in IRC is not evidence of mental illness. Meeting a woman online, attending a party, or going on a date does not establish that someone is stalking, harassing, or threatening another person. These are normal activities, yet they repeatedly became subjects of suspicion and negative interpretations in my experiences.

The Internet also made it possible for false accusations to be preserved and repeated long after the original circumstances had been forgotten. Private conversations could be selectively quoted, ordinary interactions stripped of context, and rumors circulated among people who had never met me, allowing them to form judgments without knowing what actually occurred. Over time, separate accusations accumulated into what I describe as an expanding “laundry list” of supposed behavioral offenses, with each new allegation building upon earlier claims rather than being examined independently. The result is an expanding collection of fictional and distorted information that I have associated with increasingly widespread social groups, including internationally, where accusations can be repeated and used against me without anyone examining their origins or accuracy. Almost everything I attempt to accomplish becomes another occasion for hostility, new accusations, and interference with my personal or professional goals. Meanwhile, the recurring explanation is that this is simply how the world works, that people are merely joking or teasing, or that I am responsible because of my supposed behavior. The cumulative effect is isolation, disruption of my ability to pursue ordinary ambitions, and repeated confrontations in which my reactions risk becoming the focus of police or judicial attention while the original accusations and provocations remain unaddressed.

The central issue is how damaging information originated, who circulated it, and whether it was accurate. My experiences have led me to examine improper access to private communications and the widespread dissemination of false narratives. Internet technology provides the means to collect, centralize, distort, and distribute personal information across enormous distances, creating an expanding archive of accusations that can follow someone throughout their life.

But here is the ultimate contradiction: the police and judicial system repeatedly respond as though nothing is happening, while the harassment, accusations, and interference I have documented remain unaddressed. I have challenged false criminal charges, disputed psychiatric characterizations, and repeatedly attempted to expose the conduct directed against me. Yet the attention shifts away from the circumstances disrupting my life and toward supposed defects in my behavior, personality, or mental health. The result is a devastating reversal of responsibility: I am condemned for the very difficulties and consequences I have been struggling to overcome.

Why would anyone sabotage another person’s ability to work, socialize, develop relationships, pursue education, their health, or otherwise live independently, and then punish that person for supposedly failing to live life to its fullest? Why interfere with someone’s opportunities and then portray the resulting difficulties as evidence that the person is defective, unstable, or incapable of functioning? That is not accountability. It is a circular justification for further punishment.

And even if I suffered from a mental-health condition, how would that justify harassment, false accusations, repeated arrests, or interference with my ordinary freedoms? Mental illness is not a crime. Depression is not a crime. Being different, vulnerable, or struggling with difficult circumstances is not a crime. Police officers and judges are responsible for applying the law to actual conduct, not punishing people for failing to satisfy someone else’s subjective expectations of psychological health or personal success.

This is the fundamental contradiction behind the psychiatric labeling and public-shaming narrative I have challenged since 2001. I trace the underlying conflicts to approximately age five, when I was a child who had committed no identifiable wrongdoing that could justify such treatment. The continuing question is why accusations about my mental health and behavior have been used to rationalize increasingly severe consequences while my reports of provocation, false accusations, and interference remain unresolved. If the stated objective is to help someone become healthy, independent, and productive, why would the methods being used make those very goals increasingly difficult to achieve? And why should the person subjected to that treatment be blamed for the resulting harm?

What began as family conflict and negative characterizations during childhood became increasingly entangled with the emerging Internet, my education, friendships, professional ambitions, and ordinary social activities. The recurring injustice is the transformation of harmless personal conduct into accusations that can spread far beyond the original encounter, while the person being condemned is denied a meaningful opportunity to correct the false narrative.

When Asking for Help Becomes Another Accusation

This is where the situation becomes particularly disturbing. When I go to the police for help, I encounter not only refusals to address the crimes I am reporting, even when I provide recordings and other evidence, but also additional confrontations, provocations, and behavior that I have described as psychological terror tactics. Instead of investigating the underlying incidents, the attention repeatedly shifts toward my reactions, my attempts to obtain answers, and accusations about my supposed mental health. The person reporting the wrongdoing becomes the subject of investigation, while the original complaint remains unaddressed.

The involvement of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Crisis Assessment and Management Program (CAMP) and Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) makes these encounters especially serious. The 2017 LAPD investigative reports document coordination involving Senior Lead Officer Charles Sean Dinse, Officer Steve Norris, and CAMP and MEU personnel before the corresponding dispatch calls from community members were made. This chronology is critical because the police coordination preceded the very calls requiring their intervention.

My emphasis is on the chronology I identify in those investigative reports: the coordination I describe occurred before the corresponding community dispatch calls. I want the dispatch records, report entries, and communication timestamps compared directly, rather than having the advance planning reduced to a vague suggestion that personnel “appeared” ready. The reported timing is distinct from the further question of whether individual calls were fabricated or made as a result of deliberate provocation.

The sequence raises serious questions about the legitimacy of those dispatch calls and the purpose of the planned psychiatric interventions. My account is that community members were deliberately instigating, provoking, and harassing me to manufacture reactions that could then be used to generate false or fraudulent dispatch calls. Those calls would provide the apparent justification for bringing CAMP and MEU personnel into the situation to conduct psychiatric evaluations that were unwarranted.

The critical distinction is that the advance coordination is documented in the investigative reports, while the purpose and circumstances of that coordination must be examined alongside the underlying encounters and dispatch records. The issue is not simply whether CAMP and MEU personnel responded to a reported incident. It is why their involvement was being coordinated before the corresponding community dispatch calls occurred, and whether those calls were used to create a justification for interventions already being contemplated.

If the psychiatric response was being coordinated before the calls supposedly triggering it, what was the actual basis for the planned intervention, who initiated that coordination, and what role did the preceding community confrontations play in producing the dispatch calls? These are questions that should be answered through the investigative reports, dispatch timestamps, communications between officers and CAMP/MEU personnel, and the recordings of the underlying encounters.

This is the same psychological double bind running throughout my account. Repeated confrontations and provocations create opportunities for defensive reactions, while those reactions can subsequently be presented as evidence of aggression, obsession, paranoia, or psychiatric instability. Michael Patrick Huntley’s 2001 statement, “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with,” is particularly significant in this context. The rope is the sustained provocation and the opportunity to collect a reaction, not merely my attempts to ask questions. When the events preceding that reaction disappear from police reports or psychiatric characterizations, the resulting account can reverse the roles of the person initiating the confrontation and the person responding to it.

I have faced repeated arrests and more than twenty criminal charges that were falsified by the Los Angeles Police Department and Police, fabricated, or unsupported by the underlying events. These proceedings have intensified my concerns about the use of police authority and psychiatric labeling to discredit my attempts to expose the treatment I have documented. I trace the original family conflicts and negative characterizations to approximately 1977, when I was five years old, with the situation escalating after my 2001 confrontation with Huntley. The central question is why seeking police assistance, presenting evidence, and challenging inaccurate accusations have repeatedly led to additional scrutiny and legal consequences rather than meaningful examination of the wrongdoing I reported.

If an individual has committed a crime, the police should investigate that crime. If a genuine psychiatric emergency exists, the appropriate response should address the actual circumstances. But a psychiatric label cannot substitute for evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and an arrest cannot legitimately serve as punishment for reporting misconduct or challenging an official account. The distinction is essential: the purpose of law enforcement is to investigate actual offenses, not manufacture an appearance of dangerousness by focusing on a person’s reactions while disregarding the events that preceded them.

Officer Jensen and Officer SLO Charles Sean Dinse, 2013, Jonathan Franklin, My Brothers BBQ Global Restaurant Harassment, Artistic Expression, and My Disputed Police Encounters

In 2013, I was sitting on a sidewalk holding a sign that read “Smeared for Creating Art,” protesting the nonstop provocations, harassment, and interference I had encountered while attempting to pursue my artistic career and ordinary daily activities. These included confrontations involving businesses, restaurants, coffee shops, gyms, and personal interactions, where photography, visual effects, and other forms of creative expression became subjects of criticism and accusations about my behavior.

The sign was particularly significant because I graduated from the University of Colorado with a Bachelor of Fine Arts and pursued a professional career in visual effects, computer graphics, animation, and digital media. Ironically, my mother, Anita Perelman, was an art therapist who had worked at Cedars-Sinai analyzing artwork created by troubled children. Her professional background became particularly significant to the psychiatric interpretations and accusations surrounding my own artistic expression. Rather than recognizing art as a normal part of my education, personality, and profession, I encountered characterizations suggesting that my artwork revealed psychiatric problems, dangerousness, or even supposed confessions of wrongdoing.

The protest was not only about visual art. The scrutiny I describe extended to ordinary expression, personality, movement, and time spent in public places: sitting with a laptop in a coffee shop, returning to the same business, walking, exercising, or remaining somewhere for a period that would attract little notice when another customer did the same thing. I describe this as an invasive form of micromanagement, in which the objection shifts from how long I am somewhere to the content of my work or another harmless activity. Those shifting standards are important to understanding why I protested.

This is where the hypocrisy becomes extraordinary. Millions of people create artwork, post photographs, share jokes, produce videos, and express themselves through social media every day. Some people appreciate the work, others dislike it, and most simply move on with their lives. Someone might say, “That’s hysterical,” “I love it,” “That’s not my style,” or “I’m not interested.” That is how ordinary people respond to creative expression. Yet throughout my life, virtually every form of artistic expression I produce, including college assignments, photography, visual effects, humor, and social media posts, has become another occasion for scrutiny, accusations, and hostile interpretations.

The Mike Tyson and Street Fighter Artwork: When Fiction Becomes a Supposed Psychiatric Confession

One particularly absurd example dates to approximately 1995–1996, when I was attending Professor Jim Johnson’s computer-imaging class at the University of Colorado. For an ordinary college art assignment, I created a digital composite depicting professional boxer Mike Tyson fighting a the Chun-Li character from the video game Street Fighter. The artwork was created for a small classroom of approximately thirty students and was simply an exercise in digital imaging, compositing, and creative expression.

Yet this fictional artwork later became associated with suggestions that I somehow identified as Mike Tyson, thought I was Mike Tyson, or was dangerous and schizophrenic because of the image. Creating a digital composite of a professional boxer fighting a fictional video-game character does not mean I think I am the boxer, identify with his personality, or intend to commit acts of violence. It is an art assignment, not a confession, a psychiatric diagnosis, or evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

A separate question about the image is the difference between a fictional creative composite and any allegation concerning permission to reproduce a photograph. A recognizable public figure is not automatically “public domain,” and copyright or publicity rights are distinct from a claim that creating fictional artwork is evidence of psychiatric illness. My point concerns the latter accusation: making a classroom composite of Mike Tyson and Chun-Li did not mean I identified as either character or intended the depicted violence.

What makes this example especially disturbing is the apparent circulation of information about artwork produced in a small college classroom. An assignment created for approximately thirty students became part of my concerns about private educational activities being scrutinized and interpreted outside their original setting. The supposed meaning attached to the image had little resemblance to the purpose for which it was created.

This is precisely the problem with treating fiction, symbolism, humor, or artistic imagination as literal evidence of an artist’s character or actions. Creating an image does not mean I committed the act depicted. Producing a fictional scene does not mean I identify with its characters. Referencing a movie, song, celebrity, or cultural subject does not establish that I conform to the media or confuse fiction with reality.

Creating artwork is not confessing to a crime. Photography is not evidence of obsession. And artistic expression is not proof of mental illness. Art can be imaginative, emotional, symbolic, provocative, humorous, or entirely fictional. Treating every artistic choice as a literal statement about the artist’s behavior creates an impossible standard, particularly when the interpretations are used to justify accusations rather than understand the work.

The recurring problem is that ordinary creative expression becomes associated with accusations of schizophrenia, ideas of reference, obsession, dangerousness, or confessions of imaginary offenses. The supposed meaning changes depending upon the artwork, while the actual purpose of the project is pushed aside.

Officer Toro, Studio Photography, and the Attempts to Turn Ordinary Activities Into Accusations

Instead of responding to the artwork itself, I encounter hostility, angry looks, intimidation, retaliation, and threatening behavior in reaction to both older artwork and newer creations displayed online, often without anyone identifying what I supposedly did wrong.

One particularly disturbing example was Officer Toro’s threat: “If you ever take a picture of a person, I’ll exercise the law in my own way.” This occurred in the context of my pursuit of studio photography and my interactions with Aubrey Fisher, who had befriended me alongside Rhodie Morales, my gym manager, whose connections to LAPD and Michael Patrick Huntley became central to my concerns.

Morales also attempted to get me to accept a trash bag filled with marijuana around 2001, before recreational marijuana was legal in California. The chronology is particularly important. Around 1996–1997, Michael Patrick Huntley had encouraged me to leave the University of Colorado and return to California to establish the Internet-hosting business Signet-e Services. Huntley subsequently encouraged me to join a specific World Gym location where, unknown to me at the time, a man suspected of committing murder in Europe and fleeing to California was reportedly under police investigation. At that gym, the manager, Rhodie Morales, befriended me, began taking me to strip clubs, and eventually offered me a trash bag filled with marijuana. I refused to take it. Morales never directly identified where the marijuana originated, but the surrounding circumstances raised serious concerns that it could have been LAPD-confiscated marijuana and that the objective was to get the drugs into my home, create the false appearance that I was a drug dealer, and provide grounds for an arrest, search, or additional criminal charges. The sequence is what makes this incident significant: Huntley encouraged my return from Colorado, directed me toward a particular gym, and a new acquaintance subsequently attempted to place a large quantity of illegal drugs in my possession. I connect these events to the broader history involving Huntley, members of the Perelman family, police encounters, and repeated attempts to turn my ordinary efforts to work, exercise, socialize, and build an independent life into opportunities for criminal accusations and potential setups.

Another example from my experience at the gym concerned remarks suggesting that exercising regularly meant I was obsessed or attempting to become like Arnold Schwarzenegger. I contrasted those insinuations with the ordinary reality of a gym where many people trained frequently, including serious weightlifters and competitors. If regular exercise is normal for other members, why would my own visits be assigned an entirely different psychological meaning? In my account, this is another example of an accusation changing to fit whichever activity I was pursuing.

The important distinction is that I was pursuing ordinary personal and professional interests, including photography, working out at gyms, building websites, developing friendships, pursuing relationships, and establishing a social life—not engaging in wrongdoing simply by trying to live my life.

Around 2001, my encounters involving Aubrey Fisher, Rhodie Morales, and the marijuana incident became part of the broader history of provocations, confrontations, and accusations that extended into nearly every aspect of my life. Ordinary encounters were repeatedly transformed into disputes, defensive reactions became the focus of criticism, and accusations about supposedly inappropriate behavior took precedence over the circumstances that produced the confrontations.

The same contradiction extends to expressions of warmth, friendship, and individuality. I have described how an innocent childhood kiss with a Black girl at approximately eight years old became significant to later accusations about my character, including suggestions of racism that directly contradict the nature of the original interaction. The same concern applies to friendships, dating, photography, and other ordinary activities through which people express their personalities and participate in society.

The recurring problem is the transformation of harmless or positive human behavior into negative accusations through interpretations that ignore what actually happened or what is. No one should be subjected to threats, criminal accusations, or attempts to remove them from society merely because another person assigns a hostile meaning to their lawful creative work or personal decisions.

Officer Jensen, Officer Dinse and the “Smeared for Creating Art” Protest

While I was sitting on the sidewalk with my “Smeared for Creating Art” sign in 2013, Officer Jensen approached and stated, “It’s illegal to sit on the sidewalk for longer than five minutes.” I challenged that assertion and asked for his badge number. Instead of resolving the encounter, I received a sidewalk-obstruction citation and additional criminal charges that were false, fabricated, and unjustified.

LAPD Senior Lead Officer Charles Sean Dinse also became significant to the subsequent police encounters and proceedings. I connect these events to earlier disputes involving My Brothers BBQ Restaurant and other public establishments, where I had encountered confrontations and accusations while attempting to carry on ordinary activities.

The significance of the sign was straightforward. I was protesting interference with my lawful artistic expression and ordinary life, yet the protest itself became the starting point for another criminal proceeding. Instead of addressing the circumstances that prompted the protest, the resulting police actions created another collection of accusations requiring me to defend myself.

This is the same problem illustrated by the Mike Tyson artwork. In one instance, I created a fictional image for a college assignment. In another, I held a sign protesting the treatment of my artistic expression. Both activities were forms of expression, yet both became significant to the accusations and psychiatric characterizations I subsequently challenged.

Jonathan Franklin, the Plea Agreement, and the CAMP/MEU Referral

My defense attorney in the 2013 case, Jonathan Franklin, subsequently became an important part of this history. Rather than resolving the underlying problem of the repeated community harassment, provocations, and confrontations I had been reporting, the case resulted in a plea agreement that I entered under false pretenses.

I recall Franklin stating, “I won’t say anything bad about a police officer.” But how can a defense attorney adequately defend someone against false police accusations if he refuses to challenge the officers responsible for making them? The same problem continued through subsequent legal representation, with my concerns about false reports, missing context, and official misconduct repeatedly left unresolved.

I was also provided contact information for LAPD’s Crisis Assessment and Management Program (CAMP) and Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU), supposedly as resources to help stop the harassment and address the problems I was reporting.

But that created an extraordinary contradiction. I was seeking assistance to stop the provocations, intimidation, and community harassment, not requesting a psychiatric assessment of myself. The supposed solution redirected me away from reporting the conduct of others and toward LAPD police units responsible for assessing my own mental health and behavior.

Instead of addressing the original complaints, the focus shifted toward whether I was psychologically unstable, paranoid, schizophrenia, obsessive, or dangerous.

This is why Franklin’s handling of the plea agreement and the CAMP/MEU contact information remains significant. I accepted arrangements under false pretenses, expecting help with the harassment I was reporting, while the practical result placed me in contact with police mental-health programs.

A defense attorney’s responsibility is to defend the client, not protect police officers from legitimate scrutiny. When an attorney refuses to challenge disputed police allegations, and the resulting proceedings focus upon psychiatric characterizations rather than the underlying evidence, serious questions arise about the fairness of the defense.

Subsequent Arrests, Psychiatric Evaluations, and the Escalating Legal Consequences

The situation escalated through subsequent arrests, additional police contacts, and attempts to subject me to CAMP and MEU evaluations. Particularly disturbing were incidents in which CAMP and MEU personnel appeared to have been notified or prepared to respond before the dispatch calls supposedly initiating their involvement right within the investigative reports.

That sequence raises the question of whether psychiatric assessments and arrests were arranged in advance, rather than initiated in response to legitimate emergencies or actual criminal conduct.

The same pattern continued through criminal proceedings in which I challenged charges and psychiatric characterizations that were based on false accusations, distorted circumstances, and reactions to provocations rather than actual wrongdoing.

A complaint becomes “aggression,” a question becomes “obsession,” and frustration becomes “dangerousness,” while the conduct that preceded those reactions disappears from the official narrative.

This is the psychological double bind that became central to my confrontation with Michael Patrick Huntley in 2001. I had begun confronting the troubling encounters and hostility surrounding my life, only to receive statements such as “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” and “We’re using the judicial system against you.”

I trace the origins of the family conflicts and negative characterizations much further back, to approximately 1977, when I was five years old. The subsequent arrests, police interventions, and psychiatric referrals became part of my longstanding concern that the focus was not on resolving the original complaints but on finding additional grounds to restrict my freedom.

The significance of the 2013 proceedings is therefore much greater than the disputed sidewalk citation. The legal process, plea agreement, and subsequent referral to CAMP and MEU shifted attention away from the conduct I was reporting and toward psychiatric scrutiny of the person attempting to document and protest it.

This is where the roles of judge, jury, and executioner become particularly relevant. When police officers make accusations, defense attorneys refuse to challenge them, and judicial proceedings advance without adequately addressing contradictory evidence, the accused can be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself.

How can I receive a fair trial when the very people responsible for challenging the accusations refuse to confront the evidence that contradicts them?

The central contradiction remains unchanged: I was attempting to expose interference with my artistic expression, professional opportunities, relationships, and ordinary life, yet the resulting proceedings placed my own conduct under increasingly severe scrutiny while the original complaints remained unaddressed.

If the objective was genuinely to protect my health and safety or resolve the situation, why did the process repeatedly produce additional criminal and psychiatric scrutiny instead of addressing the evidence I was providing? And what legitimate purpose could be served by pursuing confinement over alleged behavioral problems that were never clearly identified?

SLO Charles Sean Dinse, LAPD Chief Michel Moore, Community Facebook Groups, and the Rex Schellenberg Case

I am not the only person to have raised serious accusations of misconduct involving LAPD Senior Lead Officer Charles Sean Dinse and the department under Chief Michel Moore. Other individuals who are targets and stalking victims of LAPD and their community terror operations to remove have also come forward with complaints concerning police harassment, intimidation, and the treatment of vulnerable members of the community.

One particularly significant example is Rex Schellenberg, who filed a federal civil-rights lawsuit in 2020 against the City of Los Angeles and LAPD officer Sean Dinse, Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:20-cv-01313. The lawsuit concerned allegations of police participation in neighborhood Facebook groups, the circulation of information about homeless individuals, and disputed characterizations of Schellenberg’s mental health and personal circumstances.

This case is especially relevant to my account because it raises the same fundamental questions about police officers working with community groups, circulating damaging personal information, using psychiatric characterizations, and subjecting individuals to public scrutiny before any wrongdoing has been established. The central issue is whether police authority is being used to investigate actual crimes or to reinforce community accusations and prejudices against people whom certain individuals want excluded from public spaces. The allegations in Schellenberg’s lawsuit provide another documented instance of these concerns being brought before a federal court, although filing the lawsuit did not itself establish that every allegation was proven.

That controversy matters because Sean Dinse’s involvement extended beyond ordinary police patrols and individual encounters. As an LAPD Senior Lead Officer assigned to the Topanga Division, Dinse participated in neighborhood-watch activities, community meetings, Facebook groups, and online discussions where residents exchanged information about people they considered suspicious, troublesome, homeless, or mentally unstable. Dinse publicly promoted using social media as an extension of neighborhood policing, including Facebook and Nextdoor, allowing community members and police officers to exchange information about individuals and activities throughout Woodland Hills and the surrounding West Valley.

Two particularly controversial Facebook groups were “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills” and “Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley.” These groups became the subject of complaints from homeless advocates and civil-rights organizations over the circulation of personal information, photographs, locations, accusations, and hostile commentary concerning individuals in the community. Reporting documented comments by group participants encouraging harassment and even discussing violence against homeless people. Dinse used these online environments to obtain information about individuals and communicate with residents, raising serious concerns about the boundary between legitimate neighborhood policing and community-driven intimidation.

The significance is that these were not merely private conversations between neighbors. Police officers were participating in groups where individuals could be identified, photographed, discussed, labeled, and reported to law enforcement before any criminal wrongdoing had been established. Dinse’s own public communications described the use of neighborhood-watch groups, Facebook, and Nextdoor to expand police-community information sharing. LAPD’s Neighborhood Watch program also provides a formal relationship between Senior Lead Officers, community meetings, block captains, and residents.

These concerns also make the scope of police collection and use of personal information significant. Any separate claims involving LAPD data mining, a 2023 investigation, or Chief Michel Moore should be supported by the specific report, date, and findings before they are added as established facts here. The central issue remains whether particular information-sharing practices crossed from legitimate police activity into unjustified profiling or interference with individuals.

The Rex Schellenberg case exposed the dangers of this arrangement. Schellenberg accused Dinse of circulating information about where he was staying, encouraging community reporting that could provide a basis for police intervention, and publicly suggesting that Schellenberg’s circumstances involved drug addiction or mental illness. These were allegations in federal civil-rights litigation, but they concerned identifiable Facebook activity and police conduct, not merely a disagreement over someone’s personality. The controversy became serious enough that LAPD ordered officers to stop participating in the Facebook groups in 2019, following complaints about threatening and violent comments.

This is particularly relevant to my own encounters involving Dinse, community members, disputed police charges, and psychiatric characterizations. The central question is how easily neighborhood-watch systems can move from reporting actual crimes to circulating accusations about individuals whom certain residents want removed from public spaces. When a police officer shares someone’s location, discusses their supposed mental health, or encourages community reporting, the consequences can extend far beyond online gossip. Accusations can influence police contacts, enforcement actions, reputations, and the treatment of individuals who have never been convicted of the supposed wrongdoing.

I have repeatedly challenged the use of community accusations, psychiatric labels, and police intervention in my own life. The Schellenberg controversy demonstrates that concerns about Dinse’s participation in these online groups were raised publicly by other individuals and civil-rights advocates as well. I can tell you firsthand that the treatment I have experienced is not about law and order. It is about power, popularity, personal prejudice, and groups attempting to dictate who belongs in a community and who does not. Someone dislikes your clothing, your car, your appearance, your hairstyle, or the fact that you haven’t shaved, and suddenly you’re treated as an undesirable. None of these things is a crime, yet personal disapproval becomes the justification for intimidation, public humiliation, repeated police complaints, and attempts to drive someone out of the community.

The fundamental question is when neighborhood policing became a means for self-appointed groups to decide who is welcome in society. I can state firsthand that I have experienced repeated stalking, harassment, provocations, and confrontations involving LAPD officers, including Charles Sean Dinse, and individuals associated with community groups. I have documented these encounters through extensive audio and video recordings, police records, and evidence collected over many years. LAPD personnel have worked with community harassment groups to target me, provoke reactions, manufacture criminal accusations, and justify removing me from ordinary society. This is not simply a disagreement about neighborhood policing or someone disliking my behavior. My case extends back to approximately age five, followed by twenty-five years of escalating encounters since 2001 with nonstop stalking groups since around 1977, and more than twenty criminal charges that were false or fraudulent. I have also described similar experiences across the United States and internationally. I am speaking about specific incidents I witnessed, recorded, and challenged, not merely expressing an opinion about police misconduct. The fundamental issue is why my complaints and evidence have repeatedly gone unaddressed while the daily accusations harassments, instigations, death threats, physical attacks, Assaults with deadly weapons against me continue to generate arrests, legal consequences, and interference with my life. Calling this law and order does not answer for the conduct I have documented or establish that the people involved acted lawfully.

Psychiatric Labels, the LPS Act, and the Claim That Punishment Is “Help” and the Modern Day Slave

I have encountered repeated statements suggesting that I needed psychiatric treatment without anyone providing a clear explanation of the conduct supposedly requiring treatment. Remember, Brian Weaver called it “a public shaming,” yet I was expected to figure out what I was being publicly shamed for, what I supposedly did wrong, and why I was being subjected to such extraordinary punishment. My mother, Anita Perelman, once told me, “Your past caught up with you.” When I later confronted her about the statement, she denied having said it. She also angrily provided me with a list of psychiatrists and instructed me to “tell them everything.” But everything about what? What specific wrongdoing was I supposed to confess to or address? A psychiatric referral cannot resolve an accusation that nobody is willing to identify.

Millions of people live with psychiatric diagnoses while working, studying, maintaining relationships, and participating in ordinary society. A psychiatric diagnosis does not automatically establish dangerousness or justify confinement. California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act establishes legal standards and procedural protections for certain involuntary psychiatric detentions and conservatorships. It does not give relatives, acquaintances, police officers, or community groups the right to own another human being as though they were a slave, strip away their civil and human rights, or dictate every aspect of their existence. The mentality I am challenging is one of absolute ownership and domination: “You’re my property. You do what I tell you. You don’t buy a car unless I approve. You don’t eat what you want, go to sleep when you want, date whom you choose, pursue a career, or leave your house without my permission.” Under that mentality, psychiatric labels become an excuse to demand obedience and punish independence rather than a means of providing legitimate medical care. A mental-health diagnosis is not a deed of ownership, and involuntary treatment is not a license to enslave another human being or reduce them to someone else’s personal property.

Ironically, I trace this struggle over personal freedom back to childhood, including an innocent kiss with a Black girl when I was approximately eight years old and my father, Ron Perelman’s, statement, “Stay away from those people.” But who exactly are “those people”? The statement is so broad and undefined that it could apply to virtually anyone, regardless of race, friendship, relationship, or social background. It offers no reasonable explanation for whom I am supposedly forbidden to associate with or why. When that kind of vague disapproval becomes a justification for controlling every friendship, relationship, and ordinary human interaction, the result is not protection or guidance—it is social isolation. Taken to its extreme, such isolation becomes a form of social erasure: a person remains physically alive but is denied the freedom to participate in the very relationships and experiences that make life worth living.

The cruelest contradiction is the claim that this treatment is somehow intended to help me while the confrontations, accusations, and interference with my ordinary activities create the very distress subsequently used to condemn me. If the objective is to improve my health, why would exercising at a gym, taking walks, socializing, or pursuing creative work become another reason for criticism and punishment? If the objective is to resolve a supposed behavioral problem, why refuse to identify the problem? And if the purpose is genuine psychiatric assistance, why should criminal accusations, intimidation, or attempts to restrict my independence become substitutes for legitimate treatment?

The contradiction becomes even more disturbing when ordinary decisions are treated as evidence of psychiatric instability. Choosing a career, buying a vehicle, visiting a restaurant, pursuing photography, dating someone, expressing an opinion, exercise, hobbies, social lives,  or simply leaving the house are normal aspects of human independence and freedom. Disapproval of those choices does not establish mental illness, and psychiatric terminology cannot legitimately be used to transform another person’s personal preferences into enforceable rules. Even someone with a genuine psychiatric diagnosis retains fundamental rights, including the right to make personal decisions except where specific, lawful limitations apply.

The psychological double bind becomes even more disturbing when nearly every ordinary activity is treated as though it were a criminal offense. I purchase a camera, work on a car, pursue artwork, speak to someone, go on a date, exercise at a gym, or simply leave my house, and another round of insinuations, accusations, hostility, or punishment follows. Especially with the Police, and people in the Judicial System “You know what you did,” “It’s your behavior,” and “It’s a public shaming” become endlessly repeated justifications, yet nobody identifies an actual crime. Instead, ordinary lawful activities are portrayed as wrongdoing, followed by the repeated arrests, criminal charges, psychiatric characterizations, and severe consequences I have challenged throughout my life.

But publicly shamed for what, exactly? Buying a camera? Repairing a car? Talking to someone? Expressing an opinion? These are not crimes. And even if someone had committed an actual offense, that would not give strangers, community groups, family members, or police officers the right to stalk, threaten, terrorize, or punish them outside the law. The conduct I have described raises a far more serious question than public shaming: when repeated threats, intimidation, deliberate psychological cruelty, and attempts to remove someone from society are justified through constantly changing accusations, is the objective really accountability, or is punishment itself the objective? The sentence, “It’s a public shaming” is a justification and excuse to stop someone from existing out of hate.

The distinction matters because intentionally organizing people to threaten or seriously harm another human being can involve criminal conduct far beyond defamation or ordinary bullying. California Penal Code § 182 addresses criminal conspiracy, including conspiracy to commit murder, while first-degree murder is governed by Penal Code § 189. Those offenses require proof of their specific legal elements, including the requisite intent; hostility or harassment alone does not establish murder conspiracy. But calling something “public shaming” cannot excuse threats, manufactured criminal accusations, deliberate psychological cruelty, or attempts on someone’s life. The people claiming the moral authority to condemn my ordinary activities must answer for their own conduct rather than hide behind vague accusations that never identify what I supposedly did wrong.

Help should reduce harm, protect individual rights, and support a person’s ability to live independently—not create an impossible psychological double bind in which every ordinary activity becomes another accusation and every attempt to defend oneself becomes another supposed symptom. The fundamental issue is the distinction between legitimate medical treatment and the use of psychiatric labels to justify coercion, domination, punishment, and the removal of another person’s autonomy. No psychiatric diagnosis gives another person ownership over my life, and no accusation of mental illness gives anyone the right to become my judge, jury, or executioner.

COINTELPRO, FBI, CIA, Zersetzung, MKULTRA, NSA Surveillance, and Historical Psychological Coercion

My search for language to describe and understand psychological terror, manipulation, behavioral conditioning, and the deliberate neutralization of individuals led me to several documented government programs: the FBI’s COINTELPRO, East Germany’s Stasi program known as Zersetzung, and CIA operations including MKULTRA, BLUEBIRD, and ARTICHOKE. Modern surveillance disclosures involving the National Security Agency (NSA) and the CIA’s Vault 7 materials introduce another dimension: the collection, analysis, and potential misuse of enormous quantities of personal information. Although these operations differed in their objectives and methods, they demonstrate that governments have developed and employed covert techniques to discredit, isolate, destabilize, interrogate, psychologically break down, and neutralize individuals. Neutralization which can also mean KILLING.

COINTELPRO, short for Counterintelligence Program, was an FBI operation beginning in 1956 that targeted organizations and individuals considered politically threatening or undesirable. Its methods included infiltration, spreading disinformation, creating conflict between people and organizations, damaging reputations, and disrupting legitimate activities. The objective was not always to investigate criminal wrongdoing, but to disrupt, discredit, and neutralize selected targets, including individuals exercising constitutionally protected rights. These abuses were later exposed through government investigations, and the FBI itself acknowledges that some operations attempted to discredit individuals and organizations despite little or no evidence of unlawful activity.

Zersetzung, developed by East Germany’s Stasi, was an especially disturbing form of covert psychological repression. Rather than relying exclusively on imprisonment or physical violence, the Stasi sought to undermine individuals psychologically and socially. Documented methods included spreading believable false accusations, damaging reputations, interfering with employment, destroying friendships, provoking distrust, encouraging social isolation, and deliberately engineering personal or professional failures. The purpose was to weaken an individual’s confidence, relationships, independence, and ability to function. German federal archives document methods intended to isolate, disorganize, and neutralize targeted individuals while concealing the government’s involvement.

MKULTRA, established by the CIA in 1953, involved experiments intended to investigate and influence human behavior. Researchers studied LSD and other drugs, hypnosis, electroshock, sensory deprivation, and methods of increasing suggestibility or psychological vulnerability. Some experiments were conducted on people without their informed consent. Particularly disturbing research supported through CIA funding involved prolonged drug-induced sleep, repeated recorded messages, intensive electroshock, and sensory deprivation. These experiments could produce severe psychological injuries, memory loss, and lasting harm rather than legitimate medical benefits. The program became the subject of congressional investigations, including a major Senate hearing in August 1977.

BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE, earlier CIA programs beginning around 1950, explored interrogation and behavioral-control techniques involving drugs, hypnosis, isolation, and psychological pressure. The objectives included making individuals more vulnerable to questioning, weakening resistance, and obtaining information through unconventional methods. Declassified records describe the investigation of chemical agents, hypnosis, and techniques intended to influence a person’s memory, resistance, or responses during interrogation. Rather than simply asking questions, these operations explored whether a person’s psychological or physiological condition could be altered to make them more susceptible to influence.

NSA surveillance and data mining introduced another level of technological capability. Documents disclosed by Edward Snowden beginning in 2013 exposed surveillance systems capable of collecting and searching extensive quantities of electronic communications and metadata. Programs such as XKeyscore enabled analysts to search collected information using identifiers such as email addresses, telephone numbers, IP addresses, and keywords. Metadata analysis could reveal communication patterns, relationships between individuals, and aspects of their electronic activity. These disclosures demonstrated the scale of electronic intelligence gathering and raised major questions about privacy, authorization, and oversight.

The significance of keyword flagging, electronic identifiers, and data analysis is that personal information can be collected, categorized, connected, and examined far beyond the context in which it originated. An email, private conversation, search term, website visit, photograph, or online interaction can become part of a much larger collection of information. But collecting a particular word, association, or communication does not establish criminal wrongdoing. A keyword is not a confession, an association is not a conspiracy, and a fragment of private information is not an accurate representation of someone’s character or conduct.

CIA Vault 7, published by WikiLeaks beginning in March 2017, exposed documentation concerning CIA cyber-espionage capabilities, including software vulnerabilities and tools designed to compromise computers, smartphones, and Internet-connected devices. The disclosures revealed the development of techniques for exploiting digital systems and obtaining access to information through compromised technology. Unlike the historical behavioral experiments of MKULTRA, Vault 7 concerned computer exploitation and intelligence gathering rather than a documented program of psychological conditioning.

What connects these historical programs and modern surveillance capabilities is the disturbing potential for information, psychological pressure, damaged relationships, compromised health, isolation, and manipulation to become instruments of coercion without relying exclusively on overt physical violence. A person can lose professional opportunities, friendships, independence, or psychological stability through deliberate interference, while those responsible conceal their involvement or justify the conduct through claims of security, investigation, public safety, or institutional necessity.

Modern technology adds another concern: the possibility of collecting private information, removing it from context, combining it with accusations, and circulating it among people who have no firsthand knowledge of the original events. The ability to collect and analyze information does not make that information accurate, and the ability to distribute an accusation worldwide does not make the accusation true. Nor does possession of private information give anyone the authority to use it for intimidation, defamation, or punishment.

The historical record establishes that these programs and capabilities existed and were actually used against human beings. These are not merely conspiracy theories or fictional scenarios; they are documented government operations involving surveillance, psychological manipulation, disinformation, coercion, and attempts to neutralize selected individuals and organizations. Their existence does not, by itself, establish that the same programs were used against me, but it demonstrates that such abuses of institutional authority have occurred. Especially with all the Illegal Arrests, Falsified LAPD charges, and Illegal Cases and Trials. More importantly, today’s technology provides far greater opportunities to investigate and expose misconduct than existed decades ago. Digital recordings, electronic communications, metadata, forensic analysis, archived websites, and searchable government records can help reconstruct events, trace the circulation of information, identify participants, and establish connections that would once have been extremely difficult to uncover. The question is no longer whether governments have ever employed these methods—history has already answered that—but whether evidence establishes that comparable tactics were used in a particular case.

The fundamental question is whether identifiable individuals engaged in threats, deliberate provocation, fabricated accusations, unauthorized surveillance, or psychological intimidation—and whether those actions were used to discredit someone, manufacture criminal accusations, or justify further intervention. Calling such conduct behavioral correction, psychiatric assistance, public safety, government neutralization, or Brian Weaver’s “public shaming” does not make it lawful or ethical. The actual conduct, its purpose, and its consequences remain the central issues.

And there is another fundamental issue: being instructed by police officers, government officials, family members, or anyone else to participate in criminal activity does not excuse personal responsibility. Every individual remains accountable for their own conscious decisions to threaten, stalk, intimidate, assault, seriously injure, or kill another human being. California Penal Code § 182(a)(1) addresses criminal conspiracy, including conspiracy to commit murder, when the required agreement, intent, and other legal elements are established. Penal Code § 182(a)(2) addresses conspiracies to falsely and maliciously cause another person to be arrested or charged with a crime. Simply being told to participate does not automatically establish conspiracy, but knowingly joining an agreement to commit a crime can and should carry criminal responsibility. Just because someone in authority tells you to hurt or kill another person does not make it acceptable, lawful, or morally justified. No police officer, government agency, family member, or self-appointed community authority can grant another person permission to commit murder or other crimes under the disguise of public shaming, behavioral correction, or following orders.

The Difference Between Stalking and a Criminal Conspiracy

I have used severe language because the conduct and harm I am describing have been severe. California Penal Code § 182(a)(1) addresses criminal conspiracies, including conspiracy to commit murder, eradicate or remove someone from society, while § 182(a)(2) addresses agreements to falsely and maliciously procure criminal charges or arrests. Conspiracy to commit murder requires proof of an agreement, intent to kill, and the other applicable legal elements. The significance of my account is not one hostile look, one false rumor, or one troubling coincidence. It is the accumulated history of relationships, threats, provocations, disputed criminal charges, and psychiatric accusations with mass mobs, helping to remove from society, extending from childhood through nearly five decades of my life.

The chronology begins with my brother, Jason Perelman, and the family relationships I trace back to approximately 1977, when I was five years old and Jason was seven. I remember Jason later making the extraordinary statement, “Me and my friends put a teacher in a mental institution,” along with references to having a bug in my room and listening to everything I did over the radio. These statements became particularly significant alongside the recurring psychiatric characterizations, accusations of paranoia, and threats of institutionalization that I encountered in later years. The central question is why people in my own family and social environment were introducing threats involving psychiatric confinement and surveillance long before any identifiable wrongdoing had been established.

Tom Farley, my first childhood friend, subsequently became another important figure in this history. Around 2001, Farley told me, “Kevin, you can’t control people.” Yet Farley and others had originally sought me out and established relationships with me. The contradiction is that I was attempting to pursue an independent life while challenging what I describe as attempts by people within my own social circle to control my decisions, relationships, behavior, and personal freedom. Friendship does not give someone ownership over another human being, and approaching someone under the appearance of friendship does not excuse later intimidation or coercion.

Michael Patrick Huntley and Paul Humphrey entered my life through overlapping relationships when I was approximately fourteen years old. Huntley was originally connected to Jason’s social circle, while Humphrey also had indirect connections to Jason Perelman through his older brother Joe Humphrey in Jason Perelman’s class at Calabasas High. Humphrey subsequently became involved with LAPD-related work around 1998 and private security activities. Huntley, meanwhile, had encouraged my return from the University of Colorado around 1996–1997 to establish Signet-e Services. By approximately 2001, I was confronting Huntley about the increasingly disturbing circumstances surrounding my life, only to receive statements including “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” “You’d better live a careful life,” and “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with.”

These overlapping relationships form the basis of my accusations concerning the involvement of family members, longtime acquaintances, police personnel, and people associated with the psychology community. The recurring issue is the attempt to turn ordinary behavior and defensive reactions into supposed evidence of paranoia, schizophrenia, obsession, dangerousness, or criminal misconduct. The accusations are particularly disturbing because they involve people who entered my life through friendship, family relationships, professional opportunities, and institutions supposedly responsible for protecting individual rights.

The psychological double bind is central to the alleged operation. Repeated provocations create opportunities for reactions. The reactions can then be presented without their original context as evidence of aggression, instability, or mental illness. The resulting characterizations can influence police encounters, psychiatric referrals, criminal charges, and judicial proceedings. The person attempting to defend himself becomes the accused. Even with simple first amendment freedom of speech. While the conduct that provoked the reaction disappears from the official narrative.

This is where the distinction between harassment, stalking groups and criminal conspiracy becomes especially important. An individual’s hostility, false accusation, or threatening statement may constitute misconduct without necessarily proving a larger agreement. But if identifiable individuals knowingly coordinate fabricated accusations, unlawful arrests, intimidation, or acts intended to seriously harm, remove from society, or kill someone, their conduct must be evaluated according to the applicable criminal laws—not excused as public shaming, psychiatric assistance, or community policing. Establishing conspiracy requires evidence connecting the participants to the agreement and its criminal objective.

The distinction between the ultimate objective and the acts used to pursue it is equally important. We may not know the exact reasoning behind a person’s conduct, but an effort to injure, confine, or eliminate another human being can involve multiple independently punishable acts along the way. Someone who strikes another person in the skull with a lead pipe may engage in conduct supporting an assault charge, a battery charge, or more serious charges depending on the evidence, intent, and resulting injury; a fatal attack can also implicate homicide laws. Physical contact is not required for every offense: knowingly falsifying information to procure an arrest, unlawfully restricting someone’s liberty, making criminal threats, or participating in an agreement to commit a crime can each raise different legal issues if the statutory elements are proven. The point is not that two crimes automatically occur in every incident, or that these offenses have already been established in my case. It is that an ultimate objective described as “removing someone from society” must not eclipse the separate acts used to pursue it. Each alleged assault, injury, fabricated police report, unlawful detention, threat, and agreement deserves its own evaluation, with evidence, chronology, and individual responsibility examined rather than folded into a vague label such as “public shaming.”

The basic moral argument requires no exaggeration. Nobody has the right to torment another human being, manufacture psychiatric or criminal accusations, or use police and judicial authority to enforce a personal grudge. Nor does being instructed by a family member, police officer, government official, or another person automatically excuse participation in criminal conduct. The absence of a physical blow does not make deliberate psychological abuse harmless, and the language of mental-health treatment does not transform intimidation or punishment into legitimate medical care.

The central question is whether the recurring accusations, threats, relationships, police interventions, and psychiatric characterizations reflect independent incidents or identifiable agreements to commit unlawful acts. My account brings those events together chronologically because the relationships and the sequence matter. The people who originally entered my life, the statements they made, the accusations that followed, and the illegal criminal proceedings I have challenged cannot be meaningfully understood by examining only my reactions while ignoring everything that preceded them.

The Ultimate Hypocrisy: The Accusers Must Answer for Their Own Conduct

Imagine someone condemning me for resting my feet on a café chair while circulating false information about me. Imagine someone objecting to a borrowed camera while violating my privacy. Imagine someone criticizing my frustration while refusing to identify the accusation that caused the argument. In each case, the supposed offense is minor, imaginary, or unproven, while the punishment being justified is infinitely more serious than anything I supposedly did wrong.

Consider another example. Someone drops a small piece of paper on the ground. Another person says, “You littered. I want a clean world, and I don’t approve of what you did. Therefore, we’re going to organize groups to stalk, terrorize, torture, and eventually kill you, or remove you from society because you deserve punishment.” Think about the staggering contradiction. Someone claims to care about keeping the world clean, moral, and ethical, yet considers deliberately destroying another human being an acceptable response to a minor act of littering. The piece of paper becomes the supposed moral offense, while the threats, psychological cruelty, and attempts to destroy someone’s life are treated as perfectly acceptable.

Which person is actually creating the greater harm? The individual who dropped a piece of paper, or the people willing to spend years intimidating, terrorizing, and attempting to destroy that individual over it? Even if the littering occurred, the response would be wildly disproportionate. And if the original accusation were fabricated, the entire justification would collapse before the punishment even began.

This is the fundamental hypocrisy behind Brian Weaver’s statement, “It’s a public shaming.” The people claiming to enforce morality are simultaneously excusing conduct far more destructive than the supposed wrongdoing they condemn. They claim to want a better society, but their proposed method of achieving it is to inflict suffering upon people who fail to satisfy their personal preferences. They condemn minor imperfections while overlooking threats, intimidation, false accusations, and abuses of authority.

What makes this even more disturbing is the involvement I have described of police officers, community members, politically connected individuals, and people associated with the judicial system, including my own sister-in-law, Jennifer Pilchick Perelman, an attorney who ran for Congress twice in Florida, in 2020 and 2024. These are people whose professional positions and public responsibilities should demand an understanding of law, morality, ethics, individual rights, and accountability. Yet the behavior I am challenging reflects the very opposite: the mentality that “I don’t like you, therefore I have the right to punish you, destroy your life, or even kill you.”

Under that reasoning, taking a walk after dark, choosing the wrong friends, pursuing an artistic career, buying a camera, exercising at a gym, or simply having a personality someone dislikes becomes another supposed justification for extreme punishment. That is not a moral or ethical standard. It is a vigilante mentality in which personal hatred replaces law, disagreement becomes guilt, and the individual claiming moral authority excuses conduct far more serious than the supposed offense. No police badge, political connection, law degree, family relationship, or position within the judicial system gives anyone the authority to threaten, terrorize, or kill another human being because they disapprove of that person’s lawful choices.

The same reasoning applies throughout my life. I take a photograph, attend a college class, work on a car, exercise at a gym, pursue a relationship, create artwork, or sit in a coffee shop, and another accusation follows. The supposed offense changes, but the justification remains the same: “It’s your behavior,” “You know what you did,” “Your past caught up with you,” or “It’s a public shaming.” Yet none of these statements explains how an ordinary activity could possibly justify the severe treatment I have described.

What makes this mentality especially dangerous is its rigid, black-and-white approach to morality. Someone decides that another person is bad, and everything that person subsequently does becomes evidence supporting the original judgment. Positive behavior can be portrayed negatively. An innocent mistake becomes a serious offense. A reasonable objection becomes aggression. An attempt to defend oneself becomes proof of instability. The accusation determines the interpretation of the facts, rather than the facts determining whether the accusation is justified.

When people adopt that mentality, meaningful communication becomes extraordinarily difficult. If they have already decided that someone deserves punishment, presenting evidence of innocence may not change their judgment. Instead, the evidence can be dismissed, the accusation can change, or the person’s attempts to defend themselves can become another supposed offense. This is the psychological double bind running throughout my account: the punishment continues while the explanation changes to accommodate it.

There is something profoundly disturbing about claiming to represent morality while treating another person’s suffering as acceptable or even desirable. A person who knowingly threatens, terrorizes, or seriously harms others over trivial disagreements is engaging in conduct far more dangerous than the minor behavior they claim to condemn. Such conduct should be judged by the threats and actions themselves, not excused through claims of moral superiority. The willingness to inflict cruelty is not evidence of righteousness, and psychiatric insults are no substitute for examining actual behavior.

This is the hypocrisy behind the saying “That’s the pot calling the kettle black.” The people judging me cannot exempt themselves from the rules they demand I follow. They cannot call a harmless choice criminal because it offends their tastes. They cannot convert insinuation into proof by repeating it. And they cannot assume that gathering a crowd gives them the authority of judge, jury, and executioner.

The involvement of people with professional authority makes the double standard even more serious. Police officers are entrusted with enforcing laws, not personal preferences. Judicial employees are expected to uphold the administration of justice, not substitute hostility for evidence. Attorneys and political figures should understand the difference between an accusation and a proven offense. And individuals associated with psychology or mental-health professions should recognize that having an unusual personality, pursuing an unconventional career, or disagreeing with someone does not automatically establish mental illness.

The issue is not whether someone holds an impressive professional position. It is whether that person behaves according to the ethical standards their position is supposed to represent. My criticism concerns the conduct and accusations I have described, including the involvement I attribute to particular individuals, rather than treating a professional title or political connection as proof of criminal participation.

The ultimate question is not whether I have ever made an imperfect choice. Every human being has. The question is how anyone could justify inflicting extraordinary suffering upon another person over supposed imperfections while refusing to recognize that their own threats, cruelty, and intimidation are morally and legally far more serious. That is not justice, accountability, or public safety. It is the use of moral judgment as an excuse for bullying, domination, punishment or execution.

If someone claims to want a better world while deliberately making another human being’s life unbearable, the problem is no longer the piece of litter, the photograph, the friendship, the clothing, the car, or the supposed transgression. The problem is the cruelty being justified in the name of morality. No matter how many people join in the condemnation, their numbers do not transform wrongdoing into justice or give them permission to harm another human being.

Conclusion: Public Shaming Is Not a License to Destroy a Life

In approximately 2001, I confronted my longtime friend and business partner, Michael Patrick Huntley, with a straightforward question: “Mike, what the hell is going on?” Instead of receiving an explanation, I encountered statements including “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” “You’d better live a careful life,” and “I’ve given you enough rope to hang yourself with.” Brian Weaver supplied another explanation: “It’s a public shaming.” My father, Ron Perelman, said, “You know what you did.” My mother, Anita Perelman, said, “Your past caught up with you.” Garrett at Starbucks declared, “It’s your transgressions.” These statements carried accusations, hostility, and implied consequences, yet none identified the supposed wrongdoing or provided a reasonable opportunity to resolve it.

But a public shaming of what, exactly? Taking a photography class? Choosing a career in visual effects rather than aviation? Buying a camera? Exercising at a gym? Working on a car? Dating someone another person disapproves of? Creating fictional artwork? Taking a walk after dark? Declining an unwanted romantic advance? These are ordinary human activities, not offenses that justify intimidation, criminal accusations, psychiatric confinement, or social exclusion. Even where someone genuinely makes a mistake, the response must remain proportionate and lawful. Personal disapproval does not create authority to administer punishment.

The magnitude of my account extends far beyond these isolated examples. I trace its origins to approximately 1977, when I was five years old and my brother Jason Perelman was approximately seven. The history involves childhood relationships, family conflicts, statements about psychiatric institutionalization and surveillance, acquaintances who entered my life through my brother’s social circle, my education at Southern Oregon State College and the University of Colorado, and the circumstances surrounding Michael Patrick Huntley’s encouragement for me to return to California and establish Signet-e Services. By 2001, I was confronting the increasingly disturbing contradictions surrounding my life. Over the following twenty-five years, I experienced near-daily confrontations, accusations, and interference with ordinary activities across workplaces, restaurants, coffee shops, educational environments, public streets, and personal relationships.

The psychological noose is not simply the unanswered question. It is the repeated provocation and the attempt to turn my eventual reaction into evidence against me. A confrontation occurs, I attempt to understand or stop it, and the resulting objection becomes another accusation. An ordinary activity is scrutinized, a negative interpretation is imposed, and the interpretation becomes another item in an expanding laundry list of supposed behavioral offenses. Rather than correcting false information, subsequent accusations build upon earlier ones. The person attempting to defend himself becomes the subject of condemnation, while the conduct that prompted the response is omitted.

The development of Internet communications during the 1990s introduced another serious concern: the ability to collect, preserve, distort, and distribute damaging information far beyond the original participants. I have challenged the circulation of accusations about my relationships, photography, artwork, career, and ordinary social activities, including information appearing in online discussions and blogs. A private conversation taken out of context is not proof of wrongdoing. A fictional artwork is not a confession. A photograph is not evidence of obsession. And repeating an accusation through increasingly broad social networks does not make it true. The relevant questions remain who originated the information, what actually happened, and whether the resulting allegations accurately represent the original events.

The consequences became particularly serious when these disputes extended into encounters with LAPD officers, criminal charges, and psychiatric characterizations which are connected to the motive all the way down to early childhood showing their hate and obsession to get what they want. I have challenged more than twenty charges that were false or fraudulent, including proceedings arising from the 2013 encounter involving Officer Jensen while I was holding my “Smeared for Creating Art” sign. My concerns also include LAPD Senior Lead Officer Charles Sean Dinse, subsequent police encounters, and the handling of my defense by attorney Jonathan Franklin. Instead of resolving the underlying complaints, the proceedings resulted in further criminal consequences and referrals to LAPD’s Crisis Assessment and Management Program (CAMP) and Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU). The person reporting the alleged wrongdoing became the focus of criminal and psychiatric scrutiny, while the conduct being reported remained unaddressed.

The documented controversy involving Rex Schellenberg and Sean Dinse demonstrates why the relationship between police officers, neighborhood-watch groups, social media, and public accusations deserves serious examination. Police officers are entrusted with enforcing laws, not personal preferences. A community group cannot determine that someone is dangerous simply because members dislike their appearance, clothing, lifestyle, personality, or presence in a public place. Or simply just don’t like someone. The accumulation of public hostility does not establish guilt, and police authority cannot legitimately become an instrument for enforcing a neighborhood’s personal prejudices.

The same principle applies to psychiatric labeling. Millions of people with mental-health conditions live productive, independent lives. A diagnosis is not a crime, and it does not give family members, police officers, community groups, or judicial employees ownership over another human being. The mentality that “You’re my property, you do what I tell you, and you cannot live independently until I approve” is domination, not medical assistance. No psychiatric label grants someone the authority to dictate whom I date, what career I choose, what artwork I create, when I exercise, where I go, or whether I am permitted to participate in ordinary society. And deliberately creating distress cannot reasonably be defended as a method of helping someone become healthy.

This is where the historical examples of COINTELPRO, Zersetzung, MKULTRA, BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and modern surveillance disclosures become relevant. These documented programs demonstrate that covert interference, disinformation, psychological manipulation, unauthorized surveillance, and institutional abuses have occurred. They do not automatically establish the existence of a comparable operation in my case, but they demonstrate why misconduct cannot be dismissed simply because its methods are unconventional or psychological rather than physically violent. The absence of visible injuries does not make deliberate intimidation, coercion, or sustained psychological cruelty harmless.

The most serious question concerns motive and criminal responsibility. I have described conduct that I consider far more serious than ordinary public criticism, including death threats, disputed arrests, false accusations, and attempts to portray me as dangerous or mentally unstable. California Penal Code § 182(a)(1) addresses conspiracy to commit crimes, including murder, when the necessary agreement, intent, and legal elements are established. Section 182(a)(2) addresses conspiracies to falsely and maliciously procure criminal charges or arrests. No police officer, government official, judicial employee, family member, or community organizer can authorize another person to commit crimes simply by calling the activity public shaming, psychiatric assistance, or following orders. And no amount of personal hostility substitutes for the evidence required to establish a specific criminal offense.

In addition to disputed arrests and reputational accusations, my account includes reported physical assaults, threats with deadly weapons, threats against my life, and repeated confrontations that I describe as occurring day and night. I consider those concrete acts and their dates important in their own right; they should not be collapsed into a general description of public criticism or shaming. Each incident calls for examination of its evidence, participants, and possible legal consequences.

The greatest hypocrisy remains the moral authority claimed by the people making these accusations. Someone condemns a minor imperfection while excusing threats or intimidation. Someone objects to a photograph while disregarding privacy violations. Someone demands perfect behavior while refusing to explain the supposed offense. Someone claims to be helping another person while interfering with the activities that support an independent, healthy life. The people claiming to enforce morality cannot exempt themselves from the moral and legal standards they demand from everyone else.

I will not accept the premise that I must become a perfect robot to satisfy every stranger’s preferences. I do not lose my rights by pursuing art instead of aviation, exercising, taking photographs, building websites, buying a car, choosing whom to date, expressing kindness, or questioning an accusation. I am entitled to ordinary human independence, just as everyone else is. No family member, childhood friend, police officer, judicial employee, political figure, or self-appointed community authority possesses ownership over my life.

The original question remains unanswered: What exactly was the public shaming supposed to punish? If there was an actual offense, it should have been identified. If there was evidence, it should have been presented. If someone had a legitimate complaint, direct communication could have addressed it. Instead, my account concerns a continuing series of accusations whose supposed justifications change while the consequences accumulate.

“It’s your behavior” is not an explanation. “You know what you did” is not evidence. “Your past caught up with you” is not a criminal charge. “World of paranoia” is not an answer. And Brian Weaver’s “It’s a public shaming” is not permission to terrorize, intimidate, manufacture criminal accusations, or destroy another person’s independence.

The fundamental issue is not whether I have ever made an imperfect choice. Every human being has. The issue is why anyone would consider another person’s imperfections a justification for conduct that is morally and potentially criminally far more serious. You cannot claim to protect society from wrongdoing while excusing wrongdoing committed in the name of punishment. You cannot claim to help someone while deliberately interfering with their ability to live. And you cannot call cruelty justice simply because the people administering it have appointed themselves judge, jury, and executioner.

Public shaming is not a criminal conviction. Psychiatric labels are not deeds of ownership. Personal hatred is not legal authority. And no one has the right to destroy another human being’s life because they disapprove of how that person chooses to live.

— Kevin Perelman

CALIFORNIA

CARE Act Process and

2026-2027 Expansion Guide

How a petition begins, what must be proved, what the court can order, and how CARE differs from 5150 detention, AOT, conservatorship, and criminal-court competency routes

Status date

Current through October 5, 2026. The guide clearly labels provisions that are already operative and provisions scheduled to take effect January 1, 2027.

Prepared as a public-information dossier

California law changes frequently. This document is educational and is not legal or medical advice. Court forms, local procedures, and statutory text should be checked before use.

Contents

  • 1. Executive summary
  • 2. What CARE is – and what it is not
  • 3. Eligibility: every element must be met
  • 4. Who may start a CARE case
  • 5. The standard petition process
  • 6. Evidence and forms
  • 7. Hearings, proof, and respondent rights
  • 8. CARE agreements, CARE plans, medication, and housing
  • 9. Duration, reviews, graduation, and reappointment
  • 10. New and recent legislation: SB 27, SB 989, SB 1242, and SB 1323
  • 11. Related California pathways: 5150, AOT, LPS, and competency
  • 12. Process comparisons and escalation boundaries
  • 13. Practical response checklist
  • 14. Common misconceptions
  • 15. Primary authorities and official resources

Quick status table

Provision Status on Oct. 5, 2026 Core effect
CARE Act baseline Operative statewide Civil court process for specified adults meeting all CARE criteria.
SB 27 Effective Jan. 1, 2026 Expanded qualifying diagnoses to bipolar I disorder with psychotic features and strengthened criminal-court referral routes.
SB 989 Signed Sept. 27, 2026; effective Jan. 1, 2027 Lets qualifying first responders refer a matter to county behavioral health for investigation and possible county filing.
SB 1242 Signed Sept. 27, 2026; effective Jan. 1, 2027 Creates a defined channel for certain original family/household petitioners to submit information to the CARE team.
SB 1323 Effective Jan. 1, 2025 Connects misdemeanor incompetency proceedings to CARE and other treatment pathways.

1. Executive summary

The Community Assistance, Recovery, and Empowerment Act creates a civil court process through which specified petitioners may ask a superior court to connect an adult to behavioral-health treatment, medication support, housing resources, and other services. Filing a petition does not itself establish a diagnosis, authorize confinement, or prove that the respondent meets CARE eligibility.

A CARE case normally moves through several gates: an authorized petitioner files the required forms and supporting evidence; the judge performs a preliminary review; the county investigates and attempts voluntary engagement; counsel is appointed; and the court may hold a merits hearing. At the merits hearing, eligibility must be established by clear and convincing evidence. If the criteria are not met, the case must be dismissed.

The central safeguard

CARE eligibility is element-based. Concern, family conflict, homelessness, unusual behavior, an officer’s opinion, or a diagnosis by itself is not enough. The petitioner and county still must satisfy every statutory criterion and the applicable proof standard.

2. What CARE is – and what it is not

CARE is CARE is not
A civil superior-court proceeding. A criminal prosecution or automatic probation violation.
A structured route to behavioral-health services and housing supports. An automatic commitment to a locked psychiatric facility.
A process that may produce a voluntary CARE agreement or a court-ordered CARE plan. A finding that every allegation in the petition is true.
A proceeding with appointed counsel and hearing rights for the respondent. A process in which the original family or first-responder petitioner controls treatment.
Separate from emergency 5150 detention and LPS conservatorship. Authority to forcibly administer medication merely because a CARE plan lists medication.

3. Eligibility: every element must be met

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5972, CARE eligibility is conjunctive: the court must find each required element, not merely one or two. In practical terms, the court examines the following questions:

Required element Operational question
Adult status Is the person at least 18 years old?
Qualifying disorder Is the person currently experiencing a severe mental disorder within the specified diagnostic classes? Current law includes schizophrenia-spectrum and other psychotic disorders and, after SB 27, bipolar I disorder with psychotic features. A condition explained solely by current intoxication is excluded.
Not stabilized voluntarily Is the person not clinically stabilized in ongoing voluntary treatment?
Deterioration or prevention need Is the person unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision and substantially deteriorating, or does the person need services and supports to prevent relapse or deterioration likely to result in grave disability or serious harm?
Least restrictive alternative Would a CARE agreement or plan be the least restrictive alternative necessary to ensure recovery and stability?
Likely benefit Is the person likely to benefit from CARE participation?

Because the statutory test focuses on current circumstances, old records may supply context but do not automatically establish present eligibility. A respondent may contest diagnosis, current symptoms, deterioration, risk, necessity, and whether a less restrictive voluntary alternative is working.

4. Who may start a CARE case

Welfare and Institutions Code section 5974 lists the authorized petitioners. The list is specific; a concerned person who falls outside it cannot file merely because the person knows the respondent.

  • A person who lives with the respondent; a spouse or registered domestic partner; a parent, sibling, child, or grandparent; or a person who stands in loco parentis.
  • The director of a hospital in which the respondent is hospitalized, or a designee.
  • The director of a public or charitable organization, agency, or home that has provided behavioral-health services to the respondent within the statutory period, or a designee.
  • A licensed behavioral-health professional who is treating or recently treated the respondent, subject to the statutory time requirement.
  • A first responder with repeated interactions with the respondent, including specified peace officers, firefighters, paramedics, emergency medical technicians, mobile-crisis workers, and homeless-outreach workers.
  • The director of the county behavioral-health agency, or a designee.
  • The respondent.
  • Specified public guardians or conservators, and certain tribal-court or tribal-health representatives where the statutory conditions are met.

What ‘repeated interactions’ means for first responders

The first-responder route is not new in 2027. Current CARE law already permits a qualifying first responder to file when the responder has had repeated interactions with the person through multiple arrests, repeated 5150 detentions, repeated attempts to engage the person in voluntary treatment, or other repeated efforts to provide aid. SB 989 changes the practical filing route beginning in 2027; it does not create first-responder eligibility from nothing.

5. The standard petition process

Stage What happens
Pre-filing facts and status The petitioner determines whether the person appears to meet every CARE criterion and whether the petitioner is statutorily authorized.
Forms and supporting proof The petitioner files CARE-100 with either a CARE-101 declaration from a licensed behavioral-health professional or the alternative detention evidence allowed by statute.
Prima facie judicial review The judge promptly reviews the filing. If it does not make the required preliminary showing, the court may dismiss it without prejudice, subject to statutory exceptions.
County investigation For a non-county petition, the court generally orders a county agency to investigate, attempt voluntary engagement, and file a report. Current section 5977 allows up to 30 court days, with a possible limited extension when engagement is progressing.
Voluntary engagement checkpoint If the person enrolls or is likely to enroll voluntarily, the court dismisses the CARE matter. If the evidence does not support eligibility, the court dismisses.
Counsel and initial appearance If the showing remains sufficient and engagement was ineffective, the court appoints counsel and sets an initial appearance. The original petitioner generally is replaced by the county behavioral-health director as successor petitioner.
Merits hearing The court determines whether clear and convincing evidence proves all CARE criteria. If not, dismissal is required. If yes, the county must work with the respondent, counsel, and supporter toward a CARE agreement.
Agreement or clinical evaluation If a voluntary CARE agreement is not reached, the court may order a clinical evaluation and proceed toward a court-ordered CARE plan if the criteria remain established.
Review hearings The court monitors implementation through status reviews. The focus includes service delivery by the county, housing stability, engagement, and whether the plan remains appropriate.
Graduation or limited reappointment The court conducts an end-stage review. CARE ordinarily lasts up to one year, with one additional year possible only after the required findings.

6. Evidence and forms

Core filing package

Form or evidence Purpose
CARE-100 Petition to begin CARE Act proceedings. It identifies the petitioner, the respondent, eligibility facts, residence/location information, and supporting circumstances.
CARE-101 Mental-health declaration completed by a licensed behavioral-health professional who examined the respondent, or attempted to examine the respondent, within the statutory period and has reason to believe CARE criteria are met.
Alternative detention proof Instead of CARE-101, the petition may include evidence of at least two qualifying intensive-treatment detentions, with the most recent within the required 60-day period.
CARE-105 / CARE-106 Court order and notice associated with the county investigation and report.
CARE-110 / CARE-113 Notice of initial appearance and notice of the respondent’s rights.

What should be tested, not assumed

  • Whether the declarant is qualified and whether the examination or attempted examination occurred within the statutory time window.
  • Whether the facts support the qualifying diagnosis rather than merely using labels, hearsay, or conclusions.
  • Whether the alleged deterioration, grave disability, or risk is current and supported by admissible evidence.
  • Whether the person is already clinically stabilized in voluntary treatment.
  • Whether CARE truly is the least restrictive alternative and likely to provide a benefit.
  • Whether records, dates, identities, and quoted statements are accurate and complete.
Records are not self-proving

A report or prior label may be disputed. Relevance, foundation, hearsay rules, expert qualifications, privacy protections, and the statutory burden still matter at the merits stage.

7. Hearings, proof, and respondent rights

The respondent is a party and is entitled to procedural protections. Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5976 and 5976.5 provide rights that include:

  • Notice and a copy of the petition and required reports or evaluations, subject to governing confidentiality rules.
  • Court-appointed counsel at all stages and the ability to substitute retained counsel.
  • The right to be present, subject to limited waiver and statutory procedures for proceeding in an absence.
  • The right to present evidence, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and challenge expert opinions.
  • The right to an interpreter and disability accommodations where applicable.
  • The option to use a supporter, chosen by the respondent, to help understand, communicate, and make decisions. The supporter does not replace the respondent’s decision-making authority.
  • The right to appeal reviewable orders under the governing statutes and rules.

At the merits hearing, the successor petitioner must establish CARE eligibility by clear and convincing evidence. That standard is more demanding than a mere preliminary showing and requires evidence sufficient to produce a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the required facts.

Confidentiality

CARE proceedings and records receive special confidentiality protection. Hearings generally are closed. County investigation reports are confidential, are not public records, and are generally inadmissible in later legal proceedings unless the respondent moves to use them. These protections do not erase every permitted disclosure; the statute authorizes specified information sharing for treatment, implementation, and court administration.

8. CARE agreements, CARE plans, medication, and housing

CARE agreement

A CARE agreement is a voluntary settlement among the respondent and county behavioral-health agency, approved by the court. It may include behavioral-health treatment, stabilization medication, substance-use treatment when clinically indicated, housing resources, social services, and supports. Because it is voluntary, its terms should reflect informed agreement rather than a finding that every requested service is mandatory.

CARE plan

If an agreement cannot be reached and the court continues to find the respondent eligible, the court may order a CARE plan after the required evaluation and hearings. The plan is individualized and may include the same categories of treatment and services. The county also has enforceable duties to provide ordered services and supports; CARE is not solely a set of commands directed at the respondent.

Medication limits

CARE does not authorize forcible medication

A CARE plan may include a medication order. But Welfare and Institutions Code section 5977.1 states that medication may not be forcibly administered under CARE. A medication order requires the statutory findings, including a clear-and-convincing determination concerning capacity after evaluation and hearing. Noncompliance is not punishable as contempt.

Other California laws governing emergency treatment, capacity hearings, inpatient medication, or conservatorship operate separately. A CARE order should not be treated as a substitute for those independent legal requirements.

Housing limits

CARE may require a housing plan and prioritize access to appropriate housing resources. It does not, by itself, authorize locked placement, eviction, or removal from a home. A housing component should identify available resources, the respondent’s needs and preferences, and the county’s implementation responsibilities.

Consequences of nonparticipation

A respondent is not jailed or held in contempt simply for failing to comply with a CARE agreement or plan. The court may modify or terminate the process, and the record may have limited relevance to a later, independently initiated LPS proceeding where the separate statutory standards must still be met. CARE does not automatically convert into conservatorship.

9. Duration, reviews, graduation, and reappointment

Point in process General rule
Initial CARE period Up to 12 months under a court-approved agreement or plan.
Status reviews Periodic hearings assess services, progress, barriers, housing, and continued implementation.
Eleventh-month review The court addresses graduation, a voluntary graduation plan, or whether a further period is legally justified.
Reappointment One additional period of up to 12 months may be ordered only after the required findings; CARE is not an unlimited rolling order.
Dismissal The matter may end earlier if eligibility is not proved, voluntary engagement succeeds, criteria cease to be met, or statutory dismissal grounds apply.

10. New and recent legislation

SB 27 – operative January 1, 2026

SB 27 expanded CARE eligibility to include bipolar I disorder with psychotic features, in addition to qualifying schizophrenia-spectrum and other psychotic disorders. It also revised criminal-court and county referral provisions, including routes involving defendants found incompetent to stand trial. The expansion does not eliminate the remaining CARE criteria: current severity, lack of stabilization in voluntary treatment, deterioration or prevention need, least-restrictive necessity, and likely benefit must still be shown.

SB 989 – operative January 1, 2027

Before SB 989 becomes operative, a qualifying first responder with repeated interactions may file a CARE petition directly and must supply the required supporting material. Beginning January 1, 2027, SB 989 creates an additional referral mechanism:

  1. The qualifying officer or firefighter sends a standardized referral to the county behavioral-health agency.
  2. The county investigates whether the person appears to meet CARE criteria and whether a county-filed petition is appropriate.
  3. The county has 30 business days to decide whether to file and must report the outcome to the referring first responder.
  4. If the county files, ordinary judicial screening, notice, counsel, investigation, proof, and hearing requirements continue to apply.
Effect of SB 989

SB 989 lowers an administrative barrier for qualifying police and fire personnel by shifting investigation and filing work to county behavioral health. It does not make a first responder’s opinion conclusive and does not itself create a CARE order.

SB 1242 – operative January 1, 2027

SB 1242 changes what certain original family or household petitioners may provide after the county replaces them as petitioner. The original petitioner may send the CARE team information about the respondent’s condition, functioning, treatment history, housing, safety concerns, need for services, engagement, and compliance. The CARE team must receive, review, and document information relevant to care, treatment, housing stability, safety, engagement, or plan implementation. The respondent’s consent is not required merely for the team to receive that incoming information.

The statute also draws firm boundaries. Submission does not give the original petitioner party status or a right to direct treatment, obtain discovery, access confidential records or protected health information, attend confidential proceedings, or otherwise participate without the respondent’s consent except where another law expressly permits it. The court may consider the submitted information when evaluating progress, engagement, changed circumstances, needs, or compliance, but ordinary evidence rules and due-process protections remain relevant.

Practical risk and practical limit

SB 1242 creates a formal intake channel for information that could influence care-team and court decisions. It does not convert allegations into findings. Accuracy, documentation, source reliability, confidentiality, admissibility, and the respondent’s opportunity to answer remain critical.

SB 1323 – operative January 1, 2025

SB 1323 connected misdemeanor incompetency proceedings with CARE and other community-treatment options. When a misdemeanor defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, the criminal court must follow Penal Code section 1370.01 and consider the authorized pathways, which may include mental-health diversion, restoration treatment, dismissal, or referral for CARE evaluation where the statutory conditions are present. A referral is not a final CARE eligibility finding; the civil CARE court applies CARE’s separate criteria and procedures.

11. Related California pathways

Pathway Entry standard Immediate effect Key limit
CARE Act All section 5972 criteria; clear and convincing proof at merits hearing Court-supervised agreement or plan for services and housing supports No automatic confinement; no forcible medication under CARE
5150 detention Probable cause of danger to self, danger to others, or grave disability because of a mental-health disorder Up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, crisis intervention, and treatment Time-limited emergency detention; later detention requires separate authority
5250 / intensive treatment Further statutory certification after evaluation and required findings Additional involuntary treatment period with certification-review protections Separate LPS procedures, notice, and review rights
AOT – Laura’s Law County AOT criteria, repeated history, deterioration, and likelihood of benefit Court-ordered outpatient treatment framework No automatic locked placement; criteria differ from CARE
LPS conservatorship Grave disability under the LPS Act proved through conservatorship procedures Conservator may receive authority over specified personal and treatment decisions Much greater liberty restriction; jury-trial and periodic-review rights apply
Criminal competency Substantial doubt or finding that a defendant cannot understand proceedings or assist counsel Criminal case is suspended while competency procedures occur Competency is not the same as guilt or CARE eligibility
Mental-health diversion Penal Code section 1001.36 eligibility and suitability Criminal charges may be diverted into treatment and later dismissed after successful completion Requires its own findings and differs from CARE’s civil process

5150 and medication are separate legal questions

A peace officer or specified clinician may initiate a 5150 detention when there is probable cause to believe that, because of a mental-health disorder, a person is a danger to self, a danger to others, or gravely disabled. A 5150 is an emergency evaluation mechanism, not a CARE petition. Involuntary medication during LPS detention is governed by separate capacity and emergency rules, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 5332; CARE’s no-forcible-medication rule does not rewrite those separate provisions.

LPS conservatorship is not an automatic next step

An LPS conservatorship requires its own petition, evidence, findings, and procedural protections. ‘Grave disability’ has a detailed statutory definition, including recent amendments concerning personal safety and necessary medical care. The respondent has rights that can include counsel, a hearing, and a jury trial. A CARE history may be considered only as permitted by law; it does not dispense with the conservatorship burden of proof.

12. Process comparisons and escalation boundaries

Starting event What may happen next What does not happen automatically
Family member files CARE-100 Judge screens; county may investigate and attempt voluntary engagement No immediate diagnosis, medication, confinement, or final order
First responder files now Direct CARE petition with required support and ordinary court screening Officer’s conclusion does not establish eligibility
First responder refers after Jan. 1, 2027 County investigates under SB 989 and decides whether it will file Referral does not require the county to file or the judge to grant relief
Original family petitioner sends information after Jan. 1, 2027 CARE team reviews and documents relevant information under SB 1242 No party status, discovery, treatment control, or confidential-record access
5150 detention occurs Facility evaluates and may release, admit voluntarily, or pursue further LPS authority No automatic CARE case or conservatorship
Criminal court finds misdemeanor incompetency Court considers statutory options and may refer to CARE evaluation No automatic CARE eligibility finding or conviction

13. Practical response checklist

For a person who learns that a CARE petition or referral may exist, the most useful early response is organized, factual, and tied to the statutory elements:

  • Confirm whether a petition was actually filed, the county and case number, the next date, and the exact documents filed. A threat to file, a referral, and an opened court case are different events.
  • Contact appointed counsel immediately. If counsel has not yet been appointed, contact the superior court’s CARE self-help office or local public defender/legal-services provider.
  • Obtain and read CARE-100, CARE-101, the county report, notices, and any clinical evaluation. Create a list of every factual assertion that is inaccurate, incomplete, undated, or unsupported.
  • Organize records showing current housing, food, medical care, voluntary treatment, medication management, employment or daily functioning, and reliable support. These facts may bear directly on stabilization, risk, least-restrictive necessity, and likely benefit.
  • Preserve favorable audio, video, messages, medical records, witness information, and timelines in original form. Do not edit originals; make working copies.
  • Ask counsel to address each section 5972 element separately and to challenge hearsay, foundation, stale information, expert qualifications, and unsupported conclusions where appropriate.
  • Use calm, precise language in filings and hearings. Distinguish personal knowledge from inference, identify dates and sources, and avoid overclaiming what a document proves.
  • If information arrived through SB 1242, ask counsel how it was documented, whether it is being offered as evidence, and what process is available to correct or contextualize it.
  • If the matter began in criminal court, keep the CARE proceeding, competency question, diversion request, probation status, and underlying criminal allegations analytically separate unless a statute expressly connects them.

14. Common misconceptions

Misconception More accurate statement
‘Anyone can file.’ Only petitioners listed by statute may initiate a CARE case.
‘A police officer could not file until SB 989.’ Qualifying first responders already can file. SB 989 adds a county-referral route in 2027.
‘A family allegation becomes evidence automatically.’ SB 1242 permits submission and review of information; it does not make the allegation true, admissible, or conclusive.
‘CARE means forced medication.’ CARE may include a medication order after required findings, but the CARE Act bars forcible administration under that order.
‘CARE means locked housing.’ CARE provides a housing plan and service access; it is not itself authority for locked placement.
‘Refusing CARE means jail.’ CARE noncompliance is not contempt and does not itself authorize incarceration.
‘A 5150 automatically leads to CARE.’ The processes are separate. A detention may become evidence, but a CARE case requires an authorized filing and statutory review.
‘A diagnosis alone is enough.’ All eligibility elements, including current instability, need, least-restrictive necessity, and likely benefit, must be established.
‘CARE automatically becomes conservatorship.’ LPS conservatorship requires a separate proceeding and separate proof of grave disability.

15. Primary authorities and official resources

The following official sources should be checked for the current text, forms, and local implementation. URLs are included for direct verification.

1. California Welfare and Institutions Code, sections 5970-5987 (CARE Act): https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=WIC&division=5.&title=&part=8.&chapter=&article=

2. SB 1242 (2025-2026), chaptered bill text: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB1242

3. SB 989 (2025-2026), bill information and chaptered text: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB989

4. SB 27 (2025-2026), bill information and chaptered text: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB27

5. SB 1323 (2023-2024), bill information and chaptered text: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB1323

6. California Courts Self-Help: CARE Act overview: https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/care-act

7. California Courts Self-Help: CARE Act forms: https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/care-act/forms

8. California Courts Self-Help: how to file a CARE petition: https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/care-act/how-to-file

9. CARE-050-INFO, Information for Petitioners: https://courts.ca.gov/system/files?file=2025-07/care050info.pdf

10. CARE-060-INFO, Information for Respondents: https://courts.ca.gov/system/files?file=2025-07/care060info.pdf

11. CARE-100, Petition to Begin CARE Act Proceedings: https://courts.ca.gov/system/files?file=2025-07/care100.pdf

12. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=5150.&lawCode=WIC

13. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5332 (capacity and medication rules): https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=5332.&lawCode=WIC

14. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 (LPS conservatorship): https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=5350.&lawCode=WIC

15. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008 (definitions, including grave disability): https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=5008.&lawCode=WIC

16. Penal Code sections 1367-1370.02 (competency proceedings): https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=PEN&division=&title=10.&part=2.&chapter=6.&article=

Use note

This guide describes the statewide statutory framework. Counties may use different departments, calendars, filing portals, and local forms. For an active matter, use the filed papers and the superior court’s current local instructions, and obtain advice from appointed or retained counsel.

https://rumble.com/v74ellu-video-of-officer-watkins-taking-expired-old-registration-claiming-its-4463a.html

What should have been a simple speeding ticket….

Obviously this is intermingled with the daily MENTAL ILLNESS attacks, to create the appearance of CRAZY, VIOLENT, UNSTABLE with WORLDWIDE groups conspiring using the INTERNET as a weapon to coordinate with the Police, and Pscyhology community.

How does one STAY SAFE from being STALKED by the FEAR MONGERED masses working with the Police, in Community Police STALKING operaitons while the target and victim is told he’s imagining it with an AGENDA to ERADICATE at all costs with CRIMINAL and MENTAL ILLNESS labeling cover ups?

This would be equivalent to smoking some joints with your friends in college, and 10 years later your family trying to plant a trashbag of police confiscated marijuana in your house to fabricate and forge falsified police reports to try to make you look like a drug dealing to teach lessons for simply going to some social groups and having some harmless fun. By destroying your name, reputation and life in the name of someones own idealogies. Exercising the law in their own way by paying off people with the police. While indoctrinated the hypcritical masses to help.

Under California Vehicle Code § 4463(a), a person commits a crime if they do any of the following with intent to defraud:

If you fake, modify, or knowingly use fake vehicle registration or plate-related documents with fraudulent intent, you violate VC 4463(a)

Alters, forges, counterfeits, or falsifies any:

  • certificate of ownership
  • registration card
  • license
  • license plate
  • temporary plate
  • permit or similar DMV-issued document

OR

Displays, possesses, or uses any of those items knowing they are:

  • false
  • forged
  • altered
  • counterfeit
  • invalid (cancelled, revoked, etc.)

The reliance on outdated documentation, obtained without consent while valid paperwork was being presented, demonstrates a deviation from the scope of the initial speeding stop and a shift toward an unrelated allegation not supported by the operative documents, suggesting a pretextual effort to pursue an outcome independent of the facts presented.

Incident synopsis for defense counsel (VC 4463(a) allegation)

  • Stop context: Traffic stop in Ventura County on or about May 25, 2025 (per complaint).

Charges filed: Officer was Handed a Montana Registration but took a old OUTDATED California Registration when I explicitly stated that was the EXPIRED one, having 2 registrations in his hand and knowingly using the old CA one. He took it knowing it was expired.

    • Count 1: Vehicle Code 4463(a) (alleged “forgery of registration / certificate of ownership,” with intent to defraud; alleged passing as genuine/CA DMV–

issued).

    • Count 2: Vehicle Code 2234G(a) (speeding; approx. 85 mph in a 65 mph zone).

Document exchange at the stop

  • Officer requested driver license and registration.
  • Client provided current Montana registration paperwork corresponding to the Montana-plated vehicle
  • While retrieving documents, an older California DMV registration card (from a prior period before Montana registration) was in the pile of paperwork, as Officer Watkins was notified it was expired and the old paperwork
  • Client did not present the older CA registration card as current registration for the vehicle; it was outdated/expired and retained in the glovebox from prior registration history due to lack of cleaning out car.
  • Officer took/collected the older CA registration card after notifying him that, it was expired and the old one, merging it with the Montana Plates, instead of associating the Montana Paperwork he was given

Apparent misunderstanding / interpretive issue

  • The older California registration card is genuine (DMV-issued format, dates, seals/barcode) but expired/outdated and no longer current there is no forgery.
  • The Montana registration is genuine and current with Montana plates and stickers(Montana registration format, VIN/vehicle information, validity period).
  • Officer appears to have treated the existence of an expired CA registration card

(and/or an “inactive/expired” CA database return) as evidence that the CA

document was fraudulent/forged, rather than simply expired/obsolete. However

he was supposed to run the Montana Plates with the Montana Registration, not the expired California registration he took without permission,

  • Key factual mismatch: The complaint alleges the “certificate of

ownership/registration” was forged/counterfeit and intended to be represented as issued by California DMV and passed as genuine. Client’s position is that no document was forged or altered—the only CA document was a genuine but expired registration card, and the operative/current registration was Montana.

Verification questions to resolve via discovery (non-argumentative)

  • What exact document is the prosecution claiming was

“altered/forged/counterfeit/falsified” (CA registration card vs. title/ownership document vs. other)?

  • Did the officer run VIN/plate and rely on a CA “not currently registered” return? If so, what was the exact return language?
  • Was the Montana plate/VIN/registration verified at the stop (MDT/radio log), and if not, why was verification not performed?
  • Do bodycam/dashcam/photos capture (a) client handing the Montana registration first, and (b) the older CA card falling out and being collected which was not

presented to him by the driver of the vehicle?

Defense posture in one sentence

  • This appears to be a paperwork timeline/interpretation issue (current Montana registration + old expired CA registration still in glovebox), not a forgery case—i.e., no altered/counterfeit document and no intent to defraud consistent with VC 4463(a) And Proper Paperwork was presented that Officer Watkins overlooked.


ExPapp

ired California Registration Knowing it


was expired and old based on my statement

ffffff


Current Montana Registration Handed To Officer Watkins First Which He Ignored

Car history showing everything was done legit, with third party agents

A record based review of the 2017 trial appeal and relationship to Officer Charles Sean Dinse

Prepared as a standalone investigative profile. This report is not a habeas petition and does not assume that every identified omission proves a secret agreement. It distinguishes the existing record, Petitioner’s account, reasonable inferences, and matters that require counsel-file production or testimony.

Executive Assessment

The available record supports a serious, focused criticism of Seymour I. Amster’s representation. The concern is not simply that he lost a difficult misdemeanor trial or selected an imperfect strategy. The concern is that the direction of his choices repeatedly favored a psychiatric-dangerousness explanation over an innocence, self-defense, false-reporting, provocation, or police-influence defense. He recognized several components of the defense—protected expression, vigilante conduct, witness provocation, and the danger of using criminal law to suppress unpopular speech—but did not assemble the objective records capable of proving those components. He then used language that invited jurors to understand Kevin Perelman as mentally ill, paranoid, and potentially violent, including references to guns, Parkland, and Columbine.

That choice had consequences extending beyond the verdict. The trial court imposed mental-health treatment and force-and-violence conditions. Amster then handled the appeal from his own trial, repeated the psychiatric premise, reproduced damaging prosecution-centered facts, failed to develop a section 1118.1 sufficiency issue, and did not present the extra-record ineffective-assistance claim that would have required examination of his own files and decisions. The Court of Appeal expressly treated the sufficiency issue as forfeited because the opening brief did not develop it and the reply appeared to disavow it.

The relationship to Officer Charles “Sean” Dinse is evidentiary rather than personal on the current record. Dinse testified to an extensive police-centered information stream: more than fifty social-media interactions, approximately fifteen field contacts, and thirty to forty telephone calls, including calls from Burbank and Thousand Oaks asking whether Perelman “was a problem.” Amster did not expose the identities, dates, sources, repetition, independence, or police feedback underlying that apparent mass corroboration. Later public material concerning Dinse’s official neighborhood-watch communications, online groups, location sharing, psychiatric descriptions, and the Schellenberg litigation shows why that testimony demanded investigation. It does not by itself prove that Amster and Dinse made a private agreement.

The strongest supportable conclusion is therefore narrower than a proved conspiracy but more serious than ordinary negligence: Amster knew the defense theory, knew that police and civilian actors used psychiatric and dangerousness language, knew the State relied on numerous ostensibly independent complaints, and knew there was evidence of provocation and vigilante behavior. Yet he did not build the factual defense, affirmatively introduced an extreme psychiatric-danger narrative, and then occupied the appellate position from which his own trial conduct should have been challenged. That consistent direction supports an inference of purposeful adverse representation or abandonment sufficient to justify a detailed investigation. Intentional loss remains an allegation requiring direct or circumstantial proof, not an established fact.

Identity Professional Capacity and Expected Competence

Seymour I. Amster is an active California lawyer, State Bar No. 105308, admitted in December 1982. Public professional descriptions identify criminal defense, appellate practice, and federal and state trial and appellate work as principal areas of practice. A current nonprofit-board biography describes more than forty-three years of experience and claims certification as a criminal-law specialist since 1998. His reported background includes Loyola University of Los Angeles and Loyola Law School. These facts matter because the disputed choices cannot readily be attributed to an inexperienced lawyer unfamiliar with criminal trials, appeals, confrontation, preservation, or the difference between a lay label and a clinical diagnosis.

Amster’s reported appellate work includes published or publicly available federal and California matters involving confrontation, cross-examination, ineffective assistance, sentencing, and constitutional claims. In Murdoch v. Castro, he litigated a Sixth Amendment confrontation issue through repeated Ninth Circuit proceedings. Other public cases show that he knew how to challenge prosecution evidence, develop alternative-suspect theories, attack DNA or scientific proof, and allege prosecutorial misconduct. His work in the Grim Sleeper prosecution demonstrates that he could pursue extensive alternate-source and evidentiary arguments in a high-stakes case. This background does not prove misconduct in Perelman’s case, but it weakens an explanation that the central omissions resulted merely from ignorance of basic defense practice.

The profile should not distort that professional history. Public decisions also show ordinary losses and criticism of missed administrative duties in unrelated litigation. They do not establish a general pattern of intentional sabotage. The relevance is competence and capacity: the record presents a lawyer experienced enough to recognize the importance of source evidence, impeachment, preservation, confrontation, and appellate issue development.

The Representation in Context

The 2017 prosecution combined separate incidents and cases into a broad course-of-conduct narrative. The amended case ultimately submitted six counts to the jury, including public-nuisance, criminal-threat, battery, and handbill allegations. The prosecution was permitted to present a continuous history involving cards, photographs, websites, neighborhood encounters, community complaints, and police contacts. That structure created a predictable danger: separate accusers and anonymous callers could appear to corroborate one another even if they shared information, received a common warning, responded to the same online circulation, or repeated a police-supplied description.

A competent defense did not have to prove every event across Perelman’s life or ask jurors to accept a worldwide theory. It needed to isolate representative modules and prove them. The available modules included the Bailey Bernard 911 call and residence-gate sequence; Dinse’s community-contact testimony, parking citation, and alleged residence recording; representative Scroggins recordings and statements; the HOA relationship; the origin and location of the disputed photograph; and records showing that Perelman sought police assistance. Properly organized, those items could have tested initiation, claimed fear, motive, report reversal, police influence, independence, and self-defense without overwhelming the jury.

What Amster Correctly Recognized

A fair profile must acknowledge that Amster did not simply endorse the prosecution. Portions of the trial record show that he recognized several important defense principles.

  • He argued that the public-nuisance prosecution implicated protected speech and that public-nuisance law should not become a device for suppressing expression merely because distribution annoyed residents.
  • He stated that the Scroggins and Bernard encounters were initiated by others who approached or provoked Perelman and would not disengage.
  • He identified vigilante conduct and criticized people who take law enforcement into their own hands instead of using lawful channels.
  • He argued that the prosecution displayed the photograph of Perelman with a gun to portray him as dangerous.
  • He attacked the prosecutor’s personal characterization of Scroggins as an unusually “brutally honest” witness and preserved a vouching objection.
  • He sought special First Amendment instructions and argued that the jury had to distinguish expressive distribution from littering or nuisance conduct.

These points are significant for two reasons. First, they show that counsel understood the core defense theory. Second, they make the omissions harder to explain as an innocent failure to recognize relevance. Counsel rhetorically identified provocation, vigilantism, protected expression, and danger framing, but did not present the strongest objective evidence needed to turn those themes into reasonable doubt.

The Psychiatric Dangerousness Narrative Introduced by Defense Counsel

The closing argument

The most consequential conduct appears at approximately reporter’s transcript pages 999 through 1005. Amster began his closing not with innocence, factual contradictions, self-defense, or missing police evidence, but with a claimed societal mental-health crisis. He discussed the closure of state hospitals, described mentally ill people as previously being “locked up,” referred to “their paranoia,” and said they were now “among us.” He asked whether society should use criminal statutes to find a way to lock them up.

“I don’t think it’s any surprise to you if I make a statement to you that we have a mental health crisis in our society.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 999

“They were locked up. They had their paranoia they were able to deal with on their own. And they were nice away from us.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 999

“Now we have them in our society. We don’t have them locked up in hospitals. They are among us.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 999

Amster then moved from institutionalization to prospective violence. He asked what would happen if Perelman’s passive distribution were stopped, whether “the mentally ill” would move to extremes, and whether they might “pick up a gun and get violent.” After the prosecutor objected and the court warned the jury not to consider punishment, Amster continued the same theme. He invoked “the mothers in Parkland” and “the mothers at Columbine,” asking jurors to consider whether future violence could have been prevented by allowing the allegedly passive conduct.

“Do they eventually, as you close down their avenues, pick up a gun and get violent?” — Defense closing, RT approximately 1002

“I want each of you to think about the mothers in Parkland and the mothers at Columbine.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 1003

This was not a neutral plea for tolerance. It associated counsel’s own client with paranoia, institutional confinement, firearms, school massacres, and future lethal violence. It supplied a propensity and dangerousness narrative more inflammatory than the charged misdemeanors. It also treated mental illness as established without the present record identifying a competent diagnosis supporting that characterization.

Why the argument was internally contradictory

Amster’s stated rhetorical purpose appears to have been that criminalization could make a troubled person more dangerous and that society should tolerate passive expression. But the means of making that argument undermined the client. A defense attorney can argue that unconventional expression is protected without declaring the client mentally ill. Counsel could have said that the State may not convert unpopular speech into criminal propensity, that the incidents had to be judged from objective evidence, and that witnesses who approached or provoked the defendant could not erase their own conduct. Instead, he asked jurors to acquit partly because restriction might cause the client to become violent.

That is especially damaging in a case involving a criminal-threat count and a photograph used to imply dangerousness. The prosecution needed jurors to fear Perelman and to interpret ambiguous words as serious threats. The defense reinforced the emotional premise by supplying its own prediction of possible gun violence. Even if intended as social commentary, it exposed the client to precisely the inference counsel had accused the prosecution of seeking.

Client authorization and factual foundation

The existing record does not establish that Perelman consented to a mental-illness defense, agreed that he had paranoia, authorized comparisons to mass shootings, or received advice concerning the risks. Nor does it identify a qualified expert who diagnosed him and supported this strategy. A treatment history, attendance letter, family assertion, police opinion, or counsel’s belief is not a clinical diagnosis. The counsel file should reveal the factual foundation, strategy memoranda, consultations, proposed expert evidence, client objections, and reasons counsel believed these references advanced acquittal rather than dangerousness.

Failure to Build the Objective Defense

Bailey Bernard and the battery count

Count 7 concerned an alleged battery involving Bailey Bernard. Perelman’s account was that Bernard followed him from a park to his residence, physically crowded him, obstructed his entry, interfered with his camera, and struck the hand holding his keys. Perelman states that he called 911 and went to a police station. Those assertions were capable of objective testing through the 911 recording, CAD and dispatch records, gate or property video, police-station surveillance, photographs, injury evidence, the first report, report drafts, and witness statements.

The trial presentation acknowledged only generally that Bernard followed Perelman. It did not reconstruct the pursuit to his home and the gate encounter through the original records. That omission mattered to self-defense, initial aggressor, claimed fear, report reversal, and credibility. The section 1118.1 acquittal motion did not develop the battery count, and the prosecution’s appellate brief later noted that no acquittal motion was made as to Counts 2 and 7.

Scroggins and the criminal-threat count

Scroggins was not merely a passive recipient of a spontaneous statement. The record and proffered material identified an HOA role, repeated contacts, property or vehicle approaches, windshield letters, continued proximity, claimed financial or property-value concerns, acknowledged PTSD and anger-management history, and recordings that allegedly included “That’s the man I want to kill.” Those materials were relevant to bias, motive, claimed fear, who initiated encounters, and whether the disputed statement was interpreted accurately.

The precise wording was also disputed. The State used the formulation, “If you do this one more time, I will slice you open.” Perelman’s testimony used materially different conditional language: “If you don’t let me take a walk, I will cut you down,” followed by an explanation that he meant leave him alone and did not want to hurt anyone. Counsel needed to compare the exact words, context, conditional phrasing, conduct afterward, speaker perceptions, and evidence of actual sustained fear. Instead, the most inflammatory wording dominated the verdict and later appellate narrative.

Amster did object when the prosecutor called Scroggins one of the most or more “brutally honest” witnesses she had encountered. But that narrow vouching challenge did not substitute for factual impeachment. The reviewing court treated any impropriety as harmless after the objection and instruction. Objective recordings, HOA evidence, threats, approaches, and inconsistent statements would have attacked the witness’s credibility directly rather than merely attacking the prosecutor’s phrasing.

The evidence archive

Perelman states that counsel received or was offered an evidence archive of approximately seventy terabytes. Volume alone is not a defense, and counsel was not required to play or file everything. It did require a review protocol: inventory the media, preserve proof of delivery, identify representative incidents, authenticate selected clips, create transcripts or stills, interview custodians, and map each item to a charged count or impeachment purpose. No complete inventory, review log, selection memorandum, or admissibility plan is presently identified.

The absence of organization became self-reinforcing. Because counsel did not convert the archive into a limited evidentiary presentation, Perelman’s broader account could appear unsupported or symptomatic. Counsel then used that appearance to support a psychiatric framing. The lawyer’s failure to organize corroboration effectively became evidence against the client.

Officer Charles Sean Dinse and the Untested Information Network

Dinse’s trial testimony

Dinse’s own testimony made the police-community network a case-specific issue. He described receiving complaints about Perelman’s cards in multiple locations through “several different sources and methods.” He testified to being flagged down in the field, receiving calls on city cellular and desk telephones, and using social media. When asked to quantify contacts, he estimated more than fifty social-media interactions, approximately fifteen field approaches, and thirty to forty telephone calls. Some callers came from Burbank and Thousand Oaks and asked whether Perelman “was a problem.”

That testimony allowed the prosecution to present numerical repetition as apparent independent corroboration. But the jury was not shown whether the contacts came from fifty different people or repeated activity by a smaller group; whether callers saw conduct firsthand; whether they received a common photograph, label, business card, warning, or police post; whether Dinse communicated information back to community members; or whether contacts preceded the charged events. The identities, dates, content, geographic origin, and resulting police action were foundational facts, not peripheral curiosity.

What Amster did not establish

  • Who contacted Dinse, how often, and about what specific conduct.
  • Whether contacts were independent or coordinated through the same neighborhood groups or social-media posts.
  • Whether Dinse supplied descriptions, labels, photographs, location information, or advice before later witnesses encountered Perelman.
  • Whether the calls generated CAD entries, reports, field contacts, citations, or enforcement activity.
  • Whether callers from distant cities had personally met Perelman or were responding to circulated information.
  • Whether Dinse’s own notes, direct messages, account exports, telephone logs, and group-administrator records contradicted or qualified his summary testimony.
  • Whether a limiting instruction was required to prevent jurors from treating anonymous contacts as substantive proof of character, conduct, or mental state.

Recurring Dinse contacts and impeachment

Perelman identifies Dinse in the 2013 sidewalk contact, the 2017 prosecution, a parking citation bearing Dinse’s name approximately two weeks before expected defense testimony, a residence-area recording in which an officer allegedly suggested checking whether a door was unlocked, and a later accusation that Perelman followed Dinse home. Recurrence alone does not prove wrongdoing. Combined with Dinse’s own testimony about extensive community communications, however, it made assignments, reports, messages, citation metadata, complaint history, social-media activity, and bias obvious subjects for investigation.

The parking citation and residence recording provided concrete tests. The citation could have been compared with the trial schedule, Dinse’s assignment, location, vehicle position, photographs, metadata, and preceding communications. The residence recording could have been authenticated and compared with dispatch, CAD, body-camera, access, and authorization records. Amster allegedly possessed or was directed to this evidence but did not organize it into an admissible foundation or confront Dinse with it.

Later public evidence explaining the missed inquiry

A public 2014 introduction attributed to Dinse described the Senior Lead Officer role as monitoring crime trends, quality-of-life concerns, and neighborhood watch, and stated that community members used Facebook and other communications to alert one another. Public posts attributed to his officer account later showed residents being asked to identify, locate, or report people and activities. Independent reporting identified the private Valley groups “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills” and “Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley,” in which officers and residents exchanged photographs, locations, descriptions, accusations, and requests for action.

The Los Angeles Times reported that LAPD ordered officers to stop participating after violent and harassing comments appeared in the groups. The reporting identified Dinse as an active officer participant and quoted his explanation that he used the pages to absorb street information and assist residents. This evidence does not show that he endorsed every member’s words, but it confirms that a police-connected neighborhood information channel was neither imaginary nor inherently impossible.

Rex Schellenberg’s 2020 federal complaint separately named Dinse and the City under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The complaint alleged that Dinse circulated Schellenberg’s location, referred to him as a recurring subject, used an unverified “drug addiction/mental illness” explanation, and relied on community reporting as a pretext for contacts, towing, or property action. These were allegations, not adjudicated findings. Their significance is comparative: another identified person alleged a similar police-to-community process beginning during the same general period. The separate 2018 Schellenberg property-seizure case named the City rather than Dinse and must not be conflated with the 2020 Dinse case.

How Amster’s Choices Functionally Supported Dinse

No presently reviewed record proves that Amster privately coordinated with Dinse. “Supporting Dinse” is therefore best understood first as a functional result. Amster’s choices protected the evidentiary value of Dinse’s narrative and prevented meaningful testing of its source.

  1. He allowed anonymous volume to operate as corroboration. Dinse’s counts of calls and contacts remained largely unexamined, permitting repetition to look like independence.
  2. He failed to trace the information stream. Without names, dates, posts, messages, CAD records, and telephone logs, the defense could not determine whether police information preceded civilian accusations.
  3. He failed to use recurring-contact impeachment. The citation, residence recording, 2013 history, and other reported Dinse contacts were not assembled into a chronology.
  4. He substituted psychiatric explanation for source analysis. Instead of showing how labels and complaints circulated, counsel told jurors that his client was mentally ill and paranoid.
  5. He reinforced dangerousness. His gun, Parkland, and Columbine references supported the preventive logic that an unconventional person should be controlled because of what he might do.
  6. He preserved only a narrow appellate record. The missing investigation and exhibits made later review depend on the same incomplete trial record.

The functional result was that Dinse appeared as a reliable collector of independent community concern rather than a potential source, amplifier, or coordinator of the narrative. The jury could treat numerous contacts as proof that many unrelated people independently reached the same conclusion, while the defense failed to test whether they shared a common channel.

The Preventive Control or Pre Crime Theme

“Pre-crime” is not used here as a formal legal doctrine. It describes a preventive-control logic: restrain, monitor, label, exclude, treat, or confine a person because officials or community members predict future danger from speech, unconventional behavior, reputation, or psychiatric characterization rather than proving a completed offense through reliable evidence.

Amster’s closing embraced the vocabulary of that logic even while nominally criticizing criminalization. He asked what society should do with “the mentally ill,” discussed whether they should be locked up, and warned that limiting passive conduct might lead to guns and mass violence. This framed Perelman as a future-risk problem. The question subtly shifted from whether the State proved the charged conduct to how society should manage a supposedly mentally ill person who might become dangerous.

Dinse’s publicly reported methods raise a parallel concern. Community members supplied photographs, locations, warnings, psychiatric descriptions, and predictions of risk; police used those streams to decide whom to watch, approach, move, cite, tow, or refer. The Schellenberg allegations similarly challenged location sharing and psychiatric labeling as a basis for repeated intervention. Amster’s failure to investigate those channels allowed the preventive narrative to enter trial as an apparently neutral accumulation of concern.

The “political agenda” supported by the record is therefore not necessarily a partisan affiliation or campaign platform. It is an institutional preference for community surveillance, risk sorting, psychiatric characterization, exclusion, and preventive control. The current record can show that Amster’s argument and omissions advanced that framework. It cannot yet prove that he joined a political organization, received instructions from Dinse, or intentionally participated in a coordinated policy. Those stronger claims require communications, counsel-file evidence, testimony, or other direct proof.

The Appeal and the Conflict of Reviewing His Own Work

Same attorney trial and appeal

Amster represented Perelman on the appeal from the same trial. That dual role did not automatically disqualify him, but it created an obvious practical conflict. Meaningful appellate review required asking whether trial counsel failed to investigate, subpoena, authenticate, object, seek limiting instructions, move for acquittal, preserve claims, consult on strategy, or avoid prejudicial concessions. Amster could not present those arguments without evaluating and potentially accusing himself.

The record should establish whether Perelman knowingly waived that conflict, whether independent counsel reviewed potential ineffective-assistance claims, and whether Amster explained that extra-record claims required habeas development. No adequate waiver or independent review is presently identified.

Prosecution centered statement of facts

The opening appellate brief reproduced substantial portions of the State’s narrative: witnesses allegedly saw Perelman throw or drop large numbers of cards; Scroggins received the inflammatory threat; and the website described a worldwide conspiracy. It did not reconstruct the Bernard pursuit and gate encounter with original 911 and residence evidence, develop the Scroggins recording and alleged death statement, expose possible common sources underlying Dinse’s community contacts, or explain the defensive documentation purpose through authenticated representative proof.

The problem was not that an appellate brief must omit adverse facts. Counsel must state the record accurately. The problem was selection and balance: damaging allegations were repeated as the organizing narrative while the facts necessary to show provocation, nonindependence, self-defense, police influence, and report reversal remained undeveloped or outside the record because trial counsel had failed to build them.

The forfeited section 1118.1 issue

The Court of Appeal expressly stated that the opening brief did not develop why the evidence was insufficient under section 1118.1. The reply brief appeared to disavow the claim by characterizing the thrust as instructional error. The court therefore found the sufficiency argument forfeited and alternatively found substantial evidence. This was not merely an unfavorable legal ruling; it was an identified briefing failure by the same lawyer who had made the trial motion.

Narrow vouching claim and psychiatric sentencing premise

The appeal pursued the prosecutor’s “brutally honest” characterization of Scroggins, but the reviewing court found reversal unwarranted. The appeal thus attacked the prosecutor’s phrase while leaving the strongest factual impeachment outside a developed record. It also argued that the sentence punished “the mentally ill” rather than treating the psychiatric premise itself as unsupported. The reply brief stated that the community did not know how to interact with “one who is mentally ill” and asked whether incarceration would merely prolong mental illness. That framing carried the trial concession into the appeal.

The sentencing challenge raised the federal Eighth Amendment but did not develop the separate California constitutional “cruel or unusual” analysis noted by the appellate court. The court also treated aspects of the sentencing claim as forfeited for lack of a trial objection. These outcomes illustrate the cumulative problem: incomplete trial preservation, the same attorney on appeal, a psychiatric premise repeated as fact, and claims narrowed or forfeited.

Evidence Supporting an Inference Beyond Ordinary Negligence

Intentional loss cannot be declared solely because a lawyer made damaging choices. Lawyers sometimes adopt unsuccessful, inconsistent, or poorly executed strategies. The inference becomes stronger, however, when choices repeatedly run in the same adverse direction despite counsel’s demonstrated knowledge and available alternatives.

  • Amster knew that provocation and non-disengagement mattered, because he said the central encounters were initiated by others.
  • He knew vigilante conduct mattered, because he criticized witnesses taking law into their own hands.
  • He knew the State was using dangerousness, because he accused the prosecution of using a gun photograph to make Perelman appear dangerous.
  • He knew protected expression mattered, because he litigated First Amendment instructions and argued against nuisance-based suppression.
  • He knew Dinse relied on an extensive community information stream, because Dinse quantified it before the jury.
  • He had the training and experience to understand confrontation, source testing, impeachment, sufficiency, preservation, and appellate briefing.
  • Despite that knowledge, he did not present the strongest objective proof and affirmatively associated the client with paranoia, institutionalization, firearms, Parkland, and Columbine.
  • He then handled the appeal, continued the mental-illness premise, reproduced damaging facts, and failed to develop a claim the appellate court found forfeited.

This pattern permits a responsible inference of purposeful adverse representation, abandonment, or a strategy aligned with institutional control rather than acquittal. It does not establish which explanation is correct. The missing proof lies principally in the counsel file, communications, billing and review records, investigator decisions, client consultation, and Amster’s sworn explanation.

Competing Interpretations and Their Evidentiary Tests

Interpretation one misguided humanitarian strategy

Amster may claim that he sought to humanize Perelman, defend tolerance, prevent criminalization of mental illness, and argue that passive expression was socially preferable to confrontation. The test is whether he had a factual basis for the diagnosis, discussed the strategy with the client, obtained informed consent, considered its prejudice, and documented why mass-shooting references helped rather than harmed.

Interpretation two overwhelmed or poorly organized defense

He may claim that the evidence archive was too large, authentication was difficult, time was limited, or the broader account risked confusing the jury. The test is whether he created an inventory, hired or sought an investigator, selected representative clips, issued subpoenas, requested continuances, consulted experts, preserved originals, and explained rejected items. A reasonable narrowing decision requires prior investigation; counsel cannot strategically reject evidence he never reviewed.

Interpretation three tactical focus on the First Amendment

He may claim that a speech-centered defense was the strongest available approach. The test is why that theory did not include the objective context showing defensive purpose, why the battery and threat counts were not fully addressed, why anonymous community contacts were left unexplored, and why counsel introduced a psychiatric-dangerousness concession unnecessary to First Amendment analysis.

Interpretation four adverse or agenda based representation

Perelman alleges that Amster’s conduct was not merely ineffective but aligned with a wider effort to establish a mental-illness label and justify preventive control. The circumstantial support is the consistent direction of omissions and concessions. The test is communications with police, prosecutors, family, community participants, or third parties; undisclosed conflicts; retainer and payment arrangements; statements concerning desired disposition; evidence-access history; and whether contemporaneous notes reveal an objective inconsistent with acquittal.

Records Needed to Complete the Profile

  • The complete unfiltered trial and appellate files, including native electronic folders and metadata.
  • Retainer, payment, scope, third-party payer, and conflict-disclosure records.
  • Every communication between Amster and Perelman, the prosecution, Dinse, other officers, witnesses, HOA participants, family members, and appellate personnel.
  • A complete inventory of the evidence supplied, proof of delivery, access and download histories, review notes, clip selections, and excluded items.
  • Investigator requests, refusals, assignments, reports, witness contacts, subpoena decisions, and budgets.
  • Pitchess, Brady, discovery, preservation, and public-record research concerning Dinse and the community-contact evidence.
  • Drafts and notes for opening, closing, the section 1118.1 motion, jury instructions, sentencing, the appellate opening brief, and reply.
  • All records concerning a mental-health defense: diagnosis, expert consultation, treatment records relied upon, client authorization, and strategy memoranda.
  • The Bernard 911 call, CAD and dispatch records, gate and station video, original reports and drafts, photographs, and injury evidence.
  • The complete Scroggins recording set, native metadata, letters, HOA records, property-entry chronology, and alleged death-threat audio.
  • Dinse’s city cellular and desk-phone logs, emails, texts, social-media exports, direct messages, group memberships, administrator records, relevant Nextdoor communications, and complaint logs for the period surrounding the charged incidents.
  • The parking citation, citation metadata, assignment and location records, photographs, and communications preceding issuance.
  • Any waiver or consultation concerning Amster’s handling of the appeal from his own trial performance.

Questions for Seymour Amster

  • What evidence did you receive from Perelman, and where is the complete inventory?
  • Which recordings did you personally review, and which did an investigator or staff member review?
  • Why was the Bernard 911 call and complete residence sequence not introduced?
  • Why were Counts 2 and 7 not fully included in the section 1118.1 challenge?
  • What investigation did you conduct into Dinse’s social-media contacts, telephone calls, field contacts, and geographically distant complainants?
  • Did you seek names, dates, logs, posts, messages, CAD entries, or a limiting instruction concerning anonymous community contacts?
  • What did you know about the Dinse parking citation and residence recording, and why were they not authenticated and used?
  • What competent diagnosis supported calling your client mentally ill and paranoid?
  • Did Perelman authorize a mental-illness defense and the Parkland and Columbine references?
  • Why did you tell jurors that restricting his passive conduct might cause him to pick up a gun?
  • How did that argument advance acquittal on a criminal-threat charge rather than dangerousness?
  • Why did you handle the appeal from your own trial without independent review of ineffective-assistance claims?
  • Why did the opening brief fail to develop the section 1118.1 issue and the reply appear to disavow it?
  • Why did the appeal repeat that Perelman was mentally ill without challenging the absence of a documented clinical foundation?
  • Did any third party communicate a desired psychiatric, treatment, probationary, or confinement outcome?

Profile Conclusion

The record portrays a lawyer who understood the language of constitutional defense but did not build the factual structure necessary to make that defense work. Amster recognized protected expression, provocation, vigilante conduct, and the prosecution’s attempt to portray Perelman as dangerous. Yet he failed to test the police-centered information network that made multiple accusations appear independent; failed to organize representative objective evidence; failed to fully develop self-defense, report reversal, and witness motive; and affirmatively characterized his client through institutionalization, paranoia, firearms, Parkland, and Columbine.

His subsequent decision to handle the appeal magnified the problem. It placed him in the position of reviewing his own investigation, objections, concessions, and preservation failures. The appellate presentation continued the psychiatric premise, relied heavily on the prosecution’s factual frame, and forfeited or narrowed significant issues. The result was not simply a lost appeal; it was an appellate record that protected the incompleteness of the trial record.

The available evidence therefore supports a detailed investigation into whether Amster’s representation crossed from deficient performance into purposeful adverse representation or abandonment. It also supports examination of whether his trial and appellate choices functionally advanced Dinse’s police-community narrative and a preventive-control model in which psychiatric labeling and predicted future risk replace incident-specific proof. A direct agreement, political affiliation, or intentional plan to lose has not yet been proved. The pattern is sufficiently concrete, consistent, and consequential to require the files, communications, and sworn explanations that could resolve motive.

Source and Reliability Guide

Primary case materials reviewed

  • 2017 reporter’s transcripts, including the trial testimony, instruction discussions, section 1118.1 proceedings, and defense closing at approximately RT 999–1005.
  • Appellant’s opening brief and reply brief prepared in the appeal from the 2018 judgment.
  • Respondent’s brief and the California Court of Appeal opinion, including the discussion of section 1118.1 forfeiture, vouching, instructional claims, sentencing, and the state and federal punishment provisions.
  • Current seven-book master record used only as an index to issues and source locations, not as independent proof.

Independent public sources

  • State Bar of California attorney search: Seymour I. Amster, State Bar No. 105308, active, admitted December 1982.
  • Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2004), and 489 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007), reflecting Amster’s federal habeas and confrontation-clause experience.
  • Smith v. Los Angeles Unified School District, Ninth Circuit proceedings, reflecting federal appellate work involving disability and educational policy.
  • Los Angeles Times, “Cop’s use of Facebook put ‘target on our back,’” reporting on Valley Facebook groups, LAPD participation, Dinse, and the Schellenberg allegations.
  • Rex Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles et al., C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:20-cv-01313, complaint and docket. Allegations are not treated as adjudicated findings.
  • Separate Schellenberg property case, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:18-cv-07670, distinguished from the Dinse-specific 2020 action.

Reliability categories used in this profile

  • Documented: appears in a transcript, brief, opinion, docket, official profile, or authenticated record.
  • Attributed allegation: asserted by Perelman, Schellenberg, or another identified speaker but not yet adjudicated.
  • Inference: a conclusion drawn from the direction, sequence, or consistency of documented choices.
  • Unproved proposition: secret agreement, intentional loss, political coordination, or instruction by Dinse remains a subject for investigation unless direct evidence is obtained.

A comprehensive record of the 2017 representation appeal Dinse relationship and connected pattern

Executive Assessment

The available record supports a serious, focused criticism of Seymour I. Amster’s representation. The concern is not simply that he lost a difficult misdemeanor trial or selected an imperfect strategy. The concern is that the direction of his choices repeatedly favored a psychiatric-dangerousness explanation over an innocence, self-defense, false-reporting, provocation, or police-influence defense. He recognized several components of the defense—protected expression, vigilante conduct, witness provocation, and the danger of using criminal law to suppress unpopular speech—but did not assemble the objective records capable of proving those components. He then used language that invited jurors to understand Kevin Perelman as mentally ill, paranoid, and potentially violent, including references to guns, Parkland, and Columbine.

That choice had consequences extending beyond the verdict. The trial court imposed mental-health treatment and force-and-violence conditions. Amster then handled the appeal from his own trial, repeated the psychiatric premise, reproduced damaging prosecution-centered facts, failed to develop a section 1118.1 sufficiency issue, and did not present the extra-record ineffective-assistance claim that would have required examination of his own files and decisions. The Court of Appeal expressly treated the sufficiency issue as forfeited because the opening brief did not develop it and the reply appeared to disavow it.

The relationship to Officer Charles “Sean” Dinse is evidentiary rather than personal on the current record. Dinse testified to an extensive police-centered information stream: more than fifty social-media interactions, approximately fifteen field contacts, and thirty to forty telephone calls, including calls from Burbank and Thousand Oaks asking whether Perelman “was a problem.” Amster did not expose the identities, dates, sources, repetition, independence, or police feedback underlying that apparent mass corroboration. Later public material concerning Dinse’s official neighborhood-watch communications, online groups, location sharing, psychiatric descriptions, and the Schellenberg litigation shows why that testimony demanded investigation. It does not by itself prove that Amster and Dinse made a private agreement.

The strongest supportable conclusion is therefore narrower than a proved conspiracy but more serious than ordinary negligence: Amster knew the defense theory, knew that police and civilian actors used psychiatric and dangerousness language, knew the State relied on numerous ostensibly independent complaints, and knew there was evidence of provocation and vigilante behavior. Yet he did not build the factual defense, affirmatively introduced an extreme psychiatric-danger narrative, and then occupied the appellate position from which his own trial conduct should have been challenged. That consistent direction supports an inference of purposeful adverse representation or abandonment sufficient to justify a detailed investigation. Intentional loss remains an allegation requiring direct or circumstantial proof, not an established fact.

Identity Professional Capacity and Expected Competence

Seymour I. Amster is an active California lawyer, State Bar No. 105308, admitted in December 1982. Public professional descriptions identify criminal defense, appellate practice, and federal and state trial and appellate work as principal areas of practice. A current nonprofit-board biography describes more than forty-three years of experience and claims certification as a criminal-law specialist since 1998. His reported background includes Loyola University of Los Angeles and Loyola Law School. These facts matter because the disputed choices cannot readily be attributed to an inexperienced lawyer unfamiliar with criminal trials, appeals, confrontation, preservation, or the difference between a lay label and a clinical diagnosis.

Amster’s reported appellate work includes published or publicly available federal and California matters involving confrontation, cross-examination, ineffective assistance, sentencing, and constitutional claims. In Murdoch v. Castro, he litigated a Sixth Amendment confrontation issue through repeated Ninth Circuit proceedings. Other public cases show that he knew how to challenge prosecution evidence, develop alternative-suspect theories, attack DNA or scientific proof, and allege prosecutorial misconduct. His work in the Grim Sleeper prosecution demonstrates that he could pursue extensive alternate-source and evidentiary arguments in a high-stakes case. This background does not prove misconduct in Perelman’s case, but it weakens an explanation that the central omissions resulted merely from ignorance of basic defense practice.

The profile should not distort that professional history. Public decisions also show ordinary losses and criticism of missed administrative duties in unrelated litigation. They do not establish a general pattern of intentional sabotage. The relevance is competence and capacity: the record presents a lawyer experienced enough to recognize the importance of source evidence, impeachment, preservation, confrontation, and appellate issue development.

The Representation in Context

The 2017 prosecution combined separate incidents and cases into a broad course-of-conduct narrative. The amended case ultimately submitted six counts to the jury, including public-nuisance, criminal-threat, battery, and handbill allegations. The prosecution was permitted to present a continuous history involving cards, photographs, websites, neighborhood encounters, community complaints, and police contacts. That structure created a predictable danger: separate accusers and anonymous callers could appear to corroborate one another even if they shared information, received a common warning, responded to the same online circulation, or repeated a police-supplied description.

A competent defense did not have to prove every event across Perelman’s life or ask jurors to accept a worldwide theory. It needed to isolate representative modules and prove them. The available modules included the Bailey Bernard 911 call and residence-gate sequence; Dinse’s community-contact testimony, parking citation, and alleged residence recording; representative Scroggins recordings and statements; the HOA relationship; the origin and location of the disputed photograph; and records showing that Perelman sought police assistance. Properly organized, those items could have tested initiation, claimed fear, motive, report reversal, police influence, independence, and self-defense without overwhelming the jury.

What Amster Correctly Recognized

A fair profile must acknowledge that Amster did not simply endorse the prosecution. Portions of the trial record show that he recognized several important defense principles.

· He argued that the public-nuisance prosecution implicated protected speech and that public-nuisance law should not become a device for suppressing expression merely because distribution annoyed residents.

· He stated that the Scroggins and Bernard encounters were initiated by others who approached or provoked Perelman and would not disengage.

· He identified vigilante conduct and criticized people who take law enforcement into their own hands instead of using lawful channels.

· He argued that the prosecution displayed the photograph of Perelman with a gun to portray him as dangerous.

· He attacked the prosecutor’s personal characterization of Scroggins as an unusually “brutally honest” witness and preserved a vouching objection.

· He sought special First Amendment instructions and argued that the jury had to distinguish expressive distribution from littering or nuisance conduct.

These points are significant for two reasons. First, they show that counsel understood the core defense theory. Second, they make the omissions harder to explain as an innocent failure to recognize relevance. Counsel rhetorically identified provocation, vigilantism, protected expression, and danger framing, but did not present the strongest objective evidence needed to turn those themes into reasonable doubt.

The Psychiatric Dangerousness Narrative Introduced by Defense Counsel

The closing argument

The most consequential conduct appears at approximately reporter’s transcript pages 999 through 1005. Amster began his closing not with innocence, factual contradictions, self-defense, or missing police evidence, but with a claimed societal mental-health crisis. He discussed the closure of state hospitals, described mentally ill people as previously being “locked up,” referred to “their paranoia,” and said they were now “among us.” He asked whether society should use criminal statutes to find a way to lock them up.

“I don’t think it’s any surprise to you if I make a statement to you that we have a mental health crisis in our society.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 999

“They were locked up. They had their paranoia they were able to deal with on their own. And they were nice away from us.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 999

“Now we have them in our society. We don’t have them locked up in hospitals. They are among us.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 999

Amster then moved from institutionalization to prospective violence. He asked what would happen if Perelman’s passive distribution were stopped, whether “the mentally ill” would move to extremes, and whether they might “pick up a gun and get violent.” After the prosecutor objected and the court warned the jury not to consider punishment, Amster continued the same theme. He invoked “the mothers in Parkland” and “the mothers at Columbine,” asking jurors to consider whether future violence could have been prevented by allowing the allegedly passive conduct.

“Do they eventually, as you close down their avenues, pick up a gun and get violent?” — Defense closing, RT approximately 1002

“I want each of you to think about the mothers in Parkland and the mothers at Columbine.” — Defense closing, RT approximately 1003

This was not a neutral plea for tolerance. It associated counsel’s own client with paranoia, institutional confinement, firearms, school massacres, and future lethal violence. It supplied a propensity and dangerousness narrative more inflammatory than the charged misdemeanors. It also treated mental illness as established without the present record identifying a competent diagnosis supporting that characterization.

Why the argument was internally contradictory

Amster’s stated rhetorical purpose appears to have been that criminalization could make a troubled person more dangerous and that society should tolerate passive expression. But the means of making that argument undermined the client. A defense attorney can argue that unconventional expression is protected without declaring the client mentally ill. Counsel could have said that the State may not convert unpopular speech into criminal propensity, that the incidents had to be judged from objective evidence, and that witnesses who approached or provoked the defendant could not erase their own conduct. Instead, he asked jurors to acquit partly because restriction might cause the client to become violent.

That is especially damaging in a case involving a criminal-threat count and a photograph used to imply dangerousness. The prosecution needed jurors to fear Perelman and to interpret ambiguous words as serious threats. The defense reinforced the emotional premise by supplying its own prediction of possible gun violence. Even if intended as social commentary, it exposed the client to precisely the inference counsel had accused the prosecution of seeking.

Client authorization and factual foundation

The existing record does not establish that Perelman consented to a mental-illness defense, agreed that he had paranoia, authorized comparisons to mass shootings, or received advice concerning the risks. Nor does it identify a qualified expert who diagnosed him and supported this strategy. A treatment history, attendance letter, family assertion, police opinion, or counsel’s belief is not a clinical diagnosis. The counsel file should reveal the factual foundation, strategy memoranda, consultations, proposed expert evidence, client objections, and reasons counsel believed these references advanced acquittal rather than dangerousness.

Failure to Build the Objective Defense

Bailey Bernard and the battery count

Count 7 concerned an alleged battery involving Bailey Bernard. Perelman’s account was that Bernard followed him from a park to his residence, physically crowded him, obstructed his entry, interfered with his camera, and struck the hand holding his keys. Perelman states that he called 911 and went to a police station. Those assertions were capable of objective testing through the 911 recording, CAD and dispatch records, gate or property video, police-station surveillance, photographs, injury evidence, the first report, report drafts, and witness statements.

The trial presentation acknowledged only generally that Bernard followed Perelman. It did not reconstruct the pursuit to his home and the gate encounter through the original records. That omission mattered to self-defense, initial aggressor, claimed fear, report reversal, and credibility. The section 1118.1 acquittal motion did not develop the battery count, and the prosecution’s appellate brief later noted that no acquittal motion was made as to Counts 2 and 7.

Scroggins and the criminal-threat count

Scroggins was not merely a passive recipient of a spontaneous statement. The record and proffered material identified an HOA role, repeated contacts, property or vehicle approaches, windshield letters, continued proximity, claimed financial or property-value concerns, acknowledged PTSD and anger-management history, and recordings that allegedly included “That’s the man I want to kill.” Those materials were relevant to bias, motive, claimed fear, who initiated encounters, and whether the disputed statement was interpreted accurately.

The precise wording was also disputed. The State used the formulation, “If you do this one more time, I will slice you open.” Perelman’s testimony used materially different conditional language: “If you don’t let me take a walk, I will cut you down,” followed by an explanation that he meant leave him alone and did not want to hurt anyone. Counsel needed to compare the exact words, context, conditional phrasing, conduct afterward, speaker perceptions, and evidence of actual sustained fear. Instead, the most inflammatory wording dominated the verdict and later appellate narrative.

Amster did object when the prosecutor called Scroggins one of the most or more “brutally honest” witnesses she had encountered. But that narrow vouching challenge did not substitute for factual impeachment. The reviewing court treated any impropriety as harmless after the objection and instruction. Objective recordings, HOA evidence, threats, approaches, and inconsistent statements would have attacked the witness’s credibility directly rather than merely attacking the prosecutor’s phrasing.

The evidence archive

Perelman states that counsel received or was offered an evidence archive of approximately seventy terabytes. Volume alone is not a defense, and counsel was not required to play or file everything. It did require a review protocol: inventory the media, preserve proof of delivery, identify representative incidents, authenticate selected clips, create transcripts or stills, interview custodians, and map each item to a charged count or impeachment purpose. No complete inventory, review log, selection memorandum, or admissibility plan is presently identified.

The absence of organization became self-reinforcing. Because counsel did not convert the archive into a limited evidentiary presentation, Perelman’s broader account could appear unsupported or symptomatic. Counsel then used that appearance to support a psychiatric framing. The lawyer’s failure to organize corroboration effectively became evidence against the client.

Officer Charles Sean Dinse and the Untested Information Network

Dinse’s trial testimony

Dinse’s own testimony made the police-community network a case-specific issue. He described receiving complaints about Perelman’s cards in multiple locations through “several different sources and methods.” He testified to being flagged down in the field, receiving calls on city cellular and desk telephones, and using social media. When asked to quantify contacts, he estimated more than fifty social-media interactions, approximately fifteen field approaches, and thirty to forty telephone calls. Some callers came from Burbank and Thousand Oaks and asked whether Perelman “was a problem.”

That testimony allowed the prosecution to present numerical repetition as apparent independent corroboration. But the jury was not shown whether the contacts came from fifty different people or repeated activity by a smaller group; whether callers saw conduct firsthand; whether they received a common photograph, label, business card, warning, or police post; whether Dinse communicated information back to community members; or whether contacts preceded the charged events. The identities, dates, content, geographic origin, and resulting police action were foundational facts, not peripheral curiosity.

What Amster did not establish

· Who contacted Dinse, how often, and about what specific conduct.

· Whether contacts were independent or coordinated through the same neighborhood groups or social-media posts.

· Whether Dinse supplied descriptions, labels, photographs, location information, or advice before later witnesses encountered Perelman.

· Whether the calls generated CAD entries, reports, field contacts, citations, or enforcement activity.

· Whether callers from distant cities had personally met Perelman or were responding to circulated information.

· Whether Dinse’s own notes, direct messages, account exports, telephone logs, and group-administrator records contradicted or qualified his summary testimony.

· Whether a limiting instruction was required to prevent jurors from treating anonymous contacts as substantive proof of character, conduct, or mental state.

Recurring Dinse contacts and impeachment

Perelman identifies Dinse in the 2013 sidewalk contact, the 2017 prosecution, a parking citation bearing Dinse’s name approximately two weeks before expected defense testimony, a residence-area recording in which an officer allegedly suggested checking whether a door was unlocked, and a later accusation that Perelman followed Dinse home. Recurrence alone does not prove wrongdoing. Combined with Dinse’s own testimony about extensive community communications, however, it made assignments, reports, messages, citation metadata, complaint history, social-media activity, and bias obvious subjects for investigation.

The parking citation and residence recording provided concrete tests. The citation could have been compared with the trial schedule, Dinse’s assignment, location, vehicle position, photographs, metadata, and preceding communications. The residence recording could have been authenticated and compared with dispatch, CAD, body-camera, access, and authorization records. Amster allegedly possessed or was directed to this evidence but did not organize it into an admissible foundation or confront Dinse with it.

Later public evidence explaining the missed inquiry

A public 2014 introduction attributed to Dinse described the Senior Lead Officer role as monitoring crime trends, quality-of-life concerns, and neighborhood watch, and stated that community members used Facebook and other communications to alert one another. Public posts attributed to his officer account later showed residents being asked to identify, locate, or report people and activities. Independent reporting identified the private Valley groups “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills” and “Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley,” in which officers and residents exchanged photographs, locations, descriptions, accusations, and requests for action.

The Los Angeles Times reported that LAPD ordered officers to stop participating after violent and harassing comments appeared in the groups. The reporting identified Dinse as an active officer participant and quoted his explanation that he used the pages to absorb street information and assist residents. This evidence does not show that he endorsed every member’s words, but it confirms that a police-connected neighborhood information channel was neither imaginary nor inherently impossible.

Rex Schellenberg’s 2020 federal complaint separately named Dinse and the City under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The complaint alleged that Dinse circulated Schellenberg’s location, referred to him as a recurring subject, used an unverified “drug addiction/mental illness” explanation, and relied on community reporting as a pretext for contacts, towing, or property action. These were allegations, not adjudicated findings. Their significance is comparative: another identified person alleged a similar police-to-community process beginning during the same general period. The separate 2018 Schellenberg property-seizure case named the City rather than Dinse and must not be conflated with the 2020 Dinse case.

How Amster’s Choices Functionally Supported Dinse

No presently reviewed record proves that Amster privately coordinated with Dinse. “Supporting Dinse” is therefore best understood first as a functional result. Amster’s choices protected the evidentiary value of Dinse’s narrative and prevented meaningful testing of its source.

1. He allowed anonymous volume to operate as corroboration. Dinse’s counts of calls and contacts remained largely unexamined, permitting repetition to look like independence.

2. He failed to trace the information stream. Without names, dates, posts, messages, CAD records, and telephone logs, the defense could not determine whether police information preceded civilian accusations.

3. He failed to use recurring-contact impeachment. The citation, residence recording, 2013 history, and other reported Dinse contacts were not assembled into a chronology.

4. He substituted psychiatric explanation for source analysis. Instead of showing how labels and complaints circulated, counsel told jurors that his client was mentally ill and paranoid.

5. He reinforced dangerousness. His gun, Parkland, and Columbine references supported the preventive logic that an unconventional person should be controlled because of what he might do.

6. He preserved only a narrow appellate record. The missing investigation and exhibits made later review depend on the same incomplete trial record.

The functional result was that Dinse appeared as a reliable collector of independent community concern rather than a potential source, amplifier, or coordinator of the narrative. The jury could treat numerous contacts as proof that many unrelated people independently reached the same conclusion, while the defense failed to test whether they shared a common channel.

The Preventive Control or Pre Crime Theme

“Pre-crime” is not used here as a formal legal doctrine. It describes a preventive-control logic: restrain, monitor, label, exclude, treat, or confine a person because officials or community members predict future danger from speech, unconventional behavior, reputation, or psychiatric characterization rather than proving a completed offense through reliable evidence.

Amster’s closing embraced the vocabulary of that logic even while nominally criticizing criminalization. He asked what society should do with “the mentally ill,” discussed whether they should be locked up, and warned that limiting passive conduct might lead to guns and mass violence. This framed Perelman as a future-risk problem. The question subtly shifted from whether the State proved the charged conduct to how society should manage a supposedly mentally ill person who might become dangerous.

Dinse’s publicly reported methods raise a parallel concern. Community members supplied photographs, locations, warnings, psychiatric descriptions, and predictions of risk; police used those streams to decide whom to watch, approach, move, cite, tow, or refer. The Schellenberg allegations similarly challenged location sharing and psychiatric labeling as a basis for repeated intervention. Amster’s failure to investigate those channels allowed the preventive narrative to enter trial as an apparently neutral accumulation of concern.

The “political agenda” supported by the record is therefore not necessarily a partisan affiliation or campaign platform. It is an institutional preference for community surveillance, risk sorting, psychiatric characterization, exclusion, and preventive control. The current record can show that Amster’s argument and omissions advanced that framework. It cannot yet prove that he joined a political organization, received instructions from Dinse, or intentionally participated in a coordinated policy. Those stronger claims require communications, counsel-file evidence, testimony, or other direct proof.

The Appeal and the Conflict of Reviewing His Own Work

Same attorney trial and appeal

Amster represented Perelman on the appeal from the same trial. That dual role did not automatically disqualify him, but it created an obvious practical conflict. Meaningful appellate review required asking whether trial counsel failed to investigate, subpoena, authenticate, object, seek limiting instructions, move for acquittal, preserve claims, consult on strategy, or avoid prejudicial concessions. Amster could not present those arguments without evaluating and potentially accusing himself.

The record should establish whether Perelman knowingly waived that conflict, whether independent counsel reviewed potential ineffective-assistance claims, and whether Amster explained that extra-record claims required habeas development. No adequate waiver or independent review is presently identified.

Prosecution centered statement of facts

The opening appellate brief reproduced substantial portions of the State’s narrative: witnesses allegedly saw Perelman throw or drop large numbers of cards; Scroggins received the inflammatory threat; and the website described a worldwide conspiracy. It did not reconstruct the Bernard pursuit and gate encounter with original 911 and residence evidence, develop the Scroggins recording and alleged death statement, expose possible common sources underlying Dinse’s community contacts, or explain the defensive documentation purpose through authenticated representative proof.

The problem was not that an appellate brief must omit adverse facts. Counsel must state the record accurately. The problem was selection and balance: damaging allegations were repeated as the organizing narrative while the facts necessary to show provocation, nonindependence, self-defense, police influence, and report reversal remained undeveloped or outside the record because trial counsel had failed to build them.

The forfeited section 1118.1 issue

The Court of Appeal expressly stated that the opening brief did not develop why the evidence was insufficient under section 1118.1. The reply brief appeared to disavow the claim by characterizing the thrust as instructional error. The court therefore found the sufficiency argument forfeited and alternatively found substantial evidence. This was not merely an unfavorable legal ruling; it was an identified briefing failure by the same lawyer who had made the trial motion.

Narrow vouching claim and psychiatric sentencing premise

The appeal pursued the prosecutor’s “brutally honest” characterization of Scroggins, but the reviewing court found reversal unwarranted. The appeal thus attacked the prosecutor’s phrase while leaving the strongest factual impeachment outside a developed record. It also argued that the sentence punished “the mentally ill” rather than treating the psychiatric premise itself as unsupported. The reply brief stated that the community did not know how to interact with “one who is mentally ill” and asked whether incarceration would merely prolong mental illness. That framing carried the trial concession into the appeal.

The sentencing challenge raised the federal Eighth Amendment but did not develop the separate California constitutional “cruel or unusual” analysis noted by the appellate court. The court also treated aspects of the sentencing claim as forfeited for lack of a trial objection. These outcomes illustrate the cumulative problem: incomplete trial preservation, the same attorney on appeal, a psychiatric premise repeated as fact, and claims narrowed or forfeited.

Evidence Supporting an Inference Beyond Ordinary Negligence

Intentional loss cannot be declared solely because a lawyer made damaging choices. Lawyers sometimes adopt unsuccessful, inconsistent, or poorly executed strategies. The inference becomes stronger, however, when choices repeatedly run in the same adverse direction despite counsel’s demonstrated knowledge and available alternatives.

· Amster knew that provocation and non-disengagement mattered, because he said the central encounters were initiated by others.

· He knew vigilante conduct mattered, because he criticized witnesses taking law into their own hands.

· He knew the State was using dangerousness, because he accused the prosecution of using a gun photograph to make Perelman appear dangerous.

· He knew protected expression mattered, because he litigated First Amendment instructions and argued against nuisance-based suppression.

· He knew Dinse relied on an extensive community information stream, because Dinse quantified it before the jury.

· He had the training and experience to understand confrontation, source testing, impeachment, sufficiency, preservation, and appellate briefing.

· Despite that knowledge, he did not present the strongest objective proof and affirmatively associated the client with paranoia, institutionalization, firearms, Parkland, and Columbine.

· He then handled the appeal, continued the mental-illness premise, reproduced damaging facts, and failed to develop a claim the appellate court found forfeited.

This pattern permits a responsible inference of purposeful adverse representation, abandonment, or a strategy aligned with institutional control rather than acquittal. It does not establish which explanation is correct. The missing proof lies principally in the counsel file, communications, billing and review records, investigator decisions, client consultation, and Amster’s sworn explanation.

Competing Interpretations and Their Evidentiary Tests

Interpretation one misguided humanitarian strategy

Amster may claim that he sought to humanize Perelman, defend tolerance, prevent criminalization of mental illness, and argue that passive expression was socially preferable to confrontation. The test is whether he had a factual basis for the diagnosis, discussed the strategy with the client, obtained informed consent, considered its prejudice, and documented why mass-shooting references helped rather than harmed.

Interpretation two overwhelmed or poorly organized defense

He may claim that the evidence archive was too large, authentication was difficult, time was limited, or the broader account risked confusing the jury. The test is whether he created an inventory, hired or sought an investigator, selected representative clips, issued subpoenas, requested continuances, consulted experts, preserved originals, and explained rejected items. A reasonable narrowing decision requires prior investigation; counsel cannot strategically reject evidence he never reviewed.

Interpretation three tactical focus on the First Amendment

He may claim that a speech-centered defense was the strongest available approach. The test is why that theory did not include the objective context showing defensive purpose, why the battery and threat counts were not fully addressed, why anonymous community contacts were left unexplored, and why counsel introduced a psychiatric-dangerousness concession unnecessary to First Amendment analysis.

Interpretation four adverse or agenda based representation

Perelman alleges that Amster’s conduct was not merely ineffective but aligned with a wider effort to establish a mental-illness label and justify preventive control. The circumstantial support is the consistent direction of omissions and concessions. The test is communications with police, prosecutors, family, community participants, or third parties; undisclosed conflicts; retainer and payment arrangements; statements concerning desired disposition; evidence-access history; and whether contemporaneous notes reveal an objective inconsistent with acquittal.

Records Needed to Complete the Profile

· The complete unfiltered trial and appellate files, including native electronic folders and metadata.

· Retainer, payment, scope, third-party payer, and conflict-disclosure records.

· Every communication between Amster and Perelman, the prosecution, Dinse, other officers, witnesses, HOA participants, family members, and appellate personnel.

· A complete inventory of the evidence supplied, proof of delivery, access and download histories, review notes, clip selections, and excluded items.

· Investigator requests, refusals, assignments, reports, witness contacts, subpoena decisions, and budgets.

· Pitchess, Brady, discovery, preservation, and public-record research concerning Dinse and the community-contact evidence.

· Drafts and notes for opening, closing, the section 1118.1 motion, jury instructions, sentencing, the appellate opening brief, and reply.

· All records concerning a mental-health defense: diagnosis, expert consultation, treatment records relied upon, client authorization, and strategy memoranda.

· The Bernard 911 call, CAD and dispatch records, gate and station video, original reports and drafts, photographs, and injury evidence.

· The complete Scroggins recording set, native metadata, letters, HOA records, property-entry chronology, and alleged death-threat audio.

· Dinse’s city cellular and desk-phone logs, emails, texts, social-media exports, direct messages, group memberships, administrator records, relevant Nextdoor communications, and complaint logs for the period surrounding the charged incidents.

· The parking citation, citation metadata, assignment and location records, photographs, and communications preceding issuance.

· Any waiver or consultation concerning Amster’s handling of the appeal from his own trial performance.

Questions for Seymour Amster

7. What evidence did you receive from Perelman, and where is the complete inventory?

8. Which recordings did you personally review, and which did an investigator or staff member review?

9. Why was the Bernard 911 call and complete residence sequence not introduced?

10. Why were Counts 2 and 7 not fully included in the section 1118.1 challenge?

11. What investigation did you conduct into Dinse’s social-media contacts, telephone calls, field contacts, and geographically distant complainants?

12. Did you seek names, dates, logs, posts, messages, CAD entries, or a limiting instruction concerning anonymous community contacts?

13. What did you know about the Dinse parking citation and residence recording, and why were they not authenticated and used?

14. What competent diagnosis supported calling your client mentally ill and paranoid?

15. Did Perelman authorize a mental-illness defense and the Parkland and Columbine references?

16. Why did you tell jurors that restricting his passive conduct might cause him to pick up a gun?

17. How did that argument advance acquittal on a criminal-threat charge rather than dangerousness?

18. Why did you handle the appeal from your own trial without independent review of ineffective-assistance claims?

19. Why did the opening brief fail to develop the section 1118.1 issue and the reply appear to disavow it?

20. Why did the appeal repeat that Perelman was mentally ill without challenging the absence of a documented clinical foundation?

21. Did any third party communicate a desired psychiatric, treatment, probationary, or confinement outcome?

On Record Signs of Preparation and Performance Failure

The record contains several moments that must be preserved because they bear on preparation and candor. They do not amount, standing alone, to a formal confession of ineffective assistance. Together with the omissions and appellate forfeitures, however, they provide concrete points at which counsel acknowledged limitations or the record objectively documented failed performance.

· During trial proceedings the prosecutor stated that Amster had not been in a state of mind to address a matter the previous day, and Amster responded, “Yesterday, I was not.” The complete surrounding transcript must be reviewed before assigning meaning, but the admission belongs in the performance chronology.

· Amster apologized that he had been unable to obtain the full citation for City of San Clemente while litigating the speech and public-nuisance instructions. The court responded that work remained to be done. For an experienced appellate and criminal specialist, incomplete authority on the central First Amendment issue is relevant to preparation.

· The section 1118.1 record and appellate opinion supply an objective performance failure: the principal sufficiency issue was not developed in the opening brief, the reply appeared to disclaim it, and the reviewing court held it forfeited.

· The same attorney’s appellate role prevented an independent presentation of his own failure to investigate, authenticate evidence, challenge Dinse’s sources, move fully on Counts 2 and 7, or avoid a prejudicial psychiatric concession.

The phrase “self-admission to ineffective assistance” should therefore be used with precision. The existing record does not contain a statement by Amster saying, “I was ineffective.” It contains admissions and procedural outcomes that may serve as evidence of deficient preparation, together with his own words showing that he knew the relevant constitutional and factual theories. A complete dossier should preserve that distinction so an avoidable overstatement does not discredit the stronger documented evidence.

Jury Knowledge Voir Dire and the Appearance of a Predetermined Result

Perelman alleges that potential or seated jurors denied prior knowledge of him even though his name, website, cards, neighborhood controversy, and police-community circulation were allegedly widespread. That allegation cannot be resolved from the verdict alone. It requires the complete voir-dire transcript, juror questionnaires, hardship proceedings, cause and peremptory challenges, social-media preservation where lawful, and any record of juror recognition or discussion.

Amster’s obligation was not to accuse jurors without proof. It was to investigate whether the case’s unusual publicity and neighborhood circulation created a realistic contamination risk, ask sufficiently specific questions, preserve answers, seek individualized inquiry where appropriate, and move for cause or other relief when a juror’s response conflicted with known facts. The present record does not show a developed defense inquiry into whether any juror belonged to relevant neighborhood groups, had seen Dinse’s or community posts, had encountered the cards or website, or knew witnesses, officers, HOA participants, security personnel, or the locations involved.

The closing argument may itself have increased the risk of an adverse verdict. Rather than calming fear and demanding incident-specific proof, Amster told jurors to think about future gun violence and school massacres. If jurors already possessed undisclosed familiarity or community concern, those references could activate rather than neutralize prejudice. Perelman characterizes this as “scaring the jurors.” The documented fact is that defense counsel introduced fear-laden comparisons; whether he intended to produce conviction requires evidence of strategy and motive.

Judge Eric P Harmon and the Courtroom Framework

Judge Eric P. Harmon presided over the trial. The transcript shows active disputes over First Amendment instructions, public nuisance, littering, handbills, and the permissible use of expressive conduct. At one point the court used the hypothetical phrase “Harmon for Judge, 2024” while discussing political speech. Perelman views the proceeding as reflecting a political or institutional agenda and alleges that the verdict was not the result of a neutral presentation.

Amster’s performance must be evaluated within that environment. If he believed the court’s rulings improperly restricted the defense, he had to make complete offers of proof, cite controlling authority, preserve objections, request limiting instructions, seek reconsideration, and build an appellate record. If he believed judicial comments, juror contamination, or courtroom relationships created bias, he had to investigate and seek appropriate relief. A later broad accusation cannot replace a contemporaneous record, and counsel’s failure to create that record materially limited review.

The profile does not presently establish Judge Harmon’s subjective political motive or an agreement with Amster. It identifies a testable question: whether counsel repeatedly accepted a courtroom framework that treated cards, speech, psychiatric labels, anonymous reports, and predicted danger as more important than initiation, source, self-defense, and objective proof.

Court Reporters Record Continuity and Uninvestigated Integrity Questions

The 2017 clerk and transcript materials identify multiple reporters, including Ann Marie Cizin, Dominica Hotchkiss, Hilda Gutierrez, and Elsie Diwa Cervantes. The docket also contains a nunc pro tunc correction deleting Gutierrez and adding Cervantes for a May 21, 2018 proceeding. Dominica Hotchkiss appears on more than one proceeding in the assembled court packet. Perelman has separately raised whether Hotchkiss appears in another related case or proceeding. That cross-case overlap must be verified from certified title pages rather than assumed.

Multiple reporters and a corrected reporter assignment are not proof of transcript alteration. They do create concrete record-management questions: who reported each proceeding; which notes, roughs, audio, and certified transcripts exist; whether the correct reporter was identified; whether all requested volumes were designated on appeal; and whether any missing or disputed passage can be settled or reconstructed. Amster’s responsibility was to obtain and audit the complete record, correct errors, request augmentation, and preserve disputed statements.

The broader court-reporter concern also includes Debbie Wollman, whose alleged residential and court-connected role appears elsewhere in Perelman’s materials. Her property proximity and any court assignment must be established separately. The relevant criticism of Amster is not that he should have accused reporters of falsification without evidence. It is that he should have investigated reporter identity, continuity, assignments, conflicts, available audio, and transcript accuracy when those matters were material to appeal and credibility.

Dinse Complaints Pitchess and the Missed Misconduct Inquiry

Perelman repeatedly sought an inquiry into Dinse’s conduct, prior complaints, social-media activity, neighborhood relationships, recurring contacts, the citation, and the residence recording. A defense lawyer could not simply rely on public accusation. He could, however, investigate the factual predicate for Pitchess discovery, subpoena nonprivileged records, preserve social-media evidence, obtain assignments and CAD material, and request an in camera review where legally supported.

The later Schellenberg material demonstrates why such an inquiry was not frivolous. Public reporting and a federal complaint described Dinse using online groups, locations, psychiatric labels, and resident reports in connection with enforcement. Perelman also alleges that Dinse forged or caused a signature to be forged in an effort to confine Schellenberg. The presently reviewed public materials do not establish that signature allegation as a judicial finding. The dossier preserves it as a specific claim requiring the original document, known signature exemplars, authorship and metadata evidence, custodian testimony, and the complete Schellenberg case file.

Amster’s failure is not measured by whether every later allegation was already provable in 2018. It is measured by whether the 2017 testimony and evidence available then gave reasonable counsel a duty to investigate. Dinse himself described a broad network of calls, field contacts, and social-media interactions. That sworn testimony supplied the predicate to ask who the sources were, what was said, and whether the State was presenting coordinated repetition as independent corroboration.

Recurring Civilian Participants Amster Failed to Place in a Common Evidentiary Framework

Terrence Scroggins

Scroggins combined several features central to the wider pattern: HOA authority or influence, claimed property-value interests, repeated approaches despite asserted fear, letters and materials, psychiatric and institutionalization language, acknowledged PTSD and anger-management history, a criminal-threat accusation, and the alleged recorded statement, “That’s the man I want to kill.” Amster used fragments but did not present an integrated motive and credibility chronology. The prosecutor’s “brutally honest” praise consequently operated against a thin impeachment record.

Bailey Bernard

Bernard allegedly followed Perelman home from a park, approached the residential gate, interfered with his hand and camera, and then became the named victim in a battery count. The missing 911, CAD, residence, station, and original-report evidence could have shown initiation and reversal. Amster’s appellate description reduced the event to a general physical altercation rather than placing the alleged pursuit and gate conduct at the center.

Pedram Espinoza and shared residence context

Perelman describes Pedram Espinoza as another person who portrayed ordinary proximity as obsession while omitting that both lived in the same townhouse complex. That detail matters because repeated sightings near a shared residence do not independently prove stalking or fixation. Amster’s broader failure was to demand precise location, residence, approach, and initiation evidence before accepting psychiatric or obsession language.

Jason Ryan Fishman as later comparative evidence

Fishman entered the documented narrative after the 2017 case and therefore could not have been trial evidence available to Amster unless an earlier contact is established. He is relevant as later comparison, not retroactive proof of counsel’s knowledge. Perelman states that Fishman threatened, “If I see you again, you’re dead,” later approached on an electric scooter using red-and-blue lights or siren sounds, announced an arrest for trespass on a public street, followed Perelman toward Vanowen, made a police report alleging vehicle assault, pursued restraining-order allegations portraying Perelman as obsessed, and appeared anonymously in later probation material. Perelman also identifies corporate paperwork connecting Fishman to a security business.

The comparison matters because the alleged method resembles what Amster failed to expose in 2017: the accuser approaches, threatens, follows, or provokes; omits the initiating conduct; invokes police or security authority; files a one-sided report; and uses obsession or mental-illness language to reverse the roles. Fishman’s later conduct must be authenticated through videos, GPS or route evidence, calls, reports, pleadings, corporate filings, and probation-source identification. It cannot be used to prove that Amster knew of Fishman or intentionally assisted him.

Security personnel businesses and public-place exclusion

Perelman’s materials describe recurring security personnel, persons allegedly posing as guards, private security vehicles, business exclusions, park confrontations, and efforts to convert protected presence or distribution into trespass, nuisance, or dangerousness. The 2017 relevance was not to prove every later incident. It was to investigate whether security personnel, businesses, HOA actors, witnesses, and police shared photographs, cards, labels, and instructions, and whether claimed independent encounters originated through common channels.

Marketing Materials Website Photography and Defensive Documentation

The prosecution and appellate narrative repeatedly treated cards, flyers, photographs, signs, and the website as evidence of obsession, nuisance, or mental instability. Perelman’s explanation was the opposite: the materials were created because repeated encounters, threats, accusations, and police nonresponse made ordinary private reporting ineffective. He used public documentation to locate witnesses, preserve events, correct disinformation, and warn that encounters were not isolated.

Amster partially recognized the speech issue but did not establish the defensive chain. He needed to show what event preceded each item, where the disputed photograph originated, whether a flyer was displayed on Perelman’s own property, whether a card was handed to a willing recipient or deposited as alleged, and whether the website content documented recorded events. Without that foundation, defensive documentation could be reframed as the cause of the hostility rather than a response to it.

This circularity is central to the profile: community contacts and police activity produce documentation; the documentation is then cited as proof of obsession or instability; restrictions on documentation are justified by the label; and any continued attempt to explain becomes new evidence for the label. Amster’s psychiatric closing entrenched that cycle even while arguing that the passive expression should be tolerated.

The Rotating Counsel Pattern

Perelman places Amster within a longer sequence of counsel whose conduct allegedly moved in the same direction: Jonathan Franklin in 2013, Seymour Amster in the 2017 trial and appeal, Shep Zebberman in the 2023–2024 case, and Yisrael Gelb in later appellate work. The claimed common features are failure to investigate police and civilian misconduct, failure to organize supplied evidence, failure to challenge psychiatric labeling, pressure toward plea or treatment-oriented outcomes, omission of stronger innocence and constitutional issues, and protection of the existing official narrative.

The lawyers’ similar conduct does not by itself prove communication or a joint agreement. Each representation must be evaluated on its own record. The pattern is relevant to motive and transmission if records show shared sources, referrals, third-party payment, family influence, communications, repeated unexplained psychiatric strategies, or knowledge passed from one matter into another.

Jonathan Franklin

Franklin allegedly stated, “I’m not going to say anything bad about a police officer,” failed to investigate the 2013 charges, and presented C.A.M.P. or MEU involvement as police help rather than clearly disclosing its mental-health function. That earlier experience gave Amster a reason to investigate whether a psychiatric and police narrative already existed before 2017.

Shep Zebberman

Zebberman allegedly received a vast evidence archive in the later case but failed to convert representative materials into admissible proof, challenge the larger hostility, or prevent continued psychiatric characterization. The later similarity is not proof of Amster’s coordination; it strengthens the need to determine whether a common record or label moved from case to case.

Yisrael Gelb

Gelb allegedly declined to develop ineffective-assistance and extra-record issues capable of challenging trial counsel. The resulting concern mirrors Amster’s appellate conflict: appellate representation that leaves prior counsel’s omissions unexamined allows the same incomplete narrative to acquire finality and later governmental use.

Richard Barnwell

Barnwell allegedly told Perelman to wait outside a courtroom, failed to check him in, later said the matter had been dismissed although no judge had announced dismissal, and was followed by warrants and arrests. Those allegations require the minute order, appearance record, check-in procedure, communications, and warrant chronology. They are relevant to the rotating-counsel theme but do not presently establish a link to Amster.

Amster’s External Professional and Political Connections

Public sources show that Amster had a substantial professional life beyond this case. He handled prominent criminal cases, federal habeas litigation, disability and education litigation, and representation connected to politically active persons. He served or serves in nonprofit or advocacy roles involving students, veterans, disability, or mental-health support. Those associations establish experience and access; they do not establish that he imported a partisan agenda into Perelman’s trial.

The stronger political analysis arises from what Amster actually said and did in the courtroom. He converted a fact-specific criminal trial into a societal question about how to manage “the mentally ill,” whether institutions should again be used, whether passive conduct prevents future violence, and whether society should fear a person who might pick up a gun. This is political in the governance sense: it concerns who belongs in ordinary society, who should be monitored or confined, and whether predicted danger can substitute for adjudicated conduct.

The dossier should not infer motive merely because Amster represented controversial clients, belonged to a religious or cultural group, worked with mental-health organizations, or held political relationships. Association and identity are not proof. The probative facts are his words, omissions, conflicts, communications, financial arrangements, evidence decisions, and the parties who benefited from them.

Dinse’s Apparent Motive and the Benefit Produced by Amster’s Representation

Perelman’s theory is that Dinse favored aggressive community policing in which residents identify unwanted persons, circulate images and locations, repeat psychiatric or dangerousness labels, and generate police contacts until exclusion, treatment, arrest, towing, or confinement becomes easier. Public reporting on the Valley Facebook groups and the Schellenberg complaint supplies partial external support for the existence of such methods. It does not establish every element of Perelman’s account or a personal plan by Dinse to remove him.

Amster’s representation benefited that alleged objective in several ways. It left Dinse’s anonymous and geographically dispersed sources untested; left the citation and residence evidence undeveloped; failed to seek the complete misconduct and communication record; allowed psychiatric labels to replace source analysis; and gave the jury a defense-authored account of Perelman as paranoid, mentally ill, and potentially violent. The resulting conviction and treatment conditions could then be cited as institutional confirmation of the very narrative the defense should have challenged.

This is the clearest overlap between Amster and Dinse. It does not depend on proving a private meeting. The functional alignment is visible in the record: Dinse supplied the community concern, Amster failed to test its origin, and Amster supplied the psychiatric-dangerousness interpretation. Whether that alignment was accidental, incompetent, ideological, financially influenced, or coordinated remains the central motive question.

What the Dossier Can and Cannot Present as Established

Established or directly documented

· Amster represented Perelman at the 2017–2018 trial and on the direct appeal.

· He argued protected speech, provocation, and vigilante themes but did not present the full objective defense described by Perelman.

· He called the case a mental-health crisis and invoked institutionalization, paranoia, guns, Parkland, and Columbine in closing.

· Dinse testified to extensive social-media, field, and telephone contacts, including distant callers asking whether Perelman was a problem.

· The appellate court found the section 1118.1 argument forfeited or undeveloped and rejected the preserved appellate claims.

· Multiple court reporters appear in the proceedings, and the clerk record includes a reporter correction.

Supported allegations requiring adjudication

· Amster failed to review or use substantial evidence supplied by Perelman.

· The Bernard, Scroggins, citation, residence, HOA, and police-report materials would have materially altered the defense.

· Dinse or police-connected groups circulated information that influenced witnesses or enforcement.

· Jurors possessed undisclosed prior knowledge or answered voir-dire questions inaccurately.

· A signature associated with action against Schellenberg was forged or caused to be forged by Dinse.

Inferences not yet proved as direct facts

· Amster intentionally lost the case.

· Amster entered a secret agreement with Dinse, prosecutors, family, community groups, or later counsel.

· The reporter changes reflect alteration rather than ordinary staffing and correction.

· Every later civilian participant belonged to one centrally directed organization.

· A partisan, religious, racial, or financial affiliation explains Amster’s choices.

Preserving these categories does not weaken the dossier. It prevents documented facts from being dismissed because a still-unproved motive was stated too absolutely. The pattern can be presented in full while the missing communications and files are pursued.

Profile Conclusion

The record portrays a lawyer who understood the language of constitutional defense but did not build the factual structure necessary to make that defense work. Amster recognized protected expression, provocation, vigilante conduct, and the prosecution’s attempt to portray Perelman as dangerous. Yet he failed to test the police-centered information network that made multiple accusations appear independent; failed to organize representative objective evidence; failed to fully develop self-defense, report reversal, and witness motive; and affirmatively characterized his client through institutionalization, paranoia, firearms, Parkland, and Columbine.

His subsequent decision to handle the appeal magnified the problem. It placed him in the position of reviewing his own investigation, objections, concessions, and preservation failures. The appellate presentation continued the psychiatric premise, relied heavily on the prosecution’s factual frame, and forfeited or narrowed significant issues. The result was not simply a lost appeal; it was an appellate record that protected the incompleteness of the trial record.

The available evidence therefore supports a detailed investigation into whether Amster’s representation crossed from deficient performance into purposeful adverse representation or abandonment. It also supports examination of whether his trial and appellate choices functionally advanced Dinse’s police-community narrative and a preventive-control model in which psychiatric labeling and predicted future risk replace incident-specific proof. A direct agreement, political affiliation, or intentional plan to lose has not yet been proved. The pattern is sufficiently concrete, consistent, and consequential to require the files, communications, and sworn explanations that could resolve motive.

Source and Reliability Guide

Primary case materials reviewed

· 2017 reporter’s transcripts, including the trial testimony, instruction discussions, section 1118.1 proceedings, and defense closing at approximately RT 999–1005.

· Appellant’s opening brief and reply brief prepared in the appeal from the 2018 judgment.

· Respondent’s brief and the California Court of Appeal opinion, including the discussion of section 1118.1 forfeiture, vouching, instructional claims, sentencing, and the state and federal punishment provisions.

· Current seven-book master record used only as an index to issues and source locations, not as independent proof.

Independent public sources

· State Bar of California attorney search: Seymour I. Amster, State Bar No. 105308, active, admitted December 1982.

· Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2004), and 489 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007), reflecting Amster’s federal habeas and confrontation-clause experience.

· Smith v. Los Angeles Unified School District, Ninth Circuit proceedings, reflecting federal appellate work involving disability and educational policy.

· Los Angeles Times, “Cop’s use of Facebook put ‘target on our back,’” reporting on Valley Facebook groups, LAPD participation, Dinse, and the Schellenberg allegations.

· Rex Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles et al., C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:20-cv-01313, complaint and docket. Allegations are not treated as adjudicated findings.

· Separate Schellenberg property case, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:18-cv-07670, distinguished from the Dinse-specific 2020 action.

Reliability categories used in this profile

· Documented: appears in a transcript, brief, opinion, docket, official profile, or authenticated record.

· Attributed allegation: asserted by Perelman, Schellenberg, or another identified speaker but not yet adjudicated.

· Inference: a conclusion drawn from the direction, sequence, or consistency of documented choices.

· Unproved proposition: secret agreement, intentional loss, political coordination, or instruction by Dinse remains a subject for investigation unless direct evidence is obtained.

Purpose and Scope

This memorandum organizes publicly available information concerning LAPD Senior Lead Officer Charles “Sean” Dinse, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney Karine T. Philips, the LAPD Topanga Division, the private Facebook groups commonly known as “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills” and “Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley,” and their potential relevance to Kevin Perelman’s 2017 Van Nuys prosecution, identified by Perelman as case 7VW04099.

The objective is not to state unproved criminal allegations as established fact. Rather, it is to identify what the public record actually proves; what established news organizations, civil-rights organizations, litigants, and activists have alleged; what Kevin Perelman reports occurred to him; where those bodies of evidence overlap; and what documents would be necessary to determine whether government officials or community participants improperly coordinated against him.

That evidentiary distinction is critical. The strongest material does not require a theory of a massive or worldwide conspiracy. There is already a documented local factual record showing that Topanga police personnel participated in private neighborhood Facebook groups that tracked particular people, circulated personal information, discussed homelessness and mental illness, and generated law-enforcement activity. There is also a contemporaneous 2018 civil-rights complaint that specifically identifies “Mr. Perelman,” his automobile and his license plate.


I. Principal Individuals

A. Charles “Sean” Dinse

Sean Dinse has served as an LAPD Senior Lead Officer associated with the Topanga Community Police Station and Woodland Hills. LAPD’s current Topanga station directory continues to identify Officer Sean Dinse as a Senior Lead Officer.

The Senior Lead Officer position is particularly relevant because it is built around community policing, neighborhood contacts, identifying recurring local problems, working with neighborhood-watch organizations, and transmitting information between the community and police.

Dinse’s publicly expressed policing philosophy emphasized neighborhood-watch participation. Reporting concerning his 2019 campaign for Los Angeles City Council described him as advocating the prevention and deterrence of crime through Neighborhood Watch. Los Angeles Magazine subsequently reported that he regularly used the West Valley Facebook groups to obtain information about homeless encampments and to track specific homeless individuals.

Dinse also publicly expressed a strong connection between homelessness, irrational behavior, substance abuse and mental illness. In February 2018 West Hills Neighborhood Council minutes, Dinse reportedly stated that many homeless people officers encountered were homeless because of mental illness or drug use.

During his 2019 City Council campaign, Dinse told the Los Angeles Times that supportive housing by itself was insufficient and said that authorities had to stabilize irrational behavior caused by drug addiction and potential mental illness before a person could successfully accept or retain housing.

That statement is not misconduct by itself. It is nevertheless relevant because it establishes Dinse’s publicly expressed conceptual framework: certain individuals encountered in public spaces were viewed through a combined crime / nuisance / addiction / mental-illness framework rather than solely as people requiring housing assistance.

Dinse’s public record is not exclusively punitive. CBS Los Angeles reported a July 2017 incident in which he assisted a homeless mother and daughter, publicized their circumstances, and helped obtain community assistance and temporary lodging. Any balanced legal presentation should acknowledge this evidence because it demonstrates that his dealings with homeless individuals were not uniformly hostile.

The issue is therefore not that every interaction Dinse had with a homeless or mentally ill individual was abusive. The relevant issue is whether, in certain cases, he used police information and community networks to identify, characterize, locate, monitor, displace or generate enforcement against selected individuals.


B. Karine T. Philips

Karine T. Philips is a California attorney, State Bar No. 186645, admitted December 10, 1996. As of October 2026, the State Bar lists her license as Active, identifies her employer as the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office, and shows no public disciplinary action in the Bar’s disciplinary-history table.

Philips was formally assigned as the Neighborhood Prosecutor for LAPD Topanga Division no later than 2014. Contemporary City Attorney assignment lists distinguish Philips from the prosecutors assigned to Van Nuys and West Valley: Philips was assigned specifically to Topanga.

In her own May 2015 public introduction, Philips wrote:

“Hi, my name is Karine Philips and I am your Neighborhood Prosecutor assigned to the LAPD’s Topanga division.”

She said her work focused on improving neighborhood “quality of life” and preventing public-safety problems.

Contemporary reporting described Los Angeles Neighborhood Prosecutors as addressing what were sometimes characterized as “broken windows” offenses, including vandalism, trespassing, loitering, graffiti, prostitution and code violations.

This institutional relationship is central to understanding Philips’s connection with Dinse. She was not merely a prosecutor who later happened to encounter a Topanga police officer. Her official job was to serve as the prosecutor embedded with or assigned to Dinse’s LAPD division and its surrounding communities.

That fact provides a legitimate administrative explanation for why Philips could have handled a misdemeanor arising from Topanga in 2017. It does not, by itself, prove that she was specially assigned to Kevin Perelman.

Philips’s public record also contains evidence inconsistent with a simplistic theory that her purpose was always incarceration. At a 2014 neighborhood meeting she promoted the City Attorney’s Neighborhood Justice Program, described as resolving low-level offenses through alternatives designed to keep offenders out of the traditional justice system.

That countervailing evidence should remain in the record.


II. The Crimebusters / Homeless Encampment Facebook Network

Two private Facebook communities became central to the later controversy:

Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills, created in approximately 2016, and Crimebusters Homeless Encampments / Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley, created in approximately 2017.

The groups were associated with LAPD volunteer Fern Peskin-White and included participation by current and former LAPD personnel. According to the formal 2018 civil-rights complaint, the groups primarily consisted of residents of West Hills, Woodland Hills, Canoga Park and Winnetka and were nominally intended to centralize photographs, videos and community reports about suspicious or criminal behavior.

The dispute was over what the groups became in practice.

A coalition consisting of the Western Regional Advocacy Project, National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Los Angeles Community Action Network, and National Coalition for the Homeless submitted a complaint to the California Attorney General dated August 1, 2018 and updated November 20, 2018. The complaint asked for an investigation into potential civil- and human-rights violations involving the Facebook groups and government participation.

The ACLU of Southern California subsequently cited this specific Attorney General complaint, along with the 2019 Knock LA and KTown for All investigations, in its 2021 report Outside the Law: The Legal War Against Unhoused People. That does not prove every allegation contained in the complaint, but it independently establishes the provenance and significance of these materials within the civil-rights community.


III. What the 2018 Attorney General Complaint Alleged About Sean Dinse

The 2018 complaint contains allegations considerably more specific than generalized criticism of LAPD.

It alleged that members of the Facebook groups distributed names, criminal histories, information about mental-health status or treatment history, and drug or alcohol dependency information concerning people they were discussing.

It then singled out Sean Dinse.

The complaint alleged that Dinse repeatedly used his position as an LAPD Senior Lead Officer to obtain and publicize sensitive information concerning homeless individuals. It referenced screenshots identified as Figures 3 through 7.

Most significantly for the Perelman matter, the complaint states that, in one particular case, Dinse responded to a Facebook member complaining about a person accused of littering by sharing a screenshot of a law-enforcement database entry displaying that person’s personal information. The complaint cross-references the underlying littering complaint as Figure 12 and Dinse’s database screenshot as Figure 7.

This cross-reference becomes highly significant because Figure 12 is then described expressly as involving Mr. Perelman.


IV. The August 2017 “Mr. Perelman” Post

The Attorney General complaint states that an August 2017 Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills post accused an individual of littering, displayed photographs of his belongings and automobile, and instructed members to:

“Notice Mr. Perelman’s license plate.”

The complaint concluded that dissemination of those identifying photographs could expose the individual to targeted abuse.

This is one of the most important pieces of independent evidence in the entire matter.

The complaint does not merely contain the surname “Perelman.” It contains a convergence of details:

Kevin Perelman; August 2017; Woodland Hills/Topanga; an allegation of littering; photographs of his car and property; specific attention directed to his license plate; and an LAPD Senior Lead Officer whose database disclosure is cross-referenced by the complaint to the same littering allegation.

Perelman states that the personalized license plate on his vehicle read TARGETD.

Perelman further states that the TARGETD plate was not an invitation to follow him and was not the origin of his concerns. His position is that the plate was selected because he already believed he had been subjected to repeated surveillance, harassment and targeting, including conduct involving Dinse. That explanation is Perelman’s account and should be identified as such unless supported by separate contemporaneous documentation establishing when the plate was obtained and why.

The legal significance does not depend on whether anyone agrees with the message expressed by the plate.

A personalized license plate saying TARGETD does not itself authorize police officers or private citizens to follow the vehicle, circulate identifying information for harassment, manufacture evidence, make false reports, or use confidential police databases improperly.

The relevant question is what the government actors and private participants actually did.


V. The Dinse–Perelman Database Cross-Reference

The cross-references in the Attorney General complaint deserve particular attention from counsel.

The complaint first states that Dinse responded to a Facebook member complaining about a person allegedly littering and posted a screenshot from a law-enforcement database containing that individual’s personal information. That complaint is identified as Figure 12.

Only paragraphs later, Figure 12 is expressly described as the August 2017 post involving Mr. Perelman, his alleged littering, his automobile and his license plate.

If those figure references accurately describe the original exhibits, this would appear to mean that Dinse accessed and disseminated law-enforcement database information in direct response to the Perelman littering discussion.

That proposition should not yet be represented as conclusively proven until the original high-resolution Figures 7 and 12 are obtained and authenticated. But it is substantially more than a speculative association.

It is a specific written allegation in a complaint prepared by multiple established homelessness and civil-rights organizations in 2018, before the later Dinse litigation and before much of the subsequent publicity.

For an attorney reviewing the 2017 Perelman prosecution, recovering the original Figures 7 and 12 should therefore be treated as a high priority.

The inquiry should establish exactly whose database record appeared in Figure 7, what information was displayed, which system produced it, who accessed that system, the date and time of the search, whether an official law-enforcement purpose existed, and whether any of that information was transmitted to witnesses or the prosecuting City Attorney.


VI. A Critical Factual Discrepancy: “Homeless” Versus Homeowner

The Attorney General complaint repeatedly describes the person in the Figure 12 incident as a “homeless individual.”

Kevin Perelman states that this characterization was false and that he was a homeowner residing in an HOA townhouse community at the relevant time.

That discrepancy should not be overlooked.

If property records, HOA records, utility records or other evidence establish that Perelman was a resident homeowner in August 2017, then lawyers should avoid adopting the complaint’s characterization of him as homeless.

The discrepancy may be analytically useful for another reason: it illustrates how an individual discussed inside an anti-homeless or “transient” social-media environment could potentially be placed into a preexisting social category that did not accurately describe him.

It does not establish who caused the misclassification.

The original Figure 12 should therefore be examined to determine whether the Facebook poster itself called Perelman homeless or transient, or whether the authors of the later Attorney General complaint inferred that status because they were analyzing anti-homeless Facebook groups.

That difference matters.


VII. Dinse, Mental-Illness Labels, and Rex Schellenberg

The strongest independently reported example of Dinse applying a mental-illness characterization to a particular person involves Rex Schellenberg.

In February 2020, Schellenberg filed a federal civil-rights action against the City of Los Angeles and Sean Dinse under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Federal docket records confirm Dinse was individually named as a defendant.

The Los Angeles Times reported that Schellenberg alleged Dinse posted information identifying where Schellenberg was staying so that residents would contact police, thereby giving officers a supposed “pretextual basis” to force him to move or seize his property.

That allegation is important because it describes an operational sequence:

community identification → dissemination of location → repeated calls or complaints → police contact → asserted legal justification → displacement or property enforcement.

The Times further reported that Dinse had publicly suggested Schellenberg had probably lost housing because of “drug addiction/mental illness.”

Schellenberg specifically disputed those labels and asserted in the lawsuit that he was neither a drug addict nor mentally ill apart from the ordinary stress and trauma associated with living on the streets.

No court judgment establishing that Dinse violated Schellenberg’s rights was located in this research. The statements are allegations contained in litigation and reported by reputable news organizations.

Nevertheless, the Schellenberg case demonstrates that Kevin Perelman is not the only person to have alleged a combination of:

individualized tracking by Dinse; dissemination of location information; community reporting; a mental-illness/addiction characterization; vehicle-related enforcement; and police action allegedly designed to create a basis for displacement.

That comparison is potentially significant.

It does not establish that whatever happened to Schellenberg necessarily happened to Perelman.

It establishes an independent factual reason for counsel to examine Dinse’s conduct toward Perelman rather than dismissing the issue simply because Perelman describes himself as having been targeted.


VIII. Broader Reporting Concerning Dinse and the Facebook Groups

Los Angeles Magazine independently reported in August 2019 that Dinse regularly used the groups to obtain information about homeless encampments and to track specific homeless individuals. The publication reported that LAPD had conducted a formal review after complaints concerning the groups. Investigators reportedly found “demeaning” comments concerning homeless people, and participating officers were temporarily asked not to post while the review was underway.

The groups contained rhetoric suggesting the use of baseball bats, fire hoses, pigeon spikes, bleach, stink bombs, poison oak and other tactics against homeless people, according to screenshots reviewed by the publication. Los Angeles Magazine appropriately clarified that the group’s administrator disputed characterizing the groups themselves as anti-homeless vigilante organizations and said such behavior was discouraged.

This distinction is essential.

The existence of offensive or violent comments inside a group does not establish that Dinse or Philips wrote, endorsed or acted upon those particular comments.

The legally relevant questions are whether government personnel participated, what information they supplied, what enforcement resulted, and whether they knew about or facilitated unlawful conduct by private participants.


IX. Knock LA’s Reporting Concerning Dinse, Rygh and Rehabilitation / Wellness Homes

A separate August 2019 Knock LA investigation reported allegations that Dinse and former Topanga Senior Lead Officer Brent Rygh had provided community members with privileged background information regarding people residing in residential rehabilitation or wellness homes. According to the publication’s sources, neighborhood complaints followed and a residence eventually closed.

Knock LA also reported that Dinse routinely emphasized documenting people and activity so that alleged nuisance activity could be removed from neighborhoods, and that particular individuals were repeatedly tracked through the groups.

These allegations are not judicial findings.

They are nevertheless relevant because they independently concern the same intersection of policing, neighborhood groups, personal background information, behavioral-health-related facilities, and community pressure that warrants examination in the Perelman matter.


X. Karine Philips and the Crimebusters Network

The evidence regarding Philips requires greater caution than the Dinse evidence.

A 2019 KTown for All article, reproduced in surviving copies and later cited by the ACLU, listed numerous LAPD personnel and Deputy City Attorney Karine Philips as members of the controversial Facebook-group environment. The reproduced list includes Dinse, Brent Rygh, Karen Rayner, Duke Dao, Daryl Scoggins, Gabriel Ahedo, John Catalano, Kari McNamee, Jose Fernandez, LAPD command personnel and Philips.

This is significant because Philips simultaneously occupied the official role of Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor.

It creates a potential overlap between:

the prosecutor responsible for Topanga quality-of-life prosecutions;

the LAPD officers supplying or receiving neighborhood intelligence;

private Facebook groups discussing targeted individuals;

and community witnesses or complainants.

However, the public material located to date does not establish that Philips personally authored threatening Facebook posts, supplied confidential medical information, encouraged anyone to assault a homeless person, or personally instructed anyone to stalk Kevin Perelman.

No Philips-authored screenshot showing such conduct was located during this investigation.

Membership and participation are not synonymous.

That distinction should be preserved in every version of this memorandum intended for attorneys, journalists or publication.


XI. Edward Ryan’s Specific Allegations Concerning Philips, Dinse and Perelman

Separate from the mainstream reporting and the original Attorney General complaint is material published by activist Edward Ryan.

Ryan specifically alleged that Philips prosecuted Kevin Perelman while Philips, Dinse and civilian witnesses were associated with the Crimebusters group. He further alleged that posts concerning Perelman’s location and automobile occurred around court proceedings and that this association was not disclosed during the prosecution.

Ryan’s material goes considerably further than the original civil-rights complaint. He alleges prosecutorial conspiracy, witness impropriety and intentional targeting.

Those assertions must be treated as allegations by Ryan, not established facts.

The valuable aspect of Ryan’s material is that it identifies highly specific factual questions that are capable of verification:

Was Philips actually a member of the relevant group during the Perelman prosecution?

Was Dinse?

Were any prosecution witnesses members?

Were Perelman’s location, court appearances or automobile discussed in the group contemporaneously with the case?

Did Philips know about those discussions?

Were any group-generated photographs, complaints, police information or witness contacts incorporated into the prosecution?

Were these relationships disclosed to the defense?

Those are discoverable historical questions, not matters of belief.


XII. Kevin Perelman’s 2017 Case

Kevin Perelman identifies his 2017 Van Nuys case as 7VW04099 and identifies Karine Philips as the prosecutor.

Perelman reports that the prosecution arose from events involving community members and that it ultimately involved allegations such as littering and/or distribution of cards or materials.

For purposes of this memorandum, those procedural details should be verified against the certified docket, charging document, police reports, transcripts and minute orders before being quoted as final fact.

What can already be independently stated is that during August 2017, while Philips was Topanga’s assigned Neighborhood Prosecutor, a private Crimebusters post concerning a “Mr. Perelman” accused him of littering, circulated photographs of his automobile and belongings, and specifically told other group members to notice his license plate.

The Attorney General complaint further appears to cross-reference this same littering incident to an instance in which Dinse allegedly posted law-enforcement database information.

This makes the exact chronology of 7VW04099 extremely important.

Counsel should determine whether the Facebook posts preceded arrest, charging, arraignment, witness contact or trial; whether they occurred during an active prosecution; and whether anyone in the prosecution team knew of the group’s activity.


XIII. The TARGETD License Plate

Perelman’s position regarding his personalized plate should be stated clearly rather than allowing the plate to become a substitute for evidence.

Perelman states that he obtained or used the plate TARGETD because he believed that Sean Dinse and others had already been targeting or harassing him.

Accordingly, his contention is that:

the plate was a reaction to what he perceived and documented as prior conduct;

the plate did not cause the targeting;

and the existence of the plate cannot rationally justify subsequent monitoring.

Independent public evidence presently confirms only the latter part of the chronology: by August 2017, members of the Crimebusters group were being specifically directed to notice Perelman’s license plate.

For a lawyer, the best way to establish the first part would be to obtain DMV records showing when the TARGETD plate was issued and then identify documented encounters with Dinse or Topanga personnel occurring before that date.

If evidence demonstrates that Dinse-related activity preceded issuance of the plate, it would materially answer any attempt to portray the license plate itself as the origin of Perelman’s targeting concerns.


XIV. Apparent Operational Objectives and Motives

“Motive” must be divided into what participants publicly said they wanted and what remains inferential.

Sean Dinse

The strongest documented objectives attributable to Dinse involve neighborhood safety, Neighborhood Watch, nuisance control, crime prevention and the treatment of homelessness as intertwined with addiction and mental illness.

He publicly advocated neighborhood-watch policing and was reported to use Facebook groups to gather information concerning encampments and particular individuals.

He publicly argued that irrational behavior connected to addiction or potential mental illness needed to be stabilized before housing would work.

The Attorney General complaint alleges a more aggressive operational method: using law-enforcement access to supply sensitive information to civilian groups that were identifying and monitoring individuals.

The Schellenberg lawsuit alleges an even more specific mechanism: publicize an individual’s whereabouts, encourage residents to call police, and thereby generate what the plaintiff characterized as a “pretextual basis” for police removal or property seizure.

If evidence establishes that a comparable mechanism was employed against Perelman, then the relevant motive need not be described as mysterious or global. It could be framed much more concretely as an effort to classify an individual as a neighborhood nuisance or threat, mobilize community complaints, create repeated police contacts, and ultimately obtain enforcement or judicial restrictions.

Whether that occurred in Perelman’s case remains to be proved.

Karine Philips

Philips herself publicly described her mission as improving neighborhood quality of life and preventing public-safety problems.

Her position placed her on the prosecutorial side of the same community-policing structure within Topanga.

Thus a plausible institutional motive existed for Philips to pursue low-level or quality-of-life cases generated through Topanga officers and neighborhood complaints: doing so was part of her job.

The more serious question is whether that ordinary institutional role crossed a constitutional or ethical line because of undisclosed relationships, social-media participation, false evidence, retaliatory motive or the use of improperly acquired information.

No public source located so far resolves that question.


XV. Mental-Illness Labeling as a Potential Enforcement Mechanism

The documented materials justify examining mental-health labeling carefully without claiming more than the evidence proves.

The 2018 Attorney General complaint specifically alleged that private information circulated in the Facebook groups included people’s mental-health status and treatment histories, and it specifically accused Dinse of using his police position to access and distribute sensitive information.

The Schellenberg litigation independently alleged that Dinse publicly characterized an individual as probably suffering from “drug addiction/mental illness,” a characterization the individual disputed.

Dinse also publicly associated homelessness with mental illness and addiction in his governmental and political statements.

Those facts establish that mental-health characterization was part of Dinse’s documented discourse and was allegedly attached to specific people.

They do not establish that every mental-health concern expressed by Dinse was fabricated.

They also do not yet establish that Dinse gave Philips false psychiatric information about Kevin Perelman.

That is the evidentiary bridge that must be investigated.

If Perelman’s 2017 transcripts, probation proceedings, police reports or later records show that prosecutors or judges suddenly began receiving psychiatric descriptions not supported by legitimate medical evidence, counsel should determine where those descriptions originated.


XVI. Allegations of Forced Psychiatric Treatment or Institutionalization

The public evidence located does not presently establish that either Dinse or Philips personally possessed or exercised unilateral power to commit Perelman or another individual to a psychiatric institution.

No independently verified document located during this research establishes that Philips ordered a §5150 detention, fabricated a psychiatric diagnosis, personally arranged involuntary medication, or directed a psychiatric facility to imprison Perelman.

Perelman states that he possesses evidence concerning unlawful confinement, false mental-health representations and community coordination. Those materials should be evaluated separately on their own evidentiary merits.

The strongest public evidence presently establishes something narrower but still important:

Dinse was accused of disseminating mental-health information;

Dinse publicly characterized Schellenberg in mental-health/addiction terms;

community groups tracked individuals;

Philips occupied the prosecutor position attached to the same LAPD division;

and Philips was later reported as belonging to the same Facebook-group ecosystem.

Whether these ingredients were used together against Perelman requires the underlying records.


XVII. Philips and Later Homeless / Public-Space Enforcement

Philips remained involved years later in issues involving public space.

A January 2023 Winnetka Neighborhood Council agenda identifies City Attorney representative Karine Philips as participating with LAPD regarding park hours and immediately references City Council actions concerning Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18, the ordinance governing specified sitting, lying, sleeping and property activity within public rights-of-way.

This establishes continuing professional involvement in a legal area affecting homeless and public-space enforcement.

It does not establish misconduct.

It does, however, reinforce that her Topanga-era work and later City Attorney responsibilities included precisely the type of quality-of-life / public-space enforcement relevant to the broader Crimebusters controversy.


XVIII. Governor Newsom and CARE Court

The CARE Court issue should be kept separate from the 2017 case.

Governor Gavin Newsom signed the Community Assistance, Recovery and Empowerment Act, SB 1338, on September 14, 2022.

Therefore CARE Court did not exist in 2017 and could not have authorized or caused conduct in Perelman’s 2017 prosecution.

No evidence located connects Karine Philips personally to Governor Newsom, the drafting of SB 1338 or the creation of CARE Court.

A later institutional relationship does exist. In April 2023 the Los Angeles City Council expressly recognized that because the City Attorney prosecutes misdemeanor crimes and infractions, City Attorney cases could potentially involve people whose matters later intersect with CARE Court.

But this is a post-2022 policy development.

Los Angeles County currently describes CARE Court as a civil program for narrowly defined serious psychotic disorders and states that participants cannot be forced to take medication or remain in the program merely because they were petitioned into it. LPS conservatorship and involuntary commitment are separate legal systems.

For a lawyer evaluating the 2017 matter, attempting to tie Philips or Dinse retrospectively to Newsom’s 2022 CARE Act would weaken the presentation unless independent evidence emerges.

The more compelling investigation concerns the preexisting Topanga network, community-policing apparatus, Crimebusters groups, mental-health information and Perelman prosecution itself.


XIX. Misconduct Findings Concerning Philips

An extensive public search for Philips combined with terms including prosecutorial misconduct, Brady, Giglio, sanctions, discipline, civil rights, false evidence and related concepts produced no published appellate decision establishing prosecutorial misconduct by her and no public State Bar disciplinary record.

The State Bar presently shows her as active, and its public disciplinary table contains no disciplinary action.

That negative evidence must be included.

It does not prove that every decision Philips ever made was proper.

It means that a lawyer should not represent that Philips has an established public disciplinary history when the currently accessible record does not show one.

The potentially relevant misconduct issue in the Perelman matter is instead case specific: whether she possessed undisclosed information, had undisclosed relationships with witnesses or officers, knew of social-media activity involving the defendant, used false information, failed to disclose favorable or impeachment evidence, or participated in retaliatory prosecution.


XX. Potential Disclosure and Conflict Issues for Counsel to Examine

If the factual allegations concerning group membership and prosecution overlap can be authenticated, several questions could become legally significant.

If Philips was a member of the same private group in which the defendant, his vehicle, license plate, location or alleged conduct were being discussed, defense counsel would want to know whether she observed those discussions and whether they influenced charging, witnesses, plea negotiations or sentencing.

If Dinse used a law-enforcement database in response to the Perelman littering post, counsel would want to determine whether the resulting information reached Philips or prosecution witnesses.

If a prosecution witness was simultaneously a participant in a group organizing complaints or monitoring the defendant, that relationship could constitute significant impeachment information.

If Philips knew that witnesses were coordinating outside ordinary police channels and did not disclose that relationship, counsel could examine potential Brady/Giglio, due-process and prosecutorial-ethics issues, depending upon the facts and materiality.

If prosecution was undertaken or particular restrictions were sought because Perelman was criticizing Dinse, LAPD or the Crimebusters network, counsel could examine potential First Amendment retaliation theories.

None of these theories should be asserted as established merely from group membership. They become substantial only if contemporaneous communications, prosecution files or authenticated posts establish the connection.


XXI. The First Amendment / Website Issue

Perelman states that his cards, writings and website criticized Sean Dinse, LAPD and people he believed were participating in harassment against him.

If the alleged “littering” or card-distribution prosecution involved literature directing people to a website critical of Dinse or Topanga personnel, the content and handling of those materials deserve careful examination.

The critical questions are whether enforcement targeted the physical conduct itself—for example actual unlawful littering—or whether the content and viewpoint of Perelman’s speech contributed to investigation, charging, witness mobilization, probation conditions or punishment.

The contemporaneous Facebook activity is relevant because it may reveal what police and community members were saying about Perelman and his speech at the same time.

An attorney should therefore obtain not only the charging documents but the actual cards, photographs, Facebook posts, officer communications and any statements concerning Perelman’s website.


XXII. Strongest Evidence Versus Weakest Inferences

For legal presentation, the evidence can presently be ranked by reliability.

Strongly documented: Philips was the officially assigned Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor; Dinse was a Topanga Senior Lead Officer; private Crimebusters groups existed and included active police participation; established civil-rights organizations filed a formal Attorney General complaint; that complaint names a “Mr. Perelman” in an August 2017 littering/automobile/license-plate post; the complaint alleges Dinse used a police database in response to the littering complaint cross-referenced as Figure 12; Dinse was later individually sued in federal court; independent journalism reported allegations that Dinse tracked Schellenberg, shared his location and characterized him through mental illness/addiction; LAPD itself reviewed the Facebook groups and acknowledged demeaning content existed.

Supported but requiring original exhibits: the proposition that Dinse’s Figure 7 database disclosure specifically displayed Kevin Perelman’s information; Philips’s exact membership status and participation during the precise dates of Perelman’s prosecution; whether prosecution witnesses were Facebook-group members; and whether posts occurred immediately before or after particular court appearances.

Unproven allegations requiring independent evidence: that Philips and Dinse conspired to fabricate 7VW04099; that Philips instructed civilians to assault or batter Perelman; that either official intentionally created a false psychiatric diagnosis; that they attempted to force Perelman into a mental institution; or that Governor Newsom/CARE Court had anything to do with the 2017 prosecution.

Keeping these categories separate strengthens, rather than weakens, the potentially provable case.


XXIII. Records That Could Resolve the Central Questions

Counsel investigating this matter should seek the original 2018 Attorney General complaint and complete high-resolution appendix, particularly Figures 7, 12 and 13; preserved Facebook posts, comments, group membership logs and administrator records from Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills and Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley; LAPD records identifying database searches of Kevin Perelman or his license plate during the relevant 2017 period; Dinse’s official and personal social-media communications concerning Kevin Perelman, TARGETD, littering, court appearances, cards, Perelman’s website or case 7VW04099; communications between Dinse and Philips; communications involving Fern Peskin-White, Susan Fishman/Fishman-Epstein, Terrance Scroggins or any prosecution witness; City Attorney prosecution files, notes, witness-contact records and electronic communications for 7VW04099; Brady/Giglio or impeachment disclosures; Internal Affairs records concerning Dinse’s Facebook activity and the 2018 social-media investigation; records documenting when Perelman’s TARGETD plate was issued; property or HOA documentation establishing Perelman’s housing status in 2017; and complete court transcripts demonstrating exactly what Philips represented to the judge about Perelman, mental health, witnesses, the cards and the underlying allegations.

The most important evidentiary reconstruction is a minute-by-minute or day-by-day timeline combining:

Facebook activity → Dinse database activity → witness/community activity → police action → prosecutor activity → court proceedings.

If the events align temporally, the significance of the overlap increases substantially.


XXIV. Overall Assessment

The public record does not presently justify stating as established fact that Karine Philips and Sean Dinse criminally conspired to imprison Kevin Perelman or force him into a mental institution.

It does establish something narrower, unusual and worthy of serious investigation.

Philips was the prosecutor officially assigned to LAPD Topanga Division.

Dinse was a Topanga Senior Lead Officer deeply involved in neighborhood-watch policing.

Private Facebook groups involving Topanga police personnel were used to identify and track particular individuals.

Civil-rights organizations formally complained that these groups facilitated cyberharassment, stalking, dissemination of personal information and anti-homeless abuse.

That complaint specifically accused Dinse of distributing information obtained through his law-enforcement position.

The same complaint contains an August 2017 post involving “Mr. Perelman,” an accusation of littering, photographs of his vehicle and a direction to notice his license plate.

Most importantly, the complaint appears to cross-reference that Perelman littering incident with an allegation that Dinse responded by posting information from a law-enforcement database.

Dinse was subsequently sued by another individual, Rex Schellenberg, over allegations that he used Facebook to publicize Schellenberg’s location, encourage resident reporting, create a purported basis for removal or property enforcement, and publicly characterize Schellenberg through “drug addiction/mental illness.”

Independent reporting further documented LAPD review of these Facebook groups and police participation in an environment containing degrading and at times violent anti-homeless rhetoric.

Philips was subsequently reported as a member of the same Facebook-group environment, although no presently located evidence demonstrates that she personally authored threatening posts or distributed confidential information.

For Kevin Perelman, the central legal question is therefore not whether one accepts an overarching theory about every event he has experienced.

The narrower and demonstrably investigable question is this:

Did LAPD Senior Lead Officer Sean Dinse, Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor Karine T. Philips, prosecution witnesses or members of the Crimebusters network exchange information, monitor Kevin Perelman, disseminate law-enforcement or mental-health information about him, coordinate complaints or witnesses, or otherwise influence the investigation and prosecution in case 7VW04099 without disclosure to the defense?

That question is grounded in contemporaneous public evidence.

It can be answered through records.

And the August 2017 Attorney General complaint’s explicit reference to Mr. Perelman, his alleged littering, his vehicle, his license plate and Dinse’s alleged law-enforcement database disclosure makes obtaining those records substantially more important than treating the matter as merely an unsupported personal suspicion.

Evidentiary Position Regarding Kevin Perelman

Kevin Perelman’s position should be accurately stated as follows:

Perelman maintains that he was already experiencing conduct from Sean Dinse, LAPD personnel and associated community members that he regarded as targeted harassment before the Crimebusters posts highlighted his vehicle. He states that his personalized TARGETD license plate reflected his reaction to that preexisting experience; it was not the cause of it.

Independent evidence has not yet established every component of Perelman’s broader account. It does, however, establish that by August 2017 a private neighborhood group connected to active Topanga law-enforcement personnel was circulating photographs of a Mr. Perelman, accusing him of littering and specifically directing members to notice his license plate. The formal civil-rights complaint contemporaneously characterized this as conduct that could expose the individual to targeted abuse.

That independent evidence should be the starting point for further investigation.

Relevance to Kevin Perelman’s 2017 Van Nuys Matter (7VW04099) and Illegal Arrests and Trials with community and federal hate mobs and police stalking operations

How to Read This Dossier

The central value of this material is not that every allegation is proved. It is that several independently documented facts intersect in a way that justifies targeted investigation of communications, database access, social-media activity, witness relationships, and prosecutorial knowledge surrounding the 2017 matter.

LabelMeaning
VERIFIED / OFFICIALSupported by an official government record, licensing record, or undisputed institutional record.
REPORTED / ALLEGEDContained in a court filing, civil-rights complaint, or reputable/identified publication; not necessarily adjudicated as true.
CLIENT-SUPPLIEDInformation stated by Kevin Perelman or contained in his materials; should be corroborated with primary records where possible.
OPEN QUESTIONA factual issue that the current public record does not resolve and that should be tested through records, discovery, testimony, or authentication.
NEGATIVE FINDINGA searched-for fact that was not located in the public record; absence of a hit is not proof the event never occurred.

Executive Summary

The strongest public evidence presently supports a narrower—and potentially more useful—investigative theory than a generalized accusation of conspiracy. Karine T. Philips was formally assigned as the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Neighborhood Prosecutor for LAPD Topanga Division by 2014 and publicly described her role as improving neighborhood “quality of life” and preventing public-safety problems. Sean Dinse was and remains publicly listed as a Topanga Senior Lead Officer. These roles placed them inside the same Topanga community-policing / quality-of-life enforcement structure.[2]

Separately, private West Valley Facebook groups—principally “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills” and “Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley”—became the subject of a 2018 complaint to the California Attorney General and 2019 reporting by Knock LA, Los Angeles Magazine, and the Los Angeles Times. The materials described LAPD participation, individualized tracking of homeless people, circulation of personal information, and rhetoric advocating harassment or violence. Dinse was repeatedly identified as an active officer participant. A 2019 KTown for All investigation, preserved in a surviving reproduction and later cited by the ACLU of Southern California, also listed Deputy City Attorney Karine Philips among group members.[7]

Most important to Kevin Perelman, the surviving reproduction of the 2018 Attorney General complaint describes an August 2017 Crimebusters post accusing “Mr. Perelman” of littering, displaying his belongings and automobile, and directing members to “notice Mr. Perelman’s license plate.” The same reproduced complaint appears to cross-reference that littering incident (Figure 12) to an allegation that Dinse responded to a member’s complaint by posting a screenshot from a law-enforcement database containing personal information (Figure 7). Because the original high-resolution appendix has not yet been authenticated in this research, counsel should treat the Figure 7/Figure 12 connection as a high-priority lead rather than a final factual conclusion.[8]

Perelman states that the vehicle’s personalized plate read TARGETD and that the plate reflected what he regarded as preexisting targeting by Dinse and others; he rejects any inference that the plate itself created a legitimate basis to monitor him. Whatever the motivation for the plate, the legal and evidentiary question is what government personnel and private participants actually did. A personalized plate does not itself confer authority to circulate law-enforcement information, falsify evidence, organize harassment, or retaliate against protected speech.

The most independently documented example of Dinse using a mental-illness/addiction characterization toward a particular individual is Rex Schellenberg. Schellenberg filed a federal civil-rights action against Dinse and the City of Los Angeles in 2020. The Los Angeles Times reported allegations that Dinse publicized Schellenberg’s location so residents would call police, allegedly creating a “pretextual basis” to move him or seize property, and that Dinse had attributed Schellenberg’s housing loss to “drug addiction/mental illness.” Those allegations were not located as a final adjudicated misconduct finding, but they establish a concrete comparator for counsel to evaluate against Perelman’s evidence.[12]

No public appellate decision or State Bar disciplinary record was located establishing prosecutorial misconduct by Philips. Her State Bar profile currently lists her license as Active and shows no public discipline entry. That negative finding should remain in any attorney-facing version of the dossier. The potentially significant question is case-specific: whether Philips knew of, participated in, received information from, or failed to disclose Topanga/Crimebusters activity bearing on Perelman’s 2017 prosecution.[1]

The CARE Act / CARE Court does not provide a causal explanation for the 2017 case. Governor Gavin Newsom signed SB 1338 on September 14, 2022—five years after the events at issue—and Los Angeles County implemented CARE Court later. No evidence located links Philips personally to Newsom or the creation of CARE Court. Later City and County records show only an institutional, post-2022 relationship between local government, mental-health services, first responders, and CARE Court.[17]

Key Findings at a Glance

IssueCurrent EvidenceStrengthNext Step
Philips–Topanga assignmentOfficial records place Philips as Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor by 2014; she said so herself in 2015.HighObtain 2017 City Attorney assignment/case records.
Dinse–Topanga roleCurrent LAPD directory lists Dinse as Topanga SLO; contemporary reporting identifies him in Woodland Hills.HighObtain 2017 assignment and activity logs.
Crimebusters police involvementMultiple reports and ACLU-cited materials document LAPD participation in private Facebook groups.High / contextualAuthenticate screenshots and membership logs.
Philips in Crimebusters ecosystem2019 KTown for All material, preserved by a mirror and cited by ACLU, lists Philips as a member.MediumRecover original KTown article/screenshots and Facebook member data.
Perelman post, Aug. 2017Surviving complaint text describes “Mr. Perelman,” alleged littering, vehicle photos, and direction to notice his plate.High lead; appendix neededRecover original Figure 12.
Dinse database linkSurviving complaint text appears to cross-reference Dinse database screenshot (Fig. 7) to Perelman littering post (Fig. 12).Potentially very high; not yet authenticatedRecover Figures 7/12 and audit/query logs.
Mental-health labeling comparatorSchellenberg suit/reporting alleges Dinse used “drug addiction/mental illness” characterization and location-sharing.High as evidence of allegation; not adjudicationObtain complaint/exhibits and disposition.
Philips misconduct historyNo public discipline/appellate misconduct finding located.Negative findingDo not overstate; inspect trial-level and internal records.
CARE Act / NewsomCARE Act enacted in 2022, so cannot explain 2017 events.HighKeep separate unless later evidence specifically connects actors.

Chronology: Institutional Roles, Facebook Activity, Perelman Matter, and Later Corroborating Events

DateEventEvidence TypeSource
Dec. 10, 1996Karine T. Philips admitted to the State Bar of California. Current public profile shows Active status and no listed public discipline.Official[1]
June 2014Neighborhood Prosecutor assignment list identifies Karine Philips for Topanga Division; Tamar Galatzan is separately listed for Van Nuys/North Hollywood.Official[2]
2014West Hills Neighborhood Council minutes identify Philips as the new Neighborhood Prosecutor assigned to LAPD Topanga Area and record her presentation on Neighborhood Justice alternatives for low-level offenses.Official[5]
May 4, 2015Philips publicly identifies herself as “your Neighborhood Prosecutor assigned to the LAPD’s Topanga division” and describes a quality-of-life/public-safety mission.Official / self-statement[3]
2016Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills is reported to have begun. Later investigations identify LAPD volunteers/officers among administrators and members.Reported[9]
2017A homelessness-focused subgroup is reported to have been created; Dinse is reported as participating in Crimebusters-related activity.Reported[9]
July 12, 2017CBS Los Angeles reports Dinse helping a homeless mother and daughter and using social media/community contacts to obtain assistance. This is relevant countervailing evidence.Independent news[15]
Aug. 2017Surviving 2018 complaint text describes a Crimebusters post about “Mr. Perelman,” alleged littering, photos of belongings/car, and instruction to notice his license plate. The same reproduced complaint appears to link the littering complaint to a Dinse law-enforcement-database screenshot.Complaint allegation / high-priority lead[8]
2017Perelman identifies Philips as prosecutor in Van Nuys case 7VW04099. This should be verified against certified docket/transcripts/case file.Client-supplied—
Aug. 1, 2018; updated Nov. 20, 2018Coalition of homelessness/civil-rights organizations submits complaint to California Attorney General concerning the Facebook groups and government participation.Advocacy complaint; provenance corroborated by ACLU[7]
May–Aug. 2019Los Angeles Times, Knock LA, KTown for All, and Los Angeles Magazine publish material about the groups, Dinse, anti-homeless rhetoric, tracking, and police participation. KTown-derived material lists Philips among group members.Independent / advocacy reporting[9]
Feb. 10, 2020Rex Schellenberg files federal civil-rights lawsuit naming Dinse and City of Los Angeles.Court docket[13]
Feb. 11, 2020Los Angeles Times reports Schellenberg allegations of location sharing, pretextual removal, towing, and Dinse’s “drug addiction/mental illness” characterization.Independent news[12]
Sept. 14, 2022Governor Newsom signs SB 1338 / CARE Act. This postdates the 2017 case by five years.Official[17]
Jan. 10, 2023Winnetka Neighborhood Council agenda identifies Philips as City Attorney representative on park-hours issues alongside LAMC §41.18 discussion.Official local record[16]
Apr. 25, 2023Los Angeles City Council motion asks City Administrative Officer, with City Attorney assistance, to examine City role in CARE Court.Official[19]
2026Current LAPD Topanga directory lists Sean Dinse as SLO assignment 21A43; State Bar lists Philips as Active.Official[14]

I. Charles “Sean” Dinse: Documented Role, Public Positions, and Allegations

A. Official Topanga Role

VERIFIED / OFFICIAL: LAPD’s current Topanga Community Police Station page identifies Sean Dinse as a Senior Lead Officer, assignment 21A43. Topanga serves Canoga Park, West Hills, Winnetka, and Woodland Hills.

A Senior Lead Officer is a community-policing position. The relevance here is structural: the role is built around recurring neighborhood problems, community contacts, neighborhood-watch information, and communication between residents and police. That creates legitimate reasons for frequent contact with community groups, but it also makes boundaries concerning private intelligence, social-media participation, confidential records, and targeting of particular individuals especially important.[14]

B. Documented Homelessness / Mental-Illness Framing

During his 2019 City Council campaign, Dinse publicly argued that housing alone could not solve homelessness and that authorities had to “stabilize the irrational behavior caused by drug addiction and potential mental illness before a person can accept housing or keep it.” This is a direct public statement by Dinse, reported by the Los Angeles Times. It does not show illegality. It does show that mental illness and addiction were part of his stated framework for understanding and responding to homelessness.[11]

A separate Los Angeles Times article from September 2019 reported Dinse supporting restrictions on sleeping in “sensitive areas” and raising concerns about children encountering people with mental illness or addiction issues. Together, these public comments show that Dinse’s enforcement philosophy expressly linked some public-space problems to behavioral-health and addiction concerns.

CAUTION: A policy view that some homelessness involves mental illness is not proof that any particular person was mentally ill, nor proof that Dinse fabricated a diagnosis. Individualized labeling must be evaluated person by person.

C. Crimebusters / Facebook Participation

Los Angeles Magazine reported that Dinse regularly used the West Valley Facebook groups to source information about encampments and track specific homeless individuals. The same article reported leaked screenshots containing suggestions of Airsoft guns, bleach, and other tactics to deter homeless people, while noting that the group administrator disputed characterizing the groups as anti-homeless vigilante organizations and said such behavior was discouraged. LAPD told the publication it would address misconduct and would not tolerate hate speech or encouragement of violence.[10]

Knock LA reported that the Crimebusters groups were administered by current or former LAPD personnel/volunteers and that Dinse and former SLO Brent Rygh had longstanding community-policing roles in Woodland Hills and West Hills. Knock LA further alleged that Dinse and Rygh provided privileged background information concerning persons in residential rehabilitation or wellness homes and that residents used the information in complaints. This is an allegation from advocacy journalism, not a judicial finding, and should be presented that way.[9]

The significance is not merely offensive speech by private Facebook users. The potentially material issue is the alleged integration of a private group with official police functions: community members identifying people, officers obtaining or supplying information, repeated reporting, and enforcement activity directed at the same individuals.

D. The 2018 Attorney General Complaint and Alleged Database Disclosure

The ACLU of Southern California’s 2021 report cites the 2018 California Attorney General complaint, the KTown for All article, Knock LA, and Los Angeles Magazine as source material concerning West Valley anti-homeless enforcement. The original KTown-hosted complaint is no longer readily accessible through ordinary web search, but a surviving reproduction preserves extensive text from the complaint.[7]

The surviving reproduced complaint alleges that members circulated names, criminal histories, mental-health status or treatment histories, and drug/alcohol information. It then alleges that Dinse repeatedly used his position to obtain and publicize sensitive information, including a screenshot from a law-enforcement database in response to a member’s complaint about alleged littering. Critically, the reproduced text identifies that littering complaint as Figure 12.[8]

OPEN QUESTION: The original complaint PDF and full-resolution appendix must be obtained. Counsel should not rely solely on the mirror for litigation-grade authentication.

E. Rex Schellenberg: Comparator for Location Tracking and Mental-Health Labeling

On February 10, 2020, Rex Schellenberg filed a federal civil-rights action in the Central District of California against Sean Dinse and the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The docket confirms Dinse was individually named as a defendant.[13]

The Los Angeles Times reported that Schellenberg alleged Dinse posted where he was staying so residents would contact police, allegedly creating a “pretextual basis” to force him to move or seize property. The Times also reported that Dinse had said Schellenberg was probably evicted because of “drug addiction/mental illness”; Schellenberg disputed both labels and alleged repeated improper towing activity involving his van.[12]

The evidentiary value of Schellenberg is comparative, not dispositive. It demonstrates that another identifiable individual independently alleged a sequence involving Dinse, Facebook-based location dissemination, community reporting, vehicle enforcement, displacement, and mental-illness/addiction characterization. A lawyer can compare that alleged sequence to the Perelman chronology without assuming they are identical.

F. Countervailing Evidence Regarding Dinse

A balanced dossier must also include evidence inconsistent with a claim that every Dinse interaction with homeless people was hostile. CBS Los Angeles reported in July 2017 that Dinse responded to a call involving a homeless mother and daughter, concluded they needed help, publicized their story, and facilitated community assistance and motel lodging.[15]

This does not negate the later allegations. It means the defensible issue is not “Dinse hated every homeless person.” The narrower issue is whether he used police authority or private community networks improperly against selected individuals, and whether such conduct affected Perelman.

II. Karine T. Philips: Official Role, Crimebusters Connection, and Misconduct Inquiry

A. Licensing and Career Status

Karine T. Philips, State Bar No. 186645, was admitted to the California Bar on December 10, 1996. The State Bar currently lists her as Active, employed by the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office, with USC Law School identified as her law school. The public disciplinary/history table shows no disciplinary entry.[1]

NEGATIVE FINDING: This research did not locate a published appellate finding of prosecutorial misconduct, a public Brady/Giglio sanction, a civil-rights judgment against Philips, or a public State Bar disciplinary action. That absence must not be converted into a claim that misconduct is impossible; it means the issue has to be proved from the specific case record.

B. Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor Assignment

A June 2014 Neighborhood Prosecutor assignment list placed Philips at Topanga Division. The same list assigned Tamar Galatzan to Van Nuys and North Hollywood. This is important because it shows Philips’s Topanga relationship was formal and predated Perelman’s 2017 case; it was not a role created specifically for him.[2]

“Hi, my name is Karine Philips and I am your Neighborhood Prosecutor assigned to the LAPD’s Topanga division.” [3]

In that 2015 message, Philips described herself as focused on improving neighborhood quality of life and preventing public-safety problems. LAist described the Neighborhood Prosecutor program as addressing “broken windows” or quality-of-life offenses such as vandalism, loitering, trespassing, graffiti, prostitution, illegal dumping, and code violations.[3]

Thus, if a misdemeanor case originated from Topanga-area community complaints, an ordinary institutional explanation exists for Philips to become involved. The legally significant question is not simply why she was there, but whether she had undisclosed relationships, off-record information, group participation, or retaliatory reasons affecting the handling of a particular defendant.[4]

C. Neighborhood Justice / Alternative Enforcement

West Hills Neighborhood Council minutes from 2014 record Philips presenting the Neighborhood Justice Program, described as an alternative approach to low-level offenses intended to keep offenders out of the conventional justice system. This is meaningful counterevidence to any claim that her public mission was categorically to institutionalize or incarcerate people.[5]

D. Philips and the Crimebusters Ecosystem

A 2019 KTown for All investigation, preserved in a surviving reproduction and cited by the ACLU, listed Deputy City Attorney Karine Philips among members of the West Valley Facebook-group environment together with numerous LAPD personnel, including Sean Dinse. The public materials located here do not establish that Philips authored the violent or demeaning posts described by other publications.[7]

This distinction is critical. Membership can be relevant—especially for a prosecutor assigned to the same police division—but membership alone does not prove knowledge of every post, agreement with other members, receipt of confidential information, or participation in a conspiracy. The factual questions are whether Philips was a member during the precise 2017 prosecution period, what she could see, whether she posted or communicated, and whether group-derived information entered the prosecution file.[8]

OPEN QUESTION: Recover the original member list, platform records, screenshots, or archived page showing Philips’s membership date, account identity, activity, and access.

E. Later Public-Space / §41.18 Context

A January 2023 Winnetka Neighborhood Council agenda identifies Philips as a City Attorney representative providing input on park-hours issues in a section that also references Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18 and public-right-of-way determinations. This supports a continuing professional connection to quality-of-life/public-space enforcement, but it does not establish misconduct or prove a 2017 mental-health agenda.[16]

III. The Crimebusters Network and the August 2017 “Mr. Perelman” Material

A. What the Groups Were

The principal groups were reported as “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills” and “Homeless Transient Encampments of our West Valley.” Investigations described them as private Facebook forums used by residents to report suspected crime, nuisance activity, encampments, vehicles, and particular people. LAPD officers and volunteers participated to varying degrees.[9]

The public controversy arose because leaked screenshots and advocacy reports described some members advocating harassment, threats, property interference, or violent tactics against homeless people. Independent Los Angeles Magazine reporting confirmed the existence of disturbing screenshots and active law-enforcement participation, while also reporting the administrator’s denial that the groups endorsed vigilante behavior.[10]

B. The Perelman Post

The most important Perelman-specific public material is the surviving reproduction of the 2018 Attorney General complaint. It describes an August 2017 Crimebusters post accusing a “homeless individual” of littering, publishing photographs of the individual’s belongings and vehicle, and directing members to “Notice Mr. Perelman’s license plate.” The complaint states that distributing identifying information could expose the person to targeted abuse.[8]

CLIENT-SUPPLIED: Kevin Perelman states that this “Mr. Perelman” was him and that his personalized license plate read TARGETD. He also states that he was a homeowner living in an HOA community, not homeless.

The convergence of surname, geographic area, time period, littering allegation, vehicle, and distinctive plate makes identification as Kevin Perelman a strong lead, but litigation-grade use should still be anchored to the original Figure 12 image and underlying Facebook post.

C. Figure 7 / Figure 12: The Potential Dinse–Perelman Database Connection

The reproduced complaint contains a potentially crucial internal cross-reference. It alleges that Dinse responded to a Facebook member complaining about a person allegedly littering by posting a screenshot from a law-enforcement database containing personal information; that underlying littering complaint is identified as Figure 12. The same reproduced complaint later describes Figure 12 as the August 2017 “Mr. Perelman” vehicle/license-plate post.[8]

If the original figures confirm the reproduced text, the connection could establish a specific sequence: a private community post identifies Perelman and his vehicle; a Topanga SLO accesses or posts law-enforcement information; and the activity occurs in the same period as a prosecution that Perelman says was handled by Topanga’s assigned Neighborhood Prosecutor. That would not by itself prove a conspiracy, but it would make database purpose, dissemination, prosecutorial knowledge, and disclosure obligations highly material.

HIGHEST-PRIORITY AUTHENTICATION TASK: Obtain the original 2018 complaint PDF and full appendix. Compare Figure 7 and Figure 12 visually, determine whose record appears in Figure 7, identify the data system, and obtain any audit trail showing query user/date/time/purpose.

D. The “Homeless” Characterization Versus Perelman’s Homeowner Status

The reproduced complaint describes the Figure 12 subject as homeless. Perelman states that this was false and that he was a homeowner living in an HOA townhouse complex. The source of that discrepancy should be investigated rather than assumed. The Facebook poster may have called him homeless/transient; alternatively, the advocacy authors may have inferred homelessness because they were analyzing anti-homeless groups.

If property, HOA, utility, or residency records establish that Perelman was a resident homeowner in August 2017, counsel should preserve that evidence. The point is not merely semantic. Misclassification could be relevant if it shows that a person was placed into an anti-homeless enforcement framework regardless of actual housing status.

E. TARGETD Plate: Evidentiary Framing

CLIENT-SUPPLIED: Perelman states that he used the TARGETD plate because he already believed Dinse and others were targeting or harassing him. In his account, the plate was a reaction to prior events, not the cause of later attention.

For legal presentation, the safest formulation is causal neutrality: the plate proves what the plate said, not why it was chosen and not whether the underlying belief was correct. The reason should be established through contemporaneous records—DMV issuance date, earlier reports, video, communications, or documented encounters. Regardless of motive, the wording TARGETD would not authorize misuse of confidential databases, fabrication of charges, retaliatory prosecution, or private harassment.

A particularly useful chronology would place the date the plate was ordered/issued next to every documented Dinse/Topanga incident predating it. If objectively documented police/community activity preceded the plate, that evidence would directly address any suggestion that the plate itself generated the attention.

IV. Potential Relevance to Case 7VW04099

CLIENT-SUPPLIED: Perelman identifies 7VW04099 as his 2017 Van Nuys criminal matter and identifies Karine Philips as the prosecutor. The certified docket, complaint, transcripts, police reports, and City Attorney file should be used to establish the exact charges, dates, witnesses, rulings, and Philips’s role.

A. Why Philips Could Have Been Involved Without a Special Targeting Assignment

Because Philips had been Topanga’s assigned Neighborhood Prosecutor since at least 2014, a Topanga-origin misdemeanor prosecution could naturally fall within her institutional portfolio. This fact should be acknowledged. It prevents a weak inference—“Philips prosecuted me, therefore she was specially selected”—from obscuring the more important factual questions.

B. What Would Make Her Involvement Legally Significant

  • Philips was a member of the same Facebook group while the defendant, his car, plate, speech, location, or alleged conduct were being discussed.
  • Philips saw or received group posts about Perelman before charging, plea negotiations, trial, sentencing, or probation proceedings.
  • Dinse or another officer supplied information obtained from a law-enforcement database to Philips outside normal discoverable channels.
  • Prosecution witnesses were members of the same group, coordinated complaints, shared evidence, or monitored Perelman outside ordinary witness activity.
  • Philips knew of witness/officer coordination but the defense was not informed.
  • Mental-health or dangerousness descriptions appeared in the prosecution despite lacking a legitimate clinical or evidentiary source, and the source can be traced to police/community communications.
  • Enforcement escalated in response to Perelman’s criticism of Dinse, LAPD, Crimebusters participants, or other government actors.

Each proposition is testable. None should be treated as established solely from group membership or geographic overlap.

C. Speech, Cards, Website, and Retaliation Theory

CLIENT-SUPPLIED: Perelman states that his cards and websites criticized Sean Dinse, LAPD, and people he believed were participating in harassment against him.

If the 2017 case involved distributing cards or literature that directed readers to criticism of police/community actors, counsel should distinguish the alleged physical offense (for example, littering or trespass) from the content of the speech. The key question is whether enforcement was content-neutral or whether criticism of police/community participants became a reason to investigate, charge, pressure, characterize, or punish the defendant.

The Facebook material may be especially probative if posts discuss Perelman’s speech, website, court appearances, or desired removal from an area. A First Amendment retaliation theory generally depends on protected activity, adverse action, causation, and the absence or insufficiency of legitimate independent reasons; counsel should evaluate the precise record rather than relying on rhetoric.

D. Fabricated Evidence / False-Charge Theory

CLIENT-SUPPLIED: Perelman alleges that Philips falsified charges or relied on false community statements and that people were encouraged to assault/batter or follow him. Those are serious claims and are not established by the public sources reviewed here.

The way to make this claim legally useful is to decompose it into documentable subquestions: What did each witness say first? When did that account change? What objective video or physical evidence exists? Which officer contacted each witness? What did Philips know and when? Did a social-media discussion precede a police report? Were inconsistent witness statements disclosed? Did any official state a fact contradicted by contemporaneous video or records?

A lawyer can then build a contradiction chart rather than asking a court to accept a global conclusion. That approach is substantially more persuasive.

E. Brady / Giglio / Disclosure Questions

If police officers, prosecutors, and civilian witnesses were simultaneously participating in a private group discussing the defendant or coordinating complaints, the relationships and communications could be relevant impeachment or exculpatory evidence depending on their content and materiality. Counsel should evaluate federal due-process disclosure principles, California criminal-discovery obligations, and prosecutor ethics rules against the actual 2017 record.

The important factual questions include whether the prosecution team knew of group activity, whether officers’ credibility could be impeached by database misuse or undisclosed relationships, whether witnesses coordinated accounts, and whether any favorable evidence was suppressed. The mere existence of a Facebook group does not establish a Brady violation; suppressed materiality and prosecution-team knowledge matter.

V. Motive and Operational-Theory Analysis

“Motive” should be divided into documented institutional objectives and hypotheses requiring proof. This prevents speculation from obscuring the strongest evidence.

Proposed Objective / MotiveEvidence Supporting ItLimits / Alternative ExplanationStatus
Neighborhood “quality of life” / nuisance abatementPhilips’s own Neighborhood Prosecutor description; LAist broken-windows description; Dinse community-policing role.Ordinary lawful government purpose unless methods become unlawful or retaliatory.Documented
Use community reporting to identify recurring targets / locationsLA Magazine and Knock LA report officers using groups to source information and track individuals.Community tips are not inherently unlawful; key is privacy, accuracy, selective enforcement, and official action.Reported
Displace persons viewed as nuisance activitySchellenberg alleges location posting to generate calls and a pretextual basis to move him; Knock LA reports “remove nuisance activity” framing.Allegations not final adjudications; legitimate code enforcement may also exist.Alleged / comparator
Mental-illness/addiction framing to justify interventionDinse publicly linked some homelessness to mental illness/addiction; Schellenberg alleges individualized “drug addiction/mental illness” label.Does not prove false diagnosis or forced treatment in Perelman matter.Documented framing; specific misuse unproved
Retaliation for criticism / speechPerelman says he criticized Dinse/LAPD and was prosecuted/targeted.Requires proof of causal link, protected speech, adverse action, and improper motive.Client theory / open
Force psychiatric institutionalizationPerelman expresses this concern and says he has evidence of unlawful confinement/false mental-health representations.No public source located proving Philips or Dinse orchestrated psychiatric commitment of Perelman.Open / unproved
CARE Court / Newsom policy as cause of 2017 eventsNo chronological support. CARE Act enacted in 2022.Impossible as a causal legal mechanism for 2017.Rejected by chronology

A. Most Defensible Operational Theory to Test

The best-supported hypothesis is not that a hidden statewide psychiatric program caused the 2017 case. It is that Topanga’s community-policing / neighborhood-prosecution structure may have allowed a feedback loop in which residents identified an individual, private-group discussion amplified the issue, officers supplied or acted on information, repeated complaints generated enforcement, and prosecutors handled the resulting case. The legality of that loop depends on what information was shared, whether reports were truthful, whether enforcement had a lawful basis, whether protected speech drove the action, and whether the defense received material impeachment/exculpatory information.

The Figure 7/Figure 12 lead matters because it could move this from an abstract system description to a person-specific chain involving Perelman. Authentication is therefore more valuable than adding broader theories.

VI. Mental-Health Labels, Involuntary Treatment, and CARE Court

A. What the Public Record Actually Shows

The public record supports several limited propositions: the 2018 complaint alleged circulation of mental-health information; Dinse publicly used mental illness/addiction as part of his homelessness framework; Schellenberg alleged Dinse applied a “drug addiction/mental illness” characterization to him; and private/community groups tracked particular individuals. Those facts justify investigating whether mental-health characterizations were transmitted about Perelman.[8]

The public record reviewed here does not establish that Philips personally fabricated a diagnosis, ordered a §5150 detention, arranged involuntary medication, or possessed unilateral power to institutionalize Perelman. Perelman states that he has evidence of illegal confinement and false mental-health representations; those materials should be reviewed separately and matched to named actors, dates, orders, declarations, and medical/legal authority.

B. CARE Court Is Chronologically Separate

Governor Newsom signed the CARE Act, SB 1338, on September 14, 2022. The statute therefore cannot explain a 2017 prosecution. Los Angeles County describes CARE Court as a civil program for adults with specified severe psychotic disorders; it states that participation is voluntary, participants receive legal representation, they cannot be forced to take medication through CARE Court, and there are no civil or criminal penalties for leaving the program.[17]

A 2023 Los Angeles City Council motion asked the City Administrative Officer, with City Attorney assistance, to investigate the City’s role in CARE Court. This creates a later institutional connection between the City Attorney’s Office and CARE implementation, not evidence that Philips personally designed CARE Court or that Newsom was connected to the 2017 Perelman case.[19]

CONCLUSION ON CARE: For 2017 analysis, CARE Court should be treated as background on later California mental-health policy, not as evidence of motive. Using it as a causal theory would weaken the more concrete Topanga/Crimebusters evidence.

VII. Misconduct Research: What Was Found and What Was Not

A. Karine Philips

Searches of Philips’s name with terms including prosecutorial misconduct, Brady, Giglio, sanctions, discipline, false evidence, malicious prosecution, civil rights, and defendant complaints did not produce a published appellate misconduct finding or public State Bar discipline. Her State Bar page lists Active status and no public disciplinary entry.[1]

This is a negative public-record finding, not an endorsement of any specific prosecution. Many trial-level disputes, personnel investigations, complaints that do not result in discipline, and unpublished matters are not visible through general web research.

B. Sean Dinse

Dinse’s public controversy is materially more developed. The 2018 advocacy complaint alleged misuse of official access and dissemination of sensitive personal information; 2019 reporting described his active role in Facebook-based tracking; and a 2020 federal civil-rights complaint named him personally. The sources reviewed do not establish a final judicial finding that he committed the alleged civil-rights violations.[8]

A later LAPD Topanga statement from June 2023 concerning a different SLO’s inappropriate homelessness-related email declared that enforcement should not be used as a quick fix and should not be based solely on homeless status. This is not evidence about Dinse or Philips personally, but it is useful institutional context regarding what LAPD says proper Topanga enforcement should look like.[20]

VIII. Legal Issue Map for Counsel (Issue-Spotting, Not Conclusions)

The following issues may become relevant only if the underlying facts are proved. They are included to help counsel organize discovery and analysis, not to state that any element has been satisfied.

Potential IssueFact Questions That Matter
Due process / fabricated evidenceWhether officers or prosecutors knowingly created, adopted, or presented materially false evidence; whether contradictions were known; whether false evidence caused prosecution or deprivation.
Brady / Giglio / criminal discoveryWhether prosecution-team members possessed material exculpatory or impeachment information involving group membership, witness coordination, database access, inconsistent statements, bias, or officer credibility.
First Amendment retaliationWhether protected criticism or publication about police/community actors was a substantial causal factor in enforcement, prosecution, probation conditions, or other adverse action.
42 U.S.C. §1983 / state actionWhether government officials violated federal rights; whether private participants were acting jointly with officials; whether municipal policy/custom or failure to supervise is implicated.
Privacy / misuse of law-enforcement informationWhether a police database was accessed for an authorized purpose, what information was disclosed, to whom, and under what policy/statutory authority.
Witness bias / coordination / impeachmentWhether complaining witnesses were communicating with officers/prosecutor or one another through private groups and whether those relationships affected testimony.
Selective or retaliatory enforcementWhether similarly situated conduct was treated differently because of identity, speech, association, or hostility; requires careful comparator and causation evidence.
Malicious prosecution / state tort theoriesPotentially relevant depending on disposition, probable cause, malice, immunities, accrual, and limitations. Counsel should evaluate separately.
Limitations / tolling / claim-presentation rulesThe events are old. Any civil theory must be evaluated for accrual, tolling, delayed discovery, continuing violation doctrines where applicable, and government-claim requirements.

IX. Priority Evidence and Records Plan

Priority 1 — Authenticate the Perelman / Dinse Facebook Evidence

  • Original “Los-Angeles-AG-Complaint-update-20181.pdf” as submitted/hosted in 2018, including the complete appendix.
  • Original high-resolution Figures 7, 12, 13, and surrounding figures referenced in the complaint.
  • Native Facebook post data for the August 2017 “Mr. Perelman” post: author, timestamp, comments, reactions, edits, group name, member visibility, attached photographs, and metadata.
  • Native or archived post containing the alleged Dinse law-enforcement-database screenshot.
  • Proof identifying whose information appears in the alleged database screenshot; if Perelman, identify the data fields and source system.
  • Facebook membership and administrator logs for Sean Dinse, Karine Philips, relevant Topanga officers, volunteers, complaining witnesses, and named community participants during 2016–2019.

Priority 2 — Reconstruct 7VW04099 from Primary Records

  • Certified register of actions / docket and charging document.
  • All police reports, supplemental reports, citations, field interview cards, photographs, body-worn video if any, dispatch/CAD records, and property/evidence logs.
  • Every transcript: arraignment, motions, trial/plea, sentencing, probation, and any mental-health-related discussion.
  • City Attorney prosecution file: intake notes, charging worksheet, witness list, investigator notes, emails, text messages, discovery logs, plea notes, and sentencing recommendations.
  • Defense file and discovery received, including Brady/Giglio disclosures and any Pitchess-related materials.
  • Exact identification of all complaining witnesses and whether any were members of Crimebusters/related groups.
  • Copies of the cards, flyers, website material, or other speech alleged to constitute or relate to the offense.

Priority 3 — Audit Dinse / LAPD Information Access

  • Any available audit trail for law-enforcement database queries of Kevin Perelman, his license plate TARGETD, vehicle VIN, address, or identifiers during the relevant period.
  • Official purpose associated with each query and whether the query was linked to a report, call for service, investigation, citation, or case number.
  • Communications in which query results were transmitted to private residents, Facebook groups, volunteers, witnesses, or prosecutors.
  • LAPD social-media policies in force in 2017–2019 and records of training/orders issued after the 2018 complaint.
  • Internal Affairs / Professional Standards / command review materials specifically concerning Crimebusters, Dinse, Rygh, or Topanga officers’ Facebook participation, subject to lawful discovery and privacy limitations.

Priority 4 — Philips / City Attorney Communications

  • Emails and case-management entries containing “Perelman,” “TARGETD,” 7VW04099, Dinse, Crimebusters, Scroggins, the relevant address/location, or names of prosecution witnesses.
  • Communications between Philips and Dinse, Topanga SLOs, Fern Peskin-White, Crimebusters administrators, HOA/community participants, or witnesses during the relevant prosecution period.
  • Any saved social-media screenshots or neighborhood complaints used in charging, plea negotiation, or sentencing.
  • Records showing Philips’s Facebook-group membership date, account identity, posts/comments, and whether she received notifications or direct messages concerning Perelman.
  • Any mental-health characterization, dangerousness allegation, psychiatric reference, or request for evaluation associated with the file—together with its source.

Priority 5 — Establish Perelman’s Housing and Plate Chronology

  • DMV documentation showing when the TARGETD personalized plate was requested, issued, and placed on the vehicle.
  • Property title, mortgage/HOA, tax, utility, insurance, or other records establishing residence/homeownership in August 2017.
  • Any contemporaneous records predating the TARGETD plate that objectively document Dinse/Topanga contacts or alleged monitoring; these are critical to testing the claimed cause-and-effect sequence.
  • Original photographs showing the vehicle/plate during the period and matching the Figure 12 image if recovered.

X. Evidence Matrix: What Each Piece Would Prove or Not Prove

EvidencePotential Probative ValueLimit / Caution
Original Figure 12Identity of “Mr. Perelman,” actual plate, author, wording, date, context.Does not alone prove Dinse/Philips directed the post.
Original Figure 7Whose law-enforcement information was displayed; what data was disclosed.Does not alone prove improper purpose; audit/policy needed.
Database audit logWho queried Perelman/plate, when, and potentially system/purpose.Does not alone prove dissemination to civilians.
Philips group membership logWhether and when Philips had access to the group.Membership alone does not prove she read or endorsed specific posts.
Philips–Dinse communicationsCan establish knowledge, coordination, source of information, or lawful case purpose.Neutral communications may also explain legitimate prosecution activity.
Witness membership/postsCan establish bias, coordination, common source, prior inconsistent statements.Membership alone does not make testimony false.
DMV plate issuanceTests whether claimed targeting incidents predated TARGETD plate.Does not prove the earlier incidents were unlawful.
Property/HOA recordsCan rebut a claim that Perelman was homeless at the time.Does not identify who originated the “homeless” label.
Certified 7VW04099 transcriptEstablishes what Philips actually said, requested, represented, or knew in court.Does not reveal off-record communications without discovery.
Schellenberg complaint/exhibitsComparator evidence concerning Dinse methods and mental-health labeling.Does not prove same method was used against Perelman.

XI. Targeted Questions for Depositions, Interviews, or Records Review

Questions for Sean Dinse

  1. Were you a member or administrator of Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills or its homeless-encampment subgroup in August 2017? Identify the account(s) used.
  2. Did you view or respond to a post concerning Kevin Perelman, a person named Perelman, an alleged littering incident, or a vehicle bearing TARGETD?
  3. Did you access any LAPD/CLETS/DMV or other law-enforcement database in response to that post? If so, identify the purpose, system, query terms, and case/report number.
  4. Did you post, transmit, display, or describe the result to any private Facebook group or community member?
  5. Did you communicate with Karine Philips concerning Perelman before or during case 7VW04099?
  6. Did you communicate with any complaining witness or HOA/community participant concerning Perelman outside ordinary police-report channels?
  7. Did you characterize Perelman as homeless, mentally ill, paranoid, addicted, dangerous, or in need of psychiatric intervention? If so, identify the factual/clinical source.
  8. Were you aware of any instruction or policy limiting officer participation in the Facebook groups after complaints were made?

Questions for Karine T. Philips

  • Confirm your role and assignment to LAPD Topanga Division during 2017 and your precise role in 7VW04099.
  • Were you a member of Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills or a related Facebook group? On what dates and under what account?
  • Did you view any post concerning Kevin Perelman, his vehicle, TARGETD plate, cards, website, alleged littering, residence, or court case?
  • Did Sean Dinse or another officer provide you information about Perelman that originated from Facebook or a law-enforcement database?
  • Did you know that prosecution witnesses or complainants were communicating with police or one another in a private Facebook group about Perelman?
  • What disclosures were made to defense counsel concerning those relationships or communications?
  • What was the source of any mental-health, dangerousness, paranoia, psychiatric, or competency characterization appearing in the prosecution?
  • Did criticism of Dinse/LAPD or Perelman’s website/cards play any role in charging, plea, sentencing, or probation positions?

Questions for Civilian Witnesses / Group Administrators

  1. Who authored the August 2017 “Mr. Perelman” post, and why was the group told to notice his plate?
  2. Was Perelman’s location or court schedule posted or discussed? By whom?
  3. Who supplied any criminal-history, address, DMV, mental-health, or other nonpublic information?
  4. Did any officer or prosecutor ask members to photograph, follow, report, confront, or repeatedly call police about Perelman?
  5. Did members coordinate narratives before making police reports or giving testimony?
  6. Was Perelman referred to as homeless/transient despite having a residence? Who originated that characterization?
  7. Were members aware that Perelman’s materials criticized Dinse or LAPD, and did that criticism affect how members treated him?

XII. Statements That Should Not Be Overstated

For credibility with civil-rights counsel, courts, and journalists, the following propositions should not be stated as established unless additional evidence is obtained:

  • “Karine Philips is a criminal.” The current public record reviewed here does not establish a criminal conviction or public professional discipline.
  • “Philips ordered Crimebusters members to stalk or assault Perelman.” No Philips-authored instruction of that kind was located.
  • “Philips and Dinse conspired to force Perelman into a mental institution.” The public sources do not establish that proposition.
  • “CARE Court explains what happened in 2017.” CARE Court did not exist until 2022/2023.
  • “Every Crimebusters member endorsed violent rhetoric.” Group membership does not prove agreement with all posts.
  • “The Dinse database screenshot definitely contains Perelman’s record.” The surviving complaint text strongly suggests that connection through figure cross-references, but the original figures must be authenticated.
  • “The 2018 complaint proves every allegation it contains.” It is evidence that serious allegations were made contemporaneously by identified civil-rights organizations; allegations still require proof.

Using precise language—“documents show,” “the complaint alleged,” “the Times reported,” “Perelman states,” “the figure cross-reference appears to show,” and “counsel should authenticate”—makes the dossier stronger and more publishable.

XIII. Attorney-Facing Assessment

The public evidence already establishes a nontrivial reason to investigate the relationship among Perelman’s 2017 case, Sean Dinse, Karine Philips, and the Crimebusters network. Philips was Topanga’s officially assigned Neighborhood Prosecutor. Dinse was a Topanga Senior Lead Officer. Private Facebook groups with active/retired LAPD participation tracked specific people and became the subject of a multi-organization California Attorney General complaint. Independent reporting later documented Dinse’s use of those groups and a federal civil-rights lawsuit accusing him of location sharing, pretextual removal, vehicle enforcement, and mental-illness/addiction labeling.[2]

The Perelman-specific material is what elevates the matter beyond general contextual similarity. A contemporaneous complaint describes a “Mr. Perelman” in August 2017, an alleged littering event, photos of his belongings and vehicle, and an instruction to notice his license plate. The reproduced complaint then appears to connect that littering complaint to an allegation that Dinse posted information from a law-enforcement database. If the original appendix confirms that Figure 7 displayed Kevin Perelman’s information, the result would be a direct, contemporaneous public-record allegation tying Dinse’s official information access to a private-group discussion of Perelman during the same year as 7VW04099.[8]

The next legal question is therefore concrete: Did information generated or circulated through Dinse, Crimebusters members, Topanga personnel, or complaining witnesses reach Philips or otherwise affect charging, evidence, witnesses, mental-health characterizations, plea positions, or court representations in 7VW04099? That question can be investigated through primary records and does not require acceptance of any broader theory.

If the answer is no, the records should demonstrate that separation. If the answer is yes, counsel can then determine whether the communications were lawful and disclosed, whether they reveal witness bias or fabrication, whether protected speech played a role, and whether any constitutional, discovery, ethical, or civil-rights issue follows.

XIV. Publication-Safe Capsule Summary

Public records place Deputy City Attorney Karine T. Philips as LAPD Topanga Division’s Neighborhood Prosecutor years before Kevin Perelman’s 2017 case, while Sean Dinse served as a Topanga Senior Lead Officer. In 2018, homelessness and civil-rights organizations complained to the California Attorney General about private West Valley Facebook groups involving LAPD personnel, alleging that the groups tracked people, circulated sensitive information, and facilitated harassment. A surviving copy of that complaint specifically describes an August 2017 post telling members to “notice Mr. Perelman’s license plate” after accusing him of littering, and it appears to cross-reference the same incident to an allegation that Dinse posted law-enforcement database information. The original appendix should be authenticated before treating that cross-reference as conclusive.[8]

Later independent reporting and a federal civil-rights lawsuit documented similar allegations concerning Dinse and another man, Rex Schellenberg, including location sharing, repeated vehicle enforcement, and a disputed “drug addiction/mental illness” label. Philips was later reported as a member of the same Facebook-group environment, but no public evidence located here proves that she authored threatening posts, fabricated psychiatric information, or conspired with Dinse. The central unanswered question is whether group activity or police-supplied information crossed into Perelman’s 2017 prosecution and whether any such relationship was disclosed to the defense.

Source Notes and Reliability Guide

URLs were accessed or re-verified on October 4, 2026. Primary/official sources should be preferred for courtroom use. Advocacy and mirrored materials are useful investigative leads but should be authenticated through originals, archived copies, custodians, or discovery where possible.

[1] State Bar of California, Attorney Profile: Karine T. Philips #186645. Official licensing record; current status and public discipline history. Source link

[2] Van Nuys Neighborhood Council, “Neighborhood Prosecutors” (June 2014). Contemporaneous list assigning Karine Philips to LAPD Topanga Division and a different prosecutor to Van Nuys/North Hollywood. Source link

[3] Office of the L.A. City Attorney / Nextdoor, “Welcome Message from the Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor” (May 4, 2015). Philips’s own description of herself as Topanga Neighborhood Prosecutor and of her quality-of-life/public-safety mission. Source link

[4] LAist/KPCC, “LA neighborhoods get prosecutors for graffiti, prostitution, other ‘broken windows’ crimes” (2014). Contemporaneous description of Neighborhood Prosecutor program and its quality-of-life / broken-windows focus. Source link

[5] West Hills Neighborhood Council minutes (2014). Records Philips presenting the Neighborhood Justice Program as an alternative for low-level offenses. Source link

[6] Canoga Park Neighborhood Council minutes (Jan. 28, 2015). Identifies Philips as Deputy City Attorney and Neighborhood Prosecutor at LAPD Topanga Station. Source link

[7] ACLU of Southern California, Outside the Law: The Legal War Against Unhoused People (2021), endnotes 105–108. Independent provenance for the Knock LA, KTown for All, LA Magazine, and 2018 California Attorney General complaint materials. Source link

[8] Surviving reproduction of KTown for All article and 2018 California Attorney General complaint materials. Secondary/mirrored source. Important for the text describing “Mr. Perelman,” Figure 12, and alleged Dinse law-enforcement database disclosure; original appendix should be authenticated before litigation use. Source link

[9] Knock LA, “West San Fernando Valley Residents Take to Facebook To Stalk, Harass and Terrorize the Homeless…” (Aug. 12, 2019). Advocacy journalism concerning Crimebusters groups, Dinse/Rygh, alleged privileged information, tracking, and group administration. Source link

[10] Los Angeles Magazine, “Homeless Advocates Criticize Cops for Being Members of Private Facebook Groups” (Aug. 14, 2019). Independent reporting on leaked screenshots, violent/harassing rhetoric in groups, Dinse’s use of the groups, and LAPD response. Source link

[11] Los Angeles Times, “Homelessness isn’t huge in this part of L.A. — but it’s a huge campaign issue” (May 6, 2019). Reports Dinse’s public mental-illness/addiction framing and the existence of the Attorney General complaint. Source link

[12] Los Angeles Times, “Homeless man sues L.A. over police’s use of Facebook pages” (Feb. 11, 2020). Reports Rex Schellenberg’s civil-rights allegations against Dinse, including location sharing, pretextual removal, towing, and “drug addiction/mental illness” characterization. Source link

[13] Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles et al., No. 2:20-cv-01313 (C.D. Cal.), Justia docket. Confirms filing date, Dinse as named defendant, civil-rights nature, and 42 U.S.C. §1983 cause of action. Source link

[14] LAPD, Topanga Community Police Station. Current LAPD page identifying Topanga communities and Sean Dinse as a Senior Lead Officer. Source link

[15] CBS Los Angeles, “Officer Helps Homeless Mom And Daughter” (July 12, 2017). Countervailing evidence showing Dinse assisting a homeless mother and daughter and using social media to obtain help. Source link

[16] Winnetka Neighborhood Council agenda (Jan. 10, 2023). Shows Philips later providing City Attorney input on park-hours issues adjacent to discussion of LAMC §41.18 public-right-of-way enforcement. Source link

[17] Governor of California, “Governor Newsom Signs CARE Court Into Law…” (Sept. 14, 2022). Official enactment chronology for SB 1338 / CARE Act. Source link

[18] Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, CARE Court Information and Resources. Current LA County description of eligibility, voluntary participation, legal representation, and distinction from LPS conservatorship. Source link

[19] Los Angeles City Council Motion 23-0447 (Apr. 25, 2023). Official city motion directing investigation of the City’s role in CARE Court with City Attorney assistance. Source link

[20] LAPD, “Statement On Email Related To The ‘Care Plus’ Clean-Up” (June 28, 2023). Later Topanga institutional statement that enforcement should not be based solely on homeless status; not evidence about Dinse or Philips personally. Source link

A minor 2013 sidewalk dispute did not end when every charge was dismissed. It became the entry point for a police–mental-health system whose records, labels, and relationships reappeared across later arrests, neighborhood encounters, probation material, and appellate proceedings.

This investigation is based on Kevin Perelman’s firsthand account together with court records, police documents, recordings, photographs, public statements, and published reporting. Its central question is how reports of stalking, provocation, threats, and assaults were repeatedly converted into information about Perelman himself—and how psychiatric language became a shortcut for ignoring the behavior he was reporting.

The Official Version of CAMP

The Los Angeles Police Department’s Case Assessment Management Program—properly abbreviated CAMP, not CAM—was created in 2005 as a component of LAPD’s Mental Evaluation Unit, or MEU.

LAPD describes CAMP as a long-term follow-up program for people who repeatedly come to police attention or whom police consider potentially at elevated risk. CAMP pairs police detectives with psychologists, nurses, and social workers from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health. Its stated goals are to reduce repeated emergency contacts, connect people with services, and prevent violent encounters.

The federal Bureau of Justice Assistance describes CAMP more directly: it exists to identify, track, and develop individualized long-term intervention strategies for people who frequently come into contact with MEU. Bureau of Justice Assistance

An earlier LAPD outline used the words “identify, monitor, and engage.” It stated that CAMP received approximately 15 to 20 new cases each week and that its “cases never close.” At that rate, roughly 780 to 1,040 new cases could enter the system in a year. CAMP was therefore not a small, occasional crisis program; it was a continuing police–mental-health information system capable of carrying names, reports, family statements, behavioral descriptions, and psychiatric characterizations forward indefinitely.

A 2010 Department of Justice–sponsored study described how a person could enter CAMP without requesting the program or signing an agreement. Referrals could come from LAPD officers, detectives, SMART teams, school police, the Los Angeles Fire Department, or Department of Mental Health personnel. A psychologist could examine police-contact and mental-health information and decide whether the person qualified.

The same study described three levels:

  1. Active management by police and mental-health personnel.
  2. Periodic monitoring, including weekly telephone calls or monthly visits by a detective.
  3. An inactive or filed stage after the person was considered stable.

The study did not identify the subject’s signature as a prerequisite for police tracking or case creation. DOJ/BJA study

CAMP therefore is not simply a voluntary counseling program. It is a police-controlled information and case-management system operating at the intersection of law enforcement, mental-health services, family reports, community complaints, and repeated police contacts.

The Difference Between the Official Mission and Operational Reality

Government programs are ordinarily described through their lawful mission rather than every power their structure makes possible.

The National Security Agency, for example, publicly describes its work in terms of foreign intelligence and national security. That statement alone does not tell the public what data is collected, retained, searched, combined, or disseminated. Those questions require technical records, audits, access logs, court orders, and whistleblower disclosures.

CAMP raises a similar—not identical—oversight issue.

A system capable of identifying, tracking, monitoring, and engaging people over long periods can be used constructively. But it can also produce serious harm if:

  • Police accept false reports without verification.
  • Personal hostility is translated into a mental-health concern.
  • Family members supply unsupported psychiatric labels.
  • Community members repeatedly report an identified person.
  • Constitutionally protected speech is characterized as instability.
  • Dismissed allegations remain in a police database.
  • One original accusation is copied into numerous later reports.
  • Officers approach later encounters already expecting irrational or dangerous behavior.
  • Reactions to harassment are documented while the preceding harassment is omitted.
  • Lay opinions become treated as clinical findings.
  • Police and clinicians exchange information without meaningful notice to the person concerned.
  • Old characterizations are carried into later arrests, probation reports, sentencing, appeals, or CARE Act proceedings.

This can create a self-reinforcing narrative:

A community member makes an allegation. Police document it as a mental-health concern. MEU records it. CAMP sees a history of police and mental-health contacts. Later officers are warned about that history. Their observations are then interpreted through the warning. The resulting report appears to corroborate the original allegation, even though every layer originated from the same unverified source.

A police record is not a diagnosis. Repetition does not transform an allegation into medical evidence. Yet once CAMP assigns a person to continuing case management, later behavior can be interpreted through the label already attached to the file: ordinary disagreement becomes agitation, self-protection becomes paranoia, and resistance to unlawful conduct becomes supposed proof that intervention must continue. The classification can therefore manufacture the behavior it claims merely to observe.

Kevin Perelman Did Not Ask to Join CAMP

Kevin Perelman did not approach LAPD in 2013 requesting mental-health case management, psychological evaluation, or CAMP monitoring.

He was asking police to investigate and stop crimes, threats, provocations, harassment, and community activity that he was reporting against him.

According to Perelman, the plea process reversed those roles. Rather than investigating whether community members and police-connected groups were provoking and falsely reporting him, the justice system inserted CAMP into a diversion arrangement and treated Perelman as the person requiring management.

Perelman’s position is straightforward:

“I did not ask for CAMP. I asked police officers to stop crimes against me.”

The distinction is fundamental. Asking law enforcement for protection is not consent to psychiatric monitoring.

The 2013 Arrest and Five Charges

The 2013 case arose from encounters involving My Brother’s Barbecue and a nearby public sidewalk, but the sign addressed a broader pattern Kevin had experienced at restaurants and other public businesses: repeated instigation, harassment, and attempts to provoke reactions that could be portrayed as obsession, paranoia, violence, or mental illness.

Perelman states that he had previously entered the restaurant, purchased food, paid his bill, and left. He says no one told him that he was prohibited from returning and no lawful trespass warning was served.

On a later date, Perelman sat outside on a public sidewalk with a small sign reading:

“Smeared for Creating Art.”

There was no homeless encampment. The sidewalk was quiet and lightly traveled—not a crowded commercial walkway—and the small sign did not block pedestrian traffic or occupy the restaurant’s private property. A minor sidewalk encounter was nevertheless dramatized into multiple allegations and then expanded into a five-count case, functioning like a Trojan horse into CAMP and MEU involvement.

The newly obtained courthouse minute orders now establish precisely how the case expanded.

At the July 5, 2013 arraignment, the filed complaint contained two misdemeanor counts:

  • Count 1: Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18(d).
  • Count 2: Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18(a).

The minute order identifies Citation No. 02085 but does not reproduce the physical citation or establish which offense Jensen wrote on it. It also lists Deputy Public Defender Anna Brief at the July 5 arraignment. Kevin never retained or knowingly worked with a public defender; he hired Jonathan Franklin immediately. The unexplained Anna Brief entry is therefore a discrepancy in the court record, not part of Kevin’s actual attorney relationship.

On August 19, 2013, Perelman was not present. Jonathan Franklin appeared for him under Penal Code §977. On the prosecution’s motion, Judge Shellie Samuels ordered the complaint amended “by interlineation” to add three more misdemeanor counts:

  • Count 3: Penal Code §602(k).
  • Count 4: Penal Code §242.
  • Count 5: Penal Code §602(k).

Franklin entered not-guilty pleas to those three added counts on Perelman’s behalf. The record therefore confirms that counts 3 through 5 were added later, at the prosecution’s request, while Perelman was absent.

Perelman states that the two trespasses never occurred because he was outside on a public sidewalk and had never been told during his earlier paid visits that he was barred from the restaurant.

He likewise disputes the allegation that he threw a business card at anyone. Even as described by police, the allegation involved a lightweight card rather than an instrument reasonably capable of producing the grave harm later implied by the accumulation of charges.

Perelman says Officer Jensen approached him about leaving the sidewalk. Perelman was prepared to leave but first asked for Jensen’s badge number because the officer appeared unconcerned about the provocations and harassment Perelman was reporting. Jensen responded by issuing the misdemeanor citation. The newly produced records show that the final three allegations were not all placed on that citation at the scene; they were added to the court complaint later on the prosecution’s motion.

LAPD Officer Charles “Sean” Dinse was involved in the 2013 police activity. Perelman identifies this as Dinse’s first visible appearance in a series of later cases and community-policing events involving him.

On September 26, 2013, Perelman entered a no-contest plea to count 1, §41.18(d). The court entered an interim finding of guilt. Counts 2, 3, and 4 were dismissed under Penal Code §1385, while count 5 remained pending.

The court’s case history expressly states:

“THIS IS A CONDITIONAL PLEA (SEE WRITTEN AGREEMENT IN FILE).”

The matter was continued for a March 26, 2014 progress report and a September 26, 2014 probation-and-sentencing hearing.

On September 26, 2014, the court granted Perelman’s motion to withdraw the plea and ordered the plea vacated. Counts 1 and 5 were dismissed under Penal Code §1385. The prosecution moved to dismiss the case “pursuant to the original plea agreement,” the motion was granted, and the proceedings were terminated.

The final legal result was therefore not a surviving conviction. The no-contest plea and interim finding on count 1 were withdrawn and vacated, every count was dismissed, and the entire case was terminated. On December 5, 2014, an arrest-disposition report was transmitted electronically to the California Department of Justice.

Officer Jeffrey Christopher Jensen: Identity, Public Record, and the 2013 Citation

Jeffrey Christopher Jensen is identified in public LAPD-roster, California POST, payroll, and officer-profile compilations as LAPD Serial No. 37340. The public profile reviewed for this reconstruction lists badge No. 19909 as of September 2024, the rank of Police Officer II, a December 13, 2004 hiring date, POST ID B75-W87, and a Topanga Division assignment as recently as April 2025. Assignments and badge numbers can change; the serial number is the more reliable identifier for records requests.

What Public Records Show—and What They Do Not

A broad public search did not uncover an accessible sustained disciplinary finding or individualized Brady disclosure for Jensen. That absence is not a clean bill of health: police complaints, nonsustained allegations, confidential personnel files, settlements, and unindexed matters frequently do not appear in ordinary searches.

A commercial Giglio-Brady profile reports no previously disclosed Brady material for Jensen. The point is not that the website proves misconduct; it shows readers where officer-credibility disclosures may be catalogued and why the underlying agencies—not a commercial index—must answer whether impeachment material exists.

Jensen’s Disputed Role in the 2013 Incident

Perelman identifies Jensen as the officer who approached him during the restaurant and public-sidewalk episode underlying Case No. 3PY03498. Perelman states that he was on a public sidewalk displaying the sign “Smeared for Creating Art,” was prepared to leave, and requested Jensen’s badge or identifying information because Jensen appeared unconcerned about the provocations and harassment Perelman was reporting. According to Perelman, the identification dispute was followed by Jensen issuing misdemeanor Citation No. 02085.

The recovered court record establishes that the filed case began with two municipal-code counts and later expanded, on the prosecution’s motion while Perelman was absent, to include two Penal Code §602(k) trespass counts and one Penal Code §242 battery count. The minute orders do not reproduce the physical citation or establish which offenses Jensen placed on it. The no-contest plea and interim finding were later withdrawn and vacated; all five counts were dismissed under Penal Code §1385 and the proceedings were terminated on September 26, 2014.

The sequence makes Jensen’s conduct central to the story. A dispute on a quiet sidewalk began with a citation and later grew into five counts. The public record does not show that Jensen personally created every added allegation, but it places his police contact at the front of the chain that ultimately led to Franklin’s plea arrangement and CAMP.

Jonathan Franklin and the Unexplained CAMP Provision

Kevin hired private attorney Jonathan Franklin immediately after the case began.

Franklin made a categorical statement that defined the defense he would not provide:

“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer.”

That statement goes to the center of Franklin’s representation. Perelman hired a defense lawyer because police conduct, witness coordination, and community provocation were the defense—not side issues. A lawyer who refuses at the outset to criticize an officer has already removed the client’s central explanation from the case.

Franklin failed to investigate the behavior at the center of the defense:

  • Whether Perelman had actually been told to leave the restaurant.
  • Whether Perelman was on private property when police arrived.
  • Whether the sidewalk was obstructed.
  • Whether the business-card allegation occurred.
  • Whether restaurant employees supplied false or coordinated statements.
  • Whether officers padded a minor sidewalk encounter with unsupported charges.
  • Whether community provocations preceded the police contact.
  • Whether Dinse and Jensen had prior information or motives affecting their response.

Whether community members intentionally placed Kevin in confrontations he tried to avoid, creating self-defense and witness-impeachment issues.

Whether a private investigator could have documented provocation, motive, malice, police involvement, and the coordinated creation of a misleading paper trail.

During one restaurant encounter, an employee reportedly initiated an unsolicited and cryptic discussion stating that people should not post businesses on Yelp. Perelman had not mentioned Yelp. He understood the statement as either an attempt to provoke a reaction or an indirect warning not to report the restaurant’s treatment of him.

Rather than investigate that context, the plea process introduced CAMP. Franklin represented that the arrangement would work with Kevin to stop the community-harassment groups, then supplied a CAMP contact number connected to psychological evaluation. The promised investigation of the reported actors became assessment of the reporting person. Franklin accepted private payment while refusing to challenge the police conduct that formed the core of his client’s defense.

The newly recovered paperwork makes the nondisclosure issue more concrete. Perelman signed page 3 of the standard PRU-200 misdemeanor plea form. That page records the no-contest plea to count 1 and contains Franklin’s attorney certification. A complete blank PRU-200, Revision 1-2013, confirms that CAMP is not part of the standard four-page form.

The surviving signed PRU-200 does not:

  • Mention CAMP.
  • Describe CAMP’s police–mental-health purpose.
  • Authorize a mental-health evaluation.
  • Provide consent for mental-health case management.
  • Explain information collection, retention, or disclosure.
  • Identify CAMP participation as a condition of the plea.
  • State that CAMP officers would substitute for ordinary criminal investigators.

The court’s own records nevertheless describe the disposition as a conditional plea governed by a separate “written agreement in file.” The transcript separately discusses CAMP and records Judge Samuels incorporating an unidentified “second sheet” into the sentencing sheet.

Neither the separate written agreement nor the second sheet appears in the courthouse production. The existing evidence therefore does not establish that Perelman placed his signature on a document expressly agreeing to CAMP. It establishes that he signed a general PRU-200 plea form while a separate conditional agreement existed outside that signed form.

No separate CAMP agreement was disclosed or explained to Kevin and no copy was provided. A later comparison with a complete blank PRU-200 confirmed that the ordinary missing form page contained routine checkboxes and was not the substantive mystery. The unresolved documents are the separate “written agreement in file” and the transcript’s unidentified “second sheet.” If Kevin signed or accepted any additional term, it followed a discussion he says misrepresented CAMP as help against harassment rather than police–mental-health management of him.

The missing transcript and agreement leave the public without answers to basic questions:

  • Who first requested CAMP.
  • What Franklin told Perelman privately.
  • What the prosecutor represented.
  • What Judge Shelly Samuels said.
  • Whether CAMP was described as voluntary.
  • Whether information sharing was explained.
  • Whether the arrangement required an evaluation.
  • What the signed PRU-200 authorized and what, if anything, was separately authorized by the missing written agreement.
  • Whether police assistance was offered as an inducement.
  • Whether Perelman’s agreement was knowing and informed.

Franklin’s signed attorney statement is material because it states that counsel reviewed the plea form and any addenda, explained the consequences, discussed the facts and possible defenses, answered the defendant’s questions, and concurred in the plea and waiver. That certification must be reconciled with the missing written agreement, the unidentified second sheet, the absence of CAMP language from the signed PRU-200, and Perelman’s statement that CAMP was not disclosed to him as the substitute for the investigative assistance he requested.

Judge Shelly Samuels and the Missing Context

The March 26, 2014 hearing was a six-month progress review within a twelve-month conditional disposition: the plea was entered September 26, 2013, the progress hearing occurred March 26, 2014, and the plea was withdrawn and every remaining count dismissed September 26, 2014. At the midpoint hearing, Judge Samuels discussed whether Kevin was “doing well,” asked, “Can you do it for 12 months?” and then, “Can you then do it for the rest of your life?” When Kevin asked, “Do I have the civil rights to make that decision?” Samuels answered, “No, you don’t have civil rights to break the law.”

A letter from therapist Karine Echigian was dated March 25, 2014—one day before that progress hearing—and documented sessions that had begun May 13, 2013, before the criminal case was filed. The timing strongly indicates that the letter was prepared or obtained for the court’s progress review. The surviving record does not show whether therapy was a formal condition, an informal expectation, or material Franklin voluntarily presented to show Kevin was “doing well.” Because the separate conditional agreement and unidentified second sheet have not been produced, the record cannot rule out a separately documented therapy requirement.

The transcript still does not identify with precision what “it” meant. The formal March 26 minute order states only that the matter remained on calendar as previously set. It does not identify a treatment condition, CAMP requirement, prohibited conduct, or specific law under discussion.

The exchange is troubling because Perelman’s reference to civil rights was immediately reframed as though he were claiming a right to commit crimes. The later September 26, 2014 order is also critical: the plea was withdrawn and vacated, the remaining counts were dismissed, and the entire case was terminated.

The significance of the exchange is not limited to proving the private meaning of one remark. The court used indefinite language without identifying what Perelman was expected to do for life, what law he was supposedly threatening to violate, or whether “it” included continued CAMP contact or police–mental-health management. When Perelman raised civil rights, the court substituted accusation for clarification.

Within the broader chronology presented here, the exchange supports the inference that the proceeding was being used to obtain submission to an institutional narrative rather than to examine the reported police and community misconduct. Perelman’s interpretation is that the lifelong expectation was continued monitoring, provocation, selective documentation, and psychiatric labeling until authorities obtained the result they wanted. The missing written agreement, unidentified second sheet, CAMP records, and complete transcript are therefore central evidence, not peripheral paperwork.

The unresolved questions include whether:

  • “It” referred to completing the twelve-month conditional arrangement.
  • The question concerned ordinary compliance with law.
  • The question concerned CAMP contact, case management, treatment, or another undisclosed term.
  • Perelman was attempting to preserve his right to object to police misconduct and constitutional violations.
  • The judge understood CAMP’s actual function.
  • The missing written agreement would identify the condition being discussed.

Perelman has now obtained additional minute orders from the courthouse. Those records confirm the conditional plea and complete dismissal, but they do not include the separate “written agreement in file” or the transcript’s unidentified second sheet. The production includes page 1 and a largely blank page labeled page 3 of the September 26, 2013 formal minute order, without an identifiable page 2. The absence of these documents prevents full examination of what was agreed concerning CAMP, mental health, police assistance, and the later civil-rights exchange.

The Assistance Perelman Requested Never Materialized

Perelman says he agreed to diversion because he believed LAPD would provide a legitimate contact who could help address the community harassment and repeated provocations he was reporting.

Instead, he received telephone numbers and what he describes as approximately one meaningful telephone contact. Police did not investigate the larger network he was reporting, did not stop the community activity, and did not provide a detective willing to examine evidence against the reporting parties.

The new courthouse records confirm that the plea was expressly conditional, but the document defining those conditions is missing. This makes the promised assistance more than a collateral misunderstanding: police assistance may have been part of the consideration inducing the plea, while the actual mechanism supplied was CAMP rather than criminal investigation.

The distinction is operationally fundamental. A criminal investigator receives reports, interviews witnesses, preserves evidence, identifies suspects, evaluates probable cause, and investigates whether an offense occurred. CAMP identifies, assesses, monitors, engages, refers, and manages the person selected for police–mental-health attention. Calling both arrangements “police assistance” conceals the difference between investigating crimes reported by Perelman and assessing Perelman himself.

The substitution worked like this:

Perelman requests investigation of crimes against him
                         ↓
Police and counsel redirect the matter into CAMP
                         ↓
Community allegations become information about Perelman
                         ↓
Police do not investigate whether those allegations were fabricated
                         ↓
Mental-health management replaces criminal investigation

The unanswered question is no longer whether the visible PRU-200 signature mentions CAMP; it does not. The unanswered questions are what the missing conditional agreement contained, whether it mentioned CAMP, whether Perelman saw or signed it, and whether it purported to authorize broader police–mental-health information exchange.

The Public Directive to “Deem” Kevin Perelman Mentally Ill

A preserved, annotated screenshot shows a June 14, 2017 Quora response attributed to Jennifer Pilchick Perelman. She is Kevin Perelman’s sister-in-law and the wife of his brother, not an unrelated online commenter. The page identifies her as holding a Juris Doctor from St. Mary’s University School of Law. Federal Election Commission records identify Jennifer Pilchick Perelman as a Democratic candidate for the United States House of Representatives in Florida District 23 during the 2020 election cycle and Florida District 25 during the 2024 cycle.

“Kevin is my brother-in-law and yes he’s mentally ill. He has written off our entire family, thinking we’re all out to get him. My husband hasn’t spoken to his brother in 7 years and my mother-in-law does the best she can to prevent him from being homeless. We are aware of his antics and that he must be deemed ‘the crazy guy’ in Woodland Hills. Unfortunately, there’s nothing that his family can do legally. But there is absolutely no reasoning with him.”

The key words are “must be deemed.” This was not phrased as private concern or a request for treatment. It was a public directive to establish an identity: Kevin must become “the crazy guy” in Woodland Hills. Once that identity is accepted, reports of stalking become “paranoia,” objections become “instability,” and reactions to provocation become supposed proof of the label. The behavior causing the damage disappears; only Kevin’s response remains visible.

Political, Legal, and Network Resources

Jennifer Pilchick Perelman was Kevin’s sister-in-law, an attorney, and later a two-time congressional candidate. Those positions gave her statement more apparent authority and access to legal, political, media, professional, and community networks than an anonymous commenter. Her residence in Florida sharpens the public-interest question: why was a relative across the continent working to establish Kevin’s psychiatric identity in a California neighborhood when she and Kevin had never had a substantive dialogue about the behavior being directed at him? “There is absolutely no reasoning with him” described a conversation that never occurred.

The stated purpose was “help,” but the asserted remedy was loss of credibility, control, property, freedom, or institutionalization. That contradiction creates the motive question at the center of the family narrative: why devote distant legal and social resources to removing someone from ordinary life rather than speak directly with him or investigate what he was reporting?

The Credibility-Neutralization Conspiracy

The evidence is presented as a continuing conspiracy rather than a collection of isolated psychiatric remarks. Its method is to monitor Perelman, provoke or engineer encounters, omit the precipitating conduct, preserve only his reactions, circulate psychiatric labels, and then use those labels to discredit his reports of the conduct directed against him. The label becomes both the weapon and the cover-up. Reports of misconduct are reframed as paranoia; constitutional objections become instability; and reactions to provocation are offered as supposed confirmation of the original label.

Kevin traces the false labeling to early childhood, decades before CAMP existed. In his account, the system did not discover a psychiatric problem; it inherited a family narrative, amplified it through friends and community contacts, and eventually placed it inside police, mental-health, prosecution, probation, and court channels. The people claiming to “help” were simultaneously creating the damage used to justify more intervention.

Claimed Family, Court-Reporting, Property, and Police Hierarchy

The reported hierarchy begins with family monitoring and communications, extends through Jason and Jennifer Pilchick Perelman’s labeling, her father’s connection to the court-reporting business, and court reporter Debbie Wollman’s purchase of property adjoining a wall of Kevin’s residence despite not occupying it. Wollman was a Van Nuys courthouse employee during the period surrounding the 2017 arrests and proceedings. Video records Wollman pressing psychiatric labels and attempting to discourage Kevin from going to the courthouse—a striking intervention when attendance was necessary to defend the criminal cases. These relationships supplied pathways through which family allegations, observations, recordings, and psychiatric labels could move into neighborhood, police, court-reporting, and court networks.

This hierarchy becomes directly relevant to Dinse because his publicly documented neighborhood-policing model connected residents, businesses, homeowners’ associations, Facebook and Nextdoor groups, neighborhood watch participants, and LAPD resources. The question is whether the family-generated label or substantially identical language entered those networks and was then used to solicit monitoring, calls for service, business exclusions, confrontations, welfare checks, arrests, CAMP or MEU referrals, probation narratives, or later court action.

The supplied screenshot directly establishes the public statement and Perelman’s contemporaneous annotations. The remaining links should be established through records rather than assumed from proximity alone. That requires examination of:

  • Communications among Perelman’s brother, Jennifer Pilchick Perelman, her father, Debbie Wollman, Dinse, Jensen, LAPD, CAMP or MEU personnel, prosecutors, defense lawyers, court personnel, and neighborhood groups.
  • Certified property, assessor, escrow, lease, utility, and occupancy records for the property adjoining Perelman’s residence.
  • Court-reporter licensing, employment, assignment, invoice, calendar, transcript-access, and conflict-disclosure records.
  • Evidence showing whether audio, video, telephone, internet, location, or other information was collected from or transmitted concerning Perelman’s residence.
  • The first appearance of the phrases “mentally ill,” “crazy guy,” “schizophrenia,” “paranoia,” “no reasoning with him,” or equivalent language in family, neighborhood, police, CAMP, MEU, prosecutorial, probation, appellate, or court records.
  • Whether any recipient treated Jennifer Pilchick Perelman’s status as a lawyer, family member, or congressional candidate as validation of an otherwise unsupported psychiatric assertion.

Annotated screenshot supplied by Kevin Perelman. The quoted Quora response is the underlying source material; the red annotations state Perelman’s interpretation and identify additional relationships requiring documentary verification.

Charles “Sean” Dinse and Internet-Connected Neighborhood Policing

Dinse is not merely an officer whose name appears in Perelman’s cases.

He is an LAPD Senior Lead Officer assigned to Topanga Division. LAPD currently lists him as the Senior Lead Officer for Basic Car 21A43. LAPD Topanga Division

In a 2014 official LAPD Nextdoor post, Dinse described himself as responsible for monitoring crime trends, “quality of life,” and Neighborhood Watch. He stated that numerous local watch groups used Facebook and other communication systems. He wanted Nextdoor to become his primary communication network while he continued communicating through Facebook. Dinse’s Nextdoor statement

That establishes a deliberate internet-connected police-community structure:

Residents, businesses and HOAs
                ↕
Neighborhood-watch groups
                ↕
Facebook and Nextdoor
                ↕
Senior Lead Officer Dinse
                ↕
Topanga Division and LAPD resources

The structure does not make every participant a police agent. It does show that Dinse intentionally connected community groups, gathered information from them, and distributed police-related information through online networks.

Crimebusters and Anti-Homeless Facebook Groups

Dinse reportedly participated in two private Facebook groups:

  • “Crimebusters of West Hills and Woodland Hills”
  • “Homeless Transient Encampments of Our West Valley”

Los Angeles Magazine reported that Dinse regularly used the groups to gather information about encampments and track specific unhoused individuals. Los Angeles Magazine

Knock LA reported that the groups included current and former officers, LAPD volunteers, neighborhood-watch participants, and community members. Members reportedly posted photographs, locations, personal property, allegations, and strategies for removing unhoused people. Some comments advocated violence or destruction of property. Knock LA

L.A. Taco reported that Dinse rejoined one group after LAPD leadership reportedly instructed officers not to participate. L.A. Taco

These reports are relevant because they independently document the type of digitally coordinated police-community activity Perelman says affected him.

Rex Schellenberg’s Federal Civil-Rights Lawsuit

Rex Schellenberg, an elderly unhoused man who slept in or near his vehicle, filed a federal civil-rights case against Dinse and the City of Los Angeles:

Rex Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles, Sean Dinse, et al. Central District of California Case No. 2:20-cv-01313 Filed February 10, 2020 Cause of action: 42 U.S.C. §1983

The federal docket confirms Dinse was personally named as a defendant. Federal docket

According to the complaint as reported by the Los Angeles Times, Dinse allegedly:

  • Shared information about where Schellenberg was staying.
  • Encouraged residents to contact police.
  • Used resulting calls as a pretext for police intervention.
  • Shared sensitive and erroneous personal information.
  • Suggested Schellenberg had lost housing because of “drug addiction/mental illness.”
  • Targeted Schellenberg’s van for repeated towing.
  • Used online groups to monitor Schellenberg’s location and activity.

Schellenberg denied suffering from drug addiction or mental illness beyond the understandable stress and trauma of homelessness. Los Angeles Times

The accessible docket does not establish a final judicial finding against Dinse. The allegations nevertheless provide an independently documented parallel:

  • An identified person in public space.
  • Community members photographing and reporting him.
  • A police officer gathering and circulating information.
  • Unsupported mental-illness labeling.
  • Repeated enforcement contacts.
  • Efforts to remove the person or his property.
  • A resulting federal §1983 lawsuit.

Sleeping in a vehicle or being disliked by a neighborhood is not, by itself, proof of criminal conduct or mental illness.

The Bailey Bernard Incident: When the Caller Became the Accused

The Bailey Bernard incident shows the alleged operation in human terms. Perelman says Bernard followed him approximately 600 feet toward his home, screamed at him, demanded, “Is this where you live?” and struck the keys from his hand as Perelman entered the gate to his residential complex. A fight followed. Perelman called 911 and then drove to the police station seeking help.

The case nevertheless cast Perelman as the aggressor. The central evidence should have been straightforward: who followed whom, who initiated contact at the gate, who knocked away the keys, what the 911 recording showed, and what officers were told at the station. Instead, Perelman says the preexisting mental-health narrative allowed police and prosecutors to accept Bernard’s cover story and discount the report of the person who called for help.

Mental illness—real or invented—does not erase a person’s right to report a crime. Yet that is the practical effect Perelman describes: label the reporting person paranoid, treat the opposing account as inherently credible, and use the resulting prosecution as new “proof” that the label was correct.

Perelman’s Three Arrests and Three Criminal Proceedings

Perelman identifies Dinse as connected to three arrests and three criminal proceedings beginning in 2013 and continuing through the 2017 and 2023 matters.

He characterizes the proceedings as constitutionally defective because the courts repeatedly addressed his reactions while excluding or suppressing evidence concerning the preceding assaults, threats, provocations, community activity, police relationships, and allegedly false reports.

Among the events Perelman says were ignored or buried were:

  • A woman attempting to attack him with a knife.
  • A neighbor’s dog, described as police-trained, severely injuring his leg.
  • Reports involving Detectives Angela Stewart and Shapiro that allegedly failed to document or investigate the attacks adequately.
  • Repeated community assaults and batteries.
  • Police reports that allegedly reversed victim and suspect roles.
  • Community members provoking confrontations and then calling police.
  • Statements and conduct by HOA members connected with neighborhood-policing networks.
  • Dinse appearing at or influencing repeated enforcement encounters.
  • Prosecutorial narratives omitting the precipitating conduct.

Perelman also alleges prosecutorial misconduct by prosecutors he identifies as Green T. Phillips and Ingo Orbeli. Among the disputed statements, Perelman says Orbeli claimed that he followed Dinse to Dinse’s home on a court date. Perelman disputes that allegation and considers it part of an effort to portray him as obsessed with or threatening toward the officer.

These allegations require comparison against transcripts, police reports, GPS or location records, body-camera footage, witness statements, and the prosecutors’ evidentiary proffers.

Judge Gregory Dohi and the Denied Pitchess Motion

During the 2023 prosecution, the defense sought personnel information concerning Dinse through a Pitchess motion.

Judge Gregory Dohi denied disclosure concerning Dinse while allowing disclosure concerning Officer Ruiz.

That decision is significant because Dinse had already:

  • Been personally named in the Schellenberg federal civil-rights lawsuit.
  • Been publicly associated with online groups tracking specific people.
  • Been accused of distributing unsupported mental-illness and addiction narratives.
  • Participated in internet-connected neighborhood-watch systems.
  • Appeared in Perelman’s earlier police encounters.

A denial of a Pitchess request is not proof that no relevant complaints existed. It may mean the court considered the defense showing insufficient, conducted an in-camera review and found nothing discoverable, limited the categories searched, or applied a restrictive relevance determination.

The sealed transcript and in-camera record are necessary to determine:

  • What records the custodian brought.
  • Which years and complaint categories were searched.
  • Whether the Schellenberg litigation was disclosed.
  • Whether complaints involving social-media monitoring were considered.
  • Whether false reporting, retaliation, unlawful detention, dishonesty, or improper information dissemination were included.
  • Whether the court relied on an incomplete custodian declaration.

Engineered Social Contacts and Contaminated Collateral Information

Perelman further identifies people who allegedly entered his social environment, cultivated familiarity, followed or appeared around him in social groups, attempted to elicit statements, and then supplied police-connected participants with psychiatric interpretations of those statements. He maintains that this conduct was designed to create reactions or fragments of conversation that could be removed from context and used to portray him as irrational.

One person Perelman identifies is Dr. Steve Levinson, whom he describes as an elderly, no-longer-practicing gastroenterologist formerly associated with Tarzana Medical Center, where Perelman’s father also worked. Perelman reports that Levinson—approximately his father’s generation—befriended him, appeared with groups in social settings, attempted to draw out statements that could later be characterized as evidence of mental illness, and had professional or social connections capable of carrying those characterizations back to family members, police, or mental-health personnel. Levinson’s exact age, employment history, relationships, communications, and role remain subjects for documentary verification.

This alleged pathway matters because a later evaluator may receive third-party statements, welfare-check narratives, police contacts, or community complaints as supposedly neutral ‘collateral history’ without being told how the encounters were initiated. If a reporting person arranged or facilitated the contact, arrived with police, provoked the disputed conversation, selectively described what occurred, or supplied the psychiatric interpretation afterward, the resulting record would not constitute independent clinical corroboration.

Perelman describes a police visit in which a person involved in initiating or facilitating the contact allegedly appeared with officers, while the resulting narrative nevertheless characterized Perelman as suffering from mental illness. The precise date and report number must be confirmed before the incident is assigned a fixed chronology. The complete source record should identify the caller, accompanying civilians, dispatched officers, pre-arrival communications, statements made at the scene, body-camera footage, CAD comments, reports, database entries, and every later dissemination.

The resulting information pathway can be stated directly:

Engineered or selectively reported social encounter
                         ↓
Police visit, welfare check, complaint, or community report
                         ↓
Lay psychiatric interpretation entered as collateral information
                         ↓
CAMP, MEU, probation, prosecution, or evaluator receives the record
                         ↓
Repetition is presented as independent corroboration
                         ↓
Perelman’s contrary evidence is discounted because of the label

An evaluation based on contaminated or circular source material would reproduce the originating narrative rather than independently establish a diagnosis. The relevant inquiry is therefore not merely whether an evaluator repeated a label, but who supplied each source, what relationship that person had to Perelman’s family or police-connected networks, whether the source participated in producing the encounter, what exculpatory context was omitted, and whether the evaluator was told of those conflicts.

Records necessary to examine this pathway include:

  • The original CAD event, 911 or non-emergency call, dispatch audio, body-camera video, station video, and incident reports for each disputed police visit.
  • The identities and relationships of callers, accompanying civilians, social-group participants, officers, supervisors, CAMP or MEU personnel, and evaluators.
  • Communications involving Levinson, Perelman’s father or other family members, Dinse, Linton, Espinoza, neighborhood groups, police personnel, or mental-health personnel.
  • Every referral, field-interview entry, mental-evaluation report, database notation, risk flag, officer-safety notation, collateral-source summary, and dissemination log derived from the encounters.
  • The unedited recordings and surrounding statements necessary to determine whether quoted remarks were elicited, truncated, mischaracterized, or stripped of context.

Officers Linton and Espinoza

Topanga Officer Dashanay C. Linton and Officer or Detective Espinoza later supplied unsupported behavioral and psychiatric characterizations.

In a recorded back-room conversation, Linton used words to the effect of:

“He’s a schizoid” or “he’s a schizo.”

Espinoza stated:

“He harasses women.”

Neither statement was a clinical finding. Both were disputed as false and treated Kevin’s identity as settled before the underlying behavior and evidence were examined.

The Watch the Watchers profile supplied by Perelman identifies Dashanay C. Linton as an LAPD Police Officer II assigned to Topanga Division, serial No. 43696, badge No. 24373, with a 2018 hiring year. The profile states that it compiles information from LAPD, California POST, and City payroll records. It does not identify Linton as a CAMP, SMART, or MEU officer or display a substantiated misconduct finding.

Because the profile lists a 2018 hiring year—approximately five years after the 2013 CAMP arrangement—Linton could not have originated that arrangement. Her reported later statements are relevant instead to institutional continuity: whether newer Topanga personnel received, accessed, repeated, or transmitted older CAMP, MEU, neighborhood-watch, family, or police-contact narratives as though they were established facts.

That does not prevent a patrol officer from generating an MEU referral. An ordinary officer can write an incident report, contact the MEU Triage Desk, describe behavior as a mental-health concern, or supply body-camera footage later reviewed by other personnel.

If the statements by Linton and Espinoza were recorded, the complete original recording should be preserved and transcribed. The critical question is whether these statements remained informal remarks or were transmitted into:

  • An incident report.
  • A Mental Evaluation Incident Report.
  • The MEU database.
  • CAMP.
  • Probation.
  • A prosecution file.
  • An appellate file.
  • A later expert evaluation.

Kevin supplied these statements and related materials to the FBI, Department of Justice, and LAPD Internal Affairs but received no meaningful action. He also reported that Linton retained his driver’s license during the encounter and did not return it, prompting the same oversight complaints. The incident matters because a newly hired patrol officer did not need to originate the 2013 label to repeat it, strengthen it, or place it into a new police record.

Officer Steve A. Norris: The 2017 Dinse/MEU Response and Oscar Sandoval Shooting

The records make Steve A. Norris, LAPD serial No. 37704, directly relevant to the Dinse/CAMP chronology. The reconstruction places Norris in the May 2017 response with Dinse and an MEU officer, then identifies him as one of the officers who fired during the fatal December 2017 shooting of Oscar Sandoval.

Public LAPD-roster and POST compilations identify Steve Anthony Norris as Police Officer III, Topanga Division, serial No. 37704, badge No. 20263, hired in 2005, with POST ID B70-A01. Those identifiers tie the 2017 records to the same Topanga officer.

May 18, 2017: Documented Response With Dinse and MEU

The investigative narrative for Perelman’s May 18, 2017 arrest identifies Officer Campodonico #26541 and Officer Norris #37704 as responding with Sergeant Schneider #32410, Officer Charles Sean Dinse #34920, and MEU Officer Jurisaga #36897. The associated records identify an alleged Penal Code §422(a) criminal-threat arrest, Incident No. 170518002663, Booking No. 4991549, at 21620 Burbank Boulevard; Officer Compton #36582 is identified as the arresting officer.

This establishes an operational connection among Norris, Dinse, and an MEU officer during a response involving Kevin. It places Norris inside the same police–mental-health response whose information pathways are at issue throughout this investigation.

December 30, 2017: Fatal Shooting of Oscar Sandoval

Approximately seven months after Perelman’s May 2017 arrest, Norris was involved in the fatal officer-involved shooting of Oscar Sandoval in Topanga Division. LAPD’s public incident materials identify Police Officer III Steve Norris #37704 as one of four involved officers. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s later review identified Norris, Alvaro Carlos, Mathew Matzkin, and Peter Tulagan as the officers who fired and concluded that the shooting was lawful self-defense and defense of others.

The Sandoval shooting is relevant as documented professional history immediately following Norris’s participation in Kevin’s arrest. Official reviewers concluded that the shooting was lawful self-defense and defense of others. That conclusion does not erase the need to examine the conduct, reports, and information sharing in Kevin’s case; nor does the shooting itself prove a connection beyond the documented Topanga chronology.

The Security-Guard Incidents

Perelman also connects the police-community pattern to private security personnel.

In 2013, he reports that John Paul Noronha, associated with Boys & Associates Security, attacked him from behind near Starbucks, striking him repeatedly in the back of the head. Perelman says police and Starbucks-related personnel minimized or reversed the incident rather than treating him as the assault victim.

In July 2026, Perelman reported another security-guard assault that caused a forehead injury. He considers the later attack part of the same recurring pattern: security personnel and community members initiate aggression, while subsequent reports portray his reactions as evidence of instability.

The Central Public-Interest Issue

The question is larger than whether one officer wrote an inaccurate report or one neighbor made a false complaint.

The cumulative evidence shows why Perelman describes an illegal operation rather than a string of misunderstandings: governmental and private participants repeatedly pursued personal, institutional, political, and reputational agendas under the appearance of law enforcement. Neutral policing investigates both sides, preserves exculpatory context, tests witnesses, and protects constitutional objections. It does not suppress crimes reported by one person, manufacture corroboration through repetition, or use unsupported psychiatric labels to destroy that person’s credibility.

It is whether an internet-connected police-community structure can manufacture the appearance of corroboration:

Private hostility or unsupported labeling
                    ↓
Community posts, photographs and complaints
                    ↓
Senior Lead Officer and neighborhood-watch network
                    ↓
Repeated police contacts and reports
                    ↓
MEU/CAMP tracking or mental-health notation
                    ↓
Prosecutors and judges rely on the accumulated history
                    ↓
The individual’s objections are labeled paranoia
                    ↓
Later reactions become new justification for intervention

The Dinse/Schellenberg litigation demonstrates that this concern is not purely theoretical. Dinse was independently accused in federal court of using online community groups to track an identified person, circulate personal information, introduce unsupported mental-illness speculation, generate police calls, remove the person from public space, and facilitate property seizures.

Perelman maintains that he experienced a broader and longer version of the same mechanism across three arrests and three prosecutions.

His account extends back before CAMP existed. In 1977, LAPD operated a predecessor called the Mental Evaluation Detail. CAMP was not created until 2005, and SMART did not begin until 1993. Any childhood information would have originated in other systems—school records, school police, family communications, juvenile contacts, counseling records, or predecessor police files—before potentially being repeated in later databases.

Perelman states that family members with psychology backgrounds applied psychiatric labels to him from childhood and that friends, teachers, professors, police-connected individuals, and later community groups repeated those labels. The account below identifies Paul Humphrey and Michael Patrick Huntley as important participants in the period before the 2013 CAMP case.

Paul Humphrey and Michael Patrick Huntley: The Pre-2013 Continuity

Paul Humphrey had been Kevin’s friend since Kevin was approximately fourteen years old. That long friendship created unusual access, familiarity, and trust. Humphrey and Michael Patrick Huntley—originally Jason Perelman’s friend—became conduits between Kevin’s social life and the family narrative. Around Kevin’s return from the University of Colorado in approximately 1998, they used that access to manipulate or provoke him and shape how other people perceived and responded to him.

Humphrey later joined LAPD and worked with private-security companies. Kevin describes Humphrey and Huntley using the trust created by a friendship dating to age fourteen, together with police-connected people, security personnel, acquaintances, strangers, social groups, and women, to monitor him, provoke conversations, generate encounters, and circulate misleading accounts. Huntley helped persuade Kevin to return from the University of Colorado as Humphrey was entering LAPD, then answered Kevin’s requests for an explanation with phrases including “world of paranoia,” “have a good life,” and warnings that the judicial system would be used against him. The language did not answer Kevin’s questions; it pre-labeled the questions as mental illness.

The timing is essential. This conduct began years before the 2013 CAMP case. CAMP did not originate the operation; it gave an older family and social narrative an institutional home inside LAPD’s police–mental-health structure. Kevin’s father, Ron Perelman, offered the circular statement “You know what you did” and, when asked to explain, answered that “people can lie.” There was no factual dialogue—only accusation, psychiatric labeling, and threats about what would happen if Kevin continued asking questions.

The claimed pathway was:

Friendship beginning at approximately age fourteen
                              ↓
Trusted access after the University of Colorado
                              ↓
Alleged manipulation, provocation, and use of social contacts
                              ↓
Police, security-company, or community reporting
                              ↓
Narrative potentially carried into later LAPD and CAMP/MEU records

Conclusion

CAMP’s official mission is crisis prevention and service coordination. Its documented operational tools include identification, tracking, monitoring, police–clinician collaboration, information gathering, recurring contact, community engagement, and long-term case retention.

Those capabilities require serious safeguards because an inaccurate narrative can become increasingly authoritative every time it is copied.

The publicly documented Dinse material establishes that:

  • Dinse intentionally developed internet-connected neighborhood-watch communications.
  • He used Facebook and Nextdoor in his official community-policing role.
  • Journalists reported that he tracked specific unhoused people through private groups.
  • He publicly applied “drug addiction/mental illness” speculation to Rex Schellenberg.
  • Schellenberg personally sued Dinse and the City under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
  • The lawsuit alleged that community reporting was used to create pretext for police intervention and removal.
  • Dinse was later the subject of a denied Pitchess request in Perelman’s 2023 case.

Kevin’s evidence and firsthand account go substantially further. He describes three arrests, three prosecutions, repeated assaults, security-company activity, and community reporting as connected parts of one operation: provoke or follow him, conceal the initiating behavior, preserve only his reaction, call him mentally ill, and use the label to prevent anyone from examining what happened first.

The newly obtained 2013 court records independently establish several narrower but important facts:

  • The case began with two filed municipal-code counts.
  • Three additional counts were added later on the prosecution’s motion while Perelman was absent and appeared through Franklin under Penal Code §977.
  • The September 26, 2013 disposition was expressly a conditional plea governed by a separate “written agreement in file.”
  • The signed PRU-200 does not mention CAMP.
  • The transcript discusses CAMP and an unidentified second sheet.
  • The courthouse production does not include the written conditional agreement or the second sheet.
  • The plea was later withdrawn and vacated.
  • Every count was dismissed under Penal Code §1385 and the proceedings were terminated.

The public does not need to accept a psychiatric label or an institutional denial on faith. The story identifies specific people, dates, cases, statements, recordings, police programs, databases, and lawsuits that can be examined. The truth is in the behavior and chronology—not in how many connected people repeated the word “crazy.”

Personal Agendas Disguised as Law and Order

The evidence must be read cumulatively. The later-added charges while Kevin was absent, the conditional plea governed by a separate agreement, the substitution of CAMP for the investigative assistance he requested, Franklin’s refusal to challenge police, the public directive that Kevin “must be deemed” crazy, Dinse’s internet-connected neighborhood operations, and the repeated refusal to investigate reported crimes all point toward one method: protect participants and suppress exposure of misconduct by converting the reporting person into the psychiatric subject.

The allegation becomes the premise, the premise becomes the psychiatric label, and the label becomes the asserted justification for surveillance, exclusion, disbelief, arrest, prosecution, forced treatment, institutionalization, or further intervention. That is not neutral law and order. It is the structure of an illegal operation: coordinate the provocation, erase the initiating behavior, record the reaction, repeat the label, and use the manufactured history to deprive Kevin of credibility and constitutional protection.

Artificial neural networks were inspired, in part, by biological neural systems. They are not human brains and they are not conscious human beings, but they were created to perform something recognizably human: receive information, recognize patterns, reason through problems, communicate, learn from correction, combine information, and work toward a goal. In practical use, an AI system can function almost like a programmer, assistant, researcher, editor, technician, designer, teacher, or employee. You explain what you need, provide the information and variables, and it produces a result. If the result is wrong, you correct it. If something is missing, you add more information. If the first attempt is not good enough, you revise it and continue. The process keeps moving forward.

What makes this comparison interesting is not simply what artificial intelligence can do, but what artificial intelligence leaves out: human emotion. An AI chatbot does not wake up angry. It does not hate you, become jealous because you know something it does not, become embarrassed because you corrected it, or decide that it has to be better than you. It does not need to win. It does not resent your success, compete with you for social status, or lash out in anger and rage because it is having a bad day. It does not decide that because it dislikes you, you should lose your career, your friends, your opportunities, your reputation, or your right to participate in society.

AI can make mistakes. It can misunderstand information, hallucinate facts, or confidently generate an incorrect answer. But being wrong is different from lying. A lie requires knowingly communicating something false as though it were true. Human beings can lie because they have motives: money, fear, embarrassment, jealousy, hatred, revenge, status, self-protection, competition, political agendas, or simply the unwillingness to admit that they were wrong. AI does not possess those human motives in the ordinary sense, and that difference can radically change the outcome of an interaction.

Suppose a human being makes a mistake. The productive response is simple: I was wrong; let’s figure out the right answer. But insecure, or shallow people, or criminals do not always react that way. Sometimes ego takes over. Admitting a mistake begins to feel like losing. The person has to be right, has to be better, has to protect a reputation or preserve something already said. Instead of asking what is true, the question becomes how to preserve the position already taken. If the original statement was knowingly false, correcting it can become even harder because now somebody may have to admit that they lied, falsely accused someone, repeated something untrue, mistreated someone because of false information, or helped damage another person’s life.

At that point, some people admit the mistake. Others protect the story. They rationalize, deny, attack the person questioning them, modify the narrative, recruit other people, or escalate rather than allow the original falsehood to collapse. Artificial intelligence does not have the same emotional need to do that. If the answer is wrong, you give it better information, reconsider the problem, correct the answer, and continue. Nobody has to be humiliated. Nobody has to be destroyed. The problem remains the problem.

Artificial intelligence also does not require a human being to be perfect. I can make a mistake. The AI can make a mistake. Neither event has to terminate the relationship. There can be a middle ground. Maybe I am partly right. Maybe the AI is partly right. Maybe neither answer is complete. Maybe more information is needed. Then we keep working. An AI chatbot does not turn one imperfect moment into a permanent definition of somebody’s character. It does not decide that because somebody blinked wrong, phrased something awkwardly, became frustrated, disagreed, or made one mistake, that person is now a monster who should never be allowed to associate with anyone again. It focuses on what matters: what are we trying to accomplish?

That brings me to my own life.

For almost my entire life, I have been confronted with a radically different description of who Kevin Perelman supposedly is. Around 1977, when I was approximately five years old, severe psychiatric and behavioral labels were already being attached to me: Kevin is violent, Kevin is paranoid, Kevin is schizophrenic, Kevin needs to be deemed crazy, Kevin needs to be removed from society. The well was poisoned when I was five years old. From that point forward, the struggle was not simply to meet people and form ordinary relationships. It became a struggle against defamation of character and disinformation about Kevin Perelman before people ever independently knew Kevin Perelman.

The effect of defamation is much more serious than somebody simply saying they do not like Kevin. It creates an imaginary Kevin Perelman: a Kevin who supposedly already did terrible things, cannot be trusted, harasses people, hates people, is violent, and needs to be watched, controlled, excluded, arrested, or removed. Then somebody meets the actual Kevin Perelman, but instead of beginning with the person standing in front of them, the interaction can begin with the character they were already told existed. In my life, negative claims about me have repeatedly seemed to spread far beyond the person originally making them. A damaging statement about Kevin appears, then other people know it: different people, different places, different industries, different social groups, different countries. The story may change, but the result remains familiar: Kevin did something, Kevin is the problem, Kevin is not allowed here. Then the next person, and the next, and the next. That is why I describe the issue as defamation of character and disinformation about Kevin Perelman on every level.

Once somebody accepts the fictional character, almost anything can be interpreted as confirmation. I ask a question and it becomes aggression. I keep asking because nobody answered and it becomes obsession. I object to mistreatment and it becomes instability. I become frustrated and it becomes dangerousness. I defend myself against a false accusation and that is treated as proof that the accusation was correct. There is no middle ground and no allowance for Kevin Perelman to be an ordinary, imperfect human being. I am expected to be perfect while everybody around me is permitted anger, frustration, mistakes, prejudice, hostility, and bad days.

The same problem extends directly into social life. Suppose I go out on a date and yawn. The ordinary interpretation should be that Kevin is tired. Maybe I did not sleep enough. Maybe it is late. Maybe I simply yawned. But once somebody approaches Kevin through a predetermined negative narrative, something completely ordinary can acquire a completely different meaning. Now the yawn supposedly means disrespect, hostility, harassment, or evidence that something is wrong with Kevin. One imperfect interaction can become Kevin harasses women, Kevin hates women, Kevin is obsessed. Then the next person encounters the accusation rather than encountering me. How is somebody supposed to develop a normal social life under those circumstances? How do you make friends, date, meet new people, or simply go out and have fun when the interaction begins as an investigation instead of an introduction?

Human beings are supposed to work together and then sometimes go get dinner, go to a movie, work on a car, take photographs, travel, talk, laugh, and enjoy being around one another. I can do those things. I am fun-loving. I am open-minded. I enjoy learning from other people. I enjoy doing things with people. I can work with people and have a social life alongside that work. But normal relationships require the other person to be participating in the relationship too, rather than investigating an imaginary character they were told about beforehand. AI does not bring that predetermined character into the interaction.

This pattern became especially visible when I hired programmers. Over the years I hired programmers from different countries to work on websites, databases, Android applications, and other software projects. There were rarely conventional arguments about the actual programming. Instead, I experienced behavior I viewed as provoking, mocking, mimicking, cryptic hostility, and repeated efforts to focus attention on Kevin Perelman rather than simply completing the project. The remarkable part was that even simple jobs repeatedly would not get finished. Something would be promised, then not done. Something would be fixed, then something else would be broken. One programmer would be replaced by another, then another, then another.

One relatively straightforward Android application stretched for more than three years and was never properly completed. At one point, what remained amounted to roughly a couple of weeks of bug repairs, yet the application still could not simply be finished. It did not appear that these programmers lacked the technical ability. That was precisely what made the experience so difficult to understand. It felt as though enormous amounts of energy were being spent analyzing Kevin, provoking Kevin, mocking Kevin, or generating reactions from Kevin while comparatively little energy was being spent doing what I hired them to do. The relationship felt inverted: 90 percent Kevin Perelman, 10 percent completing the job.

Then AI arrived.

Now replace the programmer with an AI coding assistant. Here is the code. Here is the database. Here is the error. Here is what I am trying to build. Here are the variables. Here is what does not work. The AI produces an attempt. I say, no, that is wrong. And then something remarkable happens nothing. No rage. No personal attack. No “Kevin thinks he knows everything.” No “Kevin is impossible.” No “Kevin is a perfectionist.” No “Who does Kevin think he is?” No “Kevin is an asshole”, No “Kevin is crazy”, No “We don’t want Kevin’s kind here” The AI effectively responds, okay, what needs to change? I explain it, it tries again, and we continue. Something that became entangled for months or years with people can sometimes move forward in days. Not because AI is perfect, but because the error does not have to become a personal conflict.

The same Kevin is still sitting at the computer. My personality did not change. My standards did not disappear. My curiosity did not disappear. My persistence did not disappear. My tendency to ask detailed questions did not disappear. My desire to understand how things work did not disappear. Yet with AI I can work across an enormous range of technical and creative disciplines: Transact-SQL and database architecture, .NET development, web design and web applications, Python, PyTorch, large-language models, diffusion models, ComfyUI and AI-generation workflows, Linux, Ubuntu, Debian, Red Hat and other Linux distributions, Windows architecture, DNS, firewalls and OPNsense, server architecture, physical server and workstation builds, RAID arrays, NAS and centralized data storage, ZFS, virtual computing environments, Proxmox, VMware, mail infrastructure, web hosting, WordPress, Maya, 3ds Max, Blender, Houdini, 3D modeling and animation, visual effects, graphics and page layouts, photography, video production, Adobe Premiere, Photoshop, DaVinci Resolve, Visual Studio, AI image and video systems, mixed-media projects, and combinations of software, hardware, databases, graphics, and media into new systems.

These activities require sustained reasoning, organization, learning, communication, correction, experimentation, integration of different disciplines, and ultimately the ability to finish things. That matters when the accusation is that Kevin Perelman simply cannot function productively with others.

Another pattern I have seen is that whenever I accomplish something inconsistent with the negative characterization, the characterization changes. Kevin cannot do this. Then Kevin does it. Instead of reconsidering the original statement, another explanation appears for why the accomplishment supposedly does not matter. Then another, and another. The narrative keeps moving so the original conclusion can survive. If evidence can never change the conclusion, then the conclusion came first and the evidence is simply being forced to fit it.

The pattern did not stop with computers or creative work. It extended into automobiles: cars, engines, car parts, performance modifications, repair shops, and automotive social groups. At one point I simply wanted to do something different and positive. I bought a Corvette. That should have opened an entirely ordinary world. Learn about the car. Repair it. Modify it. Understand the engine. Meet other people who like cars. Attend automotive gatherings. Talk about parts. Possibly design something, perhaps create CAD-based components or body-kit ideas, perhaps eventually turn some of those interests into a business opportunity. Just as importantly, it could provide somewhere social to go and something enjoyable to share with other people.

Instead, roughly six years of my life involving the automotive world became another period of conflict and a recurring childhood pattern remerging crimes spree against me after taking auto shop classes, west valley occupational automotive courses in the 90’s, Working at Star Auto Haus Mercedes and anger and lashing out in those businesses I wasn’t really aware was going on at the time. I experienced problems moving from employee to employee and repair shop to repair shop while trying to get the Corvette repaired and work completed correctly. I also experienced people connected with my existing family and social history appearing around automotive social groups, including Dr. Steve Levinson, whom I associated with my family network. From my perspective, the same underlying problem followed me into yet another unrelated environment. Instead of being allowed simply to enjoy automobiles like everybody else, my participation itself became scrutinized and characterized as obsessive or abnormal.

Millions of people love cars. They modify them, rebuild engines, attend shows, spend weekends discussing wheels, suspension, bodywork, electronics, and horsepower. That is considered normal when they do it. Why does the identical interest supposedly become psychiatric evidence when Kevin Perelman does it? It is okay for everybody else, but not for Kevin. That contradiction is important.

Ordinary competition should not be confused with stalking or sabotage. Two programmers competing for clients is normal. Two photographers competing for work is normal. Two automotive companies competing to sell a better part is normal. Competition is part of economic life. What I am describing is something different: entering a new field or social environment and encountering hostility directed at my participation itself. I start developing websites and Kevin cannot do that. I take up photography and Kevin cannot do that. I explore animation or visual effects and Kevin cannot do that. I buy a Corvette and become interested in automobiles and Kevin cannot do that either. I explore the possibility of designing parts or CAD components and another door closes. The issue stops looking like ordinary commercial competition when the person has barely begun participating and the response is already that he is not allowed here.

And that leads to a much larger question: why would the Los Angeles Police Department, people connected with the psychology community, and members of my own family have anything to do with whether Kevin Perelman becomes a programmer, photographer, visual-effects artist, goes to the gym to stay healthy, plays in pool tournaments, shops at supermarkets, eats at restaurants, takes walks, goes jogging, attends college, becomes interested in cars, develops websites, starts a business, or simply tries to make new friends?

Why should any ordinary part of a person’s life require police involvement, psychiatric labeling, or efforts to characterize that person as dangerous or mentally ill?

In my experience, even completely ordinary behavior has been treated as something suspicious. I have been asked questions as strange as, “Why do you take so many walks?” as though people normally count how many times another adult goes for a walk in a month. I have seen ordinary efforts to stay healthy characterized as obsessive-compulsive behavior, as though taking walks, jogging, exercising, going to a gym, or trying to improve your health somehow becomes evidence that something is wrong with you simply because Kevin Perelman is doing it.

That creates an impossible situation. How are you supposed to stay healthy if exercise is turned into psychiatric evidence? How are you supposed to earn money if trying to work becomes a reason to monitor you? How are you supposed to build a career if entering an industry becomes evidence of obsession? How are you supposed to make friends if every new social interaction begins with suspicion? How are you supposed to pursue an education if ambition itself is treated as threatening? How are you supposed to enjoy cars, photography, technology, restaurants, sports, or ordinary public places if participation in normal life is repeatedly reinterpreted as proof that you should be excluded from it?

That is the contradiction.

Activities that are considered completely ordinary when other people do them suddenly become suspicious when Kevin Perelman does them. Walking becomes obsession. Exercise becomes pathology. Persistence becomes instability. Career ambition becomes fixation. Interest in a hobby becomes evidence of something supposedly wrong. Going somewhere becomes a question of whether Kevin is “allowed” to be there.

If ordinary human behavior is repeatedly converted into psychiatric evidence after the fact, then the label can never be disproved because almost anything can be made to fit it.

And that brings the comparison back to AI. An AI system does not care how many walks I took this month. It does not resent me for going to college, learning another skill, joining a gym, building a website, buying a car, entering a pool tournament, or trying something new. It does not need to reinterpret ordinary behavior as proof that Kevin Perelman is defective.

It simply asks:

What are you trying to accomplish?

That difference is enormous. A person cannot build a healthy, productive life if every normal attempt to participate in life is converted into another reason to monitor, label, exclude, or condemn him.

By 2001, when I was 29 years old, the situation became much more visible to me. The Perelman family and Michael Patrick Huntley had encouraged my return from the University of Colorado period of my life to become involved with Signet e-Services, an internet-hosting business. Paul Humphrey, another friend from my earlier life, was also part of that history and later worked for the Los Angeles Police Department. What should have been a technology business increasingly felt to me as though the business itself was secondary. Instead of building servers, hosting websites, finding customers, writing software, making money, and growing the company, I experienced the environment as overwhelmingly focused on Kevin Perelman.

Again, the ratio felt like 90 percent monitoring, provoking, and creating a story about Kevin Perelman, and 10 percent actually building a profitable company. There were accusations of violence. There were claims that I had tried to choke Huntley. I remember threatening and defamatory statements and references, including the “Crocodile Dundee” language and the statement, “When there’s a problem, we tell Wally, Wally tells the town, no more problem.” To me, that captured what I had experienced for years: tell somebody a story about Kevin, that person tells everybody else, and suddenly Kevin has a problem everywhere.

I also remember statements from Huntley from that period including “World of paranoia,” “Have a good life now,” “We’re using the judicial system against you,” and “You had better live a careful life.” When I began asking the most basic question—what the hell is going on?—the result was not openness. The conflict escalated. More accusations, more encounters with police, more criminal proceedings, and more characterization of the person asking what was happening as mentally ill. That is precisely where the AI comparison becomes so important.

Imagine something different. Imagine that the programmer is not trying to prove something about Kevin. Imagine that the mechanic is not thinking about Kevin’s personality. Imagine that the photographer is not trying to establish whether Kevin belongs in photography. Imagine that the people at a car gathering are not evaluating whether Kevin should be allowed to participate. Imagine that the new acquaintance has not been given defamatory information before meeting him. Imagine that there is no ulterior motive, no effort to provoke, no effort to manufacture a reaction, and no effort to turn ordinary behavior into psychiatric evidence. Just people interacting normally.

The AI comparison gives at least a glimpse of what that looks like.

Imagine walking into an automotive shop where the employees were sophisticated bipedal robots operated by AI neural networks whose personalities were programmed around honesty, cooperation, technical competence, and nondiscrimination. I bring in the Corvette. The robot does not hate Kevin. It does not know a defamatory story about Kevin. It does not care whether Kevin belongs in the automotive community. It does not become jealous because Kevin understands something about the car. It does not decide that Kevin is obsessed because he wants the repair completed correctly. It asks what is wrong with the car, diagnoses it, repairs it, and moves forward. We talk about engines. We talk about parts. Maybe we discuss CAD. Maybe we design something. Maybe an idea develops into a product. Maybe a positive interest becomes a business. Maybe I simply enjoy myself.

The same principle applies to programmers, designers, artists, photographers, engineers, mechanics, coworkers, friends, dates, and ordinary social relationships. When hatred, deception, discrimination, retaliation, and a predetermined narrative are removed, the entire equation changes.

Artificial intelligence, however, cannot replace the human life that was stolen from me in which the Police, Psychology Community, and WORLDWIDE groups are still trying to cover up.  It can help me recover productivity. It can help me build, learn, design, research, write, create, and solve problems. But a person cannot live a complete life surrounded only by machines. I still need human beings. Everybody does. Friends, relationships, employees, business partners, coworkers, clients, doctors, lawyers, mechanics, contractors, creative collaborators, people to go somewhere with after work, people to laugh with, people to eat with, people to travel with, people to build things with, and people to enjoy life with.

A normal human life includes all of those things, and it also requires honesty. Friendships, relationships, education, careers, businesses, hobbies, social circles, and ordinary participation in society cannot develop normally when the people around you are operating from false information or concealed motives.

What happened to me beginning at a young age was not merely an inconvenience. I view the destruction of those opportunities as premeditated, and that destruction is part of the damage itself. A childhood becomes adolescence. Adolescence becomes adulthood. Years become decades. Those years cannot simply be handed back later as though nothing happened.

AI cannot recreate childhood friendships. It cannot recreate elementary school or high school. It cannot recreate college. It cannot recreate relationships that never had an honest opportunity to begin. It cannot recreate businesses that might have succeeded, careers that might have developed differently, or social circles that might have formed around photography, technology, automobiles, art, sports, education, or anything else.

It cannot recreate the ordinary experiences of meeting people without a poisoned reputation already preceding you. It cannot restore the opportunities to work with people, learn with people, build things with people, go places with people, have fun with people, and develop the kinds of relationships that normally accumulate over the course of a lifetime.

Most importantly, it cannot return fifty years.

That is why the underlying defamation and disinformation matter so much.

For decades I have heard versions of the statement that Kevin Perelman is the common denominator. But another recurring variable deserves examination: the hostility, hate, defamation of character, and disinformation directed toward Kevin Perelman. Remove that. Remove the anger, rage, hate, prejudgment, defamatory biography, ulterior motives, attempts to provoke, need to be better, need to win, retaliation, psychiatric labeling, requirement that Kevin must be perfect, and assumption that every accusation against Kevin automatically has to be true. Then leave Kevin Perelman exactly where he was.

What happens?

He learns. He solves problems. He creates. He builds things. He finishes things. He works with people. He has ideas. He explores new interests. He enjoys being around other people. He has a good time. He is fun-loving. He is open-minded. He develops friendships. He can have a healthy social life alongside a productive professional life.

In other words, he has the same life everyone else is supposed to be allowed to have.

Artificial intelligence has unintentionally provided something resembling a control condition in my life. Kevin Perelman remains on one side of the interaction. What changes is what comes back at him. With AI, disagreement does not automatically become hatred and worldwide stalking groups. Correction does not become humiliation. Knowledge does not become a personal competition. Persistence does not automatically become obsession. An imperfect interaction does not become a character assassination. A question does not automatically become evidence of mental illness. Learning a new hobby does not become psychiatric evidence. Buying a Corvette does not become proof of obsession. Wanting a programmer to finish an application does not become proof that Kevin is impossible. Wanting a mechanic to repair a car correctly does not become proof that something is wrong with Kevin.

The AI asks: What do you need? What are the variables? What are we trying to build? What went wrong? What should we change? Then it works the problem.

That sounds remarkably similar to what an honest employee, honest programmer, honest mechanic, honest business partner, honest professional, honest friend, or decent human being should be capable of doing.

For almost fifty years, the accusation directed at me has effectively been that there is something wrong with Kevin Perelman and that Kevin cannot get along with people. But remove the hostility and hate, and Kevin does not stop functioning. He functions better. He communicates. He learns. He works. He creates. He solves. He finishes things. He enjoys people. He tries new things. He has fun. He builds relationships. He participates.

That is why the question should no longer simply be, Why can’t Kevin Perelman get along with people?

The more revealing question is:

Why does Kevin Perelman get along so well with an intelligence that does not hate him, does not arrive carrying defamation about him, does not demand perfection, has no ulterior motive, and is interested in accomplishing the same objective Kevin is trying to accomplish?

Because when those destructive variables disappear, something else becomes visible:

the Kevin Perelman that should have been allowed to exist all along.

“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer.”

That was attorney Jonathan Scott Franklin’s reported response when Kevin Perelman attempted to explain that LAPD officers had fabricated or distorted the allegations underlying his 2013 criminal case.

California Bar: 176617

Franklin was not retained to protect police officers from criticism. He was retained to investigate the evidence, test witness credibility, challenge false allegations, expose police misconduct, and protect his client’s constitutional rights.

Instead, the defense abandoned the central issues: whether Officer Jensen, Senior Lead Officer Charles “Sean” Dinse, restaurant personnel, and Alexandra Derse supplied false, exaggerated, or coordinated accounts; whether the incident resulted from continuing provocations and threats; and whether five criminal counts were manufactured from Perelman peacefully sitting on a public sidewalk with a small protest sign.

The case did not arise from violence, an encampment, obstruction of a crowded sidewalk, or a trespass observed by police. It arose after prolonged provocations and cryptic warnings at a restaurant and most public businesses or places her goes to based on mass defamation of character, disinformation, and using the Internet to globally and federally coordinate these methods to try to make him look unstable or like he suffers from mental illness, followed by Perelman’s peaceful public protest and request for Jensen’s badge number.

All five counts were ultimately dismissed. Before that happened, however, Perelman was placed into an inadequately disclosed plea and LAPD CAMP arrangement without informed awareness of CAMP’s identity, scope, information-gathering practices, duration, or possible future consequences. That arrangement may have generated police and mental-health records capable of being carried into later cases and used to reinforce false narratives intended to justify doing whatever was necessary to discredit, institutionalize, incarcerate, or otherwise remove him from society—continuing a pattern he reports experiencing since childhood, based on shifting labels and unsupported rationalizations that changed whenever earlier explanations failed.

Not an Isolated Restaurant Dispute

The 2013 incident was not an isolated disagreement with one restaurant.

Perelman had already observed what he describes as an extremely large network of businesses, community participants, neighborhood groups, security personnel, police-connected circles, and psychology-connected individuals exchanging information and disinformation about him with the Perelman Family and finding out around 2001 with his friend and business partner Michael Patrick Huntley, and Paul Humphrey who worked at LAPD in 1998. Such death threats from Mike Huntley were

“I have given you enough rope to hang yourself with”

“World of paranoia”

“Havea good life now”

“You had better live a careful life”

“You are too out of control for California”

Many other threats

Internet communications allowed accusations, photographs, personal information, psychiatric labels, and suggested methods of confrontation to move from one location to another. This allegedly produced recurring incidents at unrelated restaurants, coffee shops, stores, automobile events, neighborhoods, and other public locations.

Perelman would enter a business, order normally, pay, and attempt to relax. The provocations would then begin: passive-aggressive service, incorrect orders or charges, cryptic remarks, conspicuous gestures, indirect threats, staged disputes, or conduct apparently intended to obtain a reaction. These tactics that have been exponentially growing since a young age with LAPD and Community Stalking operations to remove those they simply don’t like out of HATE from society.

When one group stalking method failed, other locations allegedly introduced newer tactics. That changing pattern is important. It shows that similar conduct recurred across businesses that appeared unrelated in person but could be connected through internet communications, neighborhood-watch networks, police contacts, private social-media groups, or circulated misinformation.

The available 2013 docket does not independently prove the entire network. Establishing its participants would require social-media records, police intelligence files, emails, messages, witness testimony, dispatch records, business communications, and discovery that Franklin never meaningfully pursued.

The My Brother’s Bar-B-Q with connected business of enormous circles incident must therefore be examined as one documented episode within a much broader alleged system of surveillance, provocation, labeling, reporting, and removal—not as a self-contained restaurant disagreement.

A Pattern Observed Since Childhood

The operations described here did not begin in 2013.

Perelman reports observing changing forms of monitoring, information-sharing, psychological labeling, community participation, manufactured confrontations, and efforts to provoke him since childhood. When one justification failed, another appeared with larger and larger groups befriending or taking part if they saw Kevin. When one accusation could not be sustained, a different accusation or mental-health label replaced it.

That persistence is central to the asserted motive. If the activity continues regardless of how peacefully, responsible, or stably a person behaves, it cannot reasonably be explained as an ordinary response to particular misconduct.

In Perelman’s account, compliance did not end the activity. Good behavior did not end it. Demonstrating stability did not end it. Instead, the pressure allegedly continued through changing methods intended to discredit him, isolate him, manufacture criminal incidents, obtain psychiatric labels, force institutionalization, secure incarceration with false arrests, forged and fraudulent Police reports to remove from society at all costs out of someone’s HATE for their child with LAPD indoctrinating mass conspiring terror and stalking networks, or fulfill recurring threats that he would ultimately be “dead or gone.” While people laugh and pretend it’s a game or joke.

The 2013 prosecution must therefore be examined as an escalation within that longer alleged pattern—not as the event that created it.

Racially Charged Provocations and the Artwork Narrative

The larger history also includes reported racial slurs, threats, and deliberate efforts to use race-related accusations to provoke Perelman and distort his reactions.

Perelman reports repeatedly hearing the threatening statement, “No relaxing for you, nigger from black individuals with parts of the surrounding harassment network. In context, The statement as both a racial insult to the Jewish Community and a warning that he would not be permitted to sit peacefully in restaurants, coffee shops, or other public places. This is to manufacture the appearance of Mental Illness with the Judicial System, Psychology Community, and Police out of hate or to cover up the crimes against him when they started at a young age.

The legal importance is not the race of an individual participant by itself. A person’s racial identity does not establish conspiracy, bias, or criminal motive. The relevant evidence would be the threatening language, conduct, communications, repetition across locations, relationships among participants, and whether those participants circulated a common narrative.

Perelman identifies Alexandra Derse as Black and considers that fact relevant because of the broader pattern of racially charged provocations and reversed racial accusations surrounding him. Her racial identity alone does not prove that she acted with racial animus. It does, however, make it necessary to investigate whether her disputed absurd and infinitesimal business-card allegation was independent or connected to the recurring racialized narrative, internet communications, or other participants who had used threats and slurs.

The same network allegedly focused repeatedly on Perelman’s artwork. One work involved a photo shoot with a Black model identified as Ariana, photographed on a chessboard as part of Perelman’s visual-effects and photographic work. Perelman states that Ariana initially contacted him about participating in the photo shoot and that she was also interacting with or assisting the larger groups monitoring him.

The importance of the episode is that images from the photo shoot allegedly became part of a continuously changing justification for public hostility: private artwork was extracted from its creative context, circulated among groups, and used to encourage additional scrutiny, provocation, or defamatory claims.

Perelman’s sidewalk message—“Smeared for Creating Art,” shown in the surviving photograph with the closely related wording “Smeared for Making Art”—was a response to that claimed misuse of his artwork. Also applying to Art Therapist, Anita Perelman, since he was very young with her neurotic over analyzing of intricate aspects of his life that normal people who aren’t hypersensitive don’t look at.

He was not protesting one isolated meal. He was protesting the alleged circulation of his artwork and personal information among large groups of unheard of proportions that repeatedly supplied new changing and evolving rationalizations for harassment and removal from society out of HATE. The sign communicated that he was being publicly smeared through distorted interpretations of his creative work. This changes from Artwork to almost every other aspect of his life.

The reported racial threats, the Derse allegation, the Ariana photo-shoot history, and the continuing focus on Perelman’s artwork should not be collapsed into an accusation against an entire racial community and mass mobs from city to city, state to state. They should be investigated as particular statements, acts, communications, and relationships among identifiable people. That evidence—not race alone—could establish whether racial hostility or the manipulation of racial narratives supplied motive.

What Happened at My Brother’s Bar-B-Q

Perelman entered My Brother’s Bar-B-Q as a paying customer. He ate, paid his bill, and left.

He was not told that he was prohibited from entering. He was not served with a written trespass notice. He was not ordered to leave and then found refusing to do so. Restaurant personnel accepted his order, served him, accepted his payment, and allowed the customer transaction to be completed.

During one encounter, an employee initiated an aggressive and cryptic conversation about how people should not post negative reviews of businesses on Yelp. Perelman had not mentioned Yelp or threatened to post a review.

The importance was not simply the word “Yelp.” The employee sparked an unnecessary dialogue about customers publicly criticizing businesses while Perelman was already experiencing nonstop instigations, harassment, provocations, and indirect threats.

The statement could be examined as an attempt to obtain a reaction, an indirect warning against reporting the restaurant’s treatment of him, or evidence that personnel were discussing reputational complaints and had a motive to silence criticism.

Despite being served and allowed to pay, Perelman was later accused of trespassing.

The Public-Sidewalk Protest

After the restaurant encounters, Perelman sat on a public sidewalk with a small sign stating:

“Smeared for Creating Art.”

The surviving photograph shows the closely related wording:

“Smeared for Making Art.”

The message was a quiet protest against the continuing harassment and claimed use of Perelman’s artwork to defame, provoke, or psychologically label him.

This was not a homeless encampment. There were no tents, bedding, carts, accumulated property, or blocked pedestrian route. It was one person with a small sign. The photograph does not show a crowd being obstructed or a dangerous condition.

The sidewalk and restaurant were different locations. A person peacefully sitting on a public sidewalk is not simultaneously remaining inside a restaurant after being ordered to leave.

That contradiction is central to the trespass counts. If Jensen and Dinse encountered Perelman outside on a public sidewalk, what evidence established that he was then trespassing on restaurant property? If the restaurant previously served him, accepted payment, and never told him not to return, what notice established a knowing refusal to leave?

Franklin should have investigated those questions before discussing any plea.

Officer Jensen and the Badge-Number Request

Jensen approached Perelman on the sidewalk with Charles Sean Dinse present.

Jensen focused on removing him rather than investigating the provocations, reported threats, or reason for the protest. Jensen stated that a person could sit on the sidewalk for only approximately five minutes and directed Perelman to leave.

Perelman was prepared to leave. Before doing so, he asked Jensen for his badge number.

Jensen reportedly responded in substance, “Sure, I’ll give you my badge number,” and then issued the misdemeanor citation that became the foundation for the criminal case.

The timing matters. The citation followed Perelman’s request to identify the officer and seek accountability. The encounter did not escalate because Perelman attacked an officer, established an encampment, obstructed a crowd, or refused repeated lawful commands. It escalated after he questioned Jensen’s indifference to the continuing instigations and requested his badge number.

That sequence shows the reoccurring retaliation Jensen issued and expanded the citation because Perelman questioned police conduct and requested identifying information?

Charles Sean Dinse and Internet-Based Neighborhood Operations

Dinse’s presence is particularly important because his later public history supplies context that Franklin should have investigated.

This incident is significant because the 2013 case marks the point at which Dinse first exposed the structure of the police-connected neighborhood operations that had followed Perelman in changing forms since childhood—using coordinated provocations, circulated disinformation, unsupported mental-health labels, and even a disputed, facially absurd, and infinitesimal business-card allegation inflated into a criminal battery charge to manufacture false narratives and justify removing him from society.

Dinse was later sued personally in federal court, together with the City of Los Angeles, in Rex Schellenberg v. City of Los Angeles et al., U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, case No. 2:20-cv-01313. Schellenberg’s complaint asserted federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from alleged police harassment, dissemination of personal and purportedly false information through internet-based neighborhood groups, and resulting actions against him. The filing establishes that Dinse and the City were defendants in a federal civil-rights lawsuit; the complaint’s allegations should not be characterized as adjudicated findings unless supported by a specific subsequent court ruling.

The Schellenberg complaint alleged that Dinse participated in internet-based neighborhood groups through which residents and police exchanged photographs, locations, personal information, accusations, and statements concerning unhoused or otherwise targeted individuals.

The same groups that have been working on Kevin Perelman the majority of his life with LAPD.

Contemporary reporting stated that Dinse allegedly posted Schellenberg’s location and circulated sensitive or erroneous claims about his housing history, physical condition, mental health, and possible drug use. Schellenberg alleged that those disclosures encouraged residents to contact police, created pretexts for additional police action, contributed to continuing harassment, and culminated in the improper towing of his vehicle.

The lawsuit reportedly described Dinse’s participation in Facebook groups where information about selected individuals was distributed among police and community members. LAPD officials later acknowledged concerns about such groups, including violent comments advocating that unhoused people be poisoned or shot, and officers were reportedly instructed to stop participating in the pages.

Those allegations resemble the structure described throughout Perelman’s account:

  • separate residents and businesses connect through internet communications;
  • police officers participating in or monitoring neighborhood networks;
  • photographs and personal information circulated without meaningful verification;
  • unsupported mental-health, drug-use, dangerousness, or instability labels distributed as fact;
  • community members encouraged to watch, photograph, report, confront, or help remove selected individuals;
  • repeated police calls creating a manufactured appearance of continuing instability; and
  • police contacts later cited as confirmation of the narrative that generated those contacts.

Perelman characterizes these operations as neighborhood terror groups because their alleged effect extended beyond legitimate observation or reporting. The claimed methods involved coordinated intimidation, public labeling, privacy invasions, repeated police contacts, and community pressure intended to remove selected people.

The Schellenberg complaint does not establish that every allegation against Dinse was adjudicated as true. It does establish that Perelman was not the only person to accuse Dinse of using police-connected internet groups to circulate personal information and unsupported mental-health or drug allegations while directing community attention and continuing police action toward a particular individual.

Around 1999, gym manager Rodie Morales befriended Kevin Perelman and took him to strip clubs throughout Los Angeles. Michael Patrick Huntley had encouraged Perelman to join the gym and allegedly manipulated him into enrolling through Morales. Perelman maintains that Morales, Paul Humphry, Huntley, and others were working together to gain his trust and engineer situations that could later be used to justify his arrest. This included an incident in which Morales allegedly offered Perelman a trash bag containing what was represented to be police-supplied marijuana and attempted to persuade him to bring it into his home while taking Kevin Perelman to strip clubs all across Los Angeles working defamation of character and disinformation operations all across the United States. Perelman identifies this as part of a planned operation intended to manufacture grounds for an unlawful arrest and character assassinations.

Perelman reports that similar strip-club outings and other various setup attempts, or frame jobs with a disinformation campaign and encounters occurred during his years at Southern Oregon State College in 1991 and the University of Colorado around 1993 – 1997. Individuals connected to these events allegedly included an Alaskan exchange student, Eric Christianson, members or associates of law enforcement in Oregon and San Diego, and Russian exchange student Val Morozov. Perelman identifies the repetition of these encounters across different schools, states, Businesses, Colleges, and social groups as evidence of a broader and continuing connected pattern to remove from society rather than unrelated social events with these illegal Police operations.

That documented comparison should have caused Franklin to investigate:

  • Dinse’s participation in Facebook and neighborhood groups;
  • communications with restaurant personnel and nearby residents;
  • online posts concerning Perelman;
  • private subgroup communications;
  • photographs and personal information being distributed across enormous circles;
  • racial, mental-health, or dangerousness labels;
  • whether complaints were independently created or coordinated;
  • whether police directed residents to generate repeated calls;
  • whether businesses were encouraged to confront or exclude Perelman; and
  • whether the five counts were connected to a broader police-and-community operation.

Franklin apparently investigated none of it.

The Five Counts

Los Angeles Superior Court case No. 3PY03498 contained five counts.

Count 1 — Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.18(d)

This was a sidewalk-related charge.

Perelman was sitting with a small protest sign on a quiet public sidewalk. The photograph does not show an encampment or blocked pedestrian route. The available record does not identify anyone prevented from passing.

The sign communicated a protest message. Using a sidewalk ordinance selectively to suppress that message or retaliate against Perelman for criticizing a business or police officer, especially within self-defense to try to dissolve huge, coordinated stalking groups would raise First Amendment concerns.

Count 1 was connected to the later no-contest plea and conditional resolution. It was dismissed on September 26, 2014, in furtherance of justice under Penal Code § 1385.

Count 2 — Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.18(a)

This was a second sidewalk-related count arising from the same basic encounter.

Rather than documenting distinct dangerous conduct, the two municipal counts multiplied one peaceful incident into separate criminal accusations.

Count 2 was dismissed on September 26, 2013, under Penal Code § 1385.

Count 3 — Penal Code § 602(k): Trespass

This count alleged refusal to leave property after being requested to leave.

That event did not occur as charged. Perelman was outside on the public sidewalk when Jensen and Dinse contacted him. During his earlier restaurant visit, he entered as a customer, ate, paid, and left. He was never told he was forbidden from entering.

A trespass conviction would have required evidence of proper notice, Perelman’s actual location, a request to leave, his knowledge of that request, and a willful refusal. Those facts were not established at trial because no trial occurred.

Count 3 was dismissed on September 26, 2013, under Penal Code § 1385.

More troubling is the recurring pattern Perelman reports across businesses throughout the United States: employees initially welcome him inside and allow him to make a purchase, but then allegedly begin a sustained sequence of instigations, provocations, and confrontational interactions intended to produce a reaction before contacting the police. Perelman identifies the repetition of this sequence across numerous unrelated locations from the majority of places he goes to, as evidence of a coordinated pattern and motive, rather than isolated customer disputes. He connects these practices to police-connected operations involving LAPD Officer Charles Sean Dinse and earlier individuals associated with law enforcement, including Paul Humphry beginning around 1998 and Michael Patrick Huntley, whom Perelman had known since approximately age fourteen. Perelman maintains that these recurring tactics have been used in changing forms since childhood to generate adverse reports, manufacture the appearance of instability or criminal conduct, and ultimately remove him from public life and society.

Count 4 — Penal Code § 242: Battery

This count reportedly arose from Black employee Alexandra Derse’s accusation that Perelman threw a business card or piece of paper at someone.

Perelman states that the event did not occur. Even apart from that factual dispute, the account transformed an alleged business card into an absurd assault narrative without meaningful evidence of injury, danger, force, or harmful contact.

A paper object can theoretically support a battery allegation if intentionally used to make harmful or offensive contact. The prosecution must still prove that the event happened, that contact was intentional, and that the complaining witness’s account was reliable.

No jury tested Derse’s allegation. Franklin should have obtained surveillance footage, interviewed witnesses, examined inconsistencies, and investigated Derse’s communications with restaurant employees, Jensen, Dinse, internet groups, and other participants.

Ariana, a black girl, initially contacted Perelman through MySpace.com and asked him to photograph her. Perelman agreed, and the resulting creative work included a staged photograph of Ariana in the photoshoot she wanted to do, who is Black, posed on a chessboard. Perelman reports that harassment, threats, and coordinated group activity directed at him intensified after the photo shoot, as well as her showing hostility towards Kevin afterwards on Myspace.com and that images from the session were subsequently circulated, reinterpreted, and used to construct hostile narratives about him. While adding them to the changing accusations and narratives to these mass groups since early childhood. Because Derse’s allegations arose within this broader context, including Kevin’s reported racial threats with conspiring businesses, reversed accusations of racism, and the manipulation of the context of Perelman’s artwork, the defense should have investigated whether communications concerning Ariana or the circulated photographs supplied a motive for false or exaggerated accusations. Derse’s race alone would not establish racial hostility or motive; that would need to be demonstrated through specific statements, communications, conduct, timing, and connections among the participants. Especially with nonstop 49 year rotating coordinated conspiring groups that has never stopped.

Count 4 was dismissed on September 26, 2013, under Penal Code § 1385.

Count 5 — Penal Code § 602(k): Second Trespass

The filing contained a second charge under the same trespass statute.

Two trespass counts required two legally and factually distinct violations. Each count required its own date, notice, request to leave, willful refusal, and supporting evidence. An officer could not convert an unsupported statement that someone appeared at a restaurant more than once into multiple criminal trespasses. Especially if they welcome the victim in, and fabricate lies with LAPD, which is a common nonstop pattern of behavior with LAPD, and these Public Businesses before Kevin Perelman even walks in the door for the first time. Showing that the anonymous employees know who Kevin Perelman before he enters almost any location, in which Charles Sean Dinse, and others at LAPD deny is happening and state is supposedly mental illness. Stating HATE INFORMATION across the Internet is not possible, while Charles Sean Dinse posts disinformation about Kevin Perelman on his facebook account and other Internet Blogs Forums.  The very crime Charles Sean Dinse was sued for.

Perelman ate, paid, and left. He was never told not to return. When contacted by police, he was outside on a public sidewalk.

Count 5 was dismissed on September 26, 2014, under Penal Code § 1385.

All Five Counts Were Dismissed

The court record shows:

  • Count 1 — dismissed September 26, 2014;
  • Count 2 — dismissed September 26, 2013;
  • Count 3 — dismissed September 26, 2013;
  • Count 4 — dismissed September 26, 2013; and
  • Count 5 — dismissed September 26, 2014.

As of 2026, none of the five counts remains an active conviction.

That does not automatically erase every historical police report, plea entry, CAMP record, or database notation created during the case. Which seems to be the their real MOTIVE. It does mean that the final disposition of every count is dismissal.

Any later officer, prosecutor, probation official, attorney, judge, or evaluator relying on this matter must disclose that all five charges were dismissed.

Franklin’s Refusal to Challenge Police

Franklin’s reported statement—“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer”—was incompatible with the defense the case required.

The disputed issues concerned police and witness conduct:

  • whether Jensen retaliated after the badge-number request;
  • whether Jensen and Dinse accurately described the sidewalk;
  • whether anyone was obstructed;
  • whether Perelman was ever ordered to leave restaurant property;
  • whether two distinct trespasses occurred;
  • whether Derse’s business-card accusation was true;
  • whether charges were expanded after Perelman protested;
  • whether Dinse communicated with neighborhood or business groups;
  • whether police circulated mental-health or dangerousness labels;
  • whether racial narratives or artwork were being distributed;
  • whether the citation suppressed protected expression; and
  • whether five counts were used to manufacture an appearance of instability.

Franklin allegedly failed to:

  • obtain complete police and investigative reports;
  • demand dispatch and call records;
  • obtain restaurant surveillance;
  • interview material witnesses;
  • investigate Derse’s motive and communications;
  • inspect the locations of the sidewalk and restaurant;
  • document the absence of an obstruction;
  • investigate Jensen’s and Dinse’s histories;
  • investigate Dinse’s community-group activity;
  • identify the origin of the racial and mental-health narratives which actually link to 1980 and Kevin Perelman kissing a black girl at sunny skies day camp, and the Perelman families hostility over the harmless event using their psychology degrees with their police and judicial friends with Paul Humphrey as weapons to lash out in anger and rage over a normal situation of warmth.;
  • challenge the multiplication of one event into five counts;
  • explain CAMP adequately;
  • preserve the complete plea terms; and
  • ensure that the court accurately understood Perelman’s civil-rights concerns.

Instead, Franklin moved the case toward a plea while insulating the police narrative from meaningful scrutiny.

CAMP Was Not Properly Explained

The transcript indicates that the resolution involved CAMP—the LAPD Case Assessment and Management Program.

CAMP operates within LAPD’s Mental Evaluation Unit. LAPD materials describe it as a program pairing detectives with mental-health professionals to identify, monitor, engage, and manage people believed to have recurring contacts involving possible mental-health concerns.

CAMP may collect or use:

  • police reports;
  • Mental Evaluation Incident Reports;
  • calls for service;
  • officer observations;
  • statements from family members;
  • information from neighbors and community members;
  • available hospital or treatment information;
  • prior police contacts;
  • investigative reports;
  • referrals from officers or clinicians; and
  • information from later encounters.

A later LAPD outline stated that CAMP “cases never close.” That description raises an important question: did the 2013 agreement create an open-ended police and mental-health intelligence file that continued after all five charges were dismissed?

The ordinary Tahl waiver did not clearly explain:

  • what CAMP meant;
  • what information could be collected;
  • who could provide information;
  • whether neighbors or businesses could be contacted;
  • whether family members could be interviewed;
  • whether records could be retained indefinitely;
  • whether participation was voluntary;
  • whether consent could be withdrawn;
  • whether CAMP continued after dismissal;
  • whether information could be disclosed to other agencies; or
  • whether future police contacts would be added.

The transcript refers to a “second sheet,” but that sheet is missing from the available records.

If that sheet contained the CAMP terms, its absence is material. A person cannot knowingly accept an arrangement whose central conditions were not explained or provided to him.

Judge Shellie Samuels and the “Rest of Your Life” Exchange

The March 26, 2014 transcript contains this exchange:

THE COURT: Can you do it for 12 months?

THE DEFENDANT: [Nods.]

THE COURT: Can you then do it for the rest of your life?

THE DEFENDANT: Do I have civil rights to make that decision?

THE COURT: No, you don’t have civil rights to break the law.

THE DEFENDANT: For the year.

Perelman’s reference to civil rights was not an admission that he intended to commit crimes. It reflected concern that compliance could not require surrendering constitutional rights or silently accepting unlawful police activity.

Samuels immediately reframed that concern as though Perelman claimed a “civil right to break the law.” That was not what he said.

The phrase “for the rest of your life” is unexplained. It could have concerned obeying laws generally, continuing treatment, cooperating with CAMP, avoiding locations, or maintaining an undefined behavioral condition. Without the preceding discussion and missing second sheet, its meaning cannot safely be assumed.

If Samuels was referring to CAMP or continuing mental-health monitoring, a lifetime arrangement could not properly be imposed through an ambiguous exchange without explaining the monitoring, information collection, disclosure, and duration.

The fragment does not prove that Samuels ordered lifetime CAMP participation. It demonstrates why the complete transcript and missing paperwork are indispensable.

Promised LAPD Assistance That Disappeared

The arrangement was presented as though LAPD would work with Perelman regarding the conduct he had been reporting.

That assistance lasted approximately one telephone call—or, at most, a very small number of dismissive contacts. LAPD did not meaningfully investigate the businesses, neighborhood groups, racial threats, online communications, provocations, artwork-related defamation, or police-connected activity.

No safety plan emerged. No investigation was disclosed. No officer appears to have determined whether community participants were provoking encounters or supplying false reports.

The promised assistance operated as an inducement: accept the arrangement and LAPD will finally examine what is happening.

Once the plea was obtained, the cooperation disappeared.

If police assistance was material to Perelman’s decision, Franklin had a duty to make the promise written, specific, enforceable, and part of the official record.

The Risk of a Self-Reinforcing CAMP File

CAMP creates a particular danger when its original police narrative is disputed.

An officer or neighbor labels someone unstable. CAMP records the allegation. Later officers see a mental-health history and interpret ordinary frustration through that lens. Their observations are added to the file. Community members learn police consider the person a concern and submit additional reports. The growing number of contacts is then cited as proof that the original label was correct.

The allegation becomes the premise, the premise becomes the psychiatric label, and the label becomes the asserted justification for additional monitoring, disbelief, exclusion, treatment, medication, institutionalization, or punishment.

Every entry therefore requires examination:

  • Who supplied the information?
  • Was it firsthand?
  • Was it corroborated?
  • Did it originate with Dinse, Jensen, Derse, restaurant personnel, family members, or neighborhood groups?
  • Were racial threats and provocations omitted while reactions were recorded?
  • Was disputed information marked as disputed?
  • Were dismissed charges still described as criminal conduct?
  • Did CAMP retain information after dismissal?
  • Was information distributed to later officers, prosecutors, probation officials, or evaluators?

Without the CAMP file, those questions remain unanswered.

Potential Professional Misconduct

Franklin’s actions require examination under duties of competence, loyalty, communication, investigation, and informed consent.

Potential issues include:

  • failure to communicate material plea terms;
  • failure to explain CAMP;
  • failure to obtain informed consent;
  • failure to preserve the complete agreement;
  • failure to investigate exculpatory evidence;
  • failure to challenge materially false police accounts;
  • failure to impeach adverse witnesses;
  • failure to investigate coordinated internet communications;
  • failure to investigate racial threats and manipulated artwork;
  • failure to identify conflicts of interest;
  • failure to correct the court’s mischaracterization of Perelman’s statement;
  • inducing a plea without enforceable police assistance; and
  • placing institutional loyalty to police above the client’s defense.

Depending on the evidence, these matters could implicate California Business and Professions Code §§ 6068 and 6106, Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 1.7, ineffective-assistance principles, and the requirement that a plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under Boykin-Tahl.

Records Required for Reconstruction

A complete investigation requires:

  1. Every 2013 and 2014 transcript.
  2. The complete context of the “rest of your life” exchange.
  3. The missing second sheet.
  4. Every CAMP referral, assessment, case-management record, and status entry.
  5. Mental Evaluation Incident Reports.
  6. MEU investigative reports.
  7. The prosecution’s complete file.
  8. LAPD dispatch audio and calls for service.
  9. Jensen’s and Dinse’s notes and reports.
  10. Body-camera, dash-camera, or station recordings.
  11. Restaurant surveillance.
  12. Derse’s original statements.
  13. Communications among Derse, restaurant personnel, Jensen, and Dinse.
  14. Dinse’s neighborhood-group and Facebook communications.
  15. Posts or messages concerning Perelman’s artwork.
  16. Communications involving the Ariana photo shoot.
  17. Records documenting the reported racial threats.
  18. Police intelligence or officer-safety bulletins.
  19. Documents showing whether CAMP continued after September 2014.
  20. Franklin’s complete client file and investigative records.

Why the Dismissed Case Still Matters

The charges were dismissed, but the institutional narrative not only survived but is being used as a weapon to illegal defame all across the United States, and World to rile the masses against Kevin Perelman. As they have been doing since he was a young child. While telling Kevin Perelman, no one knows of him and he’s imagining it.

This reinforces Michael Patrick Huntley’s death threats in 2001 “World of Paranoia”.

Disseminating nonstop worldwide disinformation and defamation of character while refusal to acknowledge the situation by design to use information to Insite worldwide riots to make people look unstable to remove from society. As they create newer and newer narratives until the target, and victim is no more.

Police reports, CAMP entries, witness allegations, court comments, racialized narratives, and undisclosed mental-health labels can influence later officers, prosecutors, probation departments, judges, and experts even when the charges that created them no longer exist.

The danger is circular:

  1. Community members provoke or report the selected person.
  2. Police omit the provocations and document the reaction.
  3. Police and Judicial Employees lie stating nothing is going on with refusal to investigate what they already know is going on.
  4. CAMP retains the resulting allegation.
  5. Later officers encounter the historical label.
  6. New contacts are interpreted through that label.
  7. Later prosecutors and judges cite the accumulated contacts.
  8. The record becomes “proof” of the accusation that generated it.

The number of reports does not prove their truth when they may share a common source, online network, police contact, or coordinated narrative.

Conclusion

The 2013 case was not five proven criminal acts. It was one sidewalk encounter expanded into five counts:

  • two overlapping sidewalk charges;
  • two unsupported trespass charges; and
  • one disputed business-card battery allegation.

Perelman entered the restaurant as a customer, ate, paid, and left. He was not told that he was prohibited from entering. When Jensen and Dinse contacted him, he was outside on a public sidewalk with a small sign stating “Smeared for Creating Art” or “Smeared for Making Art.” He was not operating an encampment or blocking pedestrians.

He was as nice as can be and accepting to the employee’s met with hostility anger, and rage just like he always is.

The protest arose from a much broader alleged history of provocations, internet-based disinformation, racial threats, manipulated artwork, and recurring conduct across numerous businesses and public locations. That history included the reported “No relaxing for you, nigger” death threat and the circulation or distortion of artwork such as the Ariana chessboard photo shoot.

No individual’s race proves motive. Motive must be established through statements, actions, communications, repetition, and relationships. Franklin’s duty was to investigate that evidence rather than refuse to challenge police.

The encounter escalated after Perelman asked Jensen for his badge number and questioned the officer’s indifference to the reported instigations. This also shows Dinse, and Jenson had motive since day one. And since 2009 when Topanga division community policing police station was built.

Franklin’s statement—“I won’t say anything bad about a police officer”—protected Jensen’s and Dinse’s accounts from scrutiny, left Derse’s allegation untested, ignored the larger network, and moved Perelman into an inadequately disclosed CAMP arrangement.

The later federal civil-rights lawsuit by Rex Schellenberg supplied a documented parallel: another person accused Dinse of using internet-connected neighborhood groups to distribute personal information and unsupported mental-health or drug allegations, direct community attention toward a selected individual, and generate continuing police action.

All five counts were ultimately dismissed. What remains unresolved is what reports, labels, CAMP entries, and police intelligence survived; who continued using them; and whether the 2013 case became a foundation for later attempts to portray Perelman as mentally unstable rather than investigate the conduct he reported.

The case matters not because of its comparatively minor charges—all of which were ultimately dismissed—but because it provides an early documented view of the alleged method: repeated provocation, stacked accusations, police intervention, undisclosed mental-health case management, and the conversion of reported civil-rights concerns into suggestions of criminality or instability. Perelman maintains that the 2013 proceeding reinforces a broader pattern dating to approximately 1977—a pattern that has continued for forty-nine years, expanded exponentially through police-connected and community networks, and grown progressively more intrusive, aggressive, and dangerous.

Provoke the person. Conceal the provocation. Manufacture or exaggerate the reaction. Multiply the accusations. Refuse to investigate the underlying misconduct. Attach a psychiatric narrative as cover ups. Preserve the resulting institutional record for future use.

That is the pattern requiring disclosure, independent investigation, and judicial review.

LEGAL ADDENDUM

Potentially Implicated Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Professional Duties

This appendix is an issue-spotting reference, not a finding that any person committed a crime or is civilly liable. Each provision has distinct elements, defenses, immunities, limitation periods, and proof requirements. Criminal statutes generally do not create a private right to prosecute; charging decisions belong to authorized prosecutors. The provisions below become relevant only if admissible evidence establishes the required conduct, intent, causation, state action, injury, or agreement.

A. Statutes and Ordinances Appearing in the 2013 Case Record

  • Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18(d) — the count to which a temporary no-contest plea was entered on September 26, 2013. The plea and resulting finding were withdrawn and vacated on September 26, 2014, and the count was dismissed under Penal Code §1385.
  • Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.18(a) — count 2; dismissed under Penal Code §1385 on September 26, 2013.
  • California Penal Code §602(k) — trespass by entering land to interfere with or injure a lawful business or occupation; charged as counts 3 and 5. Count 3 was dismissed September 26, 2013, and count 5 was dismissed September 26, 2014.
  • California Penal Code §242 — simple battery; charged as count 4 and dismissed September 26, 2013.
  • California Penal Code §977 — permitted counsel to appear for Perelman in his absence at the August 19, 2013 misdemeanor proceeding, when counts 3 through 5 were added.
  • California Penal Code §1385 — dismissal in furtherance of justice. Every count was ultimately dismissed under this section.

B. Federal Constitutional Rights Potentially Implicated

  • First Amendment — speech, peaceful protest, petitioning government, requesting police assistance, criticizing public officials, and protection against governmental retaliation for protected expression.
  • Fourth Amendment — protection against unreasonable searches, seizures, arrests, prolonged detention, and certain forms of government-directed surveillance.
  • Fifth Amendment — privilege against compelled self-incrimination and federal due process. In state proceedings, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates applicable protections.
  • Sixth Amendment — effective assistance of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, compulsory process, notice of accusations, and a fair criminal proceeding.
  • Fourteenth Amendment — procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and incorporation of fundamental protections against state and local officials.
  • California Constitution, article I, §§1, 2, 7, 13 and 15 — state protections for privacy; speech; due process and equal protection; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and rights of criminal defendants.

C. Federal Civil-Rights Statutes

  • 42 U.S.C. §1983 — civil remedy against a person acting under color of state law who causes the deprivation of a federal right. Municipal liability requires proof of an official policy, custom, practice, deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise, or action by a final policymaker; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.
  • 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) — conspiracy to deprive equal protection or equal privileges, generally requiring a qualifying class-based discriminatory animus and an overt act causing injury.
  • 42 U.S.C. §1986 — potential liability for a person who knew of a qualifying §1985 conspiracy, had power to prevent or aid in preventing it, and neglected or refused to do so. It depends on a valid §1985 claim and has its own short limitation period.
  • 42 U.S.C. §1988 — governs aspects of civil-rights remedies, including potential attorney-fee awards in qualifying federal civil-rights litigation.

D. Federal Criminal Statutes That May Require Government Investigation

  • 18 U.S.C. §241 — conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate a person in the free exercise or enjoyment of federal rights.
  • 18 U.S.C. §242 — willful deprivation of federal rights under color of law.
  • 18 U.S.C. §1512(b) and (c) — witness tampering and corrupt obstruction involving testimony, evidence, or an official proceeding, if the federal jurisdictional and intent requirements are met.
  • 18 U.S.C. §1519 — knowingly altering, destroying, concealing, or falsifying a record with intent to impede or influence a matter within federal jurisdiction or in relation to such a matter.
  • 18 U.S.C. §2261A — certain interstate or electronic stalking conduct undertaken with the statutorily required intent and causing the specified fear or substantial emotional distress.
  • 18 U.S.C. §§2511 and 2520 — unlawful interception, use, or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications, together with a potential civil remedy, subject to consent, law-enforcement, provider, and other statutory exceptions.
  • 18 U.S.C. §§2701 and 2707 — unauthorized access to stored electronic communications and a potential civil remedy, subject to statutory authorization and provider exceptions.

The federal criminal provisions above ordinarily do not authorize a private criminal prosecution. Their inclusion identifies possible referral issues, not established offenses.

E. California Criminal Statutes Potentially Implicated by Proven Fabrication, Concealment, Retaliation, or Coordinated Misconduct

  • Penal Code §118 — perjury in a legally qualifying sworn statement, requiring willful material falsity and the other statutory elements.
  • Penal Code §132 — offering as genuine a fraudulently altered or forged document or other evidence in a proceeding or authorized inquiry.
  • Penal Code §134 — preparing false or antedated evidence with fraudulent intent to produce it as genuine in a proceeding or authorized inquiry.
  • Penal Code §135 — willful destruction or concealment of evidence when a person knows it is about to be produced in an authorized proceeding or inquiry.
  • Penal Code §141 — knowingly planting, tampering with, or fraudulently altering physical evidence to cause another person to be charged or to affect a legal proceeding; enhanced consequences can apply to peace officers.
  • Penal Code §148.5 — knowingly making a false report that a felony or misdemeanor was committed to a peace officer or other listed recipient.
  • Penal Code §182 — criminal conspiracy, requiring an agreement to commit a qualifying offense and, for most subdivisions, an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.
  • Penal Code §236 — false imprisonment, potentially relevant to an unlawful detention or restraint proved to lack lawful authority.
  • Penal Code §422 — criminal threats, requiring proof of the statute’s specific language, intent, unequivocality, immediacy, gravity, and sustained-fear elements.
  • Penal Code §422.6 — willful interference with another person’s civil rights by force or threat of force because of an actual or perceived protected characteristic.
  • Penal Code §646.9 — stalking, requiring repeated following or harassment plus a credible threat and the required intent.
  • Penal Code §136.1 — preventing or dissuading a victim or witness from reporting, assisting, testifying, or attending proceedings, including specified attempts to do so.
  • Government Code §6200 — theft, removal, destruction, mutilation, alteration, or falsification of public records by an officer having custody of them, subject to the statute’s precise requirements.
  • Penal Code §§630–638.55, including §§631, 632 and 637.2 — California’s Invasion of Privacy Act, governing interception and recording of communications and providing a civil remedy in qualifying cases, subject to consent and statutory exceptions.

F. California Civil Statutes and Causes of Action Potentially Implicated

  • Civil Code §51.7 (Ralph Civil Rights Act) — freedom from violence or intimidation by threat of violence because of specified protected characteristics, including race, religion, ancestry, disability, and other listed classifications.
  • Civil Code §52.1 (Bane Civil Rights Act) — civil relief for interference, or attempted interference, by threat, intimidation, or coercion with rights secured by federal or California law. The required coercion and specific intent depend on the claim and governing case law.
  • Civil Code §1708.7 — civil stalking cause of action when its detailed course-of-conduct, threat, fear, and intent requirements are satisfied.
  • Civil Code §§44–46 — statutory framework for defamation, including libel and slander, subject to falsity, publication, fault, privilege, damages, and limitation defenses.
  • Civil Code §52.3 — equitable and declaratory relief concerning a governmental authority’s pattern or practice of conduct by law-enforcement officers that deprives rights, within the statute’s authorized enforcement structure.
  • Common-law false arrest and false imprisonment — potentially applicable to an unlawful arrest or detention, subject to probable cause, privilege, immunity, claim-presentation rules, and limitation periods.
  • Common-law malicious prosecution — generally requires favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and resulting damage; prosecutorial, judicial, and other immunities may limit defendants or theories.
  • Negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress — possible state-law theories only when all elements, duties, causation, damages, immunities, and Government Claims Act requirements are met.

G. Police Records, Complaints, and Disclosure Duties

  • Penal Code §832.5 — requires agencies employing peace officers to establish procedures for investigating public complaints and to make written complaint procedures available.
  • Penal Code §§832.7 and 832.8 — govern confidentiality and disclosure of peace-officer personnel records, including statutorily public categories of specified misconduct records.
  • Evidence Code §§1043–1047 — procedures and protections governing Pitchess discovery of peace-officer personnel records.
  • California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000 et seq. — establishes public access to state and local records, subject to exemptions, privileges, confidentiality rules, retention realities, and judicial remedies.
  • Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, and California Penal Code §1054.1 — require disclosure of qualifying exculpatory and impeachment information in criminal proceedings. The precise duty depends on possession, materiality, timing, and the prosecution team’s access or constructive knowledge.

H. Duties Potentially Applicable to Defense Counsel and Prosecutors

For conduct occurring in 2013–2014, the professional rules then in effect must be used. Current rules may describe continuing or later duties but should not be applied retroactively without legal analysis.

  • Business and Professions Code §6068(a), (c), (d), (m) and (o) — duties to support the law; counsel or maintain only legal or just proceedings; employ truthful means; keep clients reasonably informed; and report specified disciplinary events.
  • Business and Professions Code §6106 — discipline for acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, whether committed in the course of the attorney-client relationship or otherwise.
  • Former California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110 — duty not to intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
  • Former Rule 3-500 — duty to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
  • Former Rule 5-200 — duties of an attorney presenting a matter to a tribunal, including truthful presentation and not misleading the court by artifice or false statement; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
  • Former Rule 5-220 — prohibition against suppressing evidence that the lawyer or client had a legal obligation to reveal or produce; applicable to the 2013–2014 period.
  • Current Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 — competence, diligence, and communication.
  • Current Rule 1.7 — conflicts of interest involving significant risk that representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s interests or duties to others, subject to informed written consent where permitted.
  • Current Rules 3.3 and 3.4 — candor toward the tribunal and fairness to opposing parties and counsel.
  • Current Rule 3.8 — prosecutors’ special responsibilities, including disclosure obligations and duties concerning evidence that may negate guilt or mitigate an offense or sentence.
  • Current Rule 8.4 — professional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, reckless or intentional misrepresentation, prejudice to the administration of justice, or knowingly assisting improper judicial conduct.

A professional-rule violation is primarily a disciplinary issue and does not automatically create a civil cause of action or prove ineffective assistance. A Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claim is governed by Strickland v. Washington and requires both constitutionally deficient performance and resulting prejudice, subject to doctrine specific to pleas and later proceedings.

I. Judicial Conduct and Due Process

  • California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 1, 2 and 3 — judicial integrity and independence; avoidance of impropriety and its appearance; impartial, competent, diligent, patient, dignified, and fair performance of judicial duties; and the obligation to give parties the right to be heard according to law.
  • Federal and state due-process principles concerning judicial bias — require a neutral decision-maker. Adverse rulings or sharp remarks alone ordinarily do not establish unconstitutional bias; the full context, source of alleged bias, and objective risk of actual bias matter.
  • California Code of Civil Procedure §170.1 — identifies circumstances requiring disqualification of a California judge, including specified interests, relationships, knowledge, and situations in which a reasonable person aware of the facts might doubt impartiality.

J. Proof and Preservation Questions for Counsel

Before alleging any particular violation, counsel should identify:

  • The exact actor, date, statement, act, and legal duty.
  • Whether the actor was a government official, private person, attorney, witness, contractor, or alleged joint participant.
  • The original recording, report, metadata, dispatch record, court filing, transcript, or authenticated communication proving the act.
  • The required mental state: knowledge, willfulness, malice, fraudulent intent, discriminatory animus, specific intent, or deliberate indifference.
  • The injury and causal connection to the actor’s conduct.
  • Any warrant, consent, privilege, immunity, statutory authorization, or good-faith defense.
  • Applicable administrative exhaustion, Government Claims Act presentation, preservation, and statute-of-limitations requirements.
  • Whether a criminal statute supplies only a referral basis or also permits a private civil remedy.

This appendix should therefore be used as a structured checklist for investigation, record requests, attorney review, and amendment after evidence is authenticated—not as a substitute for matching proven facts to every statutory element.

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